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11 Introduction and framework of study
1.1 Aim of this work and central questions
Many now argue that for-profit hospital ownership is on the rise because of the 
retrenchment of public entitlements and – often more importantly in health care 
– pro-market reforms in the delivery of these services1. Most theoretical notions 
assume that for-profit hospitals are more efficient than nonprofit and public hos-
pitals2. It is thought that the inclusion of for-profits in the mainstream health care 
delivery system may increase efficiency or lower costs3. Issues and ideas around 
ownership are central in the public arena and for-profit hospital care has thus 
become the subject of fierce debate. Much of this discourse centers on the ques-
tion whether health care differs fundamentally from other services, and should 
thus be sheltered from market forces4. Opponents of for-profit hospitals fear 
restricted access for those unable to pay, lower quality of care, cherry-picking of 
profitable services and patients, and excessive management interference in clinical 
autonomy. Proponents, on the other hand, believe that for-profits can bring about 
higher levels of efficiency and are more responsive to patient demands.
The claims surrounding for-profit hospital care have already been examined 
thoroughly, but primarily in the US. A broad body of literature exists which seeks 
to compare the performance of for-profit hospitals with nonprofit and public 
hospitals. A possible superior performance of for-profit hospitals compared to 
their public and nonprofit competitors may encourage their growth. However, 
differences regarding costs, charges, the quality of the care provided, as well as 
the access available to those in need to hospitals, have varied across these studies.
A meta-review by Mark Schlesinger and Bradford Gray (2006) found a nonprofit 
advantage or no significant performance differences in 179 out of 220 comparisons5. 
Wörz (2008) concludes that there is no definitive proof that for-profit hospitals in 
the US are more cost-efficient, but there is proof that they do often charge higher 
rates to payers, raising significant political questions. However, there still seem 
to be some methodological problems to be resolved. Wörz found only seventeen 
studies that contained adjustments for case-mix, chain-ownership, and the level 
of competition (market share): nine studies showed no significant differences be-
tween for-profits and nonprofits, for-profits turned out to be more efficient in five 
studies and nonprofits in three6. These conclusions may be applicable to other 
countries as well.7 Appendix 1.1 provides a more detailed empirical overview of 
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the effects of ownership on hospital performance. On the basis of these reviews, 
the academic case for for-profit ownership would seem limited.
Economic calculation of costs and benefits, gains and losses, and trade-offs 
provides no direct answers if one wishes to explore and explain the growth (and 
variations in the growth) of for-profit hospitals. To discover which factors actually 
foster or hinder the development of the for-profit hospital sector requires a differ-
ent approach. A quick glance at the available statistics tells us that: 1) the actual 
market share of for-profit hospitals varies greatly between Western countries; 2) 
the market share of for-profit hospitals has increased in certain countries over the 
last few decades; and, 3) in many countries for-profit providers have existed for 
some considerable time. A longitudinal and historical perspective is thus required 
in order to understand this subject fully.
The central purpose of this study is to provide an international comparison and 
historical explanation of the development of for-profit hospital care. I will seek to 
answer the following questions. 1) How did for-profit hospital ownership actually 
develop within the context of different Western health care systems? 2) How can 
one understand and explain growth (and decline) in for-profit hospitals over the 
long term? 3) Why does the development of the for-profit hospital sector differ 
between Western countries? This research will look for plausible answers to these 
three questions and provide hypotheses for future study. Such work is still uncom-
mon and limited to shorter periods or tends to be somewhat polemical in nature8.
Scholarly efforts have concentrated on the development of the much larger 
nonprofit and public hospital sectors or have sought to provide more general 
overviews9. A comparative perspective on the development of for-profit hospitals 
is – with the exception of explorative work of Henry Burdett in the nineteenth 
century (1895) – still lacking to my knowledge. A specific theory concerning (the 
development of) for-profit hospitals is similarly lacking, excluding standard theo-
ries of the firm. Paul Feldstein elaborates a standard profit-maximizing model of 
hospital behavior, but concludes that the behavior observed clearly diverges from 
this model10. This would seem to indicate the existence of strong constraints in 
the hospital sector. Although nonprofit hospitals have been studied in depth, a 
broadly accepted theory concerning their existence and behavior has also yet to 
be developed11.
The remainder of this chapter deals with the framework used for this study. First, 
a working definition of for-profit ownership in hospital care is presented. What is 
a for-profit hospital and how should we interpret ownership rights? This section 
also includes an overview of the different terms that I use in this study (section 
1.2). Section 1.3 contains a short introduction of the various theories regarding 
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hospital ownership. Section 1.4 sets out the method of analysis and justifies the 
choice of an inductive research methodology. I also discuss how I organized and 
structured the different empirical data and their analyses. Then, I will discuss the 
selection of the countries that are studied, the kind of hospitals included in this 
work, and the time period covered (section 1.5). The chapter ends with a summary 
of the structure and organization of this book (section 1.6).
1.2 For-profit ownership in hospital care
This section summarizes the different terminologies that are used in the empiri-
cal chapters, their connotations and the importance of the actual enforcement of 
ownership rights. As a general rule, essential ownership rights do not change over 
time, but it is important to note that such rights are not absolute. The degree to 
which ownership rights can be exercised depends on a variety of constraints. To il-
lustrate this point, the fact that one owns all the shares of a hospital does not mean 
that one can ignore professional ethics, disobey regulations governing hygiene, or 
avoid paying property taxes. The actual discretionary powers of ownership are, in 
reality, somewhat limited. In other words, there is a difference between the formal 
control and effective control of hospitals. Ultimately, the one with the ‘broadest 
bundle of enforceable rights’ can be seen as the material owner,12 but the precise 
scope of such a bundle of enforceable rights may fluctuate over time, depending 
on changes in constraints. As a result, a for-profit hospital may act very much like 
a nonprofit clinic in some cases, or nonprofit hospitals may resemble for-profits in 
disguise.
For-profit, nonprofit, and public hospital ownership: formal definitions and 
categorizations
The ownership of the classic for-profit firm, and thus of the for-profit hospital, 
can be defined by the possession of ‘a bundle of proprietary rights’ that represents 
formal control of the firm. These proprietary rights include: 1) the right to receive 
the residual, after all other payments to which the firm is contractually committed, 
such as wages, interest payments, and prices for supplies (residual claimancy); 2) 
the right, however qualified, to terminate or revise the ownership of the firm; and 
3) the right to sell the rights specified in the preceding two points13. It is beyond 
the scope of this study to take account of all the subtleties of corporate law that may 
differ between individual countries or over time. However, such differences seem 
to have diminished over time: ‘most of corporate law has achieved a high degree 
of uniformity across developed market jurisdictions, and continuing convergence 
toward a single, standard model is likely’14.
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The main rationale behind proprietary rights is that owners are motivated to 
seek profits, which can be distributed between them according to their stake in the 
firm. Note that an owner’s stake need not – and frequently does not – be related to 
each owner’s share of capital investment. The standard business corporation can 
be typified as a capital cooperative with one-share-one-vote as the general rule. 
However, in many other cooperatives (dairy or mutual insurance companies, for 
example), the rule is one-member-one-vote, with no adjustments for the volume 
of patronage of the individual members15. In health care, it is often the case that 
physicians who form partnerships or share commonly owned medical facilities 
do not share ownership rights and revenues according to the amount of capital 
invested. In for-profit hospital ownership too, there is a variety of models. On the 
one hand there are small stand-alone facilities that are owned and managed by 
their founders in a trading partnership and may, or may not, seek to obtain maxi-
mum profits. There are also companies with limited liability that shield the owners 
from personal insolvency risks, as well as large incorporated hospital chains that 
aggressively try to maximize profits and sell stock on the exchanges.
Nonprofit firms, in contrast to their for-profit counterparts, do not have formal 
owners. Their defining characteristic is that those who control the nonprofit 
organization – including its members, directors, and officers – are forbidden 
from receiving the organization’s net earnings. Nonprofit firms are allowed to use 
retained earnings (profits) if they choose to, but the distribution of such profits 
to controlling persons is forbidden (non-distribution constraint)16. Nonprofits 
may also own for-profit subsidiaries, and in hospital care increasingly do so for a 
variety of reasons such as ‘commercialization’ or ‘autonomization’17, or simply to 
keep their physicians ‘happy’. However, the returns of such for-profit subsidiaries 
go to the trust according to its stake. The non-distribution constraint implies that 
no clear governance structure exists. The central thread that draws this somewhat 
disparate group together is that these institutions are community-based and are 
mission-driven (as opposed to profit-driven)18. In contrast to most grassroots 
movements, they also have a legal status. Unlike public authorities, nonprofits 
cannot force people to become members of their organization19. Due to their 
weak governance structure and the specific interests of those whom they employ, 
nonprofits often develop into organizations that resemble workers’ cooperatives20. 
In addition, Hansmann points out the difference between ‘donative’ organizations 
and ‘service-oriented’ or ‘commercial’ nonprofits21. The donators often sit on the 
hospital board and influence its day-to-day operations. At the other end of the 
spectrum, ‘commercial’ nonprofits may run many for-profit subsidiaries and ef-
fectively act as for-profits in disguise.
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Public ownership implies that the government is the formal owner of the hos-
pital. Public organizations, like nonprofits, are bound by the non-distribution 
constraint22. However, how the available proprietary rights are used depends on 
the outcome of a political process. Since public hospitals are often owned by local 
authorities, this means local – not national – politics23. Public hospital ownership 
ranges from government bureaus, in which the government is responsible for 
most day-to-day operations and is a form of organization still common in military 
hospitals, towards public corporations, where government involvement is limited 
to a majority shareholder stake24.
It is important to note that the specific language and terminology used often 
tells us something of the specific characteristics of a certain ownership type. This 
becomes more obvious if one looks over a longer period-of-time. Proprietary hos-
pitals become for-profit hospitals, and these may then be called investor-owned 
to further emphasize their focus on profit-maximization. On the other hand, 
voluntary hospitals become nonprofit facilities to underscore their evolution 
from charitable institutions into more service-oriented organizations. Religiously 
affiliated nonprofits have different objectives and governance structures to secular 
nonprofit hospitals. The specific language for such ownership typologies might 
differ between countries and over time. The terminology surrounding ownership 
typologies that is used in the different empirical chapters in this book is sum-
marized in box 1.1.
Ownership: formal and effective control
The literature on ownership indicates that, although owners hold formal control 
rights, they do not necessarily (also) exercise effective control25. The difference 
between formal and effective control indicates the existence of agency problems, 
costs of contracting, and all kinds of legal, political, and social constraints. Formal 
ownership rights are not generally as absolute as the way in which they are formu-
lated would suggest, but are constrained through other institutions26. Therefore, 
the preferred ownership status of a firm depends partially on the actual difference 
between formal and effective control. To gain the benefits of formal control, one 
also has to possess, or be able to contract, effective control. If the constraints on ef-
fective control are excessive, or if the costs of executing ownership rights are high, 
for-profit ownership might not be the preferred mode of organization. In those 
cases, the costs of controlling and contracting might simply exceed any benefits.
The constraints that limit or expand effective control do change over time, as is 
normal with social constructions that are being redefined more or less continuous-
ly27. Sometimes these changes in constraints may be enough to warrant different 
terminology28. For example, ownership in investor-owned firms often becomes so 
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attenuated that those firms come close to being, and behaving like, firms that are 
formally nonprofit29. This has led Evans to suggest labeling proprietary hospitals 
as ‘not-only-for-profit’ firms, because their reliance on physicians compels them 
also to pursue non-pecuniary goals that are important to professionals. If govern-
ments provide benefits to nonprofits, for-profits will have incentives to ‘disguise’ 
themselves as nonprofit firms30. The consequences of the differences between 
Box 1.1 Commonly used terminology regarding hospital ownership in this study
1. For-profit hospitals operate for a profit or a return on investment. They can be stand-
alone hospitals or form a part of a multi-hospital system. The owners have the residual 
claimancy and the right to terminate or revise their ownership rights (all countries).
2. Nonprofit hospitals are hospitals that do not seek an investment profit and cannot dis-
tribute any formal dividends (non-distribution constraint). They are owned by religious 
or other charities and can also be part of a multi-hospital system. Nonprofit hospitals may 
be commercially aware and can focus heavily on trading activities and otherwise use a 
business model resembling that of the for-profit providers (all countries).
3. Public hospitals are (for the main part) owned by municipalities or counties. Some 
hospitals are state property (US, Germany). UK public hospitals have been owned by the 
central government since the creation of the National Health Service (NHS).
4. Proprietary or private hospitals are not owned by a government or charity and are 
characterized by the direct involvement of the owners – often physicians – in daily 
management and operations. They are usually, but not always, for-profit-oriented and 
tend to be small and locally controlled with a straightforward and simple accountability 
structure (all countries).
5. Investor-owned or corporate hospital chains are organizations that own multiple facilities 
whose owners are connected with these facilities only by virtue of holding shares in the 
parent company. Profit making is deeply embedded in the management of these organiza-
tions and in how they maintain access to capital (all countries).
6. Voluntary or charity hospitals refer to nonprofit hospitals with a primary focus on 
charity (all countries).
7. Open-staff hospitals (Belegkrankenhäuser) are small (for-profit) hospitals, which gener-
ally operate in rural surroundings. They do not employ physicians but form a platform 
for ambulatory specialists for surgery and treatment (Germany). For-profit hospitals are 
almost totally open-staff organizations in the US and the UK.
8. Included hospitals (Geförderter or Plankrankenhäuser) own a certificate-of-need license. 
They fall under the hospital plans of German states and have formal access to public 
capital (Germany).
9. Speciality hospitals (Fachkrankenhäuser) specialize in certain procedures and illnesses. 
They are mainly owned by physicians, who see business opportunities. They often concen-
trate on the most lucrative services. For-profit facilities dominate in this category.
10. Independent hospital is a term that is only used in the UK; it refers to hospitals, which 
do not form part (are independent) of the NHS. Independent hospitals can be either 
nonprofit or for-profit facilities.
Introduction and framework of study
7
formal and effective control of the firm are at the heart of many ownership-related 
theories. This is the subject of the next section.
1.3  Theoretical explanations of the prevalence and development of 
for-profit hospitals
The goal of this section is to summarize the main theories regarding hospital own-
ership. This will help to interpret the empirical work of the next chapters. Although 
a general theory on the development of hospital ownership does not exist – and the 
many market failures and institutional constraints in health care seem to prevent 
a straightforward application of the standard theory-of-the-firm – several theories 
can go some way to explaining the prevalence of for-profit and nonprofit hospitals.
The section starts with an introduction of the explanations for the viability and 
growth of for-profit hospitals (section 1.3.1). Next comes the question of why 
nonprofits exist (section 1.3.2). This section ends with the possible deductions we 
can make concerning the development of for-profit hospitals. Because a generally 
accepted theory of the nonprofit hospital, the for-profit hospital and the market 
mix of various types of provider is lacking, these approaches and their deductions 
help primarily to explore and interpret the development of for-profit hospital sec-
tors (section 1.3.3).
1.3.1 Explanations for the viability and growth of for-profit hospitals
The growth of the for-profit hospital sector is based at least partly on the assump-
tion that making a ‘decent’ profit over a long time-period is generally possible 
(although in more mature and declining capital intensive industries, there are 
lock-in effects and exit barriers that ‘force’ unprofitable firms to stay in business). 
A ‘decent’ profit means a ‘decent’ return on invested capital. Thus, a crucial precon-
dition for the viability of for-profit hospitals is that investors expect a long-term 
positive return on their investment that will cover at least the cost of the necessary 
capital31. For investors, the attractiveness of for-profit hospital care depends on the 
expected profit margin (prices minus average costs). This profit margin depends 
on the prices a hospital can charge and on its average production costs.
For-profit hospitals can charge higher prices when they have greater market 
power. The level of this market power depends on the structural characteristics 
of the markets in question. There are a number of important factors in securing 
a high level of market power; these include a concentrated market (due to high 
entrance barriers, for example), high levels of information asymmetry in favor 
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of the hospital (which brings about opportunities for supplier-induced demand 
and up-coding32), and a lack of price-sensitivity on the part of buyers,33 (which 
depends on a well-funded payer system with small levels of uncompensated 
care). Accepted wisdom holds that market failures push up prices and the cost of 
contracting for many stakeholders, particularly patients, governments, and other 
payers.
For-profit hospitals can reduce their production costs by being more efficient or 
improving access to relatively scarce production factors (capital, labor, technol-
ogy). Higher efficiency in for-profit hospitals might be expected on the basis of the 
property-rights theory. Property-rights enable owners to enjoy the yields of their 
property34. The property-rights approach centers on the impact of these rights on 
agent behavior,35 and states that an increase in property rights usually improves 
efficiency. People with more property rights take better care of their assets, which 
increases future revenues. For example, homeowners maintain their dwellings 
better than tenants do. For-profit hospitals are based on more property rights, 
most notably the residual claimancy (see section 1.2), than public or nonprofit 
hospitals, which are bound by non-distribution constraints; for-profit hospitals 
should thus be more efficient. The property-rights school provided much of the 
intellectual impetus for the first phase of welfare state reforms36. Property-right 
theorists defended outright privatizations and the conversion of public services 
to for-profit ownership. Many property-rights theorists were also critical of other 
alternatives, such as the quasi-market approach, since residual claimancy rights 
were often lacking or constrained37. In such cases, society may even be worse off: 
‘you have to introduce more private property-rights to make markets work the 
way you think they should work. Unless you do, you will find that the market 
allocation will also seem to be perverse or deficient’38.
We can split funded hospital capital into equity (stock, venture capital, philan-
thropy, and proprietary investments) and debt capital (bank loans, bonds etc.). To 
gain access to debt capital, a minimal profit margin is necessary to pay off the debt 
as well as to gain credibility from the lenders. Private investors demand a higher 
return on equity than the interest costs on debt capital or treasury bonds. From 
the perspective of a regulator, the price of investor capital to for-profit hospitals is 
generally higher than the costs of mutual bonds or other publicly backed capital 
(see box 1.2). According to property-rights theorists, it is exactly these higher capi-
tal costs that induce for-profit hospitals to behave more efficiently. This (higher) 
price can be attributed directly to actual risks and thus enhance the efficiency of 
hospital operations. Additionally, constraints on public budgets might limit access 
to ‘cheaper’ public capital; such access might also be difficult to obtain, since the 
number of altruists and taxpayers prepared to provide this kind of capital seems 
limited, while for-profit capital is more readily available39. To sum up, property-
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rights theorists state that for-profits have stronger incentives to strive for efficiency 
and will secure the additional capital required to meet the growing demand for 
hospital care if a profitable return can be made.
What does this imply about the presence of the for-profit hospital sector? Hans-
mann states that if we observe that a particular form of ownership is dominant – as 
public and nonprofit hospitals clearly are in health care – this can be perceived as 
a strong indication that these forms are less costly than other forms of ownership 
in that sector40. Indeed, in essence much of the validity of the property-rights 
approach seems to rely upon the existence of perfect competition conditions41. 
However, these conditions typically do not apply to the hospital market. Asym-
metric information and the presence of insurance lead to major failures in market 
mechanisms; a sophisticated regulatory environment to correct such failures 
might be lacking. Prices can be raised above competitive levels, which is often an 
easier and better strategy for maximizing profits than enhancing efficiency42.
Box 1.2 Why hospitals need equity and why for-profit capital is most expensive?
For hospitals, there are serious costs involved in obtaining all the capital they need 
through debt financing. In such cases, hospital administrators seeking returns have both 
the incentive and, because of asymmetric information, the opportunities to divert a share 
of the sums borrowed to themselves. The high asset-specificities of hospital investment 
create incentives for the opportunistic exploitation of the lenders, and do not constitute a 
marketable security.
How can these problems be overcome? The key is a contribution from equity capital as a 
share of the investment costs. According to Hansmann, a substantial contribution from 
equity capital avoids costly negotiations between debt holders and the hospital owners in 
the event of insolvency pressures. This is why banks force owners to provide a substantial 
amount of the capital required to get access to loans.
How can hospitals raise equity capital? For-profit hospitals turn to commercial equity 
markets; nonprofit hospitals raise capital from endowments and voluntary sources; and 
public hospitals rely on tax appropriations. All ownership types may also use retained 
earnings. How can hospitals raise equity capital under the most favorable terms? Capital 
prices are normally substantially higher for investor equity – investors demand a higher 
return on investments because such capital sources constitute the greatest risks in the 
event of insolvency. Nonprofits can access to tax-exempt debt, voluntary sources, and 
endowments. Public hospitals can also borrow at low cost and are shielded by public 
guarantees.
This implies that investor equity is normally more expensive than public or nonprofit 
equity sources, if available. In certain cases, investor financing might be more readily 
available and less cumbersome to manage than debt financing. Higher capital costs also 
form a strong incentive for for-profit hospitals to increase their efficiency since otherwise 
they will lose out in the competition with their public and nonprofit counterparts.
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Nonprofit hospitals may be ‘forced’ to mimic such strategies43 or, as Lawton 
Burns calls it, change from ‘institutions’ towards organizations while becoming 
corporate rationalizers44. If for-profit hospitals take the most profitable patients, 
nonprofits will be bound to lose money and have to move into services that are 
more profitable in order to minimize their losses. As a consequence, nonprofits 
will be induced to behave more like profit seekers in markets with mixed owner-
ship types45. Among other reasons, this might lead governments to step into the 
market and use planning, reimbursement, and tax regulation to favor other types 
of ownership over for-profit hospitals. Such policies may be softened if the level 
of information asymmetry decreases, for example as a result of healthcare reforms 
aiming at quality assurance46.
The presence of (substantial) investment-seeking capital in the health care sec-
tor is not logical a priori. Institutions regulate and constrain the rationale and 
the amount of investor-supplied capital, and such institutions change over time. 
Depending on the specific institutional configuration, entrepreneurs may choose 
not to enter this market at all. In hospital care, the difference between formal and 
effective control (see section 1.2) is often fairly large. Many patients receive treat-
ment even if they are unable to pay for it because, regardless of the ownership-type, 
not providing care is socially unacceptable47. This stems from the widely held view 
that health care is a matter of right, not privilege48.
Physicians control large parts of the hospital’s operations, have a decisive edge on 
essential medical information and control the referral of patients. All this makes 
them by far the most influential stakeholders in the hospital sector. With regard 
to the physicians, it is important to note that while ‘external’ asymmetric informa-
tion may be in the interest of for-profit owners, ‘internal’ asymmetric information 
often is not. The costs involved in monitoring hospital managers and professionals 
are a clear restriction on the applicability of the property-rights paradigm in this 
sector. Agency costs are high because medical professionals are very influential 
and pursue their own goals. Owners face substantial transaction costs to enforce 
their targets, and the higher these costs are, the less feasible a for-profit ownership 
structure will be.
1.3.2 Explanations for the presence and dominance of nonprofit hospitals
Various theories account for the presence or dominance of nonprofit hospitals. 
Historically, charity care was considered an important goal of the nonprofit 
hospital sector. Max Weber saw voluntary organizations as unstable but highly 
adaptable entities which try to balance the ‘value-rationality’ of religious or politi-
cal organizations with the technocratic ‘means-rationality’ of business and public 
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agencies49. Burton Weisbrod (1975) states that citizens in heterogeneous societies 
hold different preferences, and that this increases the need for nonprofits versus 
public organizations, since governments will only satisfy the needs of the average 
voter50.
Both public and nonprofit providers may form an alternative to for-profit hospitals 
since they are less likely to capitalize on any of the market failures mentioned 
in the previous section. Kenneth Arrow (1963) saw the dominance of nonprofit 
hospital ownership as the logical outcome of the attempt to resolve the persist-
ing information-asymmetries between providers and patients in an efficient way. 
Patients might fear suffering as a result of the opportunistic behavior of for-profit 
providers. This creates demand for the services of nonprofit organizations, which 
are assumed to be trustworthy. Arrow thus laid the groundwork for trust-related 
ownership theories51.
Hansmann (1980) points out that it is the non-distribution constraint that 
serves to demonstrate the trustworthiness of nonprofit organizations. He states 
that nonprofit firms commonly arise where: 1) customers are in a poor position 
to determine, with reasonable effort, the quality and the quantity of the services 
provided; or 2) there is at least one significant class of patrons for whom both the 
costs of contracting and the costs of ownership are quite high. Patients are in the 
main poorly placed to determine the quality and quantity of the hospital services 
they receive, and physicians are the patrons who face significant costs from the 
contracting or ownership of hospital services.
Stakeholder approaches emphasize that nonprofit ownership serves all interested 
parties the best, since they often allow stakeholders to maximize control52. Indeed, 
a great deal of the literature points out the fact that nonprofit organizations are 
bound by weak external enforcement mechanisms53. Nonprofit law is primarily 
enabling law and tends to be poorly enforced: ‘Compared to many other areas 
of law, not-for-profit law is imprecise. It is poorly developed relative to corporate 
law, has been weakened over the past few decades, and is often not enforced. Not-
for-profit directors, for example, are no longer held to stringent fiduciaries found 
in trust law, but instead are governed by the looser duties of corporate directors 
that authorize considerable management leeway54’. James points out that many 
legal systems have only mild penalties for violations of the non-distribution 
constraint55. The legal conditions for tax exemption are weakly enforced and – in 
health care – becoming a nonprofit seems relatively easy.
Who might benefit most from such a situation? Medical staff are clearly among 
the most powerful and interested stakeholders in the hospital sector and face 
significant costs if they have to contract or own hospital facilities themselves. 
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Pauly and Redisch (1973) have stated that nonprofit hospitals act as physicians’ 
cooperatives56. They assume that physicians, rather than trustees or administra-
tors hold effective control of the nonprofit hospital, and that they use these powers 
primarily to maximize their net incomes. In other words, nonprofits are attractive 
for physicians because physicians do not have to bear any capital risks or share 
rents with shareholders. According to Pauly and Redisch, nonprofits only promote 
higher quality because this is synonymous with the use of non-physician labor and 
capital in physician-income enhancing ways. The fundamental idea seems to be 
that nonprofit hospitals are effectively for-profits in disguise57.
Pauly and Redisch developed this hypothesis at a time when US for-profit hos-
pital ownership had been in decline for many decades and nonprofits had become 
the dominant form of ownership, and this might have been seen as some kind of 
empirical proof for their ideas. If, on the other hand, such a trend is reversed and 
for-profits grow, new questions arise – if physician control over nonprofit hospitals 
has decreased compared to for-profits, or if for-profit hospitals pay higher rents 
to physicians than nonprofits do, for example. At least one recent study has found 
that physicians in for-profit hospitals are more involved at the level of the board 
and may therefore wield greater influence in these settings58.
Nevertheless, nonprofit hospital care seems to fit perfectly with Hansmann’s 
conditions. It is hard to ensure the quality and quantity of hospital services in 
an objective way and for-profit ownership may imply considerable costs for such 
powerful patrons as the physicians. The natural solution to this dilemma is to 
create an organization without owners, such as a hospital whose managers hold 
it in trust for its stakeholders, who – theoretically – have no opportunistic incen-
tives, and where the benefits of full ownership are abandoned for stricter fiduciary 
constraints on its management59. The benefits of the non-distribution constraint 
have to be weighed against the disadvantages of the nonprofit form of ownership, 
such as a limited access to capital markets and fewer incentives for efficiency. Note 
that, the more markets and agents are able to develop enforceable, sophisticated 
contracts, the less rationale there is for the non-distribution constraint60. On the 
other hand, the higher the monitoring costs and the stronger the incentives for 
moral hazard, the higher the cost of contracting the services. The latter implies a 
better rationale for nonprofit ownership. It also implies that for-profit organiza-
tions will often be found in markets with ‘contractable’ services61.
Governments can make for-profits comply too all kinds of regulations to reduce 
the chances of opportunistic behavior. Political and administrative policies, 
like certificate-of-need programs and reimbursement schedules can be used to 
constrain for-profit ownership62. This (implicitly) supports the development and 
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presence of the nonprofit sector. Lester Salomon states that the presence of an 
effective and complementary63 partnership between the state and nonprofits is one 
of the best predictors of the scale and scope of nonprofit activities64. In most cases, 
the distinction between nonprofits and the rest of the public sector is not great and 
a significant proportion of their funding actually comes from government sources. 
It often seems more accurate to think of nonprofits as ‘third-party government’, 
a means by which nongovernmental entities carry out governmental purposes 
with a substantial degree of discretion65. In such a configuration, governments 
can be a great help in overcoming specific voluntary weaknesses, such as a lack 
of resources, a focus on particular subgroups, paternalism, and philanthropic 
amateurism. Governments can ensure a more stable flow of resources, discourage 
paternalism by regulations and universal access, and improve the quality of care by 
setting benchmarks and standards66. In other words, the more complementarity 
there is between government and the nonprofit sector, the more constraints there 
are to the growth of the for-profit hospital sector.
Some scholars state that a lack of ‘contractability’ cannot explain the breakdown 
of ownership entirely67. For-profit firms may also rely on reputation to solve ‘con-
tractability’ problems, as is common among consultancy firms and IT companies. 
Francois suggests that nonprofit dominance, in addition to ‘contractability’ prob-
lems, is also driven by a broader notion of ‘care’ or altruistic preferences, especially 
when third parties have a stake in the quality and delivery of such services (figure 
1.1). The delivery of ‘care’ is dependent on some kind of solidarity in society, which 
hinders profit maximization. Others suggest that ‘care’ is a form of pro-social mo-
tivation that attracts altruistic employees68. Underlying factors such as religious 
Figure 1.1: Archetypical ownership breakdown: ‘care’ and ‘contractability’73
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duties and evangelism may also be important for worker motivation, and indeed 
most nonprofits started out as religious hospitals69.
Workers with such pro-social motivations contribute additional effort, but only 
to improve outcomes, not to raise profits70. Nonprofit status can provide cred-
ible proof of the commitment of those who hold particular altruistic goals or 
preferences for ‘non-contractible’ aspects of quality71. This pro-social motivation 
can lead to important competitive advantages on the market place for nonprofit 
hospitals72. They can calculate lower prices since a much smaller mark-up (profit 
margin) is required. They can also operate with lower costs due to access to a 
certain amount of cheap capital (voluntary donations, charity) and cheap labor 
(religious or voluntary workers). Finally, lower costs may also result from favor-
able government regulation such as planning requirements and tax exemptions, 
depending on the degree of institutional complementarity.
To summarize, the market share of nonprofit hospitals is likely to be linked to 
the lack of ‘contractability’ of hospital services, the interests and market power of 
physicians within hospitals, the strength of the voluntary movement and profes-
sional ethics, and the extent of competitive advantages that may result from better 
access to cheap capital and labor or from favorable government regulations.
1.3.3 Conclusions
The growth of the for-profit hospital sector depends on a long-term positive return 
on capital, without which the sector will be unable to access equity capital. Return 
on capital investment is a crucial precondition for the development of for-profit 
hospital care. This depends directly on there being a profit margin and on the 
efficient use of capital (low costs and/or high reimbursements). The business case 
for for-profit ownership depends either on market powers or on lower produc-
tion costs due to greater efficiency or better access to capital. It is widely held 
that maximizing proprietary rights in contestable markets and a sufficient level 
of equity capital are factors which serve as strong incentives to greater efficiency, 
innovation and consumer responsiveness. If these conditions are not present, this 
may be a major reason for a low share of for-profits in the hospital sector, because 
of government, community, or market constrains.
It is often supposed that nonprofit hospitals are preferred over for-profit hospi-
tals because nonprofits offer higher levels of ‘unobservable’ quality, and because 
they take the interests of stakeholders into consideration to a greater extent. Note 
that this implies that for-profits are thought to deliver less unobservable quality 
and serve the interests of their shareholders more that those of their stakeholders. 
Since patients value the quality of care but find it hard to determine the precise level 
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of this quality, and since physicians hold high stakeholder interests in hospitals 
but hospital ownership involves high transaction costs, there may be significant 
demand for nonprofit ownership types. In addition, nonprofits may dominate if 
they are favored by public regulations, community support or competitive cost 
advantages (charity, no need for profit margins).
To conclude, the presence of for-profit hospitals may increase for at least two 
reasons. 1) Economic theory suggests that the development of a for-profit hospital 
sector is stimulated by an increase in ‘contractability’. Higher ‘contractability’ acts 
as a trade-off for trust and ‘care’. 2) Institutional approaches suggest that for-profits 
may prosper if there is less complementarity between the government and the 
nonprofit hospital sectors – for example, as a result of ‘level-playing-field’ policies. 
It seems important to study the impact of both economic and broader institutional 
constraints, which are represented in figure 1.2. Such constraints may often change 
over time and this may induce changes in ownership types. It is necessary to study 
the constraints on ownership-types across countries and over time in order to 
generate meaningful statements on the reasons that underlie the development of 
Figure 1.2: Constraints on the for-profit hospital sector
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for-profit hospital sectors. The empirical chapters of this study will all deal with 
these issues in depth.
1.4 The methodology of this research
This study is structured around four longitudinal case studies. Its purpose is to 
explore, as objectively as possible, the reasons for the patterns of for-profit hospital 
development that can be observed in different health care systems. Environment, 
or context, is essential to understanding the development of the for-profit 
hospital sector (figure 1.2)74. In such circumstances, case studies are the most 
rational method of research. Case studies are empirical inquiries that investigate 
a phenomenon within its real life context, in which the boundaries between that 
phenomenon and its context are not always clear and in which multiple sources of 
evidence are used75. Case studies are among the few research strategies that leave 
room for questions about historically, culturally, or geographically defined social 
phenomena76.
I adopt a comparative perspective to investigate which factors are likely to be 
significant drivers in the development of for-profit hospitals. Further, as Ellen Im-
mergut observes, the comparative perspective brings to the fore the institutional 
framework within which much of the developments to be studied take place: ‘com-
parisons with other countries show that the factors that might be overpowering 
in one nation – such as the peculiarities of its liberal tradition, the attitude of 
the medical profession, or the strength of its labor movement – have resulted in 
quite different outcomes in other nations’77. She states that less ‘case-embedded’ 
approaches – involving elements such as the possible convergent forces of the 
economy, medical technology, professional autonomy, or the divergent forces of 
political ideology and class-based politics – simply fail to explain national health 
insurance politics in three Western European countries78. Victor Fuchs also points 
out the relevance of an institutional and historical approach in health care services 
research79.
An inductive approach
I will not approach this research with a set of deterministic causal propositions 
to structure the evidence. To my knowledge at this point in time, no common 
analytically framework exists which includes all context-dependent aspects of 
the different cases, a precondition for causal statements80. The sparse research 
available on the development of the for-profit hospital sector lacks a well-specified 
framework that includes the relevant institutional context. It is difficult, without 
any empirical material, to specify the most likely conditions for the development 
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of for-profit hospitals. A pilot-study, conducted previously to this work, produced 
thirty-three possible conditions and constraints based on institutional, micro-
economic and political-actorist approaches. Most of these could not be tested 
empirically because of a lack of comparable and testable (longitudinal) data or 
mutual interference problems81.
In short, an approach that tries to include all possible causal variables and rests 
largely on induction and interpretation seems the most appropriate for this re-
search82. As Henry Hansmann states: ‘In studying any given organizational form, 
I have generally followed the simple practice of first examining the range of situ-
ations in which that form is found and then looking for theories that can explain 
the observed pattern’83. Paul Starr points out the fact that we – as a general rule – 
cannot derive current institutional health care arrangements from purely abstract 
analysis; it requires an analysis that is both structural and historical to explain the 
specific form taken by these departures84. Such approaches are likely to generate a 
better understanding of the development of the for-profit hospital sector.
In addition, the examination of longitudinal as well as comparative facts may 
aid the development of testable propositions. This study does not use a rigorous 
theoretical framework, which is subsequently tested against the data gathered. 
However, this does not mean that social science theories are absent, although it 
is unlikely that a single explanatory theory will be able to account for all develop-
ments in any one country, let alone across several countries with diverse cultures, 
histories, institutions, and interest groups85. Theoretical notions can increase our 
familiarity with the subject (see section 1.3). In fact, they can be useful analytical 
tools with which to structure and interpret the empirical evidence86. In addition, 
appendix 1.1 presents the available conclusions from the large number of empirical 
studies that address the performance of the various forms of hospital ownership. 
This further increases our understanding of the subject, but also underscores the 
relevance of the comparative and historical approach of this work.
Methods of investigation
I examined key-texts and secondary sources to describe how for-profit hospitals 
have developed in four health care systems. Each case is based on extensive 
scholarly, and, wherever available, statistical sources. In addition, I interviewed 
relevant experts from the various countries included in this study. I order and 
assess the complexity of the comparative and historical records by interpreting the 
significant phenomena and determining their causes87. The composition of the 
empirical findings is – to some extent – similar in the different cases. In each case, 
the relative share of for-profit hospital care is quantified as accurately as possible. 
I then investigate the available specific knowledge on the observed trends and 
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describe the major relevant developments in the health care system in question. 
The cases are structured around the relevant critical junctures I have found.
At a deeper level, the descriptions are structured according to two implicit ques-
tions. 1) How can a for-profit hospital make a profit? This leads us to a focus on 
remuneration structures, hospital strategies, market structures, and the demand 
for hospital services (both amenities and clinical treatment). 2) Who or what, in 
the broader health care system, has had a functional or ideological interest in – or 
was sympathetic or unsympathetic towards – for-profit hospitals? For example, 
private health care insurers seeking provider access or amenities for their clien-
tele88; physicians seeking access to hospitals or additional rents; governments 
seeking investor capital to build new facilities; consumers seeking additional 
hospital services that differed from the current referral agents89.
Ideally, comparative work will proceed simultaneously at two levels – at the level 
of systems (or the macro social level) and within-systems90. Both are studied in 
this work. First, an analysis of the findings is conducted for each case individually. 
We aim to develop plausible explanations for the growth or decline of for-profit 
hospitals over time. Then, another – historical comparative – analysis is conducted 
to explain if and why this process differs between the countries. The combination 
of both the longitudinal and comparative perspectives enhances the validity of the 
overall analysis.
1.5 Study objects: hospitals, countries, and time-period
This study focuses on the hospital sector. The acute hospital sector is at the center 
of health care delivery systems – especially when one takes a view of a longer 
period. Most capital investments concentrate on hospital assets. The fact that it 
is relatively easy to make cross-national comparison between hospitals is another 
consideration for their being the focus of this study. Finally, hospital developments 
are the best documented, an issue of importance for research that largely has to be 
based on secondary sources.
The total for-profit hospital sector, rather than individual for-profit hospitals, 
forms the subject of this research. This also implies a case-oriented research 
strategy, in contrast to studying (quantitative) variables or factors that are at work 
across countries91. What constitutes a for-profit hospital sector? This includes, of 
course, the number of for-profit hospitals and their attributes, such as the num-
ber of hospital beds, the specific (medical) specialties present in these hospitals, 
turnover and profit figures, the number of employees and physician status (on 
salaried or self-employed positions). It also includes the interest groups, which 
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surround them, any possible nonprofit subsidiaries and other (related) services, 
which cannot always be separated from their main activities.
I characterize hospitals as institutions that operate inpatient beds and deliver or 
facilitate acute health care services. Hospitals often offer a broad range of medical 
services, but they can also specialize in certain procedures or specialties. Hos-
pitals provide inpatient treatment and may, but do not necessarily need to, offer 
outpatient treatment. This study does not therefore include the development of 
for-profit ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs).
It is important to note that both provision and institutional constraints are often 
more compelling in hospital care than in most other health care services. Insti-
tutions – human rules – often did bound hospitals more than other health care 
providers. Common institutional constraints are certificate-of-need regulations, 
reimbursement regulations, and quality requirements.
Hospitals are generally also bound by stronger non-social constraints or provision 
characteristics such as infrastructural or technical requirements. As a result, in hos-
pitals there is less intra-industry variety than in other health care sectors. In general, 
inpatient care involves stronger constraints than outpatient care (figure 1.3).
Figure 1.3: Provision and institutional constraints in health care services92
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I will also investigate how for-profit hospital development relates to the nonprofit 
and public hospital sectors. Hansmann states: ‘to look at investor-owned firms in 
isolation, as the existing literature has largely done, is often misleading. We learn 
much more about them by comparing them with other forms of enterprise.’
Countries
For-profit hospital care is studied in the United Kingdom, Germany, the United 
States, and the Netherlands. Four cases may seem a small number from which to 
generalize, but this is defensible because an in-depth, historical, and contextual 
understanding is required to study the questions put forward. Due to the research 
strategy and the small number of cases, results cannot be generalized across other 
countries.
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The development of for-profit hospital care will be investigated in various con-
texts and (institutional) environments, a diverse cases design93. Since this research 
is primarily explorative and longitudinal, this seems to be a better approach than 
selecting those health care systems that are most similar in terms of certain critical 
variables (assuming that these exist at all) in order to isolate for possible causal 
explanations94: the presence of more than one common causal variable makes it 
impossible for J.S. Mill’s method of agreement to determine the actual cause95. 
Thus, I have sought countries that: 1) differ (a variation-finding strategy) in im-
portant aspects of their health care systems and the ways health care is governed, 
as well as in their political and constitutional environment; and 2) can provide 
enough accessible and comparable data with which to build a case.
Tables 1.1 and 1.2 provide an overview of the main features of the current political, 
economic, and hospital environment in the selected countries. There are signifi-
cant differences between these countries. 1) The constitutional environment is not 
the same, especially along the unitary and federalist dimensions. This partially 
determines the governance of the health care system since federal countries allow 
discretionary powers to the states regarding (the planning and funding of) the 
hospital sector. 2) Executive dominance may also be relevant. The UK’s West-
minster model of democracy is the archetypical majority system with supposedly 
high levels of executive dominance and agenda control; by contrast, such aspects 
are very weakly developed in the Netherlands96. 3) Different scholars proposed 
adjustments to Esping-Andersen’s typology of welfare regimes that are more spe-
cific about secondary characteristics97. It then becomes clear that health welfare 
regimes do differ substantially in these four countries. 4) The presence of an effec-
tive partnership between the state and the nonprofit sector is often assumed to be 
one of the best predictors of the scale and scope of nonprofit activities in a country, 
and thus may be negatively correlated with the viability of the for-profit sector (see 
section 1.3.2)98.
Our selected countries also need to provide variety in the features of their hos-
pital sectors102. Table 1.2 presents the central characteristics of the four hospital 
sectors. 1) The selected cases comprise the complete spectrum from no for-profit 
beds at all (the Netherlands) to comparatively high numbers (the United States and 
Germany). 2) The activities of the hospital sector may have a broad scale and scope 
(large general hospital facilities), or a smaller scale and scope of activities (smaller 
and more specialized facilities). 3) Physicians may be salaried, self-employed, or 
both: the four countries, once again, operate different models. 4) Hospital plan-
ning procedures differ according to whether the country is unitary or federalist. 
In the two federal countries the states are responsible, while some sort of central 
planning body exists in the two other countries.
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Time-period
Although the research questions do not necessitate a clearly defined time-period, 
it is important to choose a broad timeframe since I am interested in the whole 
for-profit hospital sector and a broader timeframe will allow us to investigate the 
appropriate preconditions and critical junctures for changes in a certain phe-
nomenon. This research analyzes the cases by piecing the evidence together in a 
chronological manner. It seeks to offer limited historical generalizations that are 
objectifiable and where the enabling conditions seem reasonable104.
What does this imply about the time-period? One important milestone in health 
care history was the arrival of the welfare state. This created an environment with 
‘universal’ hospital access and much greater financial stability, as well as the po-
tential for links between forms of hospital ownership and welfare state politics 
and policies. These welfare systems eventually became supplemented with cost-
containment strategies and market reforms105. The focus of my research will be 
on this period, which coincides roughly with the post-Second World War period. 
Table 1.1: Current country characteristics: political and economic systems
United Kingdom Germany United States The Nether-
lands
Constitution Unitary Federalist Federalist Decentralized 
unitary
Executive dominance 
and agenda control99
Very high Low N/a Very low
Health welfare 
system100
Liberal-
universalist101
Continental 
corporatism
Liberal residualism Liberal-
corporatism
State nonprofit 
partnership
Weaker, 
supplementary
Stronger, 
subsidiary
Stronger, associa-
tionalism
Stronger, 
subsidiary
Table 1.2: Current country characteristics: the hospital sector
United Kingdom Germany United States The Netherlands103
Share of 
for-profit beds
Five percent Fifteen percent Thirteen percent None
Scale and scope 
of hospital 
sector
Broad (large 
general clinics)
More narrow 
(inpatient)
More narrow 
(diversified)
Broad (large general 
clinics)
Physician status Salaried Mainly 
salaried
Mainly self-
employed
Self employed 
group practices
Hospital 
planning
Central body State-level State-level Central body
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Remarkably, the welfare state also seems to mark a change in the characteristics of 
the for-profit hospital sector. It coincides with the beginning of a transformation 
from stand-alone proprietary facilities towards investor-owned hospital chains.
However, I will also, insofar as the available secondary sources allow, describe 
the development of the for-profit hospital sector during the prelude to the welfare 
state. Most overviews of the development of the general acute-care hospital sector 
as a whole take the beginning of the twentieth century as their starting point. It 
was during that period that hospitals became ‘modern’: they began to focus more 
on treatment, and to use x-rays, anesthesia, and antiseptics. For the first time, 
hospitals attracted a wealthier patient base; physicians became eager to gain access 
to these facilities. Here lie the roots of proprietary hospital care. This broad time-
frame helps create a more comprehensive picture of the comparative development 
and dynamics of for-profit hospital care in Western health care systems.
1.6 Organization of the book
The composition of the remainder of this book is fairly straightforward. I start with 
the empirical chapters. They consist of country-specific descriptions as well as an 
analysis of the development of for-profit hospital care. The analytical sections ex-
plain why the for-profit sector developed in the way that it did. Chapter 2 describes 
and analyses the development of for-profit hospital care in the US. In absolute 
numbers, the US has the largest for-profit hospital sector in the world. Even more 
important may be the fact that this for-profit sector has been around for so long. 
This enables us to study the factors that have stimulated its growth and caused its 
decline over a long period. Chapter 3 examines the UK. The UK for-profit hospital 
sector and the National Health Service seem worlds apart. The particular dynamic 
between these two divided sectors is at the forefront of this analysis. Chapter 4 
describes the German case. In Germany, the completely different funding models 
for capital and operational expenses have been crucial to the development of the 
for-profit hospital sector. Germany also provides a unique insight into how the re-
structuring of an entire nation’s health care sector after the country’s reunification 
affected the for-profit hospital sector. The Netherlands (Chapter 5) is unique in yet 
another way. It only operates nonprofit hospitals. Which factors were so ‘powerful’ 
that no for-profit hospital sector has developed at all? On the basis of questions 
that structure the empirical evidence, Chapter 6 is the final analytical exercise 
of this study. Using a comparative approach, I investigate whether and how the 
country-specific analyses can be integrated to create a broader understanding of 
the developments of for-profit hospital care. In fact, I seek to infer the conditions 
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that are crucial to for-profit hospital development. The aim of this chapter is to 
identify the key determinants of for-profit growth or decline.
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Appendix 1.1 Overview of empirical studies on the effect of 
ownership on hospital performance
The past decades have witnessed the emergence of a large number of, mainly, but 
not exclusively, US-based studies that have addressed the effect of ownership on 
hospital performance. The majority of these studies have employed cross-sectional 
research approaches and been based on any available quantitative variables. They 
have thus approached issues of efficiency and responsiveness, quality and outcome 
of care, and community benefits. Community benefits are socially valued goods, 
such as indigent care, public health programs, and occupational training.
This appendix provides a short but comprehensive overview of these research 
findings. However, it is important to note that in such studies intra-sector variety 
is often much greater than the variety between the different forms of ownership. I 
first present an overview of the most important studies from the US. This appen-
dix ends with the evidence available from Germany, the only other country that to 
my knowledge has generated substantial research on the effects of ownership on 
hospital performance.
For-profit hospital performance: efficiency, costs and responsiveness
Most popular appeals for for-profit hospitals rely on their perceived superior effi-
ciency. However, there is little academic work to support such a proposition. In fact, 
studies suggest that total adjusted cost per unit-of-service does not differ widely 
between for-profit hospitals and their nonprofit and public competitors. Most 
studies show that nonprofit and for-profit hospitals operate with about the same 
level of cost-efficiency (see table 1.3). There is also little significant cost-difference 
between stand-alone and chain-owned facilities106. However, most studies show 
that for-profit and nonprofit hospitals do have a different cost-structure: for-profits 
have lower salary costs, with the notable exception of managerial compensation107 
and the medical staff, but spend more in other expenditure categories (overhead, 
capital)108. Relative performance also depends on which ownership category for-
profits are compared to: for example, religious hospitals have substantially lower 
cost than secular nonprofit hospitals109.
Regarding the revenues, or the cost to the purchasers, the picture is very consis-
tent: for-profits charge a substantially higher rate than public or nonprofit hospitals. 
These surcharges, of up to twenty percent, guarantee much higher margins for 
for-profit hospitals. How can this be explained? Research shows that hospitals rely 
primarily on revenue-generating strategies, in contrast to nursing homes where 
cost-containment strategies tend to dominate110. For-profit hospitals are most 
responsive to any financial incentives111. Recently Shen found that, responding to 
an increase of (for-profit) HMO penetration, the hazard of shutting down safety 
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Table 1.3: Academic meta-reviews on ownership differences (US)129
Efficiency and responsive-
ness
Quality of care and 
outcomes
Community benefits
Sloan (2000) No significant cost-
differences; for-profits have 
lower costs for personnel 
but score higher on other 
expenditure categories.
Different outcomes. Regions with high 
for-profit share provide 
less uncompensated care; 
public hospitals provide 
most uncompensated care.
Deveraux et al. 
(2002b, 2004)
For-profit hospitals charge 
nineteen percent more 
than nonprofit hospitals on 
average
Higher mortality risk in 
for-profit hospitals (fifteen 
studies)
Vaillancourt 
Rosenau (2003)
Nonprofit hospitals (23) 
more cost-efficient than 
for-profits (5); nine studies 
found no difference.
Nonprofit hospitals (12) 
deliver higher quality of 
care than for-profits (3); 
nine studies found no 
difference.
Nonprofits deliver more 
uncompensated care 
than for-profit hospitals; 
eight studies found no 
difference.
Currie, 
Donaldson, and 
Lu (2003)
For-profits charge higher 
prices; most studies show 
no cost-differences or a 
slightly worse performance 
by for-profits.
Nonprofit hospitals (4) 
deliver higher quality of 
care; seven studies found 
no difference.
Hollingsworth 
(2003)
DEA-analysis: publics most 
efficient (0,95), nonprofits 
(0,82) slightly more 
efficient than for-profits 
(0,8).
Eggleston et al. 
(2006 and 2008)
Highest mortality rates 
among public provid-
ers; for-profits have 
higher mortality rates than 
nonprofits; no differences 
found on individual patient 
levels; high variety.
Schlesinger and 
Gray (2006)
Nonprofits have less 
overhead and less total 
costs per admission (13), 
than for-profits score (8); 
11 studies showed no 
difference.
Nonprofits (8) have 
better mortality rates 
than for-profits (1), 16 
studies show no differences; 
nonprofits (10) score better 
on other adverse outcomes 
and process indicators, 
than for-profits (3).
Nonprofit hospitals pro-
vide more uncompensated 
care, treat more Medicaid 
patients and, provide more 
unprofitable services and 
practices affecting the 
indigent.
Wörz (2008) Nonprofit and for-profits 
are equally cost-efficient 
(9); for-profits are more 
cost-efficient (5); nonprofits 
are more cost-efficient (3).
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net services is the highest in for-profit hospitals and the lowest in government 
hospitals112.
Hansmann, Kessler, and McClellan found that for-profit hospitals were the most 
responsive to reductions in demand, followed by public and religiously affiliated 
nonprofit hospitals, while secular nonprofits were the least responsive: a one per-
cent decrease in population leads to a decline of 0.15 percent of for-profit bed 
capacity, 0.11 for public and religious facilities, but only 0.04 for secular nonprofit 
hospitals. They concluded that nonprofit ownership leads to capital traps, in which 
capital remains inefficiently embedded over long periods because of a lack of own-
ership incentives. This seems to apply less to religiously affiliated hospitals, which, 
like for-profits, have an owner in a functional sense with substantial control over 
the facility113. Stronger for-profit responsiveness to incentives might also explain 
why they encounter greater compliance problems (up-coding)114. For-profits are 
also more likely to offer profitable services; government hospitals are most likely 
to offer unprofitable services; nonprofit hospitals generally fall in the middle. This 
might be partly explained by tax-exemption requirements.
Although most work has been based on a cross-sectional perspective, some 
studies have taken a more dynamic approach. Hultman and Potter show that 
prospective payment systems had a converging effect on the reimbursement of 
different types of hospital ownership115. Others state that the entrance of for-
profit hospitals increases competition and thus forces nonprofits to lower costs: 
for example, costs for coronary heart diseases are somewhat lower in regions 
where many for-profit providers are active116. Herr points to the fact that even if 
for-profits are less efficient, they may actually increase efficiency in the health care 
market if they acquire inefficient public or nonprofit hospitals, a major strategy for 
their growth117.
To sum up, for-profits do not have a major cost advantage. However, they usu-
ally pay lower wages and use more capital. For-profits also charge much higher 
rates to payers. My conclusion is that such findings demonstrate above all that 
the conversion from nonprofit to for-profit ownership implies a transfer of the 
available monetary means to investors and physicians, rather than any increase in 
cost-efficiency. This implies that such decisions have a strong political component.
For-profit hospitals: quality of care and medical outcomes
Studies addressing quality of care and medical outcome encounter major mea-
surement and conceptualization problems. Variations in quality seem at least as 
large among hospitals of the same ownership type as they are between different 
ownership types, and ‘policymakers and researchers seeking to interpret the litera-
ture on hospital ownership and quality of care should be aware that findings differ 
significantly according to the analytic methods of individual studies’118. Thus, a 
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significant number of studies – not least the more sophisticated ones – concentrate 
on a narrow range of medical procedures such as coronary bypass surgery119, 
dialysis120, or caesarean sections121.
Table 1.3 shows that, overall, nonprofits have somewhat lower mortality rates 
and score better on other adverse outcomes and process indicators. Public facili-
ties seem to perform worst122, while for-profit hospitals are in the middle. Note 
that quite some studies do not find a statistically significant difference between 
for-profits and other ownership types on mortality or other adverse advents123. 
I conclude that for-profits do not appear to deliver better quality of care than 
nonprofits – maybe as a result of more incentives to supply-induced demand – 
but may perform better than public hospitals. This implies that there could be a 
greater rationale for for-profit hospitals co-existing alongside public facilities, than 
alongside nonprofit providers.
For-profit hospitals: community benefits
Community benefits include a variety of services such as uncompensated care 
for the needy, professional education programs, unprofitable medical services124, 
public health programs, and non-reimbursed medical research. Most studies 
show that public hospitals deliver the most uncompensated care, followed by the 
nonprofit providers (table 1.3). Notwithstanding the fact that for-profit hospitals 
are often located in states with many uninsured125, US for-profit hospitals deliver 
the least uncompensated care. Such results may give rise to concerns over the 
impact of additional for-profit market share on uncompensated care and other 
community benefits126.
However, for-profit hospitals pay taxes and public and nonprofit facilities do 
not. This implies the existence of a virtual benchmark for tax-exempted hospitals 
to deliver the amount of community benefits that equals such tax-breaks plus 
the amount of community benefits delivered by for-profit providers127. If we use 
such a benchmark, the evidence is less clear-cut, although it still seems to favor 
public and nonprofit hospitals, especially if we include ‘non-measurable’ variables 
like trust and regulatory compliance. For-profit community benefits may also be 
inflated because many studies do not adjust for the complicating factor of bad debt 
for uncompensated care. Research among Californian facilities suggests that the 
majority, but not all, of nonprofit hospitals do deliver enough community benefits 
to cover their tax-breaks128.
Evidence from other countries
The empirical literature on the effect of ownership on hospital performance deals 
to a large extent with the US situation. However, although somewhat less sophisti-
cated techniques are often used, the evidence from other countries does not paint 
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a very different picture. Two Australian inquiries, based on average length of stay 
and administrative costs suggest somewhat lower costs for for-profit hospitals, save 
in the field of obstetrics130. A French study on mortality rates tells that by choosing 
a for-profit hospital, patients have on average a lower instantaneous probability of 
dying, but can be less sure of the actual quality of care because of the much greater 
variety in the for-profit sector131.
A great deal of the non-US research regarding ownership differences focuses 
on Germany and concentrates on efficiency issues. Table 1.4 presents the results 
for the main work that has been done. There seems to be support for four general 
conclusions. 1) The studies on differences in efficiency between for-profit and 
Table 1.4: Academic research on ownership differences in Germany134
Breyer et. al., 1987 Nonprofits are more cost-efficient than for-profits (not significant); 
public hospitals are least efficient.
Simon, 1996 For-profit hospitals tend to transfer unprofitable patients to other 
providers (cherry-picking).
Karl, 1999 For-profit hospitals are more cost-efficient than public facilities.
Reichsthaler, 2001 For-profit hospitals are slightly more cost-efficient than other 
ownership types.
Helmig and Lapsley, 
2001
Public and nonprofit hospitals are more cost-efficient than for-profit 
hospitals.
Lauterbach and 
Lüngen, 2002
Nonprofit hospitals have the lowest per-case salary costs; public 
hospitals have the highest per-case salary costs.
Stock, 2002 No significant ownership differences on per diem rates, profitability, 
solvency, and share of costs in turnover.
Gerste 2003, Public hospitals have the highest costs (bed, per diem, and case); 
for-profits deliver the most nursing days per FTE.
Berhanu et. al., 2004 Nonprofit hospitals have the best cost-efficiency; public hospitals have 
the worst cost-efficiency.
Werblow and Robra, 
2007
For-profit hospitals are the most efficient (except: Baden-Württem-
berg, Bavaria, Bremen, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Thuringia).
Wörz, 2008 For-profit chain hospitals have clearly the highest case-adjusted 
revenues, although there is great variety.
Herr, 2008 For-profit hospitals perform worst on cost and technical efficiency, 
partly as a result of their longer length of stay and their lower rate of 
inclusion in hospital planning.
Tiemann and 
Schreyögg, 2009
Public hospitals perform significantly better on operational efficiency 
than for-profit and nonprofits, with the exception of for-profits with 
over a thousand beds. For-profit hospitals provide a somewhat higher 
quality of care in comparison to other ownership types.
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nonprofit hospitals show a divergent picture, which would seem to indicate that 
such differences are not very large. 2) For-profit hospital chains calculate the high-
est rates to the purchasers; they (formerly) had the highest average length of stay 
under per diem reimbursement and (currently) the highest case-mix under the 
current prospective payment system. This indicates that for-profits may seek to 
maximize their profits by maximizing revenues instead of minimizing inputs at 
a given output. 3) Quite a number of earlier studies show that public hospitals 
perform the worst on cost-efficiency. However, recent and more sophisticated 
research indicates that it is in fact the for-profits that have the lowest operational 
efficiency132. 4) A recent study found that for-profits provide a somewhat higher 
quality of care, probably as a result of a declining information asymmetry (manda-
tory publication of quality reports) over the years133.
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2  United States: the ups and downs of the largest 
for-profit sector
2.1 Introduction
The US health care system differs significantly from the health care systems of 
most other Western countries. The US health care system is, both in absolute and 
relative terms, very expensive, and although it provides first-class hospital care for 
the well-insured, large sections of the population are uninsured or underinsured. 
There are significant health disparities among the population and access to health 
care is unequal. The government operates public funding programs for the elderly 
(Medicare) and for low-income groups (Medicaid). Private employer-based in-
surance is available for most other Americans, but does not result in universally 
available coverage.
This chapter focuses on the origins, development and current state of the US 
for-profit hospital sector. How did the world’s largest for-profit hospital sector 
develop? Which factors have stimulated or held up this development? The first 
section of this chapter part consists of a chronological description of the history 
of the for-profit hospital sector (section 2.2). I begin by describing the origins 
of the proprietary hospitals and its early growth (section 2.2.1). This period is 
followed by the decline of the sector until World War II (section 2.2.2). I then 
investigate how the sector maintained itself from the end of World War II until 
the start of the public programs covering the elderly and the poor (section 2.2.3). 
Section 2.2.4 describes the impact of Medicare (1965) and Medicaid (1966) on 
for-profit hospitals and how subsequent cost-containment policies affected the 
sector. Section 2.2.5 describes the emergence and growth of for-profit hospital 
chains and how they correspond to other ownership types. Section 2.2.6 describes 
the academic and public discussion concerning the appropriateness of for-profit 
hospitals, which reached its height with the publication of a report by the Institute 
of Medicine (IOM) in 1986. This is followed by a description of the development of 
the for-profit sector during the 1980s (section 2.2.7). Section 2.2.8 investigates the 
major drivers that are shaping the current for-profit hospital landscape.
The second part of this chapter (section 2.3) presents my analysis of the 
development of for-profit hospital care in the US. This analysis follows the his-
torical sequence of events. Section 2.3.1 concentrates on proprietary hospitals (ca. 
1910–1965). The two decades following the implementation of Medicare and its 
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effects are analyzed in section 2.3.2. Section 2.3.3 considers the dynamics of the 
modern for-profit hospital sector. The chapter ends with my main conclusions 
(section 2.3.4).
2.2 Developing for-profit hospital care
2.2.1 The origins of proprietary hospital care
Hospitals were originally philanthropic institutions. Few dollars actually changed 
hands, but to some extent, the system worked for those who participated in it1. 
The antebellum hospital was not very capital-intensive and the sector as a whole 
was small. In 1873, the first national survey counted only 178 hospitals and in 
total these contained less than fifty thousand beds2. The numbers of proprietary 
clinics were negligible: a few surgical hospitals in the large cities and a couple of 
mental health asylums for the prosperous3. However, the number of hospitals grew 
quickly between 1870 and 1920, the period in which the hospital sector, according 
to Rosenberg and Stevens, assumed many of its modern characteristics4. A general 
survey in the early 1920s already revealed almost five thousand hospitals5, while 
the American Medical Association (AMA) registered 6,852 hospitals in 19286.
There is no single straightforward reason for this explosion in growth. Scholars 
have stressed various explanations: 1) mass immigration led to sustained demand 
for new hospital capacity, also along religious (i.e. Catholic7) and ethnic (i.e. Ger-
man and Jewish) lines; 2) the rise of clinical technology and the promise of surgery 
stimulated the demand for inpatient care8; 3) the need for additional hospital 
wards as medical classrooms; 4) the trend from living in private houses to living 
in apartments hampered care in people’s own homes9; and, 5) an increase in the 
average number of family members increased total household incomes. In general, 
there was a growing belief that the hospital was the best place for a sick person, 
rather than his own home; this increased people’s willingness to seek hospital 
treatment10.
Proprietary facilities accounted for a considerable share in the wider growth of 
the hospital sector. Statistics must be employed tentatively here, since official gov-
ernment figures did not include proprietary facilities, but their numbers may have 
equaled the numbers of non-proprietary facilities, and can be estimated at 1,500 to 
2,000 (1904)11. Another investigation (1911) found a smaller, but still significant 
proportion of proprietary clinics12. Thus, although they were sometimes no more 
than a few beds in a physician’s home, a large proportion of the many hospitals that 
were founded in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries seemed to be 
proprietary, notably in the South and West. How can we explain this development?
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Paying patients
Larger numbers of paying patients was the most significant difference between 
America’s nonprofit and proprietary hospitals and their European counterparts13. 
In 1875, no American hospital had an endowed income sufficient to underwrite 
free medical care for its community14. Another constant had been the difficulty 
of forcing local and county governments to underwrite the full cost of caring for 
indigent patients at private institutions15. In 1904, tax subsidies made up no more 
than around ten percent of hospital revenues16.
Henry Burdett, the British hospital expert and proponent of private payments 
(see next chapter), proclaimed that the US was the true home of the pay system17. 
By 1904, patients paid for forty-five percent of the revenues of private nonpropri-
etary hospitals, and this figure was seventy-one percent for private ecclesiastical 
hospitals18. In Western states, hospitals drew seventy percent or more of their 
operating income from patients (1903)19. The growth of pay-patients was spec-
tacular: at Union Protestant Infirmary in Baltimore, pay-patients increased from 
sixty-seven percent (1905) to eighty-eight percent (1915) and at Touron Infirmary 
(New Orleans) from forty-nine percent (1900) to seventy-nine percent in 191420. 
By the early 1920s, patient revenues already made up two-thirds of the income of 
all general hospitals21. Such large numbers of self-pay patients stimulated a rise 
in private and semiprivate accommodation in voluntary hospitals, in contrast to 
Europe where large patient wards were much more common22.
Proprietary hospitals competed for fee-paying patients23. Comfort and conve-
nience were a strategy to attract paying patients and thus proprietary hospitals 
contained many single rooms. Proprietary clinics also featured the use of new 
effective technologies, particularly surgery. Growth in the volume of surgical 
work allowed expansion and greater profits. Hospitals concentrated on obstetri-
cal deliveries, appendectomies, and tonsillectomies and adenoidectomies, which 
together accounted for more than half of all admissions24. In the suburbs and 
small towns, doctors built hospitals under proprietary ownership. Surgical treat-
ments made hospital care more profitable and enabled physicians to open new 
institutions without upper-class sponsorship and legitimacy. The disproportionate 
prominence of a few procedures in their operations – most notably appendecto-
mies – indicates the activist enthusiasm of surgeons, and their willingness to solve 
diagnostic problems with their scalpels25. The broad acceptance of private patient 
income not only allowed larger inner city hospitals to maintain their role of caring 
for the poor, but it also allowed many smaller (proprietary) institutions to exist on 
the market.
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Physicians seeking hospital access
It was not common for physicians to hold paid positions in hospitals. The ad-
vantages of place were seen as a fair substitute for salary until the final years of 
the nineteenth century. Many hospitals used a closed-staff model and each year 
physicians served for a couple of months on the hospital’s staff (under a system of 
revolving appointments), before returning to their private practices. Less than two 
percent of doctors held hospital privileges (1870)26.
However, as hospitals moved from the periphery to the centre of medical prac-
tice, control over and access to these facilities became a strategic basis for income 
and power. By the time of the First World War, hospital admission privileges were 
already so important that a city’s medical practitioners were sometimes divided 
between the ‘haves’ and bitter ‘have-nots’ – between those with staff privileges and 
those without27.
Competition was fierce: there were far more physicians in the US than in any of 
the major European countries28. Many public and nonprofit hospitals only gradu-
ally opened their doors to larger numbers of practitioners. Some physicians who 
were unable to obtain admission privileges at a hospital began their own propri-
etary hospitals, sometimes in shared ownership with colleagues. Hospital access 
was one problem, from a physicians’ perspective. Another was the right to charge 
the patient a separate bill for the physicians’ services, a practice that was not com-
mon in public hospitals or the larger traditional voluntary institutions. Although 
only thirteen percent (1913) of the sick were admitted to hospitals, the treatment 
of inpatients had become promising, and to some physicians this represented a 
significant source of income29. Thus, many doctors in the Massachusetts General 
Hospital routinely steered private patients to other hospitals, where they enjoyed 
admission privileges and where additional fees could be charged30. A more radical 
option was to start up a proprietary clinic.
There was a second reason for physicians to establish proprietary facilities. Although 
we now tend too see the hospital as an institution structured by medical priorities 
and defined by medical needs, this conception would have been inappropriate 
throughout most of the nineteenth century31. The board and their administrators 
held most powers. However, this traditional model of governance was hindered 
by increasing principal-agent problems resulting from new scientific discoveries 
that implied more clinical autonomy and a greater role for the physician in the 
hospital administration. Lay boards and hospital administrators lacked the neces-
sary medical experience and education. The rationale for including physicians at 
the top of the hospital authority structure increased rapidly. The traditional policy 
of excluding physicians from hospital governing boards now seemed indefensible 
to most doctors, especially when combined with a policy of appointing only lay 
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superintendents32. To sum up, ‘Oddly enough, proprietary hospitals were one of 
the main ways of resisting corporate domination and establishing professional 
control. Surgeons for treating their own patients founded some proprietary hos-
pitals; others were joint ventures. To supply enough patients to make the hospitals 
profitable, competing doctors often had to combine their efforts’33.
Ambitious physicians who wanted their own hospital could follow two strategies 
that were likely to succeed: 1) specialization in the most lucrative activities, which 
was often limited to the metropolitan areas; 2) founding a general clinic in (ru-
ral) areas, where other competitors were absent. Specialization had first attained 
maturity in the German-speaking countries, and did not become established in 
the English-speaking world until the 1890s. Private patients found the services 
of specialized proprietary hospitals less stigmatizing and easier to accept than 
admission to a larger general hospital. Many urban working people turned to the 
reassuring authority embodied in a ‘professor’ at a specialized outpatient clinic or 
dispensary34.
Many proprietary hospitals were also established where there was less competi-
tion from nonprofit hospitals. Most of these hospitals were in the South and West, 
and in the smaller towns throughout the country. The South and West had less 
access to philanthropic capital and thus relied more on proprietary capital. For 
example, of the seventy-eight hospitals founded in North Carolina between 1890 
and 1910, thirty-seven were proprietary. Generally they were owned and oper-
ated by individual surgeons35. The famous Mayo clinic (1887) also started out as 
a proprietary hospital, but was turned into a nonprofit foundation in 1923 by the 
founding Mayo brothers36. Judging from contemporary accounts, proprietary 
hospitals played a pioneering role in the industry, bringing medical services to 
areas where they would not otherwise have been available because the public spirit 
to support hospitals was too weak37.
2.2.2 Proprietary hospitals in the interbellum
In 1928, Rufus Rorem was the first to provide a deeper insight into the economic 
position of the proprietary hospital sector. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show that public and 
nonprofit hospitals were already dominant by the late 1920s, but that there were 
still many smaller proprietary facilities. Many of these proprietary clinics were 
losing money38. Nevertheless, in rural surroundings they often remained neces-
sary from a medical point of view: due to lack of voluntary or public resources, 
proprietary clinics were often the only place to treat patients who could not be 
treated at home39.
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How can we characterize the proprietary sector during the years of the interbel-
lum? Most of the proprietary facilities were owned directly by physicians. Many 
had a dual structure: a clinic comprising the medical practitioners and a property 
corporation that owned the plant and equipment. The clinic then leased the facili-
ties from the property corporation. This split made it possible to divide earnings in 
a way that reflected the partners’ varying contributions of labor and capital to the 
venture40. Many physician-owned hospitals were, in effect, annexes to the offices 
of private practitioners. But there were also some five hundred corporate hospitals, 
either privately held or publically traded (tables 2.1 and 2.2). Most hospital com-
panies were located in the Western states. Patient payments were most common 
in the West41 and the primary motive for this corporate group of hospitals was 
profit-seeking.
The medical staff usually held an ownership stake in proprietary facilities. Other 
investors were often hesitant about providing funds, realizing that it would be 
necessary to secure both public and physician support (i.e. they had to overcome 
major agency problems) if earnings on their investment were to be assured. Finally, 
some large corporations (mostly railway companies) owned proprietary hospitals, 
predominantly to treat their employees. It was not unusual for these industrial 
hospitals to be supported by the enterprise at little or no cost to the employees. 
Thus, these facilities were only ‘for-profit’ operations in a more formal sense.
Proprietary hospitals relied on equity capital, business loans, and patient fees 
to meet their commitments. In contrast to other ownership types, they generally 
Table 2.1: Acute care hospitals (1928)42
Facilities Beds % Beds Capital / bed % Capital
Public 772 115,037 31 $ 3,613 22
Voluntary 1,889 197,407 53 $ 6,202 66
Proprietary, individually 1,272 27,972 8 $ 2,919 4
Proprietary, corporate 448 23,150 6 $ 4,407 6
Proprietary, industrial 157 7,047 1 $ 3,565 1
Table 2.2: Specialty hospitals (1928)43
Facilities Beds % Beds Capital / bed % Capital
Public 127 12,335 29 $ 3,520 26
Voluntary 333 23,324 55 $ 4,288 60
Proprietary, individually 213 4,479 10 $ 3,201 9
Proprietary, corporate 46 2,650 6 $ 3,660 6
Proprietary, industrial - - - - -
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received no allowances from government, no voluntary contributions, and were 
not exempt from taxation. The overwhelming majority of the proprietary beds 
were intended for full-pay patients. Fees were high enough to cover both fixed and 
operating costs. However, these hospitals could not reject all patients (i.e. emer-
gency cases), and patients were sometimes unable to pay the charges. Sometimes 
proprietary clinics adjusted fees downwards, but only if patients could prove in-
ability to pay44. Their two primary business strategies – attracting the prosperous 
and providing high volume surgery – both needed substantial capital investments. 
At that point in time, doctors had to invest an entire year’s practice earnings to add 
just two or three hospital beds45.
The need to improve facilities, add outpatient services, and add new diagnostic 
and therapeutic equipment meant that the demand for capital increased continu-
ously46. Hospital construction boomed during the 1920s, buoyed up by successful 
charitable fund-raising efforts and by an increasing number of bequests. In fact, 
the real value of hospital construction in the late 1920s was not reached again 
until the 1950s47. Since the capital needs of public and nonprofit hospitals were es-
sentially met for free, they did not have to charge for capital depreciation48. Public 
hospitals delivered most of their services free of charge: in 1927, only 5.5 percent 
of their operating costs were recovered through charges49.
How did local communities ensure the necessary support for their hospitals? 
Their efforts were focused on current hospital deficits, rather than future financial 
health: ‘Community chests have uniformly taken the stand that amounts gathered 
currently from public subscription should be applied to current needs of the 
community. They have argued that obligations from the past (such as repayment 
of debt) and needs of the future (such as replacement or expansion of plant and 
equipment) should be met by other methods and under other auspices’50. Sup-
port to public hospitals was thus formally limited to the recovery of the operating 
costs. In practice, interest expenses, replacement investments, and occasionally 
building depreciation sometimes received support, especially if the hospital would 
otherwise have been unable to balance its cash budget.
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show that nonprofit hospitals invested the most capital per 
bed and this enhanced their competitive position. Neither did nonprofit hospi-
tals charge their patients for any capital costs. These were provided for almost 
entirely through charitable contributions. In addition, nonprofit hospitals could 
use a certain amount of endowment capital to cover operating expenses (i.e. for 
the indigent populations)51. Current costs were also kept down because religious 
nursing orders contributed a substantial amount of free labor. It was common 
practice that voluntary hospitals charged for most of the remaining costs.
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Although the nonprofit hospitals were clearly the most successful in obtaining 
capital, voluntary means were spread unevenly throughout the country. In 1928, 
per capita hospital investment was lowest in the South ($6) in comparison with the 
Central Northwest ($14), the Central West ($16), the Far West ($19), and the North 
and North Atlantic regions ($25)52. As a result, Southern states had the largest pro-
portion of proprietary hospitals since they had less access to philanthropic means.
The decline of the proprietary hospital sector
In 1910, proprietary clinics represented fifty-six percent of the total number of 
hospitals, but this had declined to thirty-six percent by 1928. In 1934, when official 
statistics began, proprietary hospitals were operating six percent of beds and this 
slipped to less than three percent a decade later53. The percentage of proprietary 
admissions also decreased dramatically – from thirteen percent (1935) to nine 
percent (1941) and eight percent in 195254.
Why was the proprietary hospital sector reduced so rapidly to a marginal status? 
One reason was that these hospitals were usually very small, and thus their rate 
of institutional survival was also rather low. Between 1928 and 1938, a remark-
able forty-three percent of proprietary individuals and partnerships closed their 
business, a closure rate that was about three times as high as that among nonprofit 
and public facilities55. Like other small business they opened and closed with the 
vicissitudes of personal fortune and the life span of the owner.
More importantly, their proprietary status made them vulnerable to the economic 
downturn of the Great Depression. They lacked the institutional support of public 
and voluntary patrons and were confronted with a severe increase in bad debt. In 
contrast to other ownership types, the funding for proprietary clinics depended 
entirely on their ability to charge patients at full cost. However, in the first year after 
the stock-market crash (1929), hospital receipts per person fell from $236 to $59 
and average deficits rose from fifteen to twenty-one percent of disbursements56. 
Rosemary Stevens tells us that: ‘Small profit-making hospitals were particularly 
hard hit. The number of hospitals owned by individuals or partnerships dropped 
from 1,600 in 1929, to 1,400 in 1933, to 1,200 in 1939; and their occupancy levels 
were consistently lower than those of other types of institutions. Many of the 
proprietary clinics were small, inefficient urban institutions, which were already 
generally outdated. Also for-profit hospitals were much more likely than private 
nonprofit hospitals to enter the Depression with outstanding debts. [...] As their 
clientele of paying patients fell away, they ran a serious risk of bankruptcy. Nor 
were state legislatures or city governments eager to save them. The proprietary 
hospitals had the fewest friends57.’
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Indeed, the average daily census in proprietary hospitals decreased by thirty-
three percent between 1929 and 1933, sixteen percent in voluntary hospitals, 
while it increased by twenty-one percent in low-charging public hospitals58. In 
sharp contrast to public and voluntary institutions, capital investment made by 
proprietary hospitals halved (table 2.3). Physician incomes also dropped severely, 
since patients paid a lower proportion of doctors’ bills than of hospitals’ bills for 
hospitalized illness59 and private practitioners had lost half of their 1929 incomes 
by 193360.
The growing influence of the physicians on health care and their preference for 
working in the prospering nonprofit hospital sector is a more fundamental expla-
nation for the decline of proprietary hospitals. It is important to remember that 
an initial reason for establishing proprietary hospitals was the closed-staff model 
of many public and nonprofit hospitals. However, this model was abandoned after 
1910 and by 1933 five out of six physicians were affiliated with one or more hos-
pitals62. The legitimization of the proprietary hospital as an alternative for some 
physicians for hospital access vanished.
Physician interest groups now became suspicious of corporate hospitals. This 
was partly a consequence of their professional ethics, but physicians also believed 
that any profit belonged to the doctor and not to a lay corporation or supplier 
of capital: the full return on physician labor should go to the doctors. If capital 
was required over and above what doctors could not provide themselves, it would 
have to be contributed ‘gratis’ by the community rather than by investors seeking 
a profit.
The physicians were successful in their lobbying. The development of an 
investor-owned hospital sector was limited by a series of legal decisions. Between 
1905 and 1917, several state courts ruled that corporations could not engage in the 
practice of medicine and that corporate for-profit hospitals violated ‘sound public 
policy’63. Further growth of corporate hospitals was blocked, although there were 
Table 2.3: Hospital investment, funding sources and, occupancy rates during the years 
of the Great Depression61
Investment ($ million) Change (%) Estimated income (1935) Occupancy rate 
(1935)1928 1935 Patients Public 
sources
Federal 123 226 83.7 7.5 92.4 75.0
Other public 293 401 36.9 16.7 81.1 90.2
Nonprofit 1,224 1,369 11.8 70.8 10.2 55.4
Proprietary 209 113 −45.9 91.4 4.1 41.2
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some legal exemptions in Western states where the most existed. According to 
both public opinion and professional ethics, everyone in need had the right to 
be treated at a hospital, which implied that hospital care could not be treated as a 
normal commodity.
From a physician’s perspective, the voluntary open-staff model emerged as the 
preferred place for treatment64. As one author put it in 1932: ‘the legal ownership 
(…) of the great bulk of capital invested in the practice of medicine lies with the 
lay public, but the medical profession exercises a pervasive and in most instances a 
determining influence over the utilization of this capital’65. Market conditions for 
nonprofit ownership types improved. Voluntary leaders became better organized, 
more visible, and more articulate during the Depression. Nonprofit hospitals 
could make the most of their religious affiliations, donations to them were tax-
deductible, they had charitable immunity from malpractice liability66, and – in 
contrast to public clinics – nonprofits were largely exempt from growing govern-
ment regulations67.
We have already seen that nonprofits had the best access to increasingly needed 
capital. Doctors incurred no risks from these investments, but they did hold effec-
tive control over the hospital due to severe and increasing agency problems68. This 
control was further reinforced because physicians were in a position to cut off the 
flow of paying patients, a very important source of revenue69. Nonprofit hospitals 
increasingly disassociated themselves from proprietary and for-profit hospitals, 
and joined together under the banner of voluntarism70. The AMA (1934) made a 
significant revision in its statistics, and classified proprietary hospitals as a sepa-
rate sector, a statement that was meant to legitimize the existence of a voluntary 
hospital sector, occupying the middle ground between tax-supported institutions 
and profit-making institutions71.
The absence of (compulsory) third-party payers
In most European countries, forms of compulsory insurance developed as early 
as the late nineteenth century. These schemes covered physician benefits and pro-
vided some income protection in the event of sickness or funeral costs. In the US, 
the middle classes were the dominant political force, while the working classes 
were much less of a threat to political stability than in Europe. The US middle class 
could turn to a well-developed life insurance sector for income protection and 
funeral money. Physicians’ fees could be paid from comparatively high wages. The 
life insurance lobby played a key role in the defeat of the first attempt to introduce 
compulsory insurance just after World War I72. Consumer clubs and the health 
insurance sector were relatively weak while employer benefits were limited to 
larger corporations in the railways, mining and lumber industries.
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More importantly, doctors were firmly opposed to any party coming between 
them and their patients73. They were not only suspicious of corporate hospitals, 
but also of closed-staff hospitals and third-party payers. They succeeded in kill-
ing off all attempts to introduce compulsory insurance and in limiting voluntary 
insurance until the Great Depression, when physicians began to need insurance 
money. In a world without third-party payers, the balance of supply and demand 
were, during those recession years, not favorable to proprietary hospitals, which 
were confronted with lower utilization and higher levels of bad debt.
During the 1920s, hospital costs increased due to increased volumes and higher 
unit costs. In addition, the variation in medical costs increased, heightening 
the risk of personal failures. The Committee on the Costs of Medical Care, a 
self-declared independent body, started to research health care costs. The Com-
mittee published twenty-seven reports between 1927 and 1932, which were highly 
influential at the time. The Committee opposed compulsory insurance, but the 
majority of the members approved prepaid group practice plans on a nonprofit 
basis (Blue Cross and Blue Shield). The new Democrat President Roosevelt, fac-
ing mass unemployment and increasing membership of voluntary and indemnity 
health insurance, chose not to seek to introduce a compulsory health insurance 
scheme, but to concentrate on other social issues74.
The new nonprofit Blue Cross plans became regional monopolies while a ma-
jority of their directors represented the major nonprofit hospitals. The nonprofit 
hospitals were thus much better positioned within the boards of the Blues than the 
proprietary facilities. Blue Cross negotiated reimbursement rates that were often 
lower for proprietary hospitals than for their nonprofit counterparts75. Indeed, 
in Minneapolis and St. Paul, explicit standards meant that hospitals had to be 
nonprofit if they wanted to be reimbursed by Blue Cross schemes: the number 
of proprietary hospitals declined from eight-five (1934) to sixty-one (1940), and 
twenty-six (1950). Most Blue Cross schemes confirmed the right of all physicians 
to have hospital appointments, breaking down any remnants of the system of 
closed-staff hospitals76.
The Blue Cross plans were popular among middle class Americans. The termi-
nation of sliding fees and community rating meant that, for the middle and upper 
classes, pre-paid hospital costs remained a modest percentage of their income. 
Initially, there was only limited competition for the Blues from commercial 
indemnity insurers, which imposed no controls on proprietary hospitals but 
received no tax-exemptions and only operated in the group market. In 1940, com-
mercial insurance companies insured 3.7 million people, while the Blues covered 
over 6 million and by 1945, the Blues counted 19 million subscribers, about three-
quarters of the market77. By that time, the US had established some sort of a health 
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insurance system, although only twenty percent of the population was protected 
against excessive hospital costs.
2.2.3 Reaching the bottom: proprietary hospitals before Medicare
The policies that followed World War II provided an ideal environment for the 
nonprofit hospital sector78. Meanwhile, the proprietary hospital sector declined 
even further, especially in the 1950s, but reached a bottom during the early 1960s 
(table 2.4). During this period, hospitals often passed through a proprietary stage 
before converting permanently to non-profit status79. Proprietary hospitals held a 
large share of the hospital base in the South and in the West. In 1950, eight south-
ern states reported more for-profit than nonprofit hospitals: Alabama, Arkansas, 
Georgia, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia80.
The share of for-profit hospitals and beds declined in all areas of the country, 
but this was most marked in the Northern central areas and in the South. In 1970, 
the West passed the South as the region with the largest share of for-profit hospital 
beds. In the South, new Hill-Burton funds financed the construction of many new 
nonprofit and public hospitals (table 2.5).
Three factors seem important to the changing fortunes of the proprietary sector 
and these will be discussed in the remainder of this section81. 1) The Hill-Burton 
Table 2.4: Non-federal short-term and special hospitals by ownership (1946–1965)83
Nonprofit Public Proprietary Total Total number
of hospitals
1946 total 2,584   785 1,076 4,445 4,445
Net gain or loss
1946–1950 + 287 + 157 + 142 + 586 5,031
1950–1955 + 226 + 178 − 198 + 206 5,237
1955–1960 + 194 + 140 − 164 + 170 5,407
1960–1965 + 135 + 193 +   1 + 329 5,736
Table 2.5: Percentage of for-profit hospitals and beds in different regions84
Northeast North Central South West
Hospitals Beds Hospitals Beds Hospitals Beds Hospitals Beds
1940 14 5 24 6 50 20 36 13
1950 10 4 14 4 41 18 26 9
1960 7 4 6 2 31 11 17 8
1970 9 5 2 1 21 10 19 11
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program supported the nonprofit hospital sector, which continued to grow until 
the enactment of the Medicare/Medicaid legislation. 2) Research supports the 
hypothesis that the growth of health insurance stimulated the prevalence of propri-
etary clinics due to the better prospect of making a profit82. 3) The relative position 
of the proprietary hospital sector versus the nonprofit hospitals weakened.
Financing new nonprofit infrastructure: The Hill-Burton program
The Lanham Act (1941–1946), a program of public works for the creation of a 
community infrastructure in defense areas, established the important precedent 
of allowing federal aid to nonprofit as well as local government institutions. The 
House bill left open the possibility of grants to for-profit hospitals, but profit-
making institutions were excluded at the conference stage between House and 
Senate85. This laid the foundations for postwar hospital planning, which arrived 
comparatively early in the US and predated ‘universal’ insurance coverage. The 
federal government limited its financial activity in the health care sector to the 
expansion of medical research funding and the construction of new hospitals.
The Hospital Survey and Construction Act (1946), more popularly known as the 
Hill-Burton Act, was a large program of public works to build new hospitals. This 
was considered necessary because of the growing demand and declining capital 
plant that resulted from low levels of investment during the depression years and 
World War II. The American Hospital Association86 had already recommended 
a huge program of hospital construction during the war and there was broad 
political support for such a proposal. Hill-Burton would continue until 1975 and 
invested over four billion dollars in new hospital construction87.
What were the important features of the program? 1) The states, not the federal 
government, decided on the distribution of the money. 2) The states were allocated 
federal funding on the basis of their population and per capita income88. This 
measure favored low-income Southern states where large numbers of proprietary 
hospitals were operating and where there was a recognized lack of adequate hos-
pitals. In the South, the number of beds now grew gradually to match the national 
average89. 3) The Hill-Burton program provided for matching funds. Initially, com-
munities had to raise two-thirds of the construction costs themselves. 4) The final 
constraint of central importance to this book was that proprietary hospitals were 
ineligible for Hill Burton funds.
The Hill-Burton program met the capital needs of nonprofit hospitals and con-
struction spending rose above ten percent of total health care expenditure90. 
Hill-Burton, administered by its own administrative agency, was a major help 
for the nonprofit hospital sector. Feshbach states: ‘the Bureau of Hospitals (a 
public planning agency91) acted to protect the economic position of voluntary 
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hospitals more effectively than the industry or individual hospitals could do 
themselves’92.
Hill-Burton funds were distributed as ‘loans’, which would be repaid by the 
provision of a reasonable amount of free care to people who otherwise would have 
ended up as the responsibility of the government93. However, there was minimal 
enforcement of this condition, if any at all, since the underlying expectation was 
that nonprofit and public hospitals could be trusted to further the public good. 
Uncollectibles represented only 3.5 percent of the charges of nonprofit hospitals 
(1953), but 5.9 percent for proprietary hospitals, and 6.2 percent for public hos-
pitals94. In 1972, the ‘official’ standard for indigent care became the lower of a) 
three percent of operating expenses minus any Medicare and Medicaid costs on 
free care, or b) ten percent of inflation-adjusted federal capital assistance95. The 
federal government also required that the remaining useful life and value of the 
Hill-Burton assets be repaid when a nonprofit was purchased by a for-profit hos-
pital. Thus, there were few conversions from nonprofit status to for-profit status96.
Because of Hill-Burton, nonprofits had much better access to capital than for-
profit hospitals. In essence, the government was supplying the additional capital 
that philanthropy was no longer able to provide. Hill-Burton meant that nonprofit 
hospitals paid a (much) lower price for capital than for-profit hospitals and, as a 
result, were able to operate with an excessively high capital-labor ratio97. Michael 
Davis, a well-known scholar at the time, observed that: ‘the predominance of so-
cial capital has continued. Proprietary hospitals have diminished in absolute and 
relative importance (…). More capital per physician is required than formerly’98.
Since for-profit hospitals were not eligible for Hill-Burton funds, they had no legal 
obligations to provide free care to the poor 99. Some for-profit hospitals converted 
to nonprofit status to obtain access to Hill-Burton funds, which led Lave and 
Lave (1974) to suggest that Hill-Burton may have contributed to the decline of 
for-profit hospitals. This is reflected by the trend to replace for-profit hospitals 
with nonprofits or public facilities in smaller communities and rural areas100. The 
rapid decline of the proprietary hospital share in Southern states underscores such 
reasoning (table 2.5). Nevertheless, in some areas capital spending by nonprofits 
triggered a competitive dynamic, which led ineligible for-profit hospitals to un-
dertake construction work. In such cases, for-profit hospitals used Hill-Burton 
planning documents, which showed the extent of local need within states, to 
secure private financing for their projects101. However, the consequences were 
often not appreciated.
Between 1954 and 1957, New York state for-profit hospital beds increased at a 
rate of 32.6 percent while all other hospital beds increased at the much lower rate of 
5.1 percent102. In response, state and local planning agencies103 sought to eliminate 
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‘unfair competition’ from ‘fly by night’ proprietary hospitals. The perceived lack of 
quality of the care provided by for-profits was an important issue in such discus-
sions. In 1960, only fifteen out of forty proprietary hospitals in New York were 
accredited, while seventy percent of Blue Cross payments going to unaccredited 
facilities went to proprietary hospitals104. Such critical indicators were underlined 
by the widespread idea that: ‘everybody knew that for-profit motivation was a 
menace to the health of patients and the finances of payers’105. A view that was 
supported by a renowned expert such as Milton Roemer: ‘there can be no doubt 
of the corrupting influence of profit-making in American health service. The 
unnecessary surgery (…), the entrepreneurialism of substandard nursing homes 
and proprietary hospitals – these and other problems are real’106. What happened 
was that additional licensing and fire-and-safety regulations forced many small 
proprietary hospitals to close107.
Voluntary coverage for health insurance
The number of Americans with health insurance coverage increased during the 
decade following World War II. In 1949, Blue Cross had thirty-one million sub-
scribers; commercial indemnity insurers added an additional twenty-eight million 
enrollees; and independent plans (including direct-service organizations) covered 
four million. The strength of commercial indemnity insurance increased. By 1953, 
these carriers provided hospital insurance for twenty-nine percent of Americans, 
Blue Cross for twenty-seven percent, and independent plans for seven percent108. 
For the sick poor without health insurance, Congress approved a system of ‘vendor 
payments’ – federal grants to states for direct third-party payments to hospitals 
and physicians109.
The government supported the private insurance system by exempting 
employers’ contributions from taxes. Besides, unions were given the right to 
bargain collectively for health benefits110. This stimulated the development of an 
employer-based insurance system; by 1950, employers were paying thirty-seven 
percent of workers’ net health care costs, up from ten percent in 1945111. Although 
unions preferred these to commercial indemnity insurance, provider-organized 
Blue Cross plans began to lose some of their dominance. Employers often favored 
the more flexible indemnity insurance policies112. Where hospitals were primarily 
proprietary or government-owned, indemnity insurance often dominated113. This 
was partly caused by the traditional ties between Blue Cross and local nonprofit 
hospitals. On the other hand, in such areas, indemnity insurers bore less cost shift-
ing, since proprietary hospitals delivered less free care and public hospitals relied 
on tax sources to serve the indigent.
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The increase in insurance coverage benefited the entire hospital sector. Now, most 
of the money for hospital bills was taken out of employees’ paychecks in the form 
of payroll deductions of insurance premiums. Hospital bad debt eased and their 
business model improved. The climate for hospitals was further enhanced by 
another development. Due to improved medicine and better incomes, a change 
occurred in the public’s attitude towards paying for hospital services. The better 
prospects for the hospitals can be summarized by an interesting citation from 
Rufus Rorem, one of the founders of Blue Cross, in a 1950 article114: ‘Hospital 
patients are paying more money, with less complaint, than ever before. When 
private hospital bills averaged $5 a day, only a small percentage of patients paid full 
costs. Now, when ward hospital bills averaged $12 a day, most patients expect to 
pay their hospital bill, or present a good reason for not doing so. A generation ago, 
people didn’t bother to complain about the costs. They merely accepted the ser-
vices free and complained about the food. Why this change in point of view? In my 
opinion it rests in the basic change in the public’s attitude toward hospitalization. 
Thirty years ago, hospital service was essentially a charitable function provided by 
one group of the population for the benefit of another group, through taxation or 
voluntary philanthropy. The people who supported the hospitals financially were 
not the people who utilized their services. [...] The situation has changed. Now, 
almost anyone may be a hospital patient. On the average, each family will provide 
a hospital case every two or three years. This greater frequency of use was ac-
companied by a rising price level for wages and supplies, without a proportionate 
increase in endowment income, voluntary contributions, or tax appropriations. 
The hospital gradually had been transformed from a charitable service for the 
poor to a self-supporting service for the entire population. The people who pay 
the bills are now the same people as the ones who receive the service’115.
Proprietary hospitals on the market: decreasing profits
The difficult position of the proprietary hospital sector was reflected in its profit-
ability. Between 1946 and 1965, the margins of proprietary hospitals decreased 
steadily. Nonprofit and public hospitals caught up with proprietary clinics in terms 
of patient income as a percentage of total income, thus stabilizing their revenue 
base. In comparison with nonprofit hospitals, the profit margin of for-profits 
declined more rapidly (see table 2.6).
In many aspects the 1950s represented the heyday of the voluntary sector. They 
benefited from a great deal of free labor: in 1961, there were thought to be 1.2 
million members of hospital auxiliaries, a number not far short of the total num-
ber of paid employees. In the northeast, where the most nonprofit hospitals were 
located, unpaid labor was highest, while it was lowest in the southeastern states 
where many proprietary clinics existed116. Nonprofit hospitals were specifically 
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exempted from the Taft-Harley Act (1947) on the grounds of their public role, 
allowing them the privilege of not recognizing collective bargain agents and fir-
ing union sympathizers at will. In these respects, workers in voluntary hospitals 
lacked the job protection of workers in profit-making hospitals117.
Physicians might actually have encountered more constraints in proprietary 
clinics than in nonprofit hospitals, both financially and in terms of operational 
control. Nonprofit hospitals were seen as ideal workshops for physicians: they 
enjoyed excellent remuneration, maximum control over most aspects of their 
workplace, and no financial risk. During the decades that followed World War II, 
most developments and public policies favored the nonprofit hospital sector; the 
proprietary sector contracted or, at best, stood still.
2.2.4 Medicare/Medicaid: for-profit hospitals set for a new start
Hospitals suffered from significant levels of bad debt from elderly patients who 
could not afford to pay hospital bills out-of-pocket. Because of their high-risk 
profile, elders could not afford or were denied private health insurance, and the 
scale of this problem only increased until by the late 1950s, competition from 
commercial carriers, who offered experience-rated plans, forced the Blues to 
abandon community rating, eliminating the subsidies that it implied for high-risk 
groups119.
The intention of Medicare and Medicaid was to extend the existing social security 
system to which it was modelled, so that the elderly could be sure that their savings 
and pensions would not be wiped out by costly, and at their age unavoidable, hos-
Table 2.6: Finances of non-federal short-term hospitals, 1946–1965118
1946 1955 1965
Expense per patient day ($)
 Nonprofit hospitals 10.04 23.12 44.48
 Public hospitals  7.39 20.62 41.84
 Proprietary hospitals 10.13 21.25 43.74
Patient income as percent of total income
 Nonprofit hospitals 83.5 91.4 93.6
 Public hospitals 57.1 n/a n/a
 Proprietary hospitals 96.9 96.9 96.1
Percentage difference between revenues and expenses
 Nonprofit hospitals +  4.4 +  1.5 + 3.4
 Proprietary hospitals + 12.5 + 10.6 + 8.3
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pitalization. The poor would also have access to care. After slow economic growth 
in the 1950s, momentum increased in the early 1960s and between 1961 and 1965, 
the real economy grew twenty-five percent120. Political support for reforms also 
increased and President Lyndon Johnson, who was very committed to expanding 
health care insurance, announced an unconditional war on poverty in America. 
He stands alone as the most effective health care president in American history121.
The problems of the elderly rose to the top of the policy agenda. In 1965, 
Medicare brought in compulsory hospital insurance for all those over sixty-five 
years of age, while the Medicaid program expanded federal assistance to the states 
for medical care for the poor, replacing more limited programs122. Medicare was 
financed from employer and employee payroll taxes paid into an earmarked trust 
fund. The federal government was to become a major stakeholder through Medi-
care, and thus a potentially powerful source of regulation123.
However, in an effort to implement the program as quickly as possible, the gov-
ernment did not, and could not, opt for an intermediating role for itself. Medicare’s 
benefits, reimbursement mechanisms, administration and structure of insurance 
all reflected prevailing practices in the American private sector. Existing third-
party payers, which were needed to implement the program, were given significant 
discretionary powers such as provider reimbursement, claims processing, and 
auditing. Hospitals were free to choose their own intermediary for the new federal 
funds, and ninety percent chose Blue Cross124. Blue Cross was generally sympa-
thetic to the interests of the hospitals and Medicare broadly replicated existing 
private fee-for-service paying practices. By any measure, Medicare and Medicaid 
represented a watershed for hospital funding. I will first describe the direct impact 
of these programs on the proprietary hospital sector. I will then proceed to discuss 
how they pre-structured the ‘unavoidable’ cost-containment policies of the 1970s.
The impact of Medicare and Medicaid on the for-profit hospital sector: much 
improved investment opportunities
Between 1965 and 1973, health expenditure rose from 4.4 to 11.3 percent of the 
federal budget. Primarily, these funds contributed to massive hospital payroll and 
non-payroll expenses – including profits – and far less to increases in utilization. 
In 1972 Medicare included end-stage renal disease as an additional benefit. For-
profits quickly and totally dominated the provision in this specific disease category. 
Medicare worked to the advantage of new for-profit hospital chains, covering what 
for them had previously been bad debt. For-profit hospitals captured additional 
market share: their assets increased from a negligible $243 million, or two percent 
of total hospital assets (1960), towards $ 3.5 billion, or six percent of hospital assets 
(1977)125.
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Medicare’s reimbursement procedures favored the hospital sector as a whole. In 
essence, hospitals were reimbursed for whatever charges they billed without direct 
administrative supervision by the federal government126. Hospitals were paid 
according to their costs, including depreciation on assets, and a return on sup-
plied capital. Such a cost-based reimbursement covered most costs, thus reducing 
insolvency risks as well as efficiency incentives. It is important to bear in mind that 
costs often do not equal actual hospital expenses, and that a favorable calculation 
of hospital costs generally induces profits. Medicare provided the most capital to 
the hospitals with the newest and most expensive facilities, without any review 
of their actual needs. Investors that built new hospitals could pass the bill on to 
federal government and thus a ‘medical arms race’ developed127. In the absence 
of strong federal ground rules, Blue Cross intermediaries had a fair degree of dis-
cretionary power; when the interests of the federal government and the hospitals 
conflicted, Blue Cross favor the latter128.
The actual remuneration of capital is critical in the choices investors make. 
Medicare did not control the future direction of the hospital system by controlling 
capital expenditure; its main focus was protecting the incomes of the elderly129. 
This created major business opportunities and it is important to discuss these in 
some detail. 1) Medicare payments for patient care included allowances for the 
estimated replacement costs of hospital plant and equipment130: depreciation costs 
were defined on a current base; the habit of historical depreciation and up-front 
payments came to an end. 2) Hospitals were paid another two percent for the 
future improvement of assets on top of this depreciation. 3) Interest expenses were 
also reimbursed and providing for-profit hospitals with an additional return on 
invested capital131. 4) The latter was an important advantage to for-profit hospitals 
versus other ownership-types. The rationale being that if for-profits were reim-
bursed on a strictly cost basis, thus without an additional allowance for the cost 
of equity financing, the supply of such funds would not provide any investment 
return and that source of funding would dry up132. The calculated returns were 
generous: prior to 1982 the allowance was set at 1.5 times the rate of return earned 
by Medicare’s Hospital Insurance Trust Fund. Then, legislation reduced the amount 
to the same rate as the fund; this was still the equivalent of forty percent of all 
Medicare capital payments, a disproportionately larger share in relation to the size 
of the for-profit hospital sector133. 5) Medicare also contributed to the purchase 
price of a hospital by recognizing additional depreciation expenses in relation to 
the purchase price. How did this come about? The purchaser usually paid more for 
the acquired hospital than its depreciated book value. Thus, although the acquired 
assets themselves were the same, depreciation expenses rose, and were generally 
covered by Medicare134. 6) Another for-profit advantage came through corporate 
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tax law, which permitted owners of hospital buildings to use accelerated deprecia-
tion over a fifteen-year period. Thus, a hospital building that would normally have 
an estimated useful life of forty years could be written off in fifteen years. From a 
corporate tax perspective, it could also have paid to change ownership every six 
or seven years because, by that time, more than half of the facility’s depreciation 
could be taken. Interests on loans obtained to finance the acquisition as well as 
accelerated depreciation on the hospital’s newly established value were deductible 
from income. 7) Purchasers of hospital assets could also qualify for an investment 
tax credit on at least some of the equipment acquired135. 8) Finally, as a result of 
the inclusion of capital costs in third party reimbursements, nonprofit hospitals 
also had to contend with the phasing out of the Hill-Burton program, which ended 
the head start they had enjoyed from this source of funding vis-à-vis for-profit 
hospitals136.
The combination of the above factors meant that for-profit hospitals now bore 
only a minor risk on their capital investments. This could explain why they were 
much more indebted than their nonprofit or governmental counterparts. In 1982, 
for-profit hospital chains had a total debt-to-equity ratio of 1.25 compared to 0.79 
for all hospitals137. For-profits were helped most by Medicare, but nonprofit hospi-
tals retained one important advantage. In 1963, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
issued a ruling that permitted a county or municipality to issue tax-exempt bonds 
for the benefit of nonprofit hospitals138. The majority of states passed enabling 
legislation permitting nonprofit hospitals to benefit from tax-exempt bonds139. 
Tax-exempt bonds became the backbone of capital funding for this type of hos-
pital and were used so frequently that they were allocated a separate category in 
debt-financing statistics. Section 242 of the National Housing Act (1968) allowed 
hospitals to ‘insure’ their default risk, which further lowered the cost of bor-
rowing140. The importance of philanthropy and public grants diminished, while 
dependence on debt financing grew (see table 2.7).
For-profit hospitals were able to fund a considerable share of their capital needs 
through commercial equity141. Stock issues became popular as hospital stock 
prices grew rapidly during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Between 1978 and 1983, 
new stock issues frequently accounted for more then fifty percent of the increase 
in the equity of the companies involved142. On the other hand, the financing of 
the nonprofit hospitals was threatened by efforts to restrict tax-exemption instru-
ments as well as by the steep rise in interest rates143. Together with lavish capital 
reimbursement policies, the favorable environment provided by the financial mar-
kets increased the financial power of the for-profit hospital companies. The ability 
of for-profit chains to gain capital and modernize public or nonprofit hospitals 
was a major factor in the willingness of the owners to sell off these facilities. Most 
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for-profit chains modernized the newly acquired facilities, while simultaneously 
substantially increasing charges for ancillary services and increasing reimbursable 
costs for capital, return-on-equity, and overhead expenses144.
Cost containment through government intervention: no impact on the for-profit 
hospital sector
In 1968 and 1969, Medicare costs rose at an average annual rate of fort percent. 
Russel Long, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, warned that Medicare 
had become a runaway program. President Richard Nixon proclaimed the first 
‘fiscal health care crisis’146. Importantly, the government had to create cost-con-
tainment mechanisms from scratch. The Nixon Administration imposed a general 
wage-price freeze in August 1971 and increases remained limited until 1974. Such 
a bold instrument illustrates how few options were open to the federal government 
to reduce hospital costs at that point147. This encouraged policymakers to look for 
other mechanisms, particularly market-based competition148.
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), a new variant of the old direct-
service plans, were proposed as a new method of promoting efficiency. HMOs, 
which finally took off many years later, were different to the old direct-service 
plans in one important respect. The Nixon administration, and later more espe-
cially the Reagan administration, welcomed profit-making corporations as part of 
the HMO sector149. Market forces were seen as an important way of improving ef-
ficiency. This was stipulated by a new set of definitions: the AHA now categorized 
proprietary hospitals as for-profit or investor-owned; voluntary hospitals became 
not-for-profit; surpluses were seen as indications of effective management150, 
although early researchers remained skeptical of the appropriateness of for profit 
hospitals151.
Confronted with spiraling Medicaid costs, states sought a more pragmatic ap-
proach to cost containment. In 1964, New York required all hospitals to obtain 
state approval for expansion or new construction work. By the end of 1972, twenty 
states had introduced a requirement for hospitals to obtain state approval for 
construction projects and large capital investments, known as certificate-of-need 
Table 2.7: Trends in Funding for Hospital Construction 1973–1981 (percent of total)145
1968 1973 1978 1981
Governmental grants and appropriations 23 21 16 12
Philanthropy 21 10 6 4
Hospital reserves 16 15 17 15
Debt 38 54 61 69
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programs (CON). In some of the more liberal states, consumer representatives 
formed alliances with the local government officials responsible for enforcing CON 
regulations in order to target the unpopular for-profits152. Note that such ‘plan-
ning’ was often more holding meetings, consulting and communication instead of 
analysis of empirical data to foster alternative policy decisions153. In New York the 
for-profits were effectively phased out (see section 2.2.3). The federal government 
reinforced the impact of state policies and in 1974 denied the full reimbursement 
of capital in the Medicare program unless planning agencies had approved the in-
vestment for which reimbursement was being sought154. Rate-setting was another 
way of containing costs. Again, the states led the way. By 1976, six states – Con-
necticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Washington – had 
adopted mandatory rate-setting programs for hospitals. Eventually, discounts by 
rate-setting would lead to significant cost-shifts to private insurers155.
Physicians: a change of view towards for-profit ownership
The AMA was an important organization in health care for much of the twentieth 
century and was also the primary defender of physician autonomy (and corporat-
ism156) as a way to maximize income157. For a long time, this meant defending 
fee-for-service medicine and rejecting corporate ownership: physicians had a 
natural ‘right’ to any profits (see section 2.2.2). However, from the mid-1960s on-
wards, AMA dominance was increasingly challenged by government regulation, 
large for-profit and nonprofit hospital chains, giant health insurance corporations, 
and salary-paying HMOs158.
Entrepreneurism and activism on the part of physicians was also encouraged. 
For-profit hospitals developed a habit of soliciting and ‘selling’ stock in proprietary 
hospitals to local doctors159. Nonprofit hospitals’ effort to become comprehensive 
community medical centers induces conflict between medical profession and 
hospital management160. Often the medical staff wants the hospital to remain a 
private doctor’s workshop, which sometimes seemed to be better guaranteed in a 
for-profit context.
The internal cohesion of the AMA on such issues began to break down as more 
physicians became entrepreneurs themselves and the membership of the associa-
tion gradually fell from seventy percent of all US physicians to forty percent by 
the early 1990s161. In 1984, fifty-two percent of physicians already believed that 
hospitals could be properly operated on a for-profit basis162 and investor-owned 
hospitals began to be built with the explicit support of discontented physicians163. 
As physicians came to derive more of their revenues from testing done in their own 
laboratories and from the services of the nurse practitioners they employed, the 
AMA (1980) changed its ethical guideline that a physician’s professional income 
should be derived solely from medical services personally delivered to patients. In 
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1984, the AMA stated that: ‘physician ownership interest in a commercial venture 
with the potential for abuses is not in itself unethical if the physician took certain 
precautions such as full disclosure to patients’164.
2.2.5 The take-off of the for-profit hospital sector (1965–1983)
Before Medicare and Medicaid, the proprietary hospital sector was dominated by 
three categories of ownership: individuals, partnerships, and corporations (see 
table 2.2). These entities usually owned perhaps one or, at most, a few hospitals. 
The primary goal of profit making was the continued existence of the hospital. 
For-profit hospital chains that focused on expansion and maximizing profits 
did not yet exist. However, the generous way that Medicare reimbursed (equity) 
capital and the less hostile opinions of the doctors brought about an environment 
that was conducive to a different kind of for-profit hospital sector (section 2.2.4). 
The argument that for-profit companies were simply uninterested in delivering 
hospital services vanished, and with it the argument that voluntary hospitals were 
essential165. While economic development remained lackluster during much of 
the 1970s and 1980s, hospitals turned into a very profitable sector.
The emergence of for-profit hospital chains
The ownership of multiple hospitals by public corporations dates back to 1960, 
when American Medical International (AMI) purchased two hospitals166. In the 
same year, the Health Corporation of America (HCA) opened Park View Hospi-
tal167. However, it was not until the late 1960s that significant growth began168. 
When HCA went public in 1969, stocks were priced at $18, but by the end of the 
day had soared to $46169. Investors clearly thought hospitals were a good invest-
ment. In 1969, twenty-one percent of all for-profit hospitals belonged to a hospital 
chain170. Old state laws against the corporate practice of medicine (see section 
2.2.2) were no major barriers171, although they precluded the direct employment 
of physicians by investor-owned companies172.
For-profit chains invested in new hospital plant as well as acquiring existing 
stand-alone proprietary clinics. Physicians controlled many older proprietary 
clinics that were actually not that different from nonprofit hospitals, which were 
also dominated by their medical staff173. Many of such proprietary facilities were 
by now being purchased by hospital chains because they had limited access to 
capital, lacked the skills to exploit reimbursement loopholes, and were unable to 
navigate the red tape of the new planning laws.
The entrance of the for-profit hospital companies onto the market was a major 
change, but they were joined by hybrid organizations that combined profit and 
nonprofit elements – nonprofit contract management by for-profit firms174and 
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nonprofits with for-profit subsidiaries175. The growth of the for-profit chains was 
huge: ‘after their emergence […], the profit making chains grew faster in the 1970s 
than the computer industry. In 1970 the largest for-profit chain controlled twenty-
three hospitals; by 1980 the same company, Hospital Corporation of America 
(HCA), owned or managed more than three hundred hospitals with 40,000 beds. 
In 1981 the for-profit making chains owned or managed hospitals with 121,741 
beds, up sixty-eight percent over the total of 72,282 beds they had five years ear-
lier’176. Table 2.8 summarizes the growth of hospital chains, which is much faster 
than the growth of the for-profit sector as a whole. In 1982, chains operated sixty-
five percent of all for-profit hospitals and eighty percent of all for-profit beds177. 
Investor-owned systems grew largely through the acquisition of (proprietary) 
hospitals in financial difficulty – an inventory by the General Accounting Office 
(GAO) of eleven acquired hospitals (1981) showed that nine were running severe 
operating losses178.
For-profit hospital chains proved very profitable. During the 1970s and early 
1980s, stock returns for five large for-profit hospital companies were almost three 
times as large as returns in other sectors181. In 1982, for-profit hospital chains had 
Table 2.8: Investor-owned hospitals179 and beds: chains versus the total for-profit 
 sector180
Chain-owned 
for-profit hospitals
Percent of total 
hospitals
Percent of total beds Stand-alone 
for-profit hospitals
1975 378  6.3 5.3 682
1980 531  9.0 7.5 n/a
1982 682 11.6 8.9 330
1983 767 13.1 9.8 n/a
1984 878 n/a n/a 303
Table 2.9: Profitability by ownership and chain status, 1982 (percent)184
Return on Equity Return on Assets Total Margin
All hospitals 7.5 4.2 4.3
Government, independent 5.6 3.7 3.8
Government, chain −1.6 −0.9 −0.7
Nonprofit, independent 7.1 3.9 4.2
Nonprofit, chain 9.8 5.0 5.2
For-profit, independent 35.1 10.8 7.1
For-profit, chain 26.4 11.7 9.2
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a return on equity of twenty-six percent; return on capital was twelve percent, 
while the total margin was still nine percent. These were much better figures than 
the profitability of public and nonprofit hospitals (see table 2.9). Scholars argue 
that a higher return on equity among for-profit hospitals was only natural because 
of their higher risk-premium182. For-profit capital seems to have been comple-
mentary to (increasing the lack of) public and nonprofit capital: ‘Where there is 
a strong philanthropic tradition, and demand for hospital care is not large (or 
not growing), the price [of capital PJ] can be quite low, since all needed capital 
is furnished with cheap, voluntarily donated capital. Where demand is large and 
the philanthropic tradition weak, then it is efficient to have for-profit firms, a high 
price for not-for-profit output, and an even higher price for for-profit firms’183.
How can we characterize the typical for-profit chain hospital? Many chain hos-
pitals were located in the South, Southwest, and West185. They were medium-sized 
(with 100–200 beds) with no residency programs. For-profit market share grew 
most rapidly in states with the greatest increases of per capita income and popula-
tion and where for-profits had already held a significant market share186. Legal 
restraints, such as certificate-of-need procedures, were important, but there is 
little evidence that the nonprofit sector ‘captured’ such regulations as a competitive 
weapon against for-profit hospitals187. However, virtually none of the for-profit 
chain hospitals was located in rate-setting states188. Nashville became the epicenter 
of the for-profit health services industry. Eventually, the city would be home to 
more than 450 healthcare companies and support firms, many of which sprang 
from Nashville-based HCA189. The for-profit hospital industry now employs more 
than 300,000 employees in the region.
For-profit hospital chains: more similarity with public and nonprofit hospitals?
For-profit hospital chains differed in a number of ways from their nonprofit coun-
terparts. They included many more hospitals than the competing nonprofit chains; 
a few large companies that operated on a national scene dominated the for-profit 
hospital sector. For-profit hospitals rarely operated residency programs or affili-
ated with medical schools. They were also more focused on inpatient treatment. 
Nonprofit hospitals held more outpatient and emergency departments, more 
home care programs, and more nurseries for premature deliveries190. Physicians in 
for-profit chains seem least likely to have been involved in a salaried relationship 
and were the most satisfied with the responsiveness of the hospital towards their 
needs191.
On other characteristics, for-profit and nonprofit hospitals seem to have 
converged192. With the phasing-out of Hill-Burton and the decline of charitable 
contributions, capital requirements were met mainly through retained earnings 
and debt193. Net nonprofit operating margins on patient treatments, which had 
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traditionally often been negative, now became positive194. Another trend was the 
emergence of for-profit/nonprofit hybrids. For-profit chains managed nonprofit 
and public hospitals, while some nonprofit hospitals established for-profit subsid-
iaries, such as ambulatory surgery centers195. However, converging characteristics 
were the most obvious in the scale and scope of the for-profit hospital sector. This 
is illustrated by the convergence in the average number of hospital beds. Nonprofit 
hospitals had operated on a much larger scale than for-profits until the early 1960s 
but by 2000, the average nonprofit hospital was only thirty percent larger than the 
typical for-profit hospital (figure 2.1).
David calculated the reasons behind this development. Between 1970 and 1978, 
this trend primarily reflected the creation of larger for-profit hospitals (construc-
tion) and the gradual disappearance of small proprietary hospitals, the latter 
being a trend that continued into the early 1990s. Ownership conversions from 
nonprofit to for-profit played a much smaller role. Between 1978 and 1986, large 
newly built for-profit facilities were no longer contributing to this convergence in 
scale. Nevertheless, the trend continued due to the continuing exit of small propri-
etary facilities and because nonprofit hospitals were downsizing. The conversion 
of small nonprofit and, more notably, public hospitals into for-profit ownership 
only mitigated this trend partially196. In the 1990s, mergers, acquisitions of non-
profit hospitals, and divestitures became the most important factors197. During 
this period, the convergence trend began to slow: between 2000 and 2005, there 
was a downward trend in the average number of beds in for-profit hospitals, while 
average nonprofit bed numbers remained stable198.
Figure 2.1: Convergence in average nonprofit-to-for-profit bed ratio199
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2.2.6 The IOM’s report on for-profit health care
In 1980, Ronald Reagan entered the White House with a strongly conservative 
agenda. The new emphasis on markets and deeply felt mistrust of the public sector 
strongly influenced the political climate. The new government had no reserva-
tions about the appropriateness of for-profit medicine. For health care, this natural 
corollary of this change in the Zeitgeist was more for-profit ownership and market 
competition. Nevertheless, the strong growth of the for-profit hospital corpora-
tions led to uneasiness in many quarters. The mainstream health care community 
resented the success of the large for-profit hospital chains200. Arnold Relman, 
editor of the New England Journal of Medicine, was among the first to criticize 
the emergence of a ‘new medical-industrial complex’201. He was supported by 
the American Public Health Association202. Some independent reports were also 
critical: the General Accounting Office documented sharp increases in Medicare 
charges after nonprofit or public hospitals converted to for-profit ownership203. 
Given the vast growth of for-profit hospital chains, some even wondered whether 
the nonprofit sector might eventually disappear204.
A Committee in Implications of For-Profit Enterprise in Health Care
Large-scale research into the issue of for-profit hospital care, ‘was stimulated by 
concerns among members of the Institute of Medicine and others that health ser-
vices, already heavily dependent on monetary transactions through prepayment 
and insurance, will become excessively commercialized, with growing ownership 
by stockholders’205. The Committee on the Implications of For-Profit Enterprise 
in Health Care was chaired by Walter McNerney and consisted of twenty-two 
members, including some from for-profit hospital corporations. After two years of 
research, they issued their report in 1986.
The Committee carried out its work against the backdrop of concern that for 
the first time, there was a serious possibility that the New Deal legacy may be 
dismantled. However, it was unable to come up with a way of resolving the issue, 
an indication of broader public discord206. Discussing the growth of private capi-
tal investment and reliance on market mechanisms, Relman concluded that: ‘no 
political decision has been made to rely on this method of financing health care 
– or that the implications of such a decision have even been explored or publicly 
discussed [...] the public has not given its approval of that trend, and many people 
have not even thought about it’207. The Committee could not devise a solution 
unilaterally: ‘the report should be viewed as a benchmark and not the final answer 
to the issues addressed. Its essence lies in an illumination of the issues, not in 
their resolution’208. Nevertheless, the Committee agreed that ownership was an 
important variable that affected the entire health care system.
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The Committee’s focus on ownership also meant that the (conceptual) relation-
ships between for-profit organizations and the constraints of the market place 
had not been worked out. However, the Committee did not entirely neglect the 
impact of a changing environment and of new policy incentives on the endog-
enous constraints on the various types of hospital ownership. They discussed the 
significant problems surrounding the distinction between for-profit and nonprofit 
ownership, as well as the fact that a sharpening of the competitive environment 
and the diminishing differences in access to capital may lead towards decreasing 
ownership related differences209.
However, at the same time, the Committee did not accept that public policy 
should aim to create a level playing field between the different types of ownership; 
substantive goals regarding costs, access, and quality were thought more appropri-
ate210. The IOM did take a position in the growing discussion of the tax-exempt 
status of nonprofit hospitals211: ‘the Committee strongly believes in the importance 
of a not-for-profit sector in health care, and that it is imperative that tax-exempt 
financing be maintained’212. Nonprofit hospitals kept their tax-exempt status, but 
in 1986, the federal government revoked the tax-exempt status of nonprofit Blue 
Cross plans213. Nevertheless, the idea of a special tax-status for nonprofits came to 
be challenged increasingly after Robert Clark (1980) proposed neutrality between 
nonprofit and for-profit hospitals: favoring nonprofits was considered to be unfair 
because they had no demonstrable public function that distinguished them from 
for-profits (see section 2.2.8)214.
Much of the empirical research carried out by the Committee targeted questions 
on what difference the form of ownership made. The Committee found that 
for-profit and nonprofit hospitals had about the same costs per case (adjusted 
for case-mix), but that investor-owned hospitals had significantly higher admin-
istrative costs and deployed fewer employees per occupied bed; these employees 
were paid more than in nonprofit surroundings215. For-profits were not found to 
operate with lower quality of care216, but it was concluded that for-profits were 
more responsive to economic incentives than nonprofit hospitals217. This resulted 
in significantly higher charges to payers and higher levels of capital investment218. 
On the other hand, nonprofit hospitals were found to provide only slightly higher 
levels of uncompensated care219. From a public policy point of view, the major 
advantage of for-profit organizations was thought to be their supposed better 
access to equity capital, the innovations they made in service delivery, and their 
greater responsiveness to consumers as well as to incentives in general. According 
to the Committee, the evidence available on the differences between nonprofit and 
for-profit hospitals was insufficient to justify a public policy that either opposed or 
supported investor ownership220.
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It is important to note that since ownership distinctions represent powerful ideas 
in society that transcends their history221, the value question was never far from 
the IOM’s analysis. A deep division concerning values underlies and affects any 
discussion of the implications of a growing investor-owned health care sector, 
which in effect seems to come down to a distinction between health care as an 
economic good or as a social good. For-profit hospitals, it is claimed, exacerbate 
the problem of access, provide unfair competition to nonprofits, treat health care 
as a commodity instead of the right of every citizen, damage the physician-patient 
relationship, undermine medical education, and lead to new, strong political 
regulations222. The Committee sought to evaluate such objections, but seven of 
the twenty-two members signed a supplementary statement rejecting for-profit 
medicine.
The Committee was particularly interested in how for-profit hospital corpora-
tions could affect the values of the physicians. They strongly agreed that physicians 
held fiduciary responsibilities towards their patients and that they should play a 
role in assuring the quality of care. The Committee was concerned that for-profit 
hospital ownership might, over time, permit considerations of economic self-
interest to invade the hitherto rather protected sphere of the physician-patient 
relationship223. Direct physician investment in hospital assets and bonus incentive 
arrangements were important issues in this discussion. In the 1970s, entrepre-
neurial physicians started new hospital facilities or provided traditional services 
in new settings. HMOs and (for-profit) hospitals started to give physicians a direct 
economic incentive to contribute to the ‘well-being’ of the institution. The Com-
mittee was highly critical of such developments, which some saw as detrimental to 
the credibility and moral standing of the entire medical profession. They wanted 
them terminated or codified in rules, which to a certain extent, would be what 
happened a few years later.
The concern generated by the rise of for-profit hospital chains brought about a 
broad debate, but did not produce a coalition that was able to block the growth of 
for-profit hospital chains – although the combined power of skeptical physicians, 
voluntary institutions, Blue Cross organizations, and liberal politicians probably 
could have achieved this. Ironically, the Reagan Administration itself temporarily 
put a stop to the growth of the for-profit corporations. This was a consequence of 
the introduction of a prospective payment system to contain Medicare costs as 
well as more restricted reimbursement procedures for capital. According to some 
scholars, few ongoing changes in American medicine have provoked so much 
controversy yet so little direct response from policymakers224.
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2.2.7  The 1980s: less favorable for-profit reimbursement and increasing 
countervailing powers
The 1980s started with critical discussions about the appropriateness of for-profit 
health care (section 2.2.6). However, this dispute had vanished by the late 1980s 
and, ironically, was replaced by skepticism about the legitimacy of tax-exemptions 
by nonprofit hospitals225. Following the Intermountain case of 1985, courts looked 
to the provision of actual community benefits to determine whether a nonprofit 
hospital qualified for tax-exempt status226. Nevertheless, despite this pressure on 
nonprofits, for-profit hospitals seem to encounter greater difficulty still.
The growth of the for-profit hospital sector began to slow in the mid-1980s. 
The number of for-profit hospitals decreased slowly, while the number of for-
profit beds hovered at around a hundred thousand227. As occupancy levels fell, it 
became clear that greater use of outpatient facilities and a general trend towards 
declining lengths of stay had created a surplus of hospital beds. However, the share 
of for-profit hospitals in the total number of community hospitals, community 
beds, hospital admissions, and hospital expenses continued to increase, though at 
a more modest pace (table 2.10). This growth now became more cyclical. Years of 
substantial growth were succeeded by years of lower or even negative growth. The 
next two sections will explore the patterns of this cyclical growth.
Changing reimbursements and protection of the uninsured
Changes in Medicare reimbursement procedures, often also adopted by Medicaid 
and private insurance, impacted on the for-profit business model.
Table 2.10: For-profit share (percent) in the total community hospital sector 
(1980–2002)228
Hospitals Beds Admissions Outpatient 
visits
FTE’s Expenses
1980 12.5  8.8  8.8 4.8 6.6 7.6
1985 14.0 10.4  9.7 5.7 7.4 8.8
1990 13.9 10.9  9.8 6.7 8.0 9.2
1995 14.5 12.1 11.1 7.7 9.2 9.3
2000 15.2 13.3 12.5 8.3 9.7 9.8
2002 15.5 13.2 12.7 8.1 9.3 9.6
2004 16.9 13.9 13.1 7.9 9.8 10.2
2006 18.0 14.4 13.3 7.3 9.7 10.0
2007 17.8 14.5 13.1 7.3 9.7 9.6
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1) In 1983, Medicare introduced a prospective payment scheme (PPS), based on 
467 diagnostic-related groups (DRGs) for inpatient treatments. Cost-based reim-
bursement was phased out. Hospitals now were reimbursed with a fixed payment 
per patient, regardless of the actual costs incurred and dependent on the diagnosis 
of the patient at the time of admission229. This new reimbursement system was 
strongly supported by the for-profit hospital chains, since more efficient producers 
would be rewarded with higher profits. However, the PPS was primarily designed 
to contain costs. Over time, since rates were not fully updated for inflation, the 
PPS effectively became a mechanism to limit spending. More importantly, hospital 
margins became an explicit policy concern in a way they had not been before: 
‘reports of initially high profit margins among hospitals were an invitation for the 
federal government to adjust payment levels accordingly, and annual payment 
rates increases thereafter trailed inflation. Thus, the thirty to forty percent of 
revenues from Medicare that were once seen as a highly secure source of income 
for the hospital industry became a problem with which hospitals had to cope’230.
2) For-profit hospitals received less guaranteed return-on-capital payments. In 
1982, return-on-equity payments were cut from 1.5 times the return of Medicare’s 
Hospital Insurance Trust Fund towards the same return (see section 2.2.4).
3) The method of calculating depreciation expenses when a hospital was sold 
to a new owner was also changed. Normally, depreciation could be calculated on 
the basis of the purchase price231. However, in the aftermath of HCA’s acquisi-
tion of Hospital Affiliates International (1981), the GAO found that the deal 
had raised Medicare’s interest and depreciation expenses in the first year by $71 
million for the same services and facilities. This was possible because Hospital 
Affiliates International’s book value increased by $272 million to $530 million. In 
the opinion of the GAO, HCA was allocating debt towards Medicare in a way not 
allowed by the rules of the program232; it also assigned inaccurate values to the 
assets acquired233. It was decided that Medicare would, from now on, only pay 
once for the depreciation of an asset, no matter how many times it changed hands. 
The Deficit Reduction Act (1984) set limits on Medicare’s allowances for interest, 
depreciation, and, if applicable, return on equity for hospitals changing ownership 
after July 18, 1984234. The stock market began to evaluate for-profit hospitals more 
critically. On November 1, 1983, a rumor circulated about the forthcoming GAO 
report and panic selling of HCA’s stock was triggered by speculation about the 
negative effect of this report on profits. The price per share plummeted and HCA 
requested the New York Stock Exchange to suspend trading in its stock temporar-
ily. The value recovered, but the incident demonstrated how brutally the market 
could treat a company whose earnings were threatened235.
4) After a sick patient was refused admission to a hospital and died in a hospital 
parking lot due to perceived lack of ability to pay, the government tried to secure 
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hospital access for the growing number of uninsured. In 1986, the Emergency 
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) stipulated that hospitals that 
wanted to treat Medicare patients were forbidden to ‘dump’ medically unstable 
patients on financial grounds. In other words, hospitals were obliged to provide 
emergency screening to any patient who attended an emergency room and to 
stabilize any emergency condition, regardless of the patient’s ability to pay. Since 
the share of workers who received insurance from their own employers started to 
fell, this was a serious problem. The EMTALA signaled that the growing number 
of uninsured could result in rising bad debt and thus reduce hospital profits.
Countervailing powers
During the 1980s, health care costs started to become a large burden on corporate 
profits. Health care costs, which had been equivalent to less than nine percent of 
company profits in 1965, increased to more than fifty percent of corporate profits 
in the mid-1980s236. Employers took the issue of rising health care costs very seri-
ously. In 1990, more than half of the workers who went on strike did so over health 
benefit issues237. Growing concern over health care costs encouraged the growth 
of HMOs, which used aggressive strategies to contain costs. Enrolments in HMOs 
increased from 9.1 million (1980) to 33.6 million (1990), and their cost-reduction 
strategies included discount bargaining, selective contracting, utilization reviews, 
and patient steering towards outpatient care. In November 1986, the end of Blue 
Cross’ favorable federal tax treatment stimulated the growth of their competitors, 
mainly commercial HMOs.
In the aftermath of the PPS, the number of ambulatory treatments, which were 
not subject to this scheme, grew rapidly. In response to increasing competition 
from ambulatory surgery centers, joint ventures involving physicians and hospitals 
became more common. By creating a for-profit subsidiary that could pay partners 
a proportion of its revenues, and was backed by hospital assets and access to capi-
tal, the hospital could strengthen its ties with physicians. Physicians, meanwhile, 
wanted the hospital to prosper for their own interest238. Research carried out by 
the Office of the Inspector General showed that physicians more often referred 
patients to freestanding facilities in which they had an ownership interest239. This 
provoked a political response.
In 1989, Congressman Stark amended the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act. 
These were provisions that prohibited physician-entrepreneurs from referring 
Medicare patients to clinical labs in which they held a direct or indirect financial 
interest. As a result, the numbers of joint ventures between hospitals and physi-
cians declined240. In 1993, this provision was broadened to include eleven other 
medical services. However, a notable exception to these regulations was the ‘whole 
hospital’ exception, which allowed physicians who had an ownership interest in 
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an entire hospital, and who were authorized to perform services there, to refer 
patients to that hospital241. This implied that for-profit hospital chains could 
continue attracting the loyalty of the physicians by awarding them stock bonuses.
The response of the for-profit groups
By the mid-1980s, it was becoming clear that a successful business model was 
under pressure and for the first time, many for-profit hospital chains were lower-
ing their expectations. In 1985, after a day of panic selling due to the downward 
revision of earnings estimates by HCA, the industry leader, the market value of 
the for-profit sector fell by more than $1.5 billion242. For-profit groups intensified 
their administrative efforts. For-profit providers submitted more appeals to Medi-
care’s Provider Reimbursement Review Board than other types of ownership243; 
for-profit hospitals were also more involved in health planning lawsuits; and 
finally, for-profit hospitals increased their political lobbying activities and by 1985, 
for-profit providers244 accounted for thirty-six percent of the total expenditure on 
hospital lobbying. With regard to direct contributions to political candidates, for-
profit hospitals funded thirty percent of hospital sector contributions, while their 
trade associations contributed another twenty-five percent245.
For-profit hospitals were pressured to adjust their business model in a more 
fundamental way. They began to sell hospitals and, when they made new acquisi-
tions, they became more interested in nonprofit facilities. Large for-profit hospital 
chains began to sell hospitals to smaller and newer companies or nonprofit chains. 
This is illustrated by the number of hospital facilities that HCA were operating, 
which shows large dips in the late 1980s and then again in the late 1990s (figure 
2.2). HCA ‘transferred’ many hospitals to new employee-owned companies246. 
Other companies also trimmed their facilities: six hospital chains that owned 519 
hospitals in the early 1980s, owned only 320 by late 1987247. During the late 1980s, 
private investors bought HCA, NME, and AMI.
The other response to worsening prospects was a shift into new lines of business 
such as mental health, nursing homes, or ambulatory care248. Psychiatric care ap-
peared especially appealing. In the 1980s, psychiatric care in many states became 
a required benefit in health insurance policies sold commercially within the state, 
and psychiatric care was still exempt from the PPS. However, diversification into 
mental health or long-term care did not prove a successful long-term strategy. 
NME was even fined $379 million after criminal proceedings because its psychiat-
ric hospitals paid for referrals and kept patients incarcerated until their insurance 
had expired249. Some for-profit hospital groups also started insurance subsidiaries. 
However, the success of the hospital business came at the expense of the insurance 
business or vice versa250. HCA ran into difficulties with its insurance business 
and in 1987 sold 104 of its hospitals to HealthTrust, a newly created company. 
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Humana became the only lasting success although it, too, experienced problems 
with its hospital business, which was spun off to a new company that was bought 
by Columbia/HCA in 1993251.
2.2.8 Ups and downs in the 1990s and thereafter
By the late 1980s, the for-profit hospital sector had matured and challenges 
were increasing in importance. 1) Employers ended their reliance on traditional 
indemnity insurance, increasing cost pressures from new third-party payers. 2) 
Governmental powers introduced prospective capital payments and introduced 
rate-setting policies. 3) Entrepreneurial physicians challenged the hospital sector 
with ambulatory surgery centers and specialized hospitals. Although other types 
of ownership were also confronted with such challenges, their business models 
were less susceptible.
Nonprofits were subject to increasing monitoring concerning whether they were 
delivering reasonable community benefits in return for their tax-exempt status. In 
this section, I will explore the consequences of these constraints on the for-profit 
hospital sector. I then discuss the developing debate on tax exemption, since this 
affected the competitive position of the for-profit sector. I end with an overview of 
strategies employed by the for-profit sector to deal with this new set of challenges.
Figure 2.2: Number of HCA hospitals (1968–2003)252
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The employers: the end of traditional indemnity insurance and growing 
pressures from third-party payers
Private insurance coverage was already down from a peak of more than eighty 
percent of the population in the 1970s. Between 1979 and 1998 the share of work-
ers who received health insurance from their own employer fell from sixty-six 
towards fifty-four percent. This would add to the bad debt pressures of the entire 
hospital sector253. However, there was more. The 1990s saw the end of indemnity 
insurance with its generous reimbursement policies. The number of workers cov-
ered by such plans declined from seventy-three percent (1988) towards only three 
percent in 2006254. Employers sharply reduced coverage both through conven-
tional indemnity insurance and for their retired employees255. Quite some (large) 
firms entered into self-insurance to contain their health care costs. Under this type 
of set-up, managed care organizations (MCOs) delivered administrative services 
to the company, while the companies themselves bore the underwriting risk. An 
important effect of self-insurance was that the situation of smaller employers 
to pool the risk of their employers was worsened. This added to the number of 
uninsured256. MCOs not only replaced private indemnity insurance plans, but also 
grew under the Medicaid program257. Academic studies indicate that MCOs were 
able to reduce costs without reducing quality of care258.
Managed care was also the central plank of President Clinton’s Health Security 
Act (1992), an effort to implement universal coverage, which failed due to lack 
of support from the elderly and resistance from traditional insurers and small 
employers259. This failure, and the fact that Republicans took control of both the 
Senate and the House for the first time since 1954, reinforced market-based efforts 
to contain costs and stakeholders now felt free to act without taking any politi-
cal and regulatory risks260. For-profit MCOs had the most success. In 1993, both 
for-profit and nonprofit plans had about the same enrollment, but by 2001, for-
profit plans had 50 million enrollees, while nonprofit plans covered 30 million261. 
Although price reductions had more effect than lowering utilization, MCOs 
contributed to excess hospital capacity262. Some researchers stipulated that MCOs 
primarily reduced non-recurrent X-inefficiencies263.
The restrictive MCO standards did not gain the trust of the American people264. 
In response to a patient backlash in the late 1990s, MCOs started to ease restric-
tions. Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs), which allowed enrollees to receive 
full-reimbursement if they received their care from within the network, became 
the most popular form of managed care265.
The increase in managed care penetration did not help the for-profit hospitals. 
On the contrary, it was the for-profit hospital sector, which was the first to begin 
renegotiating contracts with MCOs, that demanded more ‘appropriate reimburse-
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ment’. The Wall Street Journal reported that ‘big insurance companies held the 
upper hand in the struggle over prices charged by hospitals [...] In a little known 
power shift since the late 1990s, HCA and other major hospital chains have re-
shaped themselves into local oligopolies with the muscle to enforce much higher 
prices. For-profit hospital chains told MCOs that they could not just contract one 
of their hospitals, but had to give the same price to all of the chains’ hospitals in a 
particular state’. Well-positioned hospital networks achieved solid rate increases. 
Health insurance premiums advanced and the increased out-of-pocket payments 
and risks of PPOs were shifted to the insured (figure 2.3). The long-term trend of 
increasing insurance protection weakened and the number of uninsured grew as 
premiums increased266. The result was an increase in hospital bad debt.
The government: prospective capital payments and more rate-setting policies
Capital costs were ‘passed through’ under PPS. They were not used when comput-
ing the maximum amount payable or in establishing the prospective rate and were 
paid to the facility on a reasonable cost basis. In the mid-1980s, Congress started 
to discuss the elimination of the explicit return-on-equity payments, as well as the 
separate cost-based payments for interest and depreciation expenses. The report of 
the IOM (1986) favored including capital costs under the PPS268. This sometimes 
hurt for-profit hospitals, which had much higher reimbursable capital costs: ‘in 
the short run investor owned hospitals would be less advantaged by a payment 
system that included capital as a fixed-percentage add-on to the DRG-rates. Inves-
tor owned hospitals might be disadvantaged over the long run as well, unless their 
higher capital costs in fact show the financing of more future costs’269.
Figure 2.3: Increases in health premiums compared to earnings 1988–2006267
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GAO figures stipulate that the ratio of capital to operating costs (including for a 
return-on-equity) among for-profit hospitals was about double that of public and 
nonprofit hospitals270. This was a result of their higher leverage, lower occupancy 
levels271, and the lower average age of their plant272. However, it is important to 
note that since nonprofits use slower depreciation trends, the higher capital costs 
of for-profits can be distorted. Nevertheless, even if we adjust for these differing 
accounting methods, for-profit hospitals are still generally more capital intensive 
than their nonprofit counterparts273.
In 1986, the GAO issued a report reviewing the different proposals on the future 
of capital reimbursement. Most proposals converged on a fixed percentage add-
on to the PPS, although the idea of the length of the transition period differed 
between the health department and the hospital association274. The add-on per-
centage varied according to the types of capital costs covered and the base period 
used to compute the payment rates. The GAO recognized that hospitals with large 
uncompensated care loads were not always able to accumulate the capital needed 
to finance replacement assets275. This resulted in a longer transition period for 
implementing prospective capital rates.
In 1992, Medicare’s capital costs moved from cost reimbursement to prospective 
payments. Because risk increased, borrowing costs increased and many hospitals 
started to postpone construction projects and substitute equity for debt as the 
relative cost of debt grew276. Excess capacity also weakened construction proj-
ects277 and over the course of the 1990s, the median average age of hospital plant 
increased from eight to ten years278. Capital spending declined toward less than 
seven percent of operating expenses279. The amount of capital accessed from tradi-
tional sources, especially commercial banks, dropped280 because many banks were 
less willing to supply loans to the hospital sector281. In 1998, the Allegheny Health 
Education and Research Foundation defaulted on $1.3 billion of debt, sending a 
shock through the financial markets. Hospital interest spreads widened from 0.3 
percent to 1.2 percent, reflecting the increased risk perceived by investors282.
For-profit hospitals had no access to the tax-exempt bond market, meaning that 
the decline in commercial loans hit them hard. For-profit hospitals were also heav-
ily leveraged and, by now, few had broad access to capital (table 2.11). Between 
1997 and 2001, more than half of all for-profit hospitals did not invest enough to 
keep up with depreciation on their fixed assets283. This suggests that the for-profit 
sector did not see much prospect of making future investments284. It was possible 
that the importance of broad access to capital would diminish once the hospital 
sector had moved from being a mature industry to a declining industry. With no 
need for equity capital, for-profit hospitals could have used retained earnings and 
asset-based debt to fund investment, and they could even have exited the stock 
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market altogether via a leveraged buy-out285. Indeed, in 2006, HCA was taken 
from the stock market in a highly publicized $33 billion leveraged buy-out.
The hospital sector also had to contend with severe cost-containment measures. 
Medicare rates are adjusted annually on the basis of statutory cost factors in a 
market basket. Congress – medicare policymaking often resembles ‘congressional 
government’287 – typically sets the update rates at a discount. Medicare’s median 
update rate between 1988 and 2003 was 62.2 percent of the market basket update288. 
The 1995 Republican budget plan sought for $ 270 billion of cuts in Medicare 
spending289. Indeed, after Congress adopted the Balanced Budget Act (1997), the 
discounts on the annual PPS adjustments were very steep. Substantial budget cuts 
of $ 115 billion over a five-year period were sought for. In 1998, Medicare rates 
were frozen, and in 1999 the increase was no more than half a percent. The Bal-
anced Budget Act also introduced an expanded market of private insurance into 
Medicare (the program’s first major adjustment known as Medicare + Choice); to 
some extent, and with support of the Democrats, Medicare now could become 
part of the managed care movement290.
The for-profit hospital chains responded to the Balanced Budget Act by massive 
cost cutting and divesting ancillary businesses such as home health agencies, am-
bulatory surgery facilities, and physician practices. The sector split into companies 
that focused on the more competitive urban markets (HCA, Tenet) and those 
that focused on the more monopolistic rural markets (HMA, Community Health 
Systems, and Lifepoint). At $ 31 billion, the expenses of the for-profit hospital 
sector remained flat for three years in a row between 1997 and 1999. Hospital 
acquisition values fell from a median price of about $ 250.000 per bed in 1997 
to about $ 170.000 by 1999291. For-profit chains lost much of their profitability 
and initiated grassroots campaigns in an attempt to correct this. They succeeded. 
In 1999, Congress passed the Balanced Budget Refinement Act, which reduced 
further Medicare cuts, as well as the Benefit Improvement and Protection Act, 
which helped compensate the extensive reductions292. In 2001, hospitals received 
an increase in Medicare payment rates that was equal to the market basket293.
Table 2.11: Relative capital access and five-ear capital spending (1997–2001) per bed286
Broad Access Limited Access Total $ (1,000) per bed
Governmental 28% 19% 26% $ 230.9
For-profit  5% 22% 15% $ 143.7
Nonprofit religious 15% 15% 14% $ 243.1
Nonprofit 52% 45% 46% $ 222.0
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Entrepreneurial physicians: more competition from ambulatory surgery centers 
and specialty hospitals
As inpatient treatment became less central to the process of care, hospitals en-
countered additional competitors. Fuelled by new technological possibilities, 
outpatient revenues increased294. This opened up many opportunities and a wave 
of entrepreneurism swept doctors. Physicians competed with hospitals by refer-
ring patients to their own facilities. Although federal law generally prohibits these 
self-referrals, there are some significant exceptions. Physicians may refer patients 
to specialized or general hospitals in which they have an ownership interest (the 
‘whole-hospital’ exception)295. Another important exception allows physicians 
to refer patients to ambulatory surgery centers in which they have an ownership 
interest, because such facilities are expected to deliver care more efficiently and 
at lower prices than hospitals296. Nevertheless, as recent research found, physi-
cians at physician-owned facilities are more likely than other physicians to refer 
well-insured patients to their facilities and route Medicaid patients to hospital 
outpatient clinics297.
For-profit hospitals sought to harmonize the conflicting interests of their 
physicians and their hospital systems. Columbia/HCA often gave physicians 
an economic stake in its local ventures or offered other inducements (i.e. cheap 
office rents) in an effort to stop physicians splitting their admissions with other 
hospitals298. This action was legal because of another exception to the Stark laws 
covering public hospital companies worth at least $50 million299.
During the early 1980s, hospitals had dominated the market for outpatient 
surgeries, but, in the 1990s, physicians effectively competed for this lucrative 
market (figure 2.4). The number of ambulatory surgery centers, diagnostic testing 
facilities, and specialty hospitals301 increased rapidly (table 2.12). Between 2002 
and 2008, the largest increases in capital spending were in outpatient departments 
(12.1 percent), followed by ASCs (11.2 percent), while the growth of investment 
in inpatient services was estimated at only 6.2 percent302. Competition from 
physician-owned ambulatory surgery centers and specialty hospitals reduced the 
volume of hospital admissions and average length of stay. Also, as less severely ill 
patients began to be treated elsewhere, hospitals were left with a less profitable case 
mix. In 2003, HCA attributed one third of its lower-than-expected first-quarter 
earnings to the increase in competition from physician-owned specialty hospitals 
and ASCs303.
Research showed that the emergence of specialty hospitals or ASCs was leading 
to lower patient volumes for the existing hospitals304. Specialty hospitals presented 
the greatest threat because they provided high revenue services and were receiving 
many patient referrals. ASCs operated as specialized factories and were praised for 
maximizing efficient practice305. The GAO found that such hospitals were mainly 
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for-profit and physician-owned, and they were concentrated in seven states, which 
did not operate CON programs (Arizona, California, Kansas, Louisiana, Okla-
homa, South Dakota, and Texas)306. Since these states were also home to many 
for-profit hospitals, the for-profit sector was sometimes hit disproportionately by 
competition from specialty hospitals. Although specialized hospitals were fiercely 
criticized by both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals for cherry picking, the AMA 
voted in 2004 to oppose efforts to extend a moratorium on specialty clinics307. 
Nevertheless, after intense lobbying from hospital interest groups and several 
critical reports from the GAO, Congress did establish a moratorium, which tem-
porarily halted further development of physician-owned specialty hospitals308. 
The moratorium expired in June 2005, but then was again reimposed309.
Pressure on nonprofit hospitals: community benefits
The debate on community benefits was fuelled by academic arguments that 
nonprofit hospitals resembled the for-profit sector because of conversions, joint 
ventures, and the growing importance of market constraints. Growth in the 
Figure 2.4: Market of outpatient surgeries by facility type 1981–2003300
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Table 2.12: Technology is moving care away from hospitals (by number of facilities)310
Ambulatory surgery 
centers
Diagnostic testing 
 facilities
Specialty hospitals
1997 2,462 n/a  31
1999 2,786 n/a  49
2001 3,371 2,012  67
2002 3,597 2,403  86
2003 3,735 n/a 113
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number of uninsured – a result of the decline in employment-based insurance 
protection especially for low-income workers – made tax-exemption an important 
issue. The number of uninsured rose from thirty-five million in 1990 to forty-four 
million in 2002. Medicaid enrollees, often paid for beneath actual costs, grew even 
faster and this number surpassed the number of uninsured in the late 1990s311. 
These numbers put pressure on the entire hospital sector, since, as Rosemary 
Stevens states, hospitals – not insurers – form America’s de facto national health 
system312.
Ownership is central in US laws on tax obligations. In contrast to many other 
countries, such as Germany, for-profit hospitals in the US bear a high tax-burden. 
The tax advantages of nonprofit hospitals were increasingly disputed, because it 
was suspected that they did not always provide equivalent community benefits to 
compensate for these advantages. Others argued that this was part of the steady, 
long-term erosion of the special tax status afforded to nonprofit organizations313. 
Nevertheless, the dispute on the future of the tax-exempt status of nonprofit hos-
pitals intensified. For-profits complained that these tax-breaks gave nonprofits an 
unfair advantage. Some firms challenged the tax-exempt status of nonprofits by 
sponsoring research that concluded that in fact for-profit firms provided more 
community benefits than nonprofits314.
In 1990, the GAO argued for clearer standards for the tax-exemption of nonprofit 
hospitals315. They reported that a significant percentage of nonprofit hospitals in 
five states provided fewer community benefits than the tax-breaks they received, 
and in some cases they actually provided less uncompensated care than for-profit 
hospitals. The nonprofit hospitals with the highest margins (and, therefore, the 
greatest ability to provide charity care) often had the lowest rates of uncompen-
sated care. After the GAO study, an academic and public debate ensued over the 
appropriateness of nonprofit tax exemptions316. National data showed that there 
was little difference between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals in the overall rates 
of uncompensated care and indicated an aggregate value of $7.8 billion in tax re-
lief317. Benefits varied widely at the level of individual hospitals, depending on the 
profitability of the nonprofit hospital318. Although some argued that the justifica-
tion for tax-exemptions is more a matter of values, theory, and politics than of the 
actual monetary numbers involved319 and that there are serious problems with the 
concept of uncompensated care320, the new consensus was that it was reasonable 
to expect nonprofits to provide community benefits and that these should at least 
equal those provided by for-profit hospitals plus their tax breaks321.
In 2005, the GAO concluded that although nonprofit hospitals devoted more 
resources to uncompensated care than for-profits, the differences were small. 
Uncompensated care tended to be concentrated in a small number of large public 
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hospitals. The GAO stated once again that if Congress wished to encourage non-
profits to provide charity care for the poor, it should consider revising the criteria 
for tax exemption322. The media, politicians, and governmental agencies chal-
lenged hospitals to justify their tax exemptions. Now, many states asked hospitals 
for mandatory and voluntary community benefit reports323. Some states, ranging 
from conservative Texas to liberal Massachusetts, enacted legislation that required 
nonprofit hospitals to deliver a fixed percentage of community benefits324. From 
2001 onwards, reported uncompensated care levels increased significantly325.
For-profit strategies: increasing consolidations and ‘maximization’ of 
reimbursement
Consolidation was the natural response to increasing managed care326. Consoli-
dated hospitals had more leverage in negotiations and could achieve economies of 
scale by spreading fixed costs over a larger number of beds327. A core strategy of 
for-profit Columbia/HCA328 was to buy several hospitals in a local market, close 
the weaker ones, and bolster the stronger hospitals with rerouted admissions. In 
1993, Colombia and HCA formed a chain with 190 hospitals and 42,000 beds329. 
The new firm immediately acquired or formed joint ventures with 32 nonprofit 
hospitals and at that point operated about half of all for-profit beds330.
Continuing difficulties at many nonprofit hospitals fuelled between twenty-five 
and fifty acquisitions and mergers annually. In 2003, HCA bought Health Mid-
west, a nonprofit network in Kansas City, for $1.1 billion331. For-profit hospital 
corporations were in competition with large, emerging nonprofit hospital systems. 
Anti-trust regulations were less severe for nonprofits – for example, a judge ruling 
on a merger between two large nonprofit hospitals in Grand Rapids (Michigan) 
accepted the claim that nonprofits were (more) unlikely (than for-profit hospitals) 
to act in a way that would be costly to their communities.
For-profit hospital chains came increasingly to rely on the conversion of non-
profit clinics to for-profit status. Case studies suggest that financial considerations 
and the culture of the nonprofit hospital both influenced for-profit conversions332. 
Physicians often favored these conversions because it allowed them to have an 
ownership share in the new entity333. However, nonprofit to for-profit conversions 
were also associated with decreases in the staff-to-patient ratio, which explains 
why local unions opposed such efforts334. The local authorities usually approved 
conversions, which brought in additional capital for the community because of 
the new endowments filled with the money from the deal335. Some, but not all, of 
these endowments returned funds to the hospital sector336. The terms negotiated 
for the conversions often included charity care and service provisions337.
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There was a considerable debate over whether for-profit hospitals were offering 
to pay a fair value for the nonprofit hospital338. Investment bankers often value 
nonprofit hospitals as being worth much less than the financial markets value their 
for-profit counterparts. For-profit chains may be able to purchase a nonprofit facil-
ity at one price, but that same hospital is valued with a much higher price-earnings 
multiple after its acquisition. If the for-profit chain uses the differential to purchase 
another nonprofit facility, this circle continues339.
In most states, the attorney general is responsible for monitoring hospital 
conversions. Prior to 1990, few had paid attention to this role and many state at-
torneys, especially those from jurisdictions in fiscal difficulties, saw conversions 
as beneficial since tax-exempt institutions would become tax-paying ones340. 
Allegations of insider dealing and the undervaluation of charitable assets led to 
more scrutiny by attorney generals341. During the mid 1990s, many states enacted 
legislation to require attorney generals to determine whether a fair market value 
had been established, advance notification, and community involvement342. The 
actual enforcement of these laws varied343. In liberal states, particularly Rhode 
Island, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Michigan, the state attorney tried to block the 
entry of Columbia/HCA into local markets344. In Tennessee with its large stock of 
for-profit hospitals, on the other hand, the state attorney took little action345.
For-profit hospital companies were repeatedly investigated for (Medicare) 
fraud due to their aggressive reimbursement strategies. During the 1980s, there 
was already much unease about the way for-profit hospitals were interpreting 
the possibilities for capital reimbursement (section 2.2.7). In 1993, the GAO 
pointed out unacceptable or questionable costs charged to Medicare by HCA and 
other corporations346. In 1997, Columbia/HCA was accused of Medicare fraud 
(i.e. routine up-coding) after a highly publicized federal raid on their hospitals in 
seven states. After a long lawsuit, Colombia/HCA reached an agreement with the 
Justice Department in which it paid $745 million to settle civil fraud allegations. It 
also paid $95 million in penalties and fines relating to a criminal probe. In 2002, 
it paid another $631 million as a final settlement for the remaining outstanding 
issues relating to cost reports and physician relations347. In another scandal, Tenet 
Healthcare, agreed to pay $100 million to former patients who charged that the 
company had illegally interned them in psychiatric hospitals against their will to 
obtain their insurance benefits348. In 2002, Tenet was also accused of overbilling 
Medicare for cardiac surgery and was fined for its billing practices349. Research 
has revealed suspicions of up-coding – Cutler and Sheiner, among others, found 
that areas with more for-profit hospitals have higher levels of Medicare reimburse-
ment350.
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2.3 Analysis
In this section I will try to explain the forces that have shaped US for-profit hos-
pital care from a chronological perspective. I will first explain the long decline of 
the proprietary hospital sector. This period lasts from the early twentieth century 
until the mid 1960s (section 2.3.1). Medicare (1965) and Medicaid (1966) form a 
watershed in the development of the for-profit hospital sector. I focus next on the 
rapid growth of the for-profit hospital sector, as well as its metamorphosis from 
(stand-alone) proprietary facilities to investor-owned hospital chains. This period 
lasts roughly from the mid 1960s until the mid 1980s (section 2.3.2). I will then 
explain developments in the US for-profit hospital sector since the mid 1980s. Sec-
tion 2.3.3 focuses on the changing configuration of constraints and inducements 
in a more mature hospital industry. This chapter ends with my main conclusions 
(section 2.3.4).
2.3.1 Proprietary hospitals: lack of competitive powers
In the early twentieth century, many proprietary hospitals were founded. They 
were a result of physicians seeking hospital access in an otherwise closed-staff hos-
pital sector, combined with a comparatively high percentage of paying patients. 
However, these proprietary clinics were – as a general rule – not particularly prof-
itable. Proprietary hospitals were much smaller than their public and nonprofit 
counterparts, and were also less capital-intensive. In the late 1920s, proprietary 
clinics required around twelve percent of total capital, which declined to only two 
percent by the mid- and late 1960s. Nevertheless, with the exception of the period 
during the Great Depression, the number of proprietary beds did not decline 
substantially, although the number of proprietary facilities did. It was rather that 
other ownership types were growing strongly, especially nonprofit providers.
Proprietary hospitals suffered from low profitability and returns on capital 
investments were meager. There were three major reasons for this. 1) Nonprofit 
and public hospitals had increasingly better access to relatively cheap capital. 
The price of proprietary capital was considerably higher. 2) A lack of buyers with 
sufficient purchasing power and less favorable coverage by Blue-Cross plans 
produced volatile revenues and investment risks. 3) Nonprofit hospitals became 
increasingly attractive to physicians, who could appropriate any surplus (nonprofit 
as a physician’s cooperative). For these three reasons, nonprofit hospitals obtained 
an increasing competitive advantage, which diminished for-profits’ prospects of a 
sufficient return on investment.
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1) The relatively high price of proprietary capital
In the period 1900–1945, voluntary capital and charity sources were available in 
large parts of the US, especially in the northeastern and central regions. Nonprofit 
hospitals could tap these capital sources and relied on comparatively high num-
bers of paying patients. They could also rely on religious or ethnic bonds with their 
patient base. They were thus highly competitive relative to other types of hospitals. 
Philanthropic capital was cheap and in plentiful supply. This is underscored by the 
fact that nonprofit hospitals saw strong growth and that the level of capital invested 
per bed was much higher than the amount invested by proprietary hospitals and 
– to a lesser extent – by the public sector. Most proprietary hospitals were located 
in the southern and western parts of the country, where less voluntary capital was 
available. In those regions, proprietary hospitals were more competitive, although 
public hospitals had the largest share of the market. However, public hospitals 
were stigmatized as poor houses and found it hard to attract the paying patients of 
the middle classes. This constellation survived until after World War II.
Through the new Hill-Burton program (1946), the government started to supply 
large amounts of capital to the hospital sector. The supply of free philanthropic 
capital, alone, was no longer enough to meet the nation’s increasing demand for 
hospital care. However, because of Hill-Burton sufficient capital remained avail-
able on attractive terms. The Hill-Burton program supplied the capital necessary 
to construct and renovate nonprofit and public hospitals, especially in the eco-
nomically less developed South with its large stock of proprietary hospitals.
Proprietary hospitals were not eligible for Hill-Burton funds, meaning that 
the relative price of for-profit capital increased. The numbers of proprietary beds 
continued to decline until the mid-1960s, especially in the South, which received 
more funds because Hill-Burton’s allocation formula favored states with lower per 
capita incomes. Formally, the Hill-Burton money was a gift that hospitals ‘repaid’ 
by the delivery of charity care and community benefits. Consequently, the cheap 
price of Hill-Burton capital was far more attractive than any equity that private 
investors could offer.
One result of Hill-Burton was a significant role for the states in hospital policy. 
States and local authorities had to provide matching funds for construction or 
renovation projects. They also had to endorse hospital applications as part of a 
state hospital plan. The result was variety in state hospital policies. This pre-struc-
tured more restrictive policies on for-profit providers in some states and more 
liberal policies in others. For example, New York effectively phased out for-profit 
hospitals during the late 1950s and early 1960s. Although for-profits converted 
to nonprofit status, conversions in the opposite direction were not attractive. If 
nonprofit hospitals converted to for-profit ownership, the Hill-Burton funds had 
to be repaid minus depreciation, though this rule was not well enforced.
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To sum up, the relative price of investor capital was substantially higher than 
capital supplied by voluntary sources or by Hill-Burton funds. Neither state gov-
ernments nor philanthropic donors asked for many provisions in return. Together 
with other charity sources like religious labor, the competitive position of nonprofit 
providers, and to a lesser extent public hospitals, was substantially better than that 
of the proprietary hospital sector.
2) The Great Depression increases uncompensated care; the answer – Blue Cross 
– favored nonprofits
In the US, paying patients were common and this constituted one of the main 
factors behind the development of a significant proprietary hospital sector. Inter-
mediaries and underwriters were of little importance. However, the combination 
of high out-of-pocket payments and few third-party payers made the proprietary 
sector vulnerable to economic problems, a fact that was confirmed during the 
Great Depression.
The Great Depression decreased the number of patients with sufficient purchas-
ing power and pushed up hospitals’ levels of bad debt as a result of non-paying 
patients. The proprietary hospital sector was unable, due to ethical reasons, to 
avoid its responsibility for uncompensated care completely. However, even a small 
percentage of bad debt substantially reduced hospital margins. The Great Depres-
sion also reduced the service levels of the proprietary clinics, which added to their 
vulnerability.
Proprietary hospitals often co-existed alongside public hospitals with much 
lower or no charges, which enjoyed continuing funding from state legislatures 
and local government. Daily census figures show that the attractiveness of public 
hospitals versus proprietary hospitals increased considerably (section 2.2.2). Dur-
ing the depression, levels of bad debt rocketed and many proprietary clinics went 
out of business, never to return. More and more, niche strategies were necessary to 
survive and obtain a positive return on proprietary investments.
The level of uncompensated care declined gradually after the mid 1930s. This was 
a consequence of the marginally better economic conditions and the wider avail-
ability of hospital insurance. In response to the financial problems, the hospital 
sector started Blue Cross – prepaid group insurance plans to cover hospital costs. 
Although these new insurance plans mitigated the financial problems of the hos-
pital sector, they were tailored to voluntary providers. Blue Cross often negotiated 
reimbursements that were (much) higher for nonprofit hospitals; some Blue Cross 
plans even declined reimbursement coverage to proprietary clinics. Initially, there 
was not much competition for Blue Cross schemes from commercial indemnity 
plans; they were often local monopolists. After World War II, these commercial 
plans became stronger competitors and were favored by many employers.
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3) The gradual evolution of nonprofit hospitals as physicians’ cooperatives
The need of doctors for access to inpatient treatment in a mainly closed-staff hos-
pital sector was another major reason for the emergence of a proprietary hospital 
sector. This gradually became a less important factor during the first decades of 
the twentieth century, because the AMA, Blue Cross, and also many nonprofit 
hospitals came to prefer open-staff hospitals. The improving professional status 
of physicians strengthened their market power within hospitals as well as the 
influence of the AMA as the major health care interest group. Often, proprietary 
hospitals were no longer necessary to help doctors to get patient access.
Nonprofit hospitals were the most attractive to physicians. Technological devel-
opments, improved physician status and shortages of physicians created agency 
problems that shifted effective control of the hospitals to the medical staff. It was 
the physician, not the hospital, who became the effective residual claimant of 
surpluses on either physician or hospital services.
The AMA successfully rejected the status of physician-employees in propri-
etary hospitals owned by laymen. AMA guidelines were redefined and stated 
that all ‘profits’ belonged to physicians as compensation for professional labor. 
The preferred model was the open-staff voluntary hospital in which physicians 
held effective control. Most states, with the exception of a few in the far west, 
outlawed the corporate practice of medicine by non-physicians, implying that any 
remaining proprietary hospitals had to be physician-owned. Proprietary hospitals 
therefore came to be heavily reliant on physicians’ savings for their investment and 
had limited access to other sources of equity. If physicians affiliated with nonprofit 
hospitals, capital was much more broadly available while their dominant status 
guaranteed their control over investment and daily operations as well as giving 
them equally generous income opportunities. Any physician who wanted to start 
a hospital business would face very high transaction costs and a comparatively low 
prospect of any adequate reward for such high risks.
2.3.2 Changing trends and the rise of for-profit hospital chains
The share of for-profit hospital beds rose rapidly from the mid 1960s until the 
mid 1980s. In retrospect, this was the golden age of the for-profit hospital chain 
with average yearly investment returns at almost thirty percent. The institu-
tional configuration described in the previous section changed radically. 1) The 
introduction of Medicare offered the prospect of generous reimbursements for 
for-profit hospitals; Medicare, Medicaid, and expanding employer-based private 
health insurance reduced the problem of uncompensated care. 2) Due to the 
declining role of voluntary capital and Hill-Burton funds, nonprofit hospitals lost 
most of their advantage in terms of access to cheap capital. 3) For-profit hospitals 
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became increasingly attractive to physicians – the substantial returns on invest-
ments, made it possible to offer physicians favorable financial conditions as well as 
access to new technologies.
1) Medicare, Medicaid and their impact on the for-profit business model
Medicare, and to a lesser extent Medicaid, represented a turning point for the 
for-profit hospital sector. Overnight, significant positive equity returns became 
possible for most for-profit hospitals. This attracted a major inflow of investor 
capital. In essence, Medicare ‘guaranteed’ substantial investment returns for 
for-profit hospitals, but not for nonprofit and public facilities. Both programs 
substantially reduced the amount of uncompensated care and bad debt; now, 
many (but not all) of the poor and high medical cost patients qualified for insur-
ance coverage.
Investment risks in for-profit hospitals declined. The generous, cost-based 
reimbursement policies of the Medicare program were the icing on the cake. In 
addition, Medicare paid for equity, interest, and depreciation on a cost-plus basis. 
Such payments were substantially higher for for-profit hospitals than for other 
ownership-types and were copied by other third-party payers. The new money 
was used to construct new plant and to consolidate the proprietary sector. Many 
small proprietary hospitals became available for take-over. Moreover, a large pro-
portion of the cost of buying other hospitals was actually reimbursed by Medicare. 
Such funding for hospital consolidation became increasingly common, but did not 
become controversial until the early 1980s. By then, a few large firms with listings 
on the stock market were dominating the for-profit hospital sector.
2) Diminishing access to cheap capital for nonprofit hospitals
On the other hand, the capital supply from voluntary sources and the Hill-Burton 
program was diminishing. Voluntary capital could no longer match the growth in 
demand that Medicare had created. Medicare’s capital payments, which were rep-
licated by other third-party payers, made it possible to terminate the Hill-Burton 
program. In other words, the competitive advantage of the nonprofit hospitals was 
gradually eroded. In 1974, Hill-Burton was formally scrapped and these funds 
were no longer a way for nonprofits to raise capital. Nonprofit hospitals had to 
fall back on retained earnings and the debt markets. By way of compensation, a 
tax-exempt bond market became available to nonprofit hospitals. The termination 
of Hill-Burton also implied that the conversions of nonprofit hospitals to for-profit 
status became easier (section 2.2.3).
To conclude, ‘free’ sources of capital were drying up for nonprofit and public 
owners, while for-profits could ‘guarantee’ investment returns. Through these 
United States: the ups and downs of the largest for-profit sector
79
changes in the capital institutions, risk was transferred from the for-profit to the 
nonprofit and public hospital sectors.
3) For-profit hospitals become increasingly appealing to physicians
The dominant and disciplining force of the AMA and the opposition of the phy-
sicians to corporate medicine gradually weakened. The new for-profit hospital 
chains linked the financial interests of physicians with those of their hospitals 
using financial incentives. Physician remuneration in for-profit hospitals caught 
up with or exceeded the level in nonprofit hospitals. For-profit hospitals became 
much more capital intensive and could offer physicians opportunities for innova-
tive medical practice that had formerly been reserved for public and nonprofit 
hospitals. For physicians, the attraction of working in an open-staff voluntary hos-
pital declined.
The AMA’s traditional opposition to corporate ownership vanished. More 
physicians began to hold some kind of financial interest in the for-profit hospital 
where they also had staff privileges; now, such involvements came to be viewed as 
appropriate. In contrast to the 1920s, when physicians needed to supply investor 
capital and had to take severe risks, they now enjoyed a very real chance of ac-
cumulating capital under favorable conditions by affiliating themselves with one 
of the for-profit hospital chains. Physicians were increasingly willing to work in 
such clinics. For-profit hospitals built larger facilities, bought new equipment, and 
maintained these investments. They could afford to acquire nonprofit and public 
hospitals. As a result, for-profit and nonprofit hospitals began to converge in scale, 
patient mix, and capital appropriations.
2.3.3 The dynamics of a mature for-profit hospital sector
The for-profit hospital sector was well established by the early 1980s, with both 
high growth and high investment returns. Critics began to talk of a new indus-
trial-medical complex. However, the growth of the sector slowed as for-profits 
encountered new constraints. Growth became more modest and cyclical as the 
sector encountered more competition on the supply-side and more countervailing 
pressures on the demand-side.
Since for-profits did not seem to be able to operate much more efficiently than 
their competitors, growth stagnated in the for-profit hospital industry. There 
are four major explanations for this. 1) The termination of Medicare’s generous 
capital reimbursement rules. 2) The increasing price-sensitiveness of payers. 3) 
The increasing relevance of uncompensated care for the profit margins of the 
for-profit providers. 4) Increasing competition due to excess capacity and new 
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entrants (ASCs) and specialty hospitals). Nonprofit hospitals, on the other hand, 
saw their tax-exempt status questioned, but not terminated.
1) The gradual termination of for-profit access to capital under more favorable 
terms
New regulations put an end to the favored position of for-profit hospitals in capital 
reimbursement. The Republican administration brought the distorted capital 
reimbursements of for-profit providers into line with the other ownership types, 
which eventually increased relative for-profit capital costs. In the early 1980s, 
Medicare’s loophole of increasing book values to calculate higher post-acquisition 
depreciation reimbursements was closed and payments for return on equity to 
for-profits were lowered. In 1992, they were phased out altogether because of the 
introduction of prospective capital rates for the entire hospital industry. A kind of 
level playing field – with the exception of nonprofit access to tax-exempt bonds 
– developed in capital reimbursement. Because they operated newer facilities, 
for-profit chains sometimes struggled to secure adequate compensation to cover 
their higher depreciation costs. The consequence of this level playing field was that 
all types of ownership were now relatively exposed to the pressures of the market. 
Payers wanted lower costs and until the late 1990s government regulations and 
MCO penetration tempered cost increases.
2) Increasingly price-sensitive buyers reduce potential profit margins
Health care costs increased steeply, leading to increased price sensitiveness on the 
part of the payers. In 1983, the new Prospective Payment System made it pos-
sible to cut prices for hospital care to Medicare patients and the margins on these 
patients fell. To counteract the threat of cross-subsidization, private indemnity 
plans were transformed into cost-conscious MCOs that won over much of the 
employer-based insurance market in the early 1990s. Increasing MCO penetra-
tion reinforced the price-sensitivity of the private payers still further. Indemnity 
insurers were replaced by MCOs, which sought and received large discounts and 
squeezed cross-subsidization from private insurance. HMOs dominated this 
market until the late 1990s, when PPOs – a less restrictive model – became more 
popular. The result of managed care was a decline in the demand for inpatient 
capacity and a reduction of hospital margins.
The PPS (1983) set the standard for other third-party payers. It allowed efficient 
hospitals to be more profitable and obtain higher margins. Many saw this as an 
advantage for for-profit hospitals. However, it turned out that it was guaranteed 
returns on equity, and not so much a higher efficiency level, that was driving the 
for-profit business model. This was confirmed by most research that showed no 
large differences between the costs of for-profit and nonprofits351. In response to 
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these developments, for-profit hospital chains reallocated capital to other sectors 
of healthcare, such as mental health or nursing homes, which did not fell under the 
scope of the PPS. However, the PPS did not stop at acute care and was gradually 
extended to cover other healthcare sectors. After a few years these new business 
lines were often divested. The for-profit hospital sector enjoyed limited success in 
its search for alternative business opportunities.
An unanticipated consequence of the PPS was that it made hospital Medicare 
margins more transparent and they became a political issue in Congress. This 
was possible because for all of PPS’s complexity, each system has crude budget-
ary instruments that can be manipulated without much expertise. In the case of 
Medicare, moving the annual update factor up or down controls the overall level 
of program payments352. Many state legislatures reduced Medicaid rates, which 
were already lower than the rates of other third-party payers. Cutting the regular 
market basket updates was legitimized on the grounds of higher hospital margins; 
this also made funds available for other health needs.
Medicare and Medicaid, which had been the original driving force behind the 
success of for-profit hospital chains, now increasingly became a burden for for-
profits because their margins lagged behind and were sometimes even negative. 
In 1997, the Balanced Budget Act, which froze Medicare reimbursement rates, 
imposed the strongest constraints. For-profit hospitals responded by fierce cost 
cutting and their expenses remained flat during 1997, 1998, and 1999. For-profits 
were at the forefront of successful lobbying that had broken these margin-related 
cuts by the start of the new century.
3) Increasing levels of uncompensated care
The cost-containment strategies described above led to reduced revenue and 
higher levels of uncompensated care. To maintain their investment returns, 
charges to indemnity insurers and private patients were increased, and employers 
shifted part of this rising bill to their employees. Combined with the impact of 
slow economic growth and rising premiums353 on purchasing power, the relative 
price of insurance coverage rose. This pushed up the number of the uninsured. 
The federal government sought to fix the problems caused by a rising indigent 
population through regulations (EMTALA), which forced all hospitals to provide 
any necessary medical emergency care regardless of patients’ ability to pay.
Uncompensated care and rising levels of bad debt came to dominate the man-
agement agenda of for-profit hospital companies. The level of uncompensated care 
became one of the biggest threats to hospital margins. During the 1990s, strict 
managed care strategies made cross-subsidization to the indigent less feasible until 
more expensive PPO policies became more widespread. Up-coding and overtreat-
ment were strategies that could be severely penalized. The two largest for-profit 
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chains (Columbia/HCA and Tenet Healthcare) were successfully prosecuted for 
legal irregularities and forced to divest many facilities.
4) Increasing competition due to excess capacity and physician-owned new 
entrants
By the early 1990s, the hospital sector had reached maturity as an industry. Due 
to the worsening growth prospects of the for-profit hospital sector, stock market 
valuations decreased. Excess capacity increased as managed care induced fewer 
hospital admissions and prospective capital payments increased the level of risk on 
supplied capital. Capital needs stabilized or even declined and access to investor-
owned capital was less valuable than before. These were favorable conditions for 
private equity and, in 2006, HCA – by far the largest listed for-profit hospital chain 
– became private and some smaller hospital companies followed.
Better access to capital was no longer the driving force behind the growth of 
the for-profit hospital sector. However, troubled individual hospitals sometimes 
still needed investor capital and affiliation to a (for-profit) hospital chain was a 
natural way to obtain such resources. Consolidation became the main strategy of 
for-profit hospital groups to deal with this more challenging environment, and 
rural hospital operators with local monopolies seemed to employ it the most suc-
cessfully. The large for-profit hospital chains were well positioned for acquisitions. 
However, there was competition from new nonprofit hospital chains that also 
pursued mergers and were less dependent on lucrative acquisition deals. More and 
more states and communities therefore disputed whether for-profit chains were 
paying a fair price for local hospital assets.
There was another force that increased competition. The entrance barriers to 
elective acute care decreased because of technological developments, which shifted 
the focus toward ASCs and specialty hospitals, which required less capital. This 
opened up a promising business model for entrepreneurial physicians. They now 
had well-paying alternatives to working in a hospital, and this shifted the balance 
of power in their favor. Hospitals had to play defense. During the 1980s, for-profit 
and nonprofit hospitals set up subsidiaries that allowed additional compensation 
for their affiliated physicians. Hospitals hoped that these certain losses might be 
compensated for by additional patient admissions. This strategy seemed fairly ef-
fective at first, but did not last.
ASCs and specialty hospitals did not operate emergency departments and were 
therefore less affected by increases in bad debt, giving them a more favorable risk 
profile and boosting their profits. The market favored outpatient and focused 
facilities, which were considered more efficient. In the 1990s and thereafter, 
physician-owned ASCs and specialty hospitals began to pose a significant threat 
to the hospital sector, especially in metropolitan areas. Since most of these com-
United States: the ups and downs of the largest for-profit sector
83
panies were concentrated in the same states as the for-profit hospitals, these were 
threatened the most. They sought to influence Congress and the state legislatures 
to redress ‘unfair competition’ from physician-owned facilities. In the case of 
specialty hospitals, they partly succeeded. Increasingly, for-profit hospitals had to 
navigate their way through a more competitive environment in which low costs 
were more important than access to additional investor capital.
2.3.4 Conclusions
There are three factors that, over a longer period of time, are key to understand-
ing the development of the US for-profit hospital sector. The first factor is access 
to capital. This analysis has shown three periods in terms of capital reimburse-
ment. In the first period, capital reimbursement favored nonprofits: for-profits 
had no access to voluntary and public funds, which were available and cheap (ca. 
1900–1965). The second period was favorable to for-profits: Medicare regulations 
‘guaranteed’ investment returns to for-profits, but not to other ownership types 
(1965–1985). Finally, a sort of level playing field was created that also reduced the 
need for equity capital (the PPS). Since equity capital is most expensive, and since, 
in the US, there is little evidence that it is earned back by higher efficiency, the 
need for investor capital as a supplementary source declined.
Physician remuneration is a second important factor. This analysis has shown 
that the interests of physicians can encourage as well as hinder for-profit hospital 
growth. The birth of the proprietary sector was a result of the physicians’ lack 
of hospital access to other ownership-types (ca. 1880–1920). Once this problem 
was solved, physicians turned against proprietary hospitals that tried to capture 
a share of the surpluses. Physician remuneration was most favorable in the open-
staff voluntary hospital (ca. 1920–1970). Since 1970, for-profit ownership types 
have increasingly outcompeted nonprofits in keeping their ‘physicians happy’ (i.e. 
remuneration, access to technology, fringe benefits). For-profit hospitals have 
seemed better able to solve agency problems thanks to generous reimbursements 
and to involving physicians in helping them make additional profits. However, this 
position is currently being challenged due to physician-owned ASCs and specialty 
clinics that make even better remuneration possible (1995 and onwards).
Finally, in the US, the number of uninsured patients matters. Since hospitals 
have both high fixed costs and ethical or legal duties to deliver necessary medical 
care, too much uncompensated care threatens the ability to earn profits. This first 
became a problem during the Great Depression. At that time, it hurt the propri-
etary sector that was dependent on charging paying patients at full costs the most 
(1929–1940). Medicare and Medicaid substantially reduced the amount of bad 
debt. Together with favorable capital reimbursement policies, this benefited the 
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for-profit sector the most (1965–1985). Since the mid-1980s, cost-containment 
policies have cut the margins on Medicare and Medicaid payments severely. This 
has represented a continuing challenge to the for-profit hospital sector, accom-
panied by other challenges such as the increasing number of uninsured and legal 
requirements to treat them, and more effective cost control by third parties. High 
levels of uncompensated care have limited the business opportunities of the for-
profit hospital sector.
To conclude this chapter, it appears that a new area of growth for the for-profit 
hospital sector depends on large additional demand for (equity) capital – to invest 
in new technologies, for example, which may again induce inpatient care – and 
the establishment of some kind of (private) universal health insurance system 
which may reduce the level of bad debt, maybe partly paid by the abandonment 
of nonprofit tax exemptions. The latter is important in structurally improving 
the competitive position of the for-profit hospital sector vis-à-vis other forms of 
ownership.
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3  United Kingdom: for-profit hospitals outside 
the mainstream system
3.1 Introduction
This chapter deals with the development of for-profit acute hospital care in the 
UK. Section 3.2 presents a historical description of the development of the for-
profit hospital sector and is split into nine chronological sections. I begin with the 
status of the voluntary and pay hospitals before World War I (section 3.2.1) and 
World War II (section 3.2.2). Then follows the start of the NHS (section 3.2.3) and 
its immediate impact on private and voluntary hospital care (section 3.2.4). The 
next sections describe hospital care outside the NHS (the independent sector). 
These sections address the period until 1970 (section 3.2.5), the politicization of 
independent hospital care during the 1970s (section 3.2.6) and 1980s (section 
3.2.7), the years of the internal NHS market until 1997 (section 3.2.8), as well as 
the more recent developments (section 3.2.9).
The second part of the chapter analyzes this historical sequence of events. Fac-
tors that shaped how and how much for-profit hospital care was delivered are 
analyzed. I first analyze the growth and decline of proprietary hospitals (section 
3.3.1). This section is followed by an analysis of the way in which the NHS shaped 
relations with the independent hospital sector for decades to come (section 3.3.2). 
Section 3.3.3 analyzes the rapid expansion of for-profit hospital chains during the 
1970s and 1980s. I explore current dynamics, such as the efforts to open up the 
NHS to the independent sector, in section 3.3.4. The chapter then ends with my 
main conclusions (section 3.3.5).
3.2 The development of for-profit hospital care
3.2.1 Pay hospitals and paying wards before World War I
In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, illness was generally endured at 
home. The fellows and licentiates of the Royal Colleges of Physicians were the 
elite of the medical practitioners. They were consulted by the rich and often held 
honorary positions in (university) voluntary hospitals. Medicine was a highly 
competitive field and there were many demarcation disputes between general 
86
For-profit Hospitals
practitioners (GPs) and consultants. Generally, hospitals worked with a closed 
list of consultants, meaning that many (general) practitioners had no hospital 
access and feared that consultants would ‘steal’ their patients if they sent them to 
a hospital.
The profession sought to solve such tensions over remuneration through a 
system of referral: ‘the need has arisen for a class of men who will practice as 
consultants in the strictest acceptance of the term, who will see patients only by 
the intermediary of their ordinal medical attendant, and who, consequently, could 
never be the cause of the latter losing his patient1. In 1911, a national insurance 
scheme for general practitioner, pharmaceutical, and tuberculosis services was 
based on these principles2. Patients were to be accompanied with a letter of rec-
ommendation from their GP when seeking consultant care. Since GPs were paid 
capitation fees, they had an incentive to move seriously ill patients to the hospital.
The UK hospital sector consisted mainly of voluntary facilities, supplemented 
with public institutions for the poor, and some cottage facilities in the rural areas. 
Most hospitals were controlled by laymen and staffed by honorary physicians3. 
How were hospitals funded? Public facilities depended on tax-money and did 
not meet the standards of the middle classes. Larger voluntary hospitals could 
sometimes support themselves through their endowment incomes. As a matter 
of fact, charity contributions were very significant and the scale of donations 
indicated a tremendous sense of social duty and responsibility4. Many voluntary 
hospitals depended on annual subscriptions5, private donations, and church or 
union collections.
The nursing reform movement – begun by Florence Nightingale who, in 1860, 
founded a school – gradually raised the cost of treatment, which increased incen-
tives to make provisions for those who could afford to pay6. However, in sharp 
contrast to the US (see chapter 2), direct payments by patients remained negligible 
in voluntary clinics: in 1910, after many years of attempting to attract more paying 
patients, they only received about 2.5 percent of their revenue from such pay-
ments7. There were three reasons for this lack of paying patients. 1) Most patients 
lacked the necessary means. 2) It was strongly believed that introducing payments 
for treatment would harm appeals for charity funds8. 3) GPs wanted hospitals to 
be ‘free’9. Nevertheless, some large voluntary clinics – despite the opposition of 
physicians – formed paying wards10 and under pressure from GPs, such wings 
became open to all doctors11.
Quite some physician-controlled cottage hospitals formed an exception to these 
rules. They were the pioneers in the movement of patient payments. In 1895, there 
were some 300 cottage hospitals12. Henry Burdett (1892) calculated that patients’ 
payments accounted for about eight percent of the income of a sample of 183 cot-
tage hospitals, a much higher percentage than in other types of hospital13. Many 
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of these cottage hospitals were still charities, but significant proportions had been 
formally founded as proprietary facilities. Nevertheless, in the UK pay hospitals 
and pay wards developed comparatively late.
In 1877, Henry Burdett14, the founder of the pay-hospitals movement, ‘advocated 
the formation of an association for the purpose of founding a hospital replete with 
every comfort and provision for the privacy and proper treatment of the well-
to-do patients to which admission should be by payment alone’15. The medical 
profession gave its lukewarm approval, but – importantly – came out strongly 
against pay wards attached to general hospitals: paying patients should be treated 
in separate institutions. Burdett’s home hospital, intended for those whose homes 
are ill adapted for the successful treatment of serious illness, was established in 
1880; by 1902 1,476 doctors had treated 5,376 patients16.
During the 1880s and 1890s, many nursing homes and pay hospitals were 
founded by GPs or by ladies with or without a nursing qualification. In 1900, 
there were at least fifty nursing homes in London. The British Medical Journal 
remained dubious about this trend: ‘it is on the whole better that neither physi-
cians nor surgeons should be pecuniarily interested in running such homes’17. 
Indeed, quite a number of homes seemed to be of a dubious nature. They offered 
unusual treatments such as ‘fresh air cures’ and ‘vegetarian diets’, or ‘massages’ for 
men who were not really ill. Calls for inspection grew, but no further regulations 
were enforced. By 1914, virtually all such homes were run on business principles 
and patients had to pay substantially above costs. However, besides the cottage 
hospitals where patients usually paid less than actual costs, there were very few pay 
beds in the general hospital sector18.
3.2.2 Pay hospitals, paying wards, and pay beds before World War II
After World War I, the voluntary hospitals faced grave financial pressure. This was 
a result of the decrease in their per diem payments for the wounded servicemen 
and increasing inflation. Now, many hospitals abandoned their tradition of not 
charging patients and increased their numbers of pay beds. It became clear that 
charity contributions could no longer be their principal source of income.
A Committee suggested the use of contributions and collections from wage earn-
ers to solve such problems, but rejected the idea of permanent support from public 
funds22. Provident and contribution savings schemes were set up in response23. 
Such schemes were unpopular with the profession because of their lower levels of 
reimbursement. However, the physicians were unsuccessful in their attempts to 
impose income limits on these schemes. One such scheme, the British Provident 
Association (later BUPA), had been organized to provide pre-insurance for the 
somewhat better off24.
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In 1936, the remaining legal restrictions on the ability of charitable hospitals to 
charge fees to private patients were lifted25. A high proportion of patients in vol-
untary hospitals now made some form of payment, which gave these hospitals the 
financial power to withstand the attractions of the modernizing public hospitals. 
There were now three classes of patients: 1) those that paid directly for treatment, 
2) those that paid for insurance contributions, and 3) poorer patients for whom the 
community paid. Most poor patients were treated in municipal hospitals,26 which 
started paying considerable salaries to their consultants. Specialists in voluntary 
hospitals still had to gain their income mainly from private practice and additional 
hospital fees charged to the better-off27.
Well-to-do patients were gradually seeking more inpatient treatment as a result 
of changes in medical techniques and socio-economic conditions. Again, demands 
for the regulation of the expanding number of nursing homes increased. Many 
richer people still preferred the small nursing homes where they could be treated 
with a better class of patients. Ironically, the standard of care they received was 
limited (because of the small size of the institutions and their resources) and less 
good than they might have received in a public or voluntary hospital28. The bad 
quality of proprietary nursing homes did not go unnoticed – in Decline and Fall, 
Evelyn Waugh’s 1928 satirical literary debut, he commented on the low standards 
and corruption in the private nursing home where Paul Pennyfeather, his hero, 
was sent to have his appendix removed29. It was estimated that one-third of the 
nursing homes had no operating theatre and in nearly every case there was no 
X-ray apparatus, no laboratory, and no resident doctor. In fact, nursing homes 
seemed grossly inadequate in comparison to other hospital types30. The College 
of Nurses was a vigorous proponent of the registration of nursing homes, but 
the British Medical Association continued to be reluctant to harm the interests 
of proprietary physicians. The Nursing Homes Registration Act (1927) set down 
some minimal standards: nursing homes had to be run by a ‘fit’ person in a ‘fit’ 
premise. Nevertheless, the number of these beds had dwindled to 22,500 by 1938, 
although this figure might be exaggerated due to changes of title to less regulated 
convalescent homes (table 3.1)31.
Table 3.1: Estimated hospital statistics (1800–1948)19
1800 1861 1891 1911 1921 1938 1948
Voluntary beds 4,000 11,000 39,000 43,000 57,00020 87,000 90,000
Public beds n/a 50,000 83,000 154,000 172,000 176,000 200,000
Pay beds in pay homes21 n/a n/a 9,500 13,000 40,000 48,500 n/a
of which nursing homes n/a n/a n/a n/a 26,000 22,500 n/a
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3.2.3 The National Health Service
In the 1930s, a broad consensus developed that changes in hospital care were 
needed. The idea of a national health service – which would address the problems 
and had been included in a 1920 ministerial report (The Dawson report) – gained 
ground. World War II accelerated these developments. By the end of World War 
II most voluntary hospitals were suffering from inadequate accommodation and 
shortages in and poor distribution of specialists, and the entire system lacked 
coordination32. Although, during the war, voluntary hospitals had added more 
than £10 million to their reserves, this did not mean that they were in a stronger 
overall financial position. Voluntary hospitals became dependent on the govern-
ment for their maintenance expenditure33. With low interest rates, these reserves 
could not contribute much towards operating costs and price levels had become 
much higher. If the higher standards of service that had been achieved during 
the war were to be maintained, much higher spending was needed. World War II 
brought a watershed in the approach to health care delivery. Mass mobilization 
was matched by a call for social justice, the abolition of privileges, a more equitable 
distribution of income and wealth, and drastic changes in the socio-economic life 
of the country34.
In 1945, the Labour party won an unprecedented electoral victory, capturing more 
than sixty percent of the seats in the House of Commons. Labour had the political 
will to enact bold social changes and this provided a window of opportunity for 
major change. Nevertheless, it is widely believed that the political skills of Aneurin 
Bevan (a left-wing member of the Labour party) were at least partly responsible 
for reaching the ambitious goal of an almost totally nationalized health service35.
To accomplish this goal, Bevan ensured that some private care was still possible 
within the NHS. In the debate in the House of Commons he stated that ‘unless 
we permit some few paying patients in the public hospitals, there will be a rash of 
nursing homes all over the country. If people wish to pay for additional amenities, 
or something to which they attach value, like privacy in a single ward, we ought 
to aim at providing such facilities for everyone who wants them […] people will 
want to buy something more than the general health service is providing36’. He 
was thus able to secure the approval of the influential Royal Colleges that effec-
tively represented the consultants, who were not averse to being paid for hospital 
work that they previously carried out for free, but want to retain some lucrative 
private practice. Only consultants and not the other doctors (associate specialists, 
registrars, and house officers) were allowed to treat private patients in NHS pay 
beds37. The number of such beds was about 1.3 percent of total NHS capacity. 
The government set maximum fees, but in the process of getting consultant sup-
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port, some non-ceiling pay beds were also tolerated. Note that Bevan’s policies 
produced interdependence between the public and private facets of consultants’ 
total remuneration.
With the inclusion of some NHS private practice and attractive salaries, Bevan 
secured the support of the consultants, thereby splitting the common front between 
consultants and GPs38. He famously remarked to a friend: ‘I stuffed their mouths 
with gold’39. However, Bevan also tried to deter the consultants from treating 
private patients in nursing homes or small clinics. This was less for ideological 
reasons, and was mainly because the quality of care was still believed to be inferior 
in small settings40.
The NHS came into operation on the 5th of July 1948, after a relatively easy vote 
in parliament. From that point on, health services were free of charge at the point 
of delivery. After nationalization, the central government owned about ninety 
percent of the country’s hospitals and inherited a waiting list of approximately 
half a million patients41. Hospital physicians were salaried. In England and Wales, 
hospitals fell under the responsibility of one of the fourteen Regional Hospital 
Boards. Consultants became key participants on these boards as well as on the lo-
cal hospitals’ management committees. From the outset, Bevan’s accommodation 
with the consultants turned the NHS into a system of ‘hierarchical corporatism’, 
with effective veto rights for the medical profession at each level of the hierarchy42.
3.2.4 The survival of a small independent hospital sector
NHS costs exploded because of much higher than expected use. Many hospitals 
were out-dated and the capital funds needed to modernize them were not avail-
able. During the first decade of the NHS, only £100 million was invested, while the 
BMA gave £500 million as the absolute minimum figure that was required.
Some hospitals decided to remain outside the NHS. They were mainly small, 
Roman Catholic facilities that received some contracts from the NHS43. However, 
their numbers declined rapidly due to terminations and delayed NHS inclusions. 
The remaining facilities formed the core of the independent hospital sector and 
in 1949 they were represented by the Association of Independent Hospitals and 
Kindred organizations.
The independent hospital sector consisted overwhelmingly of nonprofit orga-
nizations44. These hospitals were located disproportionately in the London area 
and other parts of the more affluent south. Labour took a permissive attitude to 
them, hoping that eventually these hospitals would become part of the NHS or 
go out of business. Minimal legislation was introduced to control their activities. 
Independent hospitals remained eligible for tax-exempt charity status even though 
there was a free public alternative. Consultants relied largely on NHS pay beds for 
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additional remuneration. The rates for such services were high; in comparison 
with their private income, the number of treated patients was small45. In 1955, 
part-time consultants working a maximum number of sessions in the NHS could 
earn as much as one seventh of their salary from pay beds.
Private insurance schemes were severely threatened by the introduction of the 
NHS and most of the old social contributory schemes went out of business46. Some 
3.5 million people remained insured for minor additional services with one of the 
health plans that were ideologically close to the NHS47. However, some private 
insurers believed that demand for a ‘comprehensive’ health insurance package, as 
an alternative to the NHS, would continue. In an attempt to secure a basis for con-
tinued operations, eighty-nine local funds formed the British United Provident 
Association (BUPA). They covered 34,000 subscribers and their families, which at 
that time (1949) was around eighty-five percent of the private insurance market48. 
Their subscribers were different from the pre-war middle-class clientele, who did 
not fall under statutory insurance but could not, like the rich, bear the risk of 
medical cost by themselves. Now, the core clientele of private medical insurance 
(PMI) was overwhelmingly upper-middle class.
3.2.5 Moderate growth in independent hospitals
Independent hospitals grew at a moderate but steady pace until the beginning 
of the 1970s. They grew from a trivial percentage to about 3.5 percent of NHS 
expenditures49. Political attention was not on the independent hospitals, for which 
there was no agenda, but primarily on the NHS pay beds. Over time, many NHS 
contracts hold by independent providers were phased out. In 1956, the NHS 
strengthened its commitment to scale: a new hospital plan introduced the district 
general hospital, with an average of six- to eight hundred beds. As a result, capital 
investments increased slowly from 4.5 percent of total hospital expenditure (1961) 
to 6.5 percent (1970)50. However, the Treasury had long neglected NHS capital 
funds and in 1969 the average age of a hospital facility was seventy years.
During the same period, consultants’ salaries could be set at a relatively low level 
because consultants could also engage in private practice. During the 1960s, con-
sultant salaries rose less than sixty percent, while average GPs’ net remuneration 
more than doubled. In the mid 1960s, private payments to consultants equaled 
fourteen percent of their salaries; it would have cost the Treasury a considerable 
amount to compensate consultants for the loss of private practice income51. Note 
that clinicians involved in private practice had to retain their positions in the NHS, 
otherwise the consultant was unlikely to attract referrals and hence less attractive 
to the owners of independent sector facilities.
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The payers of the independent sector
PMI companies, the new third-party funders of the independent hospital sector, 
grew healthily after the creation of the NHS. They presented themselves as a re-
sponsible alternative to the NHS and they pointed to the family responsibilities of 
their subscribers, convenient appointments52, no waiting lists, privacy, congenial 
surroundings, and more luxury care. PMI subscribers could make use of indepen-
dent hospitals or NHS pay beds.
Although the charitable status of the provident associations, who dominated 
PMI, was terminated in 1960, the number of subscribers to the three dominant 
companies continued to grow (table 3.2)53. Initially, only individual insurance 
policies were sold, but in the mid 1960s, group plans came to dominate this 
market, reaching sixty-four percent of policies sold in 1969. The growth of PMI 
implied an additional flow of resources into the independent sector. Nevertheless, 
in the first decades of the independent hospital sector, out-of-pocket payments 
remained a much more important source of funding. Even as late as in 1975, forty 
percent of the bills were still paid directly out-of-pocket54. Overseas patients from 
Commonwealth and Arab countries seeking first-class medical treatment were 
supportive of this arrangement.
Private insurers copied the NHS regulations that only consultants could treat 
private patients as a way of proving their commitment to high-quality care and 
justifying their high fees. The business model of the private insurers also de-
pended on the availability of enough private hospital beds, since the NHS was not 
always willing or able to deliver a sufficient number of pay beds. PMI companies 
monitored the availability of hospital capacity closely, since demand was growing. 
A BUPA survey in 1953 counted 8,045 NHS pay and amenity beds56 and some 
18,000 suitable beds within the independent sector57. The capacity of the indepen-
Table 3.2: Persons insured, number of subscribers (BUPA, PPP, WPA) and claims 
1950–198455
Year Persons insured as
% UK population
Subscribers (thousands) Claims as % subscriptions
1950 0.2 56
1955 1.2 274 84
1960 1.9 467 84
1965 2.7 680 88
1970 3.6 930 83
1975 4.1 1,087 73
1980 6.4 1,647 83
1984 7.8 2,010 82
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dent sector remained stable during the 1950s and 1960s, but the number of NHS 
pay-beds declined58. Because of the abolition of caps on pay-bed fees, not much 
consultant resistance followed this decline.
Following its survey, BUPA decided to intervene in the hospital market itself. 
Many stand-alone independent hospitals had been integrated into the NHS or left 
the market. BUPA believed that more quality beds were necessary to guarantee 
that its clientele could get rapid access to (typically lower-technology) care in 
modern, pleasant and comfortable surroundings, and wanted to be less dependent 
on the NHS. In 1957, BUPA donated £100,000 to help start the Nuffield Homes 
Charitable Trust, which grew quickly by acquiring and building small hospitals. 
By 1967, Nuffield was operating thirteen hospitals, which grew to seventeen (493 
beds) in 1970 and twenty-six (831 beds) in 1976. By that time it had become the 
biggest provider of independent hospital beds, treating 35,000 patients a year59.
3.2.6 Politicization: the left and the birth of for-profit hospital care
In the early 1970s, the politicization of the issues of pay beds and the indepen-
dent hospital sector began. During Labour’s opposition (1970–1974), the party’s 
left-wing dominated on health issues, paving the way for a more radical agenda. 
Such leftist viewpoints were supported by some other factors. Within the strong 
hierarchy of the medical professions, junior doctors sometimes felt exploited by 
senior colleagues, whom they relied on for references, and who were asking them 
to assist in their private practice without compensation.
In early 1971, the association of junior doctors sent an alarming open letter to 
the Health Secretary. The association demanded a public inquiry into the abuse of 
NHS facilities by ‘unscrupulous’ consultants who were engaging in private prac-
tice. Another suspicion was that, due to its weak administration, the NHS did not 
identify all private services for its charges. In 1972, the first broad investigation of 
NHS private practice, based on interviews and opinions among interested parties 
and persons, suggested that on balance the retention of private practice and pay 
beds was having a damaging effect on NHS patients60. However, the Conservative 
government decided to take no further action and maintained the status quo.
The attack on private hospital care
In February 1974, Labour returned to power and was anxious to curtail both 
independent hospitals and NHS pay beds. As they saw it, Bevan’s legacy of free 
access to care according to medical need was being undermined. Barbara Castle, 
the new Secretary of State for Health, had a strong personal commitment to these 
issues. In society at large there seemed to be support for reforms.
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At the time, some described the NHS as being in the grip of ‘workers’ syndi-
cates61. Indeed, inn various parts of the country, NHS union members started 
actions to terminate private care in their facilities62. The BMA urged the govern-
ment to intervene in the strikes but the government angrily refused to support the 
BMA’s interests. It was not until July 1974 that the government made a hesitant 
and reluctant announcement and attempted to end the strikes, which for the time 
being was enough to normalize the situation63.
However, relations between the consultants and the government had been 
undermined and in late 1974, they became even worse after new radical policy 
proposals, the fiercest reform effort since the beginning of the NHS64. The govern-
ment sought for three major adjustments: 1) fewer NHS pay beds; 2) an increase 
in the attractiveness of full-time NHS positions to consultants in comparison with 
part-time contracts; and 3) common waiting lists for private and NHS patients, to 
prevent ‘queue-jumping’.
Consultants thought that these proposals seriously undermined the treatment of 
private patients within the NHS. Rough estimates suggest that part-time consul-
tants earned some twenty percent more than their full-time NHS colleagues65. In 
early 1975, they began a ‘go-slow’, only to find still stiffer government proposals in 
response. The government now intended to phase out all the NHS pay beds, while 
simultaneously curbing the independent hospital sector. A new license system 
would ensure that the total volume of independent care was frozen at 1974 levels. 
The government also stated that independent hospitals, which used NHS services 
for some of the treatments they delivered, must pay full economic costs, meaning 
a substantial rise in prices66. In addition, an administrative fee for the independent 
sector’s use of freely donated blood was introduced.
The independent hospital sector and most consultants were outraged and mas-
sive strikes loomed; the uncertainties engendered by the pay-beds dispute seemed 
also responsible for (temporarily) arresting the growth of PMI67. The moderate 
Association of Independent Hospitals split in two. Under the lead of BUPA, a more 
radical and successful association was formed (the Independent Hospital Group). 
BUPA supplied most of the money to support this new trade association, which 
only focused on commercially aware hospitals, not long-term care providers or 
charity hospitals. The Independent Hospital Group was able to win the full and 
explicit support of almost all the medical profession. This produced a degree of 
unanimity almost without precedent in the history of the medical profession68.
The failure of the governmental attacks leads to the commercial transformation 
of independent hospital care
A compromise was needed and Prime Minister Harold Wilson intervened per-
sonally. He appointed Lord Goodman, who had close links to the independent 
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sector, as an intermediary69. The Government now no longer sought to terminate 
private care, but committed to maintaining it according to the needs of society. In 
December 1975, a compromise was reached to release a thousand NHS pay beds. 
An independent review board was to make decisions about any possible future 
reductions. To guide its decisions, this Health Services Board considered the 
demand for pay beds and the actual occupancy rates. The Health Services Board 
saw a fifty percent utilization rate as appropriate for pay beds; later sixty percent 
was considered appropriate.
The attack on pay beds had largely failed, but in response consultants were now 
much more willing to shift their patients to independent hospitals (see table 3.4). 
The Health Services Board required building permits for newly built independent 
hospitals with over seventy-five beds (in London a hundred beds). However, most 
independent hospitals were smaller than these thresholds and the Board was only 
allowed to test the impact of such facilities on the NHS marginally.
The number of NHS pay beds further declined (table 3.3). With waiting lists 
growing, independent hospitals started to fill the gap. Not only were the tradi-
tional (commercially aware) nonprofit operators (Nuffield) growing rapidly, new 
for-profit hospital companies were entering the market. American AMI opened 
its first clinic in 1970 and bought another one in 1977. In 1976, Humana, another 
US for-profit hospital chain, bought the large and prestigious 256-bed Wellington 
Hospital. In 1975, BUPA, in reaction to the threat that the government might phase 
out all NHS pay beds, founded BUPA Hospitals Ltd, a for-profit subsidiary72, with 
more sophisticated facilities than the Nuffield nursing homes73. BUPA hospitals 
expanded rapidly. All for-profit hospital groups invested heavily in new facilities 
and equipment; as a result, the proportion of capital expenditure went up.
Table 3.3: NHS pay-beds70
1953 1956 1965 197671 1979 1980 1983 1986
8,045 7,188 6,239 4,859
4,407 3,924 3,301 3,144 3,138
Table 3.4: Value of private hospital care (turnover £ million) and percentage of pay 
beds 74
NHS pay beds Independent hospitals Percentage pay beds
1970 20  20 50
1974 36  49 42
1980 46 173 21
1982 50 369 12
1984 58 525 10
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To sum up, private acute care was more or less equally divided between NHS 
pay beds and independent hospitals. In the 1970s, independent hospitals clearly 
outpaced the turnover of the NHS pay beds (table 3.4). The independent hospital 
sector became more sophisticated and capital-intensive. New for-profit chains 
entered the market, which transformed the traditional nonprofit character of the 
sector. Under the Labour government of the late 1970s, the independent hospital 
sector grew, particularly capital-intensive for-profit hospital providers.
3.2.7 Politicization: right-wing policies and the for-profit hospital boom
Ever since the creation of the NHS, the independent sector had continued to grow. 
Even during the hostile political climate of the 1970s. Still the Royal Commission 
on the NHS reported in 1979 that the independent sector was to small to make a 
significant impact on the NHS75. However, in May 1979, the coming to office of 
Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government marked a real watershed. Figure 
3.1 shows that the growth path of the private sector climbed steeply. The new 
Conservative government constituted an ideological project, although not along 
the lines of a coherent and well-developed policy agenda76. The retrenchment of 
the public sector formed an essential part of this project. Between 1982 and 1994, 
the number of acute NHS beds dropped by twenty-five percent77. Public invest-
ment declined and obtaining new capital continued to be a problem78. In the late 
1980s, the necessary capital was so hard to find that the government sought out 
private partners, under the private finance initiative (PFI)79. The other goal of the 
Conservative project was to induce the growth of private markets.
The independent hospital sector boomed. In 1979, it counted 6,578 beds, but by 
1985 there were 10,155 beds80. Fifty new hospitals, generally for-profit facilities, 
opened their doors and almost half of all independent hospitals had been built 
Figure 3.1: Total spending (£ million) acute private health care86
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since 1975. Total spending on private acute care went up from £144 million (1979) 
to £1,490 million (1990)81. Between 1979 and 1985, for-profit hospital companies 
created fifty-four additional facilities and 3,500 beds; their market share in the 
total independent hospital sector grew from twenty-eight to fifty percent. The for-
profit hospital sector was now firmly established.
US for-profit hospital chains were responsible for most capital investment. Sup-
ported by a historical high level of the dollar there has been a strong incentive to 
invest overseas82. These companies copied their own business models and built 
comparatively large facilities with modern and expensive equipment. In 1985, the 
average for-profit hospital owned by a US chain had a total of 85 beds; the average 
hospital owned by a British company counted 44 beds. The larger scale of the US 
chains was supposed to attract the consultants who brought the patients in. In such 
facilities, complex procedures such as cardiac surgery became more feasible83. On 
the other hand, for-profit chains also created niches where the NHS was less active, 
like day surgery, screening services, sports medicine, fertility services as well as 
acute mental health84.
The entry of US hospital chains provoked animosity among British operators, 
who felt threatened by their aggressive expansion and explicit promotion of for-
profit medicine. However, British chains like Nuffield and BUPA hospitals had 
better access to political influence and the media. In 1983, BUPA insurance de-
cided that not all of their comprehensive insurance schemes would cover the full 
fees of some of the higher-charging US hospitals. BUPA now offered the choice of 
less expensive schemes that only permitted access to the (lower-charging) British 
hospitals. Eventually, most of the US hospital chains left the market. Britain did 
not turn out to be the springboard into continental Europe that they had hoped, 
there was some antagonism in the population and falling revenues in their US 
home market led them to trim their overseas operations85.
The Conservative agenda: curtaining the NHS and stimulating independent 
hospital care
The Conservative government was strongly committed to the free market. Polls 
financed by BUPA seemed to show that there was reasonable public support for 
some mix of private and public health care87. Nevertheless, the idea of free health 
care at the point of delivery, a strong symbol of fairness, was still cherished by 
a large majority of the population. Although some senior officials might have 
played with the idea of abolishing the NHS, this was not politically feasible88. As 
an alternative, tight budgetary measures limited NHS spending. During Thatcher’s 
first two terms, the average annual rate of real NHS expenditure growth was only 
1.25 percent, compared with 2.75 percent from 1976 through 1979, when Labour 
introduced global budgets; and, 6.5 percent for the 1970s as a whole89.
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Budgetary deprivation gradually damaged the image of the NHS. It resulted 
in long waiting lists, which grew even faster in the later part of the 1980s. In 
1990, forty-seven percent of the public was generally dissatisfied with the NHS, 
compared with twenty-five percent in 198390. Another survey found that patient 
satisfaction was much higher in the independent sector. Private patients always 
saw a consultant, compared to forty percent in the NHS91. However, such figures 
did not increase popular support for the independent sector. As a matter of fact, 
opposition to what was called the ‘two-tier system’ increased between 1983 and 
1989. The general public seemed to prefer increasing spending on the NHS92.
The Conservative government did not dare to challenge the existence of the NHS 
in any fundamental way, but it did take measures to stimulate the independent 
hospital sector. In 1980, the Health Services Act abolished the Health Services 
Board and thus the certificate-of-need regulations for both NHS pay beds and 
the independent hospital sector. Although, the government developed some 
alternative conditions for the delivery of private care in pay beds, these were 
not enforced93. The independent hospital sector tended to see NHS pay beds as 
unfair competition and argued that the NHS was in fact subsidizing them94. The 
government also eased the requirements for developing independent hospitals. 
Ministerial veto powers on the construction of new hospitals or on hospital con-
versions became much more limited95. Town and county planning legislation was 
weakened, making it easier for new for-profit hospitals to be approved regardless 
of their impact on the local community96.
However, the most important changes were in the terms of employment of 
consultants. It became much more attractive for consultants to treat private 
patients. Full-time consultants were allowed to earn an additional ten percent of 
their gross salary from private work (whereas they had previously been allowed to 
earn nothing extra). Maximum part-timers had to forego one-eleventh (previously 
two-elevenths) of their salary, but now could undertake any amount of private 
practice97. Consultants could also be flexible about meeting their NHS commit-
ments98. Such changes increased the willingness of consultants to become involved 
in private practice. It was estimated that in 1984 eighty-five percent of consultants 
did some private practice, the highest proportion since the NHS had come into 
being99. In 1987, average consultant income from private practice was £17,000100.
The independent sector stated that they were in fact subsidizing the low wages 
that consultants were receiving from the NHS. Others were concerned that the 
NHS was subsidizing the independent sector because consultants were not always 
fulfilling all their NHS duties. Some seventy percent of surgery in the independent 
sector was carried out within regular office hours101. Beyond doubt is the fact that 
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the interdependence of the NHS and the independent sector strengthened since 
more consultants depended for their total income on a substantial private share.
Finally, the government sought to stimulate the number of contractual agree-
ments between the NHS and the independent sector. The work, which the 
independent sector provided for the NHS, had been in decline ever since 1948102. 
In 1983, the Regional Health Authorities were directed to use independent 
hospitals as a way of reducing waiting lists for non-urgent cases and for those 
waiting over one year103. The Royal Institute for Public Administration (1984) 
found that only seven percent of District health authorities responded to contract-
ing out some acute care to independent providers, without exception short term 
contracts to clear operation backlogs104. In 1989, the National Audit Office (NAO) 
estimated that such contractual arrangements were around £50 million, or less 
than five percent of total turnover of the independent sector. Only a small part of 
this money went to projects to reduce waiting lists; the remainder was still paid 
out for longstanding arrangements with nonprofit providers. This limited success 
was not surprising. The average marginal cost of contracting (for-profit) hospitals 
was almost double that of NHS hospitals. This raised questions about the value of 
independent hospitals in reducing waiting lists105.
A boom in private medical insurance
The Conservative government was much more outspoken in its efforts to stimulate 
PMI and removed many obstacles to this. Employers who paid for PMI for their 
employees received new tax benefits106. In 1984, 4.4 million people were covered, 
up from 2.3 million in 1977. New commercial insurers had a significant share of 
this growth in subscriptions107. Combined with the dwindling number of non-
British patients, this led to a decline in the share of out-of-pocket payments in the 
independent hospital sector108. In 1984, twenty-five percent of all hospital charges 
were patient-paid; in 1975 this number had been as high as forty percent109. As a 
consequence of tax benefits for companies, most growth was in company schemes 
that targeted the working population. The lengthening of the waiting lists also 
encouraged the growth of PMI110. Indeed, research indicated that waiting lists 
coincided with the purchase of PMI111.
Gradually more working families were covered by PMI. Because of the larger 
number of claims filed by this lower-income group, the pay-out ratio went up. In 
combination with inflationary pressures on hospital costs and consultants’ fees, 
the claim ratio increased to ninety-five percent. Private insurers were forced to 
raise premiums sharply and by the mid 1980s the PMI boom had ended.
The growth of PMI favored for-profit hospitals. Private insurers were not com-
peting on price and exercised little direct influence on containing hospital costs. 
They were offering services whose marketing appeal was that they were ‘better’ 
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than the NHS. This made the private insurers natural allies of the independent 
providers who wished to charge more to demonstrate their perceived ‘superiority’. 
At the end of the 1980s, it was clear that the independent hospital sector was a 
permanent player. It accounted for slightly over six percent of all the acute hospital 
beds in the UK. For-profit hospital chains held more than half of this lucrative 
market; nonprofit hospitals were obliged to modify their charity focus and imitate 
the strategies of the for-profits or take the risk of a buy-out or termination.
3.2.8 Internal market: the NHS contracting for-profit hospitals
At the end of the 1980s, the Royal Colleges triggered a debate on inadequate NHS 
funding. With waiting lists lengthening rapidly, the Conservatives prepared a new 
set of policies, with Mrs. Thatcher taking personal charge of these efforts. The 
remaining restrictions on the development of activity in the independent sector 
were ended112. People over sixty were awarded tax rebates for certain comprehen-
sive PMI schemes113. On the other hand, the insurance tax on PMI increased from 
2.5 to 4 percent. The growth of the number of people in PMI slowed114.
However, the real fundamental policy reform, also for the independent hospital 
sector, was the effort to introduce markets into the NHS. Such a policy had already 
been chosen for public education. In an influential essay entitled ‘Reflections on 
the National Health Services’ (1985), Alan Enthoven, who developed the model 
of managed competition, proposed such a solution. Enthoven proposed that the 
District Health Authorities (DHA) would receive a needs-based global budget 
and be free to use either directly managed facilities, buy services from other au-
thorities, or from the independent sector to cover the demands of their patients. 
The central idea was that providers would compete for contracts from DHAs – a 
purchaser-provider split115. The NHS and Community Care Act went into effect 
on 1 April 1991. In 1992, the PFI was enacted to minimize the impact of public 
funding restrictions on investments116. Nevertheless, hospital capital investments 
under this new program remained modest, with no major project launched until 
1997. Obtaining capital remained a problem for the NHS117.
A purchaser-provider split to mimic market pressures
The internal market represented the greatest change in the history of the NHS118. 
What were the main adjustments? A purchaser-provider split was introduced 
inside the NHS. The DHAs had to purchase hospital services and could chose 
block contracts, cost-and-volume contracts, or cost-per-case contracts. Initially, 
the DHAs were not allowed to roll over spare funds119. The hospitals were gradu-
ally organized into separate trusts. These hospital trusts, and by 1998 this included 
all NHS hospitals, only had limited freedom on financial affairs. The government 
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enforced a system of global budgets. Hospital trusts were required to pay the 
Treasury six percent (later 3.5 percent) charges for the use of capital, which was 
considered to be a ‘free good’ prior to the 1990s, to cover for interest and deprecia-
tion; trusts also were required to break even on their operational budgets. Hospital 
payments were regulated and hospital trusts were expected to price their services 
on the basis of average costs; they could not engage in marginal cost pricing.
What was the outcome of these reforms? Most scholars tend to view the evidence 
on efficiency, equity, choice, responsiveness, and accountability as inconclusive120. 
Competition among hospital trusts did not come into being, although this 
had been the cornerstone of the project. One reason for the limited amount of 
competition was the monopoly position of many hospital trusts. Another factor 
was the persistence of the relationships and patterns of activity that predated the 
purchaser-provider split. The internal market remained socially embedded in pro-
fessional and managerial networks and institutions within the NHS hierarchy121. 
By 1997, waiting lists had risen to a record of 1.25 million persons. Waiting lists 
were worst for elective surgery, the principal activity of the independent hospital 
sector122.
NHS pay beds gain through the internal market
It was the intention of the Conservative government that the independent hospital 
sector could tender for NHS work. Theoretically, this created the opportunity to 
increase the quantity of for-profit hospital services provided for the NHS123. How-
ever, for the independent sector as a whole, this remained a negligible possibility 
with mostly spot purchasing being used to reduce waiting lists and no long-term 
contracts124. Table 3.5 shows that during the 1990s the value of private acute medi-
cal care for the NHS increased only modestly.
During the period of Conservative government, NHS pay beds grew more 
rapidly. Some scholars think that the public NHS trusts proved to be more com-
petitive than for-profit hospitals125. Indeed, charges for NHS pay beds were often 
much lower than the charges of the for-profit hospital companies. The growing 
autonomy of NHS trusts increased their interest in income from pay beds. In 1989, 
the Health and Medicine Act extended the freedom of hospitals to set rates for 
private patients. The Norwich Union estimated that in 1994 the NHS had earned 
a surplus of about £300 on each private patient. Only a few years earlier, the NHS 
had been losing about £90 million due to undercharging for private patients126.
NHS trusts developed dedicated private patient units, entire wards or wings 
which were dedicated to treating private patients and similar to independent 
hospital surroundings, but had the advantage of providing NHS back-up services. 
These units typically offered single rooms with en-suite facilities and stand-alone 
catering127. By 1998, there were seventy-five NHS dedicated private patient units 
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that had transformed 1,400 of a total of about 3,000 pay beds. The growth of NHS 
dedicated patient units was seen as a threat to the independent hospital sector 
interests and dedicated patient units were strongly opposed by its representative 
body, which claimed that the NHS was in fact subsidizing its private activities 
to undercut independent hospitals128. For-profit hospital companies responded 
to this challenge by introducing fixed-price surgery for self-pay patients. PMI 
companies offered a choice of specific insurance benefit reductions by which 
premiums for private treatment could be reduced129.
Consultant remuneration leads to inefficiency in the independent hospital sector
A new investigation concluded that private consultant fees were much higher than 
necessary to ensure the availability of an appropriate level and range of specialist 
skills. British private fees were also much higher (by up to five times) than medical 
fees in other countries130. NHS salaries were comparatively low and the supply 
of physicians to the independent hospital sector was limited to the high-earning 
consultants. In 1992, an average consultant earned £59,000 of which £17,000 came 
from private practice.
Private net income as a percentage of total consultant remuneration increased 
from 11–13 percent (1975) to 28–31 percent in 1992131. Although there were wide 
variations, private fees were substantial for all consultants132. The government 
refused compliance measures to check whether, due to their growing private prac-
tices, consultants were still fulfilling their NHS responsibilities133. This produced 
another long-term problem. Because consultants were working in private practice 
on a self-employed basis, often at low volumes, and with disproportionately high 
traveling times and other logistical costs, the general efficiency of independent 
hospitals was low.
Table 3.5: Value of independent acute healthcare markets (1992–2006)147
1992 1996 2000 2002 2004 2006
Total acute market (£ million) 1,786 2,331 3,246 4,059 4,923 5,911
% Private fees for medical specialists 30.7 27.4 26.2 26.1 26 25.4
% Private treatment in NHS hospitals 9.2 10.7 10.3 9.6 8.1 7.3
% Private acute medical care 48 47.5 46.9 46.5 45.5 42.8
% Private acute medical care for NHS 2.9 3.8 4.2 4.7 5.2 7.3
% Private acute psychiatric care 5.4 7.5 4.2 3.5 2.2 2.3
% Private acute psychiatric care for 
NHS
incl. incl. 5.0 6.5 9.9 12
% Private care remaining 3.8 3.3 3.2 3.1 3.1 2.9
% Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
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The high level of private fees provoked some response; it was believed that PMI 
could contain these fees by monopsony power or by preferred provider networks. 
In 1993, BUPA, which had a widely used consultant fee schedule and had always 
been given the role of referee in the independent sector, became the sole de facto 
regulator of private consultant rates, because its competitors were allowed to fol-
low this schedule and form a de facto monopsony134. From 1989 to 1993, the BMA 
published its own fee guidelines because its members were concerned that BUPA 
was holding fees down – it had not increased fees in the previous three years. 
In 1992, around 6,600 consultants were following the BUPA benefit maxima and 
3,400 were following the BMA guidelines135.
However, an important report by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
was highly critical of the BMA schedule. The Commission stated that private 
hospital services were a ‘complex monopoly’. In such a situation the countervailing 
power of the private medical insurers was seen as crucially important. The BUPA 
schedule was deemed to be in the public interest because the Commission thought 
that these guidelines put downward pressure on consultant fees. Considering the 
BMA guidelines they thought that this was primarily a way of closing the market, 
leading to high prices and suppressing competition. The BMA schedule was pro-
hibited. The reaction of most private insurers to the report was to adopt stronger 
cost-containment measures. Private consultant fees rose at a more moderate pace 
in the years after this ruling.
3.2.9 Labour: new business models to the for-profit hospitals
In May 1997, after eighteen years of Conservative rule, Labour was elected by a 
landslide victory136. The new government was less radical than its predecessors 
of the 1970s, although Frank Dobson, the first Secretary of State for Health 
(1997–1999) and a left-winger, emphasized cooperation as an alternative to 
the internal market. Trusts changed short-term DHA contracts into long-term 
service agreements for which ‘commissioning’ became the new terminology; the 
GP-fundholder program, the source of a small amount of independent sector 
revenues, was abolished137. ‘The New NHS’, the first white paper on the subject, 
made no mention of the independent hospital sector138.
The government started an ambitious NHS expansion program with almost five 
percent in annual real monetary increases. The Conservative PFI program was 
revived, being seen as a useful way to provide a rapid injection of capital invest-
ment into new hospital plant without breaching public borrowing limits139. Under 
PFI, hospitals typically pay annual charges averaging between eight and eleven 
percent of their income to private consortiums, covering the costs of leasing and 
of procuring non-clinical services140.
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The steep increase in NHS spending was the main reason that the share of the 
independent sector (acute and long-term care) in total health care expenditure 
decreased from twenty percent (1997) towards seventeen percent (2006)141. Apart 
from the fact that purchasing independent hospital care was restricted to last-resort 
cases, the new government did not envisage any restrictions on NHS pay beds, 
nor on the independent hospital sector. Nevertheless, arguments on this subject 
continued in the background142. Private medical insurance companies were af-
fected by some factors that constrained demand. 1) Tax relief for individually paid 
PMI-premiums was terminated for those over sixty. 2) In 1999, non-life insurance 
premium taxes (which also applied to PMI) were increased by one percent. 3) A 
loophole used by a few employers to avoid paying this tax was closed.
This section describes how the huge amounts of new funding for the NHS affected 
the business model of the for-profit hospital groups. Note that it thereby concentrates 
on England. In 1999, the government handled over NHS discretionary responsibili-
ties towards the different ‘countries’ forming the UK (devolution). The reform path 
adopted by England is different from that being followed in Wales and Scotland, 
especially in respect of its more favorable adoption of market-style incentives143.
The NHS became a more attractive option for both patients and consultants, 
which affected the position of the for-profit hospital groups as a ‘better’ alterna-
tive. Eventually, the for-profit sector got ‘access’ to a part of these additional NHS 
funds. Alan Milburn, Frank Dobson’s centrist successor, introduced patient choice 
policies. Milburn enacted the ‘New Labour’ agenda, in fact a continuation of the 
internal market policies: ‘Reflecting (…) on his experience in reforming the NHS, 
at a time when New Labour was busy reintroducing market forces into health care 
having spent its first few years insisting it had abolished them, Enthoven notes 
that New Labour, while claiming to do something different, in fact built on and 
extended Thatcher reforms’144.
Patient choice paved the way for more cooperation between the NHS and the 
independent hospital sector. Table 3.5 shows that for-profit groups were more 
successful in providing acute psychiatric care for the NHS than in providing acute 
medical care. This success was driven by NHS outsourcing and bed reductions in 
mental health145. However, there is a strict separation between for-profit acute care 
and for-profit mental health care providers. Only Capio has a small interest in the 
independent mental health sector146. The growth of commissioned mental health 
services therefore did not benefit the for-profit hospital sector.
Additional patient choice through ‘including’ independent hospitals
During a political health care crisis in the winter of 1999/2000, the government 
changed direction. Despite significant monetary increases, severe capacity con-
United Kingdom: for-profit hospitals outside the mainstream system
105
straints meant that long waiting lists were only decreasing very slowly. Real annual 
budgetary expenses increased to as much as 7.5 percent. However, it now was also 
recognized that the help of the independent hospital sector might be required to 
achieve the promised service levels set for the NHS. This brought about a rather 
sudden change in the stance of the government.
In 2000, the government began to ‘encourage’ the use of the independent sector 
by the NHS148. A ‘Concordat’ between the NHS and the Independent Hospital 
Association was established and signed on national television149. The purpose was 
said to be to pave the way for more long-term relationships between the NHS 
and the independent hospital sector. On the other hand, the government thinks 
that this could also drive down prices in the independent hospital sector150. Thus, 
value-for-money became an important criterion in the commissioning of inde-
pendent hospital services.
The primary impact of the ‘Concordat’ was political, as is illustrated by qualita-
tive research indicating that NHS organizations do not yet view the development 
of public/private partnerships as a high priority151. Indeed, private medical 
services commissioned for the NHS were picking up only gradually (table 3.5). 
Nevertheless, NHS purchasing of for-profit hospital services became easier. Before 
the ‘Concordat’, District Health Authorities had to use all of their local capacity 
before they were allowed to purchase any for-profit services. The independent 
hospital sector also had to fulfill all NHS quality standards and complaints 
procedures152. This now became feasible, since the Care Standards Act (2000) 
set national minimum quality standards for the delivery of independent hospital 
care153. Previously, the sector had been subject to little external regulation154. Since 
the larger (for-profit) groups were already compliant and public recognition of 
such compliance would make business with the NHS easier, the sector welcomed 
these regulations155.
In 2001, the Department of Health started a program of diagnostic and treatment 
centers. Such centers offered fast-track surgery, separated from emergency cases. 
Treatment centers were intended to reduce waiting lists, particularly for elective 
surgery, and primarily in orthopedics and ophthalmology. Initially, these centers 
were publicly owned. However, as the program expanded, it was decided that the 
independent hospital sector would deliver 100,000 of the 280,000 procedures that 
were to be completed by 2006156. A second wave (2005–2010) was foreseen to 
include up to 250,000 additional procedures.
From the perspective of the for-profit hospital groups, the government set its prices 
very low. NHS and independent sector were reimbursed by the same prospective 
payment rates (payment-by-results). As a result, for-profits began to restructure 
and are reviewing their cost and price structures, which can be up to forty percent 
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higher than NHS costs157. Between 2002 and 2006, the average cost of outsourced 
care in the independent sector decreased by twenty percent per episode, partly due 
to transformations from high-cost spot purchasing to fixed volume block purchas-
ing158. The independent sector has not much further to go to match for unadjusted 
NHS costs159. Some dispute the fact that the NHS and the independent sector 
got the same reimbursement. Pointing to the higher value added tax independent 
providers pay on certain contracted-out services; higher registration and report-
ing requirements; and, higher costs for insurance against clinical negligence as 
well as IT services. Besides independent providers seek for a much higher return 
on capital than NHS trusts, which further increases their costs (see box 1.2). On 
the other hand independent providers are not obliged to provide a full range of 
services and may benefit from a better case mix and no or less costs for emergency 
care, research and development as well as teaching and training expenses160.
The government saw ‘additional’ medical staff – one reason for resorting to 
the private sector was to avoid dependence on the monopoly position enjoyed 
by NHS consultants161 – as another condition for contracting independent sector 
treatment centers. This means that the independent sector is expected to employ 
‘additional’ staff and not draw them away from the NHS162. As a result, most con-
tracts went to (cheaper) non-British providers who were likely to employ foreign 
doctors163. This led to concern among both the British providers and the BMA; the 
Independent Hospital Association collapsed because some of its members gained 
a contract and left the trade-association164. Existing independent providers face 
a double challenge: the loss of their traditional clientele as waiting lists shrink, as 
well as the unfavorable conditions of new NHS contracts to compensate for this 
loss of business165.
The government saw the increased competition as beneficial166. However, a re-
port by the House of Commons Health Committee was critical of the results of the 
program, including its quality of care, and made a case for NHS alternatives167. On 
the other hand, for-profit hospital groups continued to struggle to comply with the 
pricing conditions of the program. In 2006, seven tranches of the program were 
cancelled; in 2007 another two schemes were terminated. At that point in time, 
Alan Johnson, the Secretary of State for Health, stated that better value for money 
was essential for the continuation of the independent sector treatment centers168.
Initially, the government’s commitment to patient choice did not stop with 
the independent sector treatment center program. In 2002, pilots started for the 
‘extending choice for patients’ scheme. The purpose was to create treatment alter-
natives for patients on waiting lists. In late 2002, the government implemented a 
framework whereby funding followed patients. Patients could now obtain treat-
ment in those for-profit hospitals that accepted the prices it specified. Starting 
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in 2006, patients were allowed to chose from at least four hospitals or treatment 
centers (choose-and-book).
Patient choice broadened access to for-profit hospital care and the government 
thought that the market share of independent treatment centers could increase 
substantially169. Indeed, the ‘Concordat’ led to additional NHS business, but it 
failed to produce the long-term contractual relationships that the for-profit hospi-
tal groups had been seeking. The historical separation between the NHS and the 
independent sector with few cooperative institutional structures still forms an ob-
stacle to any such pact170. Besides, patients are in no hurry to choose independent 
hospitals for their treatment, which leads to budgets not being used171.
Recently, independent hospitals have entered choppier waters. In 2006, growth 
was the lowest in a decade. The new Brown government seems to be cooler on 
moves towards more choice and competition in the NHS, which alarms the for-
profit hospital sector172. Alan Johnson has promised an end to the permanent 
NHS revolution. The same day, September 25th 2007, the commercial advisory 
board of the NHS disbanded itself due to these political changes in direction173.
Increasing remuneration for NHS consultants
Few Trusts took action against consultants on the grounds that private practice 
was affecting their NHS commitments, or collected information on the amount of 
private practice, or tried to regulate private practice174. Consultants went unchal-
lenged and enjoyed a favored position within the NHS175. The only exception was 
that their salaries were comparatively low (see sections 3.2.5 and 3.2.8). Now, the 
large increases in funding made a change of policy possible on consultant remu-
neration.
The government reconsidered remuneration in order to reward those consul-
tants who contributed most to the NHS. The goal was to increase the consultants’ 
hours of work within the NHS176. The government also proposed a seven-year ban 
on private practice for newly qualified consultants. However, this ban failed due to 
fierce resistance from consultants177.
The only feasible way to increase the hours that consultants devoted to the NHS 
was to increase their pay. The idea was that many consultants would have little 
incentive to consider private practice if the NHS made a more reasonable financial 
offer for their services178. The government raised consultant salaries considerably 
and introduced large bonuses for NHS work. Consultants have to work more hours 
for the NHS before becoming eligible for these higher salaries and bonuses179. The 
income gap between public and private work narrowed.
The government succeeded in its efforts to redirect consultants to their NHS 
duties. In 2006, the National Audit Office estimated that fifty-five percent of con-
sultants were active in private practice, down from seventy percent in 1999180. 
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Thus it becomes less attractive for consultants to align themselves with for-profit 
hospitals, putting their business model of keeping ‘physicians happy’ under pres-
sure. Although private remuneration is still considerable181, this development 
could curtail the supply of consultants active in the independent hospital sector 
in the future.
PMI strategies predominantly hurt other ownership-types, not for-profit 
hospital groups
Inflationary pressures on independent hospital rates gradually led PMI compa-
nies to intensify their cost-containment strategies. From the mid 1990s onwards, 
they began building preferred provider networks. Subscribers who choose such 
schemes agree that they will use a limited hospital network but pay lower premi-
ums. Insurers obtain better prices from these in-network hospitals in exchange for 
the expectation of increased volume. However, the main strategy was not so much 
to increase competition in the market, but to split total overhead costs over fewer 
hospital facilities182.
All the larger for-profit hospital chains tended to be included in these networks. 
These companies now formed the backbone of the independent hospital sector 
and were the only ones that could offer some sort of national provider network. 
It was also not in the interest of the insurers to hurt the for-profit hospital chains, 
which formed the only feasible alternative to the NHS. The preferred provider 
networks hit the other providers within the independent sector: 1) dedicated NHS 
private patient units (see table 3.5); 2) non-affiliated hospitals, especially stand-
alone for-profits as well as some of the religious hospitals183.
Real growth in claims payments, the most important source of income for in-
dependent hospitals, slowed markedly to less than one percent a year. These were 
by far the lowest increases of the past three decades. Other reasons behind these 
trends were an increase in the incidence of smaller claims, more effective cost 
management by insurers, and some impact by the restructuring of prices following 
the competition from the treatment centers184.
In 2006, PMI funded sixty-three percent of the independent hospital sector. 
Subscription growth remained modest throughout the 1990s and has declined 
slightly in more recent years. During the end of the 1990s, self-insured company 
schemes grew; now third-party administrators were servicing some twenty-five 
percent of the insurance market185. Self-pay patients also grew, stimulated by the 
favorable economic climate, increasing demand for cosmetic surgery, and a sharp 
increase in critical illness policies186. However, self-pay patients eased again in 
recent years. Demand weakened in traditional areas where NHS waiting lists were 
now shrinking (table 3.6).
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Consequences for the independent hospital sector
By 1995, the bed capacity of the independent sector had peaked. The network 
arrangements and the general trend towards outpatient treatments contributed 
to the downward pressure on the number of beds (table 3.7). Nevertheless, inde-
pendent hospital care continued to grow. The main reason for this was the NHS’s 
outsourcing of acute psychiatric and medical care (see table 3.5). In 2006, the turn-
over of the independent hospital sector reached almost six billion pounds. Because 
the share of NHS dedicated private patient units declined, the for-profit hospitals 
could continue their growth paths. As mentioned above, many of the dedicated 
private patient units were excluded from the preferred provider networks of the 
insurers. They were considered to be unduly expensive after the gradual elimina-
tion of traditional NHS cross-subsidy policies. Neither did the NHS form a cartel 
to increase the bargaining powers of their private business.
Due to capital requirements, economies of scale, access to information systems, 
and excess capacity, consolidation continued among independent hospitals (table 
3.8). In response, mergers authorities are increasing their activities. In 2000, the 
Department of Trade and Industry blocked a takeover bid for Community Hospi-
tals made by BUPA hospitals; in 2001, the Competition Commission blocked the 
possible purchase of the Heart Hospital in Central London by HCA; in 2007, as 
Table 3.6: Percent self-pay patients in independent hospitals (England and Wales)187
Total Male Female
1981 28.0 24.9 30.8
1986 21.0 17.6 24.3
1992 12.9 11.0 14.2
1997 19.2 16.1 21.6
2002 22.5 n/a n/a
2006 18.2 n/a n/a
Table 3.7: Independent acute medical/surgical hospitals and beds188
Hospitals Beds
1981 154  7,035
1985 200 10,067
1990 211 10,739
1995 227 11,681
2000 225  9,980
2007 209  9,572
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a result of a review by the European Competition Commission, the Swedish firm 
Capio189 sold its hospitals to Australian Ramsay Health Care190.
The for-profit hospital chains continued to increase their share of the market. 
Despite their favorable tax status, nonprofits lost market-share191. In mid 2007, 
for-profits owned seventy-three percent of all independent hospitals and a slightly 
larger share in the number of beds and total revenues192. For-profits operated half 
of all hospitals in 1985 and twenty-eight percent in 1979. Nuffield remains the only 
large nonprofit hospital chain with 1,700 beds, but gains almost a hundred percent 
of its turnover from trading activities193. In 2007, Nuffield sold nine hospitals to 
the General Health Care group194. BUPA (2005) sold nine hospitals to Classic 
hospitals and the remainder of its facilities to a private equity company (2007)195.
Elective surgery forms the bulk of independent hospital services. Surprisingly, 
the market share of the independent sector in elective surgery declined during 
the mid 1990s; by 1998 their market share had fallen back to the level of 1981197. 
The apparent reasons: 1) increased efforts to reduce NHS waiting lists; 2) high 
price inflation in the independent hospital sector; and 3) the independent hospital 
sector is highly dependent on the amount of time NHS consultants are willing to 
undertake private work and there may be natural limits to that, since the Royal 
Colleges have historically kept the number of training places low.
The independent sector focuses on a fairly narrow range of medical work, with 
a preponderance of minor or intermediate procedures. In the distribution of 
clinical activity, the number of abortions has clearly declined, while endoscopic 
investigations and the number of admissions without an operation have increased 
(table 3.9). Due to its focus on elective treatment, the independent hospital sec-
tor performs more and more operations in day surgery. The percentage of day 
surgery cases increased from twenty-three percent in 1986, to thirty-seven percent 
in 1993, and fifty-one percent in 1998. Nevertheless, the independent sector still 
lags behind the NHS in terms of private day surgeries198. In fields that resemble 
life-style medicine, such as cosmetic surgery and fertilization procedures, the 
independent sector has a high market share199.
Table 3.8: Percent market share independent hospitals by medical revenue196
1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2006
Top 3 48.9 56.7 59.0 60.0 56.3 51.9
No. 4–10 22.0 23.0 26.0 26.8 27.9 30.3
Remaining 29.1 20.3 15.0 13.2 15.8 17.8
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3.3 Analysis
I will now seek to explain the underlying forces that shaped the development of 
the UK’s for-profit hospital sector. I will identify critical junctures to separate the 
different stages in the development of the independent hospital sector, focusing 
on the sub-sector of for-profit hospitals. I will first analyze the growth and decline 
of proprietary homes in relation to other types of ownership (section 3.3.1). The 
creation of the NHS was clearly the most important event in the history of the UK 
health care system and therefore merits separate attention.
Section 3.3.2 analyzes the impact of the NHS on those disclaimed hospitals that 
formed no part of it – the independent hospital sector. What shaped relations 
between NHS and independent hospital sector? Were they two worlds apart, or 
did they complement one another? How did such relations shape the development 
of the independent hospital sector?
Section 3.3.3 explores the take-off and growth of a for-profit sector within the 
independent hospital sector. The confrontation between the independent sector 
and a more hostile government agenda actually brought about growth in for-profit 
hospitals. I will also look for an explanation for the possible influence of gradu-
ally changing market conditions that favored for-profit ownership over nonprofit 
ownership in the independent hospital sector.
Section 3.3.4 analyzes the current stagnation of for-profit hospital growth. 
Internal market policies and NHS spending increases have created a delicate bal-
ance between opportunities and threats for the independent sector; the for-profit 
hospital sector is urged to deliver more value for money. This chapter ends with 
my main conclusions (section 3.3.5).
Table 3.9: Percentage of clinical activity in private sector hospitals200
1981 1986 1992/93 1997/98
No operation or procedure 6.1 7.4 11.5 16.9
Endoscopic investigations 4.0 6.8 8.8 12.6
Operations on lens 1.4 1.8 2.3 4.1
Heart operations 0.2 1.0 1.7 2.9
Joint replacements 2.3 2.2 1.9 2.2
Abdominal hernia repair 3.4 3.4 2.5 2.7
Abortion 23.9 14.9 13.2 11.0
Other elective surgery 58.7 62.5 58.1 47.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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3.3.1 A small and stable fringe of proprietary hospitals (pay homes)
Proprietary hospitals developed comparatively late in the UK. The main reasons 
for this were a general lack of paying patients and the fact that most physicians had 
less need for hospital access. Proprietary hospitals were tolerated in some rural 
areas, where not enough voluntary or public sources were available. However, as a 
general rule these hospitals were not profitable and only tried to cover their own 
costs. The limited access of physicians to hospitals due to closed staff-facilities was 
resolved by a system of referral that limited the demand for hospital affiliations. 
Voluntary hospitals depended on comparatively high levels of charity income and 
were therefore hesitant to supply any pay services201. Free hospital care was also 
strongly supported by GPs, a newly formed profession. Free voluntary hospitals 
did not hinder their referral practices and allowed them to raise their fees for (ad-
ditional) services. Public hospitals were to a large extent still almshouses.
The above meant that voluntary and public hospitals offered a limited number of 
treatment possibilities for the small and exclusive group of potential well-to-do pa-
tients. This group wanted to be cared for in separate facilities with more amenities 
and among their own class. In the 1880s and 1890s, this led to the establishment 
of a new group of pay homes whose clientele was limited to those that were able 
to pay substantially above costs. These homes were clearly for-profit – that is they 
were run as small businesses.
Physician involvement in such facilities was limited. Physicians did not really 
need proprietary homes for patient access or as a source of income. The lack of 
physician involvement is illustrated by the terminology used. Until World War II, 
one spoke of nursing homes and convalescent homes. The owners were most often 
ladies who may or may not have held nursing qualifications, rather than physi-
cians (although the latter may have been affiliated on a fee-for-service basis). The 
scale and scope of this sector was limited, but, in contrast to the rural proprietary 
hospitals, they were profitable.
After World War I, these pay homes encountered competition from nonprofit 
hospitals and the quality of nursing homes was disputed. Partly as a result of finan-
cial pressures, voluntary hospitals gradually accepted paying patients for which it 
developed separate wards. Proprietary hospitals now encountered more serious 
competition. Between 1921 and 1938, the number of voluntary beds increased by 
30,000 while the number of beds in nursing homes (the most hospital-like for-
profit institutions) declined by almost 4,000. Efforts to improve the medical quality 
of nursing homes through registration policies and more physician involvement 
could not counter this trend. Nevertheless, the sector continued to appeal to well-
to-do patients who strongly favored amenities as well as the companionship of 
similar patients in small-scale surroundings.
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3.3.2 The creation of the NHS brings about a ‘two-tier’ logic
In 1948, the NHS created a dichotomy between public and private hospital care. 
The NHS offered free care for all UK citizens, which severely restricted the group 
of potential buyers for private hospital care since they had to pay the full price for 
this. However, the independent sector did deliver amenities that is, as supported 
by recent research, often highly valued202. Private care was inefficient because 
many consultants were servicing only a few private beds.
Private hospital care accounted for less than two percent of all acute care beds. 
NHS pay beds dominated this market, although its market share had gradually 
slipped to fifty percent by the early 1970s. Due to the opportunity for treating 
private patients on pay beds, the NHS was also the most attractive facility for most 
consultants to treat their private patients. The remainder of private care was pro-
vided by ‘independent hospitals’. Independent hospitals operated on a very small 
scale and the bulk of them were nonprofit, largely religiously based or charitable 
institutions. Initially, many were commissioned to provide services to the NHS. 
They supplemented this work by trading activities for paying patients. Private 
insurance was still in its infancy.
Initially, for-profit providers were a small minority within the independent 
sector. Precise figures are lacking, but in the late 1970s, after the entrance of the 
first for-profit groups, their share in terms of hospital beds was still no more than 
twenty-eight percent. This suggests that during the 1950s and 1960s, for-profits 
were well underneath twenty percent, and probably even lower than ten percent, 
of total independent hospital capacity. How was this possible?
Nonprofits had a few important advantages over their for-profit counterparts. 1) 
NHS-commissions guaranteed a certain volume to religious nonprofit hospitals. 
2) Nonprofits had better access to cheap philanthropic capital and cheap labor 
from religious workers. 3) Nonprofits were legally eligible for tax-exempt charity 
status. 4) Finally, nonprofits had better access to consultants and physicians who 
shared their (religious) values.
For-profit hospitals lacked such advantages and were much more dependent on 
patients paying above full cost. As a consequence, many proprietary nursing homes 
simply went out of business or converted to nonprofit status. Despite their com-
mercial orientation, in 1957 Nuffield hospitals began as a nonprofit organization. 
In search for a long-term strategy versus the NHS, most independent hospitals 
focused on providing choice, early access, consultant treatments, and comfort. 
Most were located in the more affluent south. The basic attraction of independent 
hospital providers was the growing demand for such care. The increasing penetra-
tion of private medical insurance decreased price sensitivity to private treatments; 
rich overseas patients from the Commonwealth also sought treatment.
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Consultant incomes increasingly supplemented by work in independent 
hospitals
The total income of consultants – and this is a very important feature that accom-
panied the start of the NHS – was partially dependent on treating private patients. 
With private remuneration rising over time, consultants became more tied to the 
interests of the independent hospital sector. Since medical etiquette prevented 
consultants from starting treatment without a reference letter from a GP, it was 
practical for consultants to keep an NHS position.
Why were NHS consultants allowed to treat private patients? Historically, 
consultant incomes depended on the share of affluent private patients, who were 
reluctant to obtain treatment from large public (or nonprofit) hospitals. From a 
consultant’s point of view, the NHS presented a risk in that these patients may 
not follow them. Consultants demanded facilities for such patients, either within 
or outside of the NHS. They got their way and were allowed to earn additional 
income under NHS part-time contracts. Three-quarters of consultants chose such 
contracts, demonstrating how important they were to them.
Nevertheless, this situation also worked from the government’s point of view. 
1) Private patients did not utilize public services very much, while their taxes 
continued to pay a considerable amount towards the cost of the NHS. 2) Many 
private patients were treated in NHS pay beds, further adding to NHS revenues. 
3) Private consultant remuneration may lower salaries that the government had 
to pay. Consultant salaries could be held down because they could recoup lost 
income by their private practice. Indeed, during the 1960s consultants’ salaries 
grew much more slowly than GPs’ salaries.
The interests of the private medical insurers and the independent hospital sector 
are closely linked
After the creation of the NHS, the demand for private medical insurance gradually 
increased (section 3.2.5), adding to the demand for additional private beds. How-
ever, private insurers did not feel comfortable being dependent on a monopolistic 
provider system that was politically managed. They sought an alternative to NHS 
pay beds, which the independent hospital sector could provide.
Insurers had an interest in and were highly supportive of a stronger and more 
modern independent hospital sector. This was more important than their interest 
in low costs. The support of BUPA, which dominated PMI, was highly accommo-
dating to the development of the independent hospital sector. In 1957, ideological 
positioning and an expected scarcity of pay beds led insurers (mainly BUPA) to 
establish Nuffield, the first not-for-profit hospital group, which concentrated on 
trading activities. At that point in time, the business case for for-profit hospitals in 
the independent sector was still weak (see beginning of this section).
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An inverse relationship: meager NHS funding stimulates a prospering 
independent hospital sector
The dichotomy between the NHS and independent hospitals implies an inverse 
relationship between both sectors. As long as NHS performance remained below 
the expectations of the (upper) middle-classes, these people would increasingly be 
willing to pay for PMI and for services from the independent hospital sector203. 
Such a situation could happen if funds were lacking and indeed, the NHS was soon 
short on resources as a result of unanticipated demand.
The tax-based integrative health system made enforceable cost-containment 
policies quite easy. Strict budgetary limits were often put in place. In 1960, 
capital investments amounted to only 4.5 percent of hospital expenditure, which 
by the way also hit the updating of NHS pay beds (section 3.2.5). The slow but 
steady growth of waiting lists for elective procedures was another consequence 
of structural cost-containment policies. Both trends added to a gradual increase 
in willingness to pay for an alternative to NHS treatment, through either PMI or 
out-of-pocket payments. This became evident during the 1980s, when the dete-
riorating image of the NHS (severe increases in waiting lists and outdated capital 
plant) invigorated the independent hospital sector.
3.3.3 Political tensions fuel the rapid expansion of for-profit hospital chains
The underlying drivers of for-profit hospital development – the increasing im-
portance of private remuneration for consultants, the common interests of PMI 
companies with the independent hospital providers, and meager NHS funding 
– came to the fore during the 1970s and 1980s. New for-profit hospital groups saw 
rapid growth, the result of the interaction of these three drivers with new ideologi-
cal political agendas. 1) It became much more attractive for consultants to perform 
private services for the independent sector. 2) Within the independent hospital 
sector, the traditional advantages of nonprofit providers declined and investor 
capital became more valuable. 3) The expansion of private medical insurance 
accelerated, which increased the demand for private care and reduced the price 
sensitivity of patients. 4) Rapidly growing waiting lists led to increased demand for 
private hospital services. These were the consequences of left-wing policies of the 
1970s of curbing pay beds and independent hospitals, and the right-wing efforts of 
the 1980s to expand the role of private markets.
Labour induces an unintended commercial transformation of the independent 
hospital sector
In the mid 1970s, the new Labour government tried to phase out NHS pay beds 
and freeze the capacity of the independent hospital sector. With the support of 
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the unions and the association of junior doctors, the ideology underpinning the 
NHS – free care at the point of service – was literally revitalized. However, the 
government underestimated the underlying logic of the system. The interests of 
the consultants were firmly bound to their private practices. A natural alliance 
between consultants, private indemnity insurers, the independent hospital sector, 
and large parts of the Conservative party was formed. This opposition was very 
energetic and was successful in stopping most of the policies of the government. 
With the exception of new certificate-of-need regulations for some larger indepen-
dent hospitals and some ‘paper’ reductions in NHS pay beds, nothing substantial 
was implemented.
On the contrary, something unintentional happened to strengthen the indepen-
dent hospital sector. In response to the policies of the government, consultants 
shifted many patients from NHS pay beds to independent hospitals. The con-
sequence was that the dominant position of the NHS in private practice ended. 
This vaulted the independent hospital sector into the lead in private practice. New 
for-profit hospital companies (BUPA hospitals and some US chains) were willing 
and the best equipped to fill this gap. They had the access to investor capital that 
was necessary to build the hospital plant to take the place of pay beds.
Nonprofit hospitals could not react as quickly and their traditional advantages, 
commissioning by the NHS, access to cheap philanthropic capital, and access 
to cheap religious labor, dwindled or declined in importance. Increasingly, they 
became objects for consolidation. Stand-alone proprietary hospitals and non-
profit hospitals with low profit margins and reserves often went out of business or 
merged with the larger for-profit chains. Left-wing policies had brought about a 
larger share for the independent hospital sector within the total amount of private 
hospital care, and most of this additional share went to for-profit companies. By 
1979, they held twenty-eight percent of this larger pie.
The Conservatives bring about strong growth in for-profit hospitals
In 1979, the Conservatives entered government with an ideologically pro-market 
agenda and the for-profit hospital sector boomed during the 1980s. Three changes 
of policy brought about such rapid growth. 1) New tax-benefits incentivized the 
purchase of private medical insurance, which intensified the trend toward grow-
ing private coverage. Thus, the demand for private care was stimulated because 
the availability of an important source of funding increased. Price-sensitivity 
decreased, partly as a result of the crowding out of self-pay business by PMI. This 
benefited the higher-charging for-profit hospital chains. 2) New employment 
conditions for consultants made private practice much more attractive to them. 
The importance of private practice for consultant income was further strength-
ened204. 3) The government severely curbed the amount of funding it provided to 
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the NHS. This led to major growth in waiting lists for elective care. More and more 
budgetary cuts and underfunding encouraged patients to seek hospital services 
in the independent sector. Note that none of these policy changes addressed the 
independent hospital sector directly. Indirectly, they positively influenced the 
demand for (additional) independent hospital services.
Regarding the balance between for-profit hospitals, nonprofit hospitals, and 
NHS pay beds, the dynamics of the 1970s continued during the 1980s. For-profit 
hospital groups met the additional demand, not nonprofit hospitals or NHS pay 
beds. Wrestling with budgetary pressures, the NHS was unable to meet the grow-
ing demand for private capacity. In the early 1990s, the market share of pay beds 
bottomed out. Nonprofits continued to be confronted with the long-term decline 
of their competitive advantages (see section 3.3.2).
Only the for-profit hospital groups had the necessary access to investor capital 
to invest in new plants and capitalize on first-mover advantages. US for-profit 
hospital chains, which were looking for attractive investments abroad, also en-
tered the market. These hospitals were comparatively large and purchased more 
medical technology and were thus also attractive to consultants. Some of these 
companies started to leave the British market by the mid 1980s, but their facilities 
were simply taken over by for-profit UK hospital operators. In the late 1980s, due 
to large for-profit investments, some excess capacity had developed. However, it 
was not the for-profit chains (which did not earn as much as they had hoped for) 
that were hurt the most, but the stand-alone facilities and voluntary providers 
who lacked the financial strength to compete. In fact, consolidation favored the 
for-profit groups.
3.3.4  Internal market strategies induces higher demand for value-for-
money
In 1991, the purchaser-provider split was designed to replicate market forces 
within the NHS. The establishment of an internal market became the goal of 
most NHS policy adjustments. This gradually affected the independent hospital 
sector, although not necessarily in a positive way. 1) NHS hospital trusts were 
rewarded for earning additional income and, with newly formed dedicated private 
patient units, increased their share of the private market. After the mid 1990s, 
the threat of these dedicated private patient units to the for-profit hospitals eased 
due to the fact that PMI companies did not include these units in their preferred 
provider networks. In 1997, the Labour government discouraged this kind of 
entrepreneurship in the NHS. 2) One of the Conservatives’ intentions in creating 
the purchaser-provider split was that the (for-profit) hospital sector would obtain 
a larger share of the NHS’s market. Although they gained some NHS business, this 
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was mostly spot purchasing to reduce NHS waiting lists rather than long-term 
contracts. NHS purchasers did not see any continuing advantage or found too 
many contractual complications to make use of independent hospitals (lack of 
cooperative institutions). 3) Since 1997, large increases in NHS spending by the 
new Labour government stopped the deterioration of the NHS’s image. Many new 
public hospitals were built with a more pleasant environment and waiting lists were 
reduced substantially. As a result, the price-sensitivity of care seekers to private 
care increases. Consultants were given significantly higher rewards if they worked 
more hours in the NHS and if their involvement in private practice declined. They 
thus became less active in the independent hospital sector. Simultaneously, the 
policies of the internal market were doing as much to hinder as to encourage the 
structural growth of independent hospital care. These companies were in need of 
a different business model.
The Labour government was willing to let the independent sector participate in 
reducing NHS waiting lists and increasing patient choice. This less ideological 
stand implied that the independent sector could be involved as a subcontractor of 
NHS funds. In 2000, a ‘Concordat’ gave independent hospitals the opportunity to 
treat NHS clients. However, the NHS turned out to be a price-sensitive purchaser 
of hospital services and for-profit hospitals needed to provide value-for-money 
if they wanted work from the NHS. Conditions were strict: 1) for-profit provid-
ers must be able to make a case for an acceptable level of efficiency compared to 
NHS provision; 2) there were limitations on the use of NHS employees, which 
stimulated the employment of foreign doctors and companies.
The Labour government had created the most uncertain prospects for the for-
profit hospital sector since the creation of the NHS. To be successful in gaining 
a share of the lavish NHS funding, the independent hospital sector needs to 
transform its traditional high-margin, low-volume model, into a low-margin, 
high-volume model. This is difficult since it also implies a fundamental change of 
its relations with the many self-employed consultants that treat only a few patients 
in a private session. In other words, they must either cut back on the number of 
consultants or they must tremendously improve logistical efficiency. However, the 
results of a recent study, sponsored by BUPA, might be an escape since they point 
to the fact that the NHS is probably unable to continue its current growth path 
and that raising revenues by other sources like PMI might be a necessity in the 
future205.
Ever since the foundation of for-profit hospitals in the 1970s, their growth has 
depended on two strategies. 1) The acquisition of the remaining nonprofit hos-
pitals in the independent sector. This strategy seems less feasible now, since the 
number of nonprofit hospitals available for take-over is minimal. 2) The fact that 
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the private market bears high prices. For many years, price inflation in the inde-
pendent sector was substantially higher than the increases in NHS prices. Indeed, 
since 1980, independent market share in total elective treatments has remained the 
same, although the share in the financial turnover has increased significantly. This 
structural high cost-base is hindering the for-profit hospital sector in competing 
for NHS contracts. The threat of improving NHS performance seems to be greater 
than the opportunities of for-profits to gain a share of the additional NHS funding.
3.3.5 Conclusions
In the UK, the proprietary and for-profit hospital sectors have since their incep-
tion focused very much on providing services for a richer clientele. This can be 
explained not only by the fact that these were the only patients that were able to 
pay, but also that voluntary and later NHS hospitals were reluctant to treat these 
private patients. The creation of the NHS ended most, but not all, voluntary and 
proprietary acute health care.
However, at the same time, the NHS brought about the gradual consolidation 
of the remaining fragmented private forces into an independent sector. The inde-
pendent hospital sector functions as a kind of alternative to the NHS206 for those 
people who want treatment by a consultant, want to jump waiting lists, or seek 
more convenient appointments and amenities. The independent hospital sector 
complements – rather than substitutes – the public hospital system. Accordingly, 
the better the NHS performs according to the standards expected by the upper-
middle classes, the less demand there is for independent hospital care.
The independent hospital sector also serves as an important means of supple-
menting the remuneration of NHS consultants. This not only explains part of 
its growth, it is critical in understanding the specific shape of the independent 
hospital sector. Many consultants perform only a few low-volume sessions in the 
independent sector, giving rise to low efficiency. For a long time, however, this 
low efficiency did not hinder its growth. Demand increased due to the curbing of 
NHS expenses and, additionally, an effective political ‘iron triangle’ protected and 
stimulated the independent hospital sector. This triangle consisted of consultants, 
private medical insurers and the Conservative party. BUPA acts as the natural 
coordinator of these interests.
Left-wing governments and their supporters have, hitherto, been unable to 
bring an end to or reduce independent and for-profit hospital care. The combined 
interests of the independent hospital sector and its ‘iron triangle’ have proved too 
strong to overcome. The ‘iron triangle’ was most successful during the decade of 
change (1975–1985), when it was able to defend independent hospital care suc-
cessfully against left-wing ideological policies and speed up the development of 
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the independent hospital sector. It remained very successful in the following years, 
which resulted in the rapid expansion of the number of for-profit hospitals. This 
was helped by other factors that more gradually improved the business climate for 
for-profit hospitals vis-à-vis their nonprofit counterparts within the independent 
sector – declining nonprofit access to cheap capital and cheap labor and a fall in 
NHS commissioning. When opportunities arose in the mid and late 1970s, the 
better access to capital enjoyed by for-profit hospitals groups proved decisive.
The traditional business model of the independent hospital came under gradual 
pressure as investment in the NHS increased very rapidly after 1997. This reduced 
the demand for separate acute care services and facilities alongside those of the 
NHS. This implies that independent hospitals are now more dependent on access 
to NHS funds. However, unless independent hospitals are able to reform their 
business model radically, they cannot compete with regular hospital trusts for 
additional NHS business on a cost basis. Meanwhile the number of nonprofit 
hospitals available for acquisition has severely diminished. For-profit hospitals 
now account for some three-quarters of the total independent sector. This op-
portunity for further growth thus also seems less feasible. It will be a considerable 
challenge for for-profit hospital groups to adapt their business model to the new 
circumstances. Indeed, many traditional for-profit companies have recently left 
the market and sold their hospitals to new owners.
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4  Germany: the impact of public capital 
subsidies on for-profit hospitals
4.1 Introduction
This chapter describes and discusses the development of for-profit hospital care in 
Germany. Until reunification in 1990, this chapter concerns West Germany, not 
the German Democratic Republic. The first part of the chapter describes the actual 
development of the for-profit hospital sector (section 4.2).
I start with an overview of the proprietary hospital sector until World War II 
(section 4.2.1). Section 4.2.2 describes the new political-institutional situation 
after the occupation of Germany by the Allied forces. The next section discusses 
the problem of building up the hospital sector with the scarce resources avail-
able (section 4.2.3)? Section 4.2.4 describes the immediate consequences of the 
Hospital Finance Act of 1972. Section 4.2.5 covers how West Germany, until 
reunification, brought about cost-containment and market-building policies in 
small incremental steps. In the new unified German republic, important institu-
tional changes were made (section 4.2.6). This was also the period when the rapid 
growth of the for-profit hospital sector began (section 4.2.7). Finally, section 4.2.8 
describes the dynamics of the development of the for-profit hospital sector in the 
current landscape. Since many for-profit hospital groups evolved from rehabilita-
tion companies, appendix 4.1 gives a brief account of these developments.
Section 4.3 gives an analysis of the historical descriptions. I start with a historical 
interpretation of the specific structure of the proprietary hospital sector (section 
4.3.1). I then explain the impact of scarce resources and the newly formed institu-
tions on the development of the for-profit hospital sector (section 4.3.2). Section 
4.3.3 analyzes how the impact of ‘free’ public capital hit the for-profit hospital 
sector. However, this policy proved unsustainable, and section 4.3.4 explains how 
the same institutions gradually evolved into a framework of incentives that actu-
ally stimulated for-profit hospital growth. The chapter ends with my conclusions 
(section 4.3.5).
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4.2 Developing for-profit hospital care
4.2.1 Historical background
Small proprietary hospitals have existed since the mid-nineteenth century, espe-
cially in the northern part of Germany. The early development of liberal settlement 
legislations and other capitalist principles in these protestant regions were prob-
ably important factors in this1, but other reasons were the growth of an educated 
middle class (Burgertum) and the growing urbanization (städtischen Lebensform)2.
Proprietary clinics were often located next to the much larger public or nonprofit 
hospitals, situated mainly in the (major) cities and often specialized in particular 
disciplines or treatments3. Comparatively, such clinics attained high levels of qual-
ity; they contributed significantly to medical practice and scholarship. Medical 
doctors, who held senior positions at university hospitals, often ran the more 
important proprietary clinics4. Typically, a proprietary hospital consisted of up to 
thirty beds and also operated an outpatient department5. To set up a proprietary 
hospital, one had to be fairly affluent or have a wealthy sponsor (typically a family 
member or friend)6. Generally, proprietary clinics were owned by physicians who 
served affluent families. The numbers of small proprietary hospitals rose steeply in 
the last part of the nineteenth century. In Berlin, their numbers rose from eleven 
(1873) to seventy-three (ca. 1900)7. One explanation for this was the dramatic 
increase in the number of physicians; all these extra doctors needed hospital ac-
cess and to a certain extent this pushed up the number of proprietary clinics.
In Germany, the level of hospital fees varied according to social class: first-class pa-
tients consisted of the educated people and officials with senior positions, who were 
used to a high level of consuming; second-class patients were (more senior) white-
collar workers; the much lower third-class charges were for blue-collar workers 
and those who were used to hardship. Many of these third-class patients soon came 
to be covered by some sort of insurance. In an attempt by Chancellor Bismarck to 
counter the rapidly strengthening socialist party, the country was in 1883 the first 
nation in which a segment of the population received statutory insurance.
In 1910, membership of these sickness funds was already at just under twenty 
percent of the population8. A consequence of the early introduction of statutory 
insurance was that only a rather small private insurance sector developed9. The 
statutory health insurance scheme was executed through thousands of sickness 
funds10. Their comparatively small scale increased insolvency risks, making the 
reduction in the number of funds a policy goal for many decades to come. Obliga-
tory entitlements included medical care, pharmaceuticals, sickness benefits (up to 
thirteen weeks)11, and funeral coverage. The coverage of hospital care was left to 
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the decision of the funds on a case-by-case basis, but was mostly included. Work-
ers paid for two-thirds of the contributions, which represented around 2.5 percent 
of their wages12. Sickness funds were allowed to contract any providers, including 
proprietary hospitals.
Worsening conditions for the hospital sector
Conditions for the (proprietary) hospitals deteriorated during the first decades of 
the twentieth century. World War I caused a sharp increase in general inflation. 
The government proclaimed a prohibition on any supplementary entitlements un-
der the sickness funds13. Since hospital services were included as supplementary 
entitlement, this hit hospital finances. Due to a change of law during the revolu-
tionary upheavals of 1919, the socialists and communists gained more powers on 
the boards of the funds14. Many sickness funds became more hostile towards pro-
prietary hospitals. Only a few years later, in the early 1920s, hyperinflation crushed 
the financial reserves of the entire hospital sector. Many smaller proprietary clinics 
went out of business. After a few years of economic recovery, during the mid- and 
late 1920s, recession struck again.
In contrast to other countries, hospital access was less important for doctors 
in Germany. Why was that the case? Ambulatory doctors dominated physician 
interests. The Leipziger Union (later called Hartmann bund) became the most im-
portant physician interest group. By 1910, it already counted seventy-five percent 
of the doctors among its members15. The Hartmann bund won repeated victories 
over sickness funds, over other health professions, and over salaried hospital 
physicians.
Nevertheless, in 1927 the physician/patient ratio was twice as high as in 1887 and 
this put pressure on doctors’ incomes. In an attempt to ease the tensions over 
physician reimbursements as well as the network policies of the sickness funds, 
which now insured almost sixty percent of the population, some enduring reforms 
were made. In 1931, ambulatory physicians were given a legal monopoly on all 
outpatient care. This makes the German outpatient larger than in many other 
countries16. Hospital services were strictly limited to inpatient care. The result of 
this unique reform was that the (potential) business of hospitals shrunk.
Hospital access became less important for the majority of ambulatory physi-
cians. The hospital sector became the domain of the salaried physician; note that 
in the 1920s, the majority of hospital doctors were already employed full-time 
on a salary. Due to their (obligatory) care for the poor, local authorities were 
also involved in the hospital sector17. The split between outpatient and inpatient 
care resulted in structural inefficiencies because of the increasing duplication of 
(diagnostic) services.
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The reform was also a setback for many proprietary hospitals since (generally) 
outpatient care was more lucrative. In deprived or rural surroundings, where it 
was not feasible to guarantee hospital access, some open-staff hospitals were still 
permitted (Belegkrankenhäuser). These open-staff clinics were mainly proprietary 
facilities, in which a combination of outpatient and inpatient care remained pos-
sible. Nevertheless, the market share of proprietary hospitals declined; utilization 
rates and average length-of-stay were much lower in those facilities (tables 4.1 and 
4.2).
The Nazi regime
The Nazis did not fundamentally alter the structure of the health care system. 
However, the leadership principle (Führerprinzip) was carried over into the gov-
ernance structure of the sickness funds. This implied that the National Socialist 
party effectively controlled the funds by appointing their leaders. Soon after the 
establishment of the regime in 1933, an economic recovery strengthened the 
finances of the funds. In contrast to many other countries, Germany was not hit 
particularly hard by the economic recession of the 1930s. Membership of the 
sickness funds rose, premiums fell, and co-payments were halved. The balance of 
power shifted further from the sickness funds towards the physicians.
Table 4.1: Hospitals and beds (acute care, psychiatric, rehabilitation and other)18
# Hospitals Public Nonprofit Proprietary
1931 2,263 1,454 1,234
1937 2,076 1,552 1,117
# Beds
1931 367,245 186,246 41,612
1937 390,189 201,213 37,282
Table 4.2: Bed utility rate (percent) and average length of stay (days)19
1934 1957
Bed Utility
 Public 80.3 91.2
 Nonprofit 72.3 88.0
 Proprietary 59.5 83.6
 Average Length of Stay
 Public 43.5 31.4
 Nonprofit 37.4 26.7
 Proprietary 24.5 25.5
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The number of physicians decreased due to the racist policies of the regime: 
twelve percent of German doctors were of Jewish origin and, because of long 
standing Anti-Semitism, these were engaged disproportionately in private practice 
and physician-owned hospitals. In the mid 1930s, the principles of self-regulation 
were combined with central conditions regarding costs20. Regional physicians’ 
associations obtained the right to negotiate remuneration contracts with the sick-
ness funds and distribute these payments among their members.
Despite some indulgence regulations, hospital expenses were contained. Ger-
many was one of the first countries to introduce rate-setting for the hospital sector. 
In 1936, the government froze per diem charges and these were not raised signifi-
cantly until 1948. Consequently, many hospitals gradually came under budgetary 
pressure and required additional voluntary or public resources.
By the end of World War II, the entire hospital sector was bankrupt. Finan-
cial reserves were worthless and most of the infrastructure had been destroyed. 
Twenty percent of hospital beds had vanished and there was no money to upgrade 
the undamaged facilities that remained. It was, once again, the year zero (Stunde 
Null) for the hospital sector.
4.2.2 Old policies embedded in new institutions
Following the Allied occupation, West Germany became a federal republic. For 
health care, this eventually implied a constitutionally enshrined sharing of powers 
between the states and the federal government, with further powers delegated to 
nongovernmental corporatist bodies (self-regulation)21. The institutionalization 
of many countervailing powers implied that the policies of the middle way became 
firmly established22.
Since election schedules are not synchronized, the lower (Bundestag) and higher 
(Bundesrat) assemblies often have different political majorities, further reinforcing 
the need to negotiate. As a general rule, stable political majorities only exist after 
the elections for the lower assembly. Thus if any health care reforms are to be 
made, they are implemented within one or two years of a general election23. The 
first post-war elections were won by the conservative CDU; Konrad Adenauer 
became West Germany’s first Chancellor. The CDU dominated the federal govern-
ment until 1969, when a left-wing coalition of social democrats (SPD) and liberals 
(FDP) took over.
Post-war German politics were characterized by the reflex to oppose any policy 
that the National Socialists had implemented. By 1955, the health care system, 
which had existed since the end of the Weimar republic, was restored within the 
new constitutional institutions24. In the first years of post-war Germany, health 
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policies were characterized by: 1) ad hoc public health interventions aimed at 
handling and preventing epidemics; 2) a fair and efficient distribution of the scarce 
health care resources.
For many years to come, the sickness funds increased their market share. Many 
sickness funds merged although they remained relatively small-scale25. Enrol-
ment in the sickness funds grew because of the strong growth of the working 
population and various legislative measures26. By the mid 1970s, ninety percent 
of the population was covered via statutory insurance. The remaining people were 
covered through private insurance schemes, which also had a legal monopoly on 
the provision of supplementary insurance schemes. Private insurance calculates 
experience-rated premiums, although by law were forced to make some provision 
for claims during old age in the form of premiums paid while the insured are still 
young.
A pluralist hospital system
West Germany developed a social market system – the Rhineland model – for 
which there was broad political consensus and in which the principle of subsidiar-
ity, taken from Catholic Social Teaching, was consistently applied. Hospital interest 
groups became heavily involved in the implementation of government policies. 
Sickness funds and physicians’ associations have the status of public law bodies, 
which gave them a privileged legal status and a (near) monopoly on social welfare 
provision but, at the same time, constrained their freedom of action by requiring 
that they fulfill certain public functions27.
The principle of subsidiarity meant that the government would only intervene in 
hospital care if there were no private alternatives; at the same time, the government 
could only retreat from supplying public hospital services if a private alternative 
existed. This promoted a pluralist hospital landscape that corresponded with the 
interests of nonprofit and proprietary hospitals28. The socialization of proprietary 
hospitals never became an important political issue29. The German hospital sector 
also differs in a number of ways from other countries. 1.) Inpatient and outpatient 
care are strictly separated. Hospitals are not involved in outpatient activities. 2) An 
influential role for physicians in hospital operations and management is provided 
for by law30. 3) There are large numbers of facilities that specialize in preventive 
medicine and rehabilitation. Appendix 4.1 describes this sector, which has always 
been dominated by for-profit facilities.
How can we characterize the various types of ownership? Public hospitals are 
large-scale facilities – owned by the federal government (army hospitals), the 
states (university clinics, state psychiatry clinics and the public hospitals in the city 
states), but mostly by local government (community hospitals). Such public hos-
pitals can be governed in a very centralist way or at arms-length, where it has been 
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possible to accrue a certain amount of retained earnings31. Nonprofit hospitals 
were operated mainly by religious foundations but sometimes also by other chari-
ties. Until the 1970s, these hospitals were able to rely on considerable amounts of 
cheap religious labor, which gave them a considerable cost advantage of up to fifty 
percent over other ownership types. However, public hospitals could count on 
deficit funding by the municipalities, which was also necessary because of a lack of 
retained earnings. Some religious charities also supplied nurses to public hospitals 
at comparatively low rates32. The for-profit or private hospital sector consisted 
mainly of smaller specialized facilities (Fachkrankenhäuser) and, especially in the 
rural surroundings of the south33, there were a number of open-staff hospitals 
which provided services for local ambulatory physicians. Often these doctors had 
an (indirect) interest in these hospitals. According to law, private hospital com-
panies shared the profit-seeking motive as general goal. However, they also had 
to fulfill legal requirements on their trustworthiness and compliance with certain 
health legislation as well as inspections34.
4.2.3 Scarce resources dominate hospital policies
After the war, the main policy priority of the federal government was to restore 
the solvency of the sickness funds. Together, the sickness funds had lost more than 
14.5 billion Reichmarks35. According to the constitution, the federal government 
was responsible for any deficits in the statutory insurance schemes36. The schemes 
for both public pensions and unemployment insurance were linked with the sick-
ness funds through the federal budget. These two social security schemes had to 
pay health insurance contributions, so any increases in health premiums had to 
be paid from the federal budget37. This explains why the ministry of social affairs 
was strongly opposed to easing the pricing caps on the hospital sector and, until 
the end of the 1960s, succeeded in accomplishing its goals against the more liberal 
ministry of economic affairs as well as the newly (1962) formed health department.
The federal government had a strong interest in holding down the growth of 
hospital rates. However, about 80,000 hospital beds had been destroyed during 
the war and eleven million refugees required an additional 100,000 beds38. It was 
estimated that 3.25 billion Deutschmarks (DM) were necessary to upgrade the hos-
pitals to modern standards. There was no money for these additional beds. On the 
contrary, hospitals continued to struggle with deficits. Most hospitals did not get 
enough money to make the necessary investment in restoration, nor were charges 
sufficient to cover the remaining operating costs39. During the 1950s and 1960s, 
the scarcity of resources dominated hospital politics. Two political coalitions de-
veloped. On the one hand, the interest of the federal government and the sickness 
funds coincided. The same was true of the hospital providers and the states and 
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local communities that were the owners of the struggling public hospitals. These 
authorities had the ultimate responsibility for ‘solving’ their hospitals’ financial 
difficulties.
Tight reimbursement
The federal authorities did not accept the rises in hospital charges that, to some 
extent, became possible in 1948. A freeze on hospital per diem rates was installed 
once more only a year later. The ‘way out’ of this underfunding by the sickness 
funds implied that the hospitals’ owners should pay for at least part of any losses, 
as well as additional investments. However, losses were often significant and are 
likely to have been about thirty to forty percent of total hospital turnover40.
How did the various types of ownership handle this situation? Nonprofit hos-
pitals had some voluntary means from endowments, had access to cheap labor 
by religious orders, and could sometimes generate retained earnings. However, 
nonprofits also relied on funding through additional debt and on the willingness 
of state and local authorities to support them. The losses made by public hospitals 
became a considerable burden on local budgets, since these governments had to 
finance these deficits by law. The proprietary hospitals had the most problems. 
In principle, they could only rely on retained earnings and profitable patients 
(cherry-picking) to solve any financial problems. Any hypothetical large for-profit 
clinic would have needed to be close to fifty percent more efficient than a public 
hospital to make a decent return on investment, which was simply not possible.
Financial adjustments seemed necessary and the federal government increased 
its powers in the area of health care41. They did this on general jurisdiction, since 
until the constitutional reform of 1969 the states had the formal jurisdiction over 
hospital regulations42. These federal regulations determined the methodology 
of the per diem calculations; although the states held some discretionary powers 
since they set the actual rates in a bureaucratic procedure.
In 1954, the government issued a hospital reimbursement ordinance (Pflegesatz-
verordnung), which eased budgetary pressures somewhat, although the common 
practice that hospital owners shared in the financial burden was reiterated. In their 
per diem payments, the sickness funds did not allow for any calculated return on 
equity, interest payments, or reimbursement for repairing war damage. Acceptable 
depreciation costs were very low: one percent on the basis of historical calcula-
tions43. Besides, sickness funds could always reject per diem increases if they went 
beyond their economic means. Finally, the mean of all public contributions of 
the past five years were detracted from the rates44. This was important since it 
meant that states and local communities were forced to continue funding hospital 
deficits.
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Preparing a solution for scarce hospital resources
In the early 1960s, forty percent of hospital beds predated 191645. Technological 
developments led to an additional need for capital. In 1960, the federal govern-
ment issued an interest-free loan of 150 million DM for building new nonprofit 
and for-profit plant. However, this was only a temporary remedy, since hospitals 
were already heavily in debt46. States were much more active in solving the prob-
lem of hospital capital shortages. Between 1950 and 1966, the states granted 4.3 
billion DM for the construction of new hospitals47. Often all types of ownership 
were eligible for these funds. The states wanted the federal government to share 
the burden of these capital costs.
Financial difficulties were exacerbated by other developments too. Economic 
prosperity and labor shortages put pressure on wages. The large surplus of doctors 
turned into a shortage, especially for assistant physicians. Worse still, the substitu-
tion of religious nurses for secular personnel put additional pressure on nonprofit 
and public hospital costs48. As a consequence, many less educated nurses were 
employed to meet requirements.
In 1970, the hospital sector operated at a yearly loss of almost one billion DM49. 
Since total hospital equity was estimated at around thirty-five billion DM, this 
implied a continuing loss of assets50. There were only two ways out of this problem 
that were politically feasible: 1) per diem rates that included all hospital costs 
(monistic finance); or 2) separate remuneration of current and capital costs (dual 
finance). Under the latter option, the sickness funds would pay for the current 
costs and the public authorities for the capital costs. This option would reconfirm 
the existing situation of hospital funding. However, for-profit hospital providers 
would be best-off with the first option, which implied less risk for their access to 
public capital funds.
Proprietary hospitals in a period of scarce resources
During the 1950s and 1960s, a large-scale for-profit hospital business model was 
not feasible due to lack of funding. The two dominant modes of survival were 
specialization in profitable service lines and the delivery of hospital facilities to 
ambulatory physicians in rural areas. Any new models that would have enhanced 
efficiency, such as the integration of outpatient and inpatient care, were unsuccess-
ful because ambulatory physicians resisted any such ‘violation’ of their monopoly 
on outpatient care51.
How did proprietary clinics manage to stay in business when general resources 
were so scarce? The affluent and those who had private insurance provided a mar-
ket niche for the sector. Private insurers patronized proprietary hospitals with their 
well-developed amenity structures52. It is important to note that private insurance 
rates were between 1.5 and two times the sickness fund rate53. This gave the pro-
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prietary sector a means of surviving and of making small profit margin. Secondly, 
proprietary hospitals often specialized in certain procedures, particularly elective 
surgery. Such clinics were often owned by renowned medical specialists54.
In the late 1950s, proprietary clinics owned almost eight percent of planned acute 
care beds, but this had fallen to 4.25 percent by 196955. This decline was primarily 
a result of the more rapid increase in public and nonprofit hospital beds, although 
the number of private beds also grew by forty-five percent. Growth seemed to be 
the strongest in the surgical disciplines and in obstetric care, where amenities are 
important. In internal medicine and orthopedics, there were absolute decreases in 
the number of the private beds (table 4.3).
Table 4.4 presents the number of all proprietary beds per 10,000 inhabitants until 
1969. Note that with the exception of the last year (second bar), it was not possible 
Table 4.3: Proprietary beds in selected specialties and increase/decrease (%)56
1959 1969 Change (%)
Internal medicine 3,309 2,795 − 15.4
Gynecology 1,907 3,507 83.9
Eye diseases 252 709 181.3
Surgery / Urology 2,519 4,469 77.4
Pediatrics 328 492 50.0
Orthopedics 567 401 − 29.3
Other 4,058 6,653 63.9
Table 4.4: Proprietary beds per 10,000 inhabitants (acute care, rehabilitation, and 
other)57
1952 1956 1957 1961 1969 1969
Schleswig-Holstein 6 7 8 5 5 4
Hamburg 3 3 2 3 4 4
Lower Saxony 8 10 11 11 10 4
Bremen 5 5 5 5 6 5
North Rhine-Westphalia 2 2 2 2 2 1
Hesse 7 8 9 9 16 3
Rhineland-Palatinate 5 5 6 9 11 2
Baden-Wuerttemberg 9 11 12 13 17 5
Bavaria 6 9 9 11 14 4
Saarland n/a n/a 1 1 5 1
West-Berlin 12 13 13 14 13 7
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to divide acute care from other proprietary beds. Proprietary hospitals had some 
market share in the more thinly populated areas, especially in parts of the south. 
Open-staff hospitals existed in Hesse, Bavaria, and Baden-Wuerttemberg. Special-
ized proprietary clinics operated in the more urban areas. On the other hand, the 
large state of North Rhine-Westphalia had mainly nonprofit hospitals and there 
were hardly any proprietary providers at all. In Bavaria, Baden-Wuerttemberg, 
Lower Saxony, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Hesse, the number of private beds for 
rehabilitation and other non-acute treatments increased rapidly. This is an im-
portant point since some of the current more successful for-profit hospital groups 
started as rehabilitation or preventive care clinics during the 1950s and 1960s (see 
appendix 4.1).
4.2.4 Initial consequences of the Hospital Finance Act
In 1970, the hospital sector experienced an annual loss of almost one billion DM. 
A major reform to clarify the financial responsibilities seemed necessary. What 
pre-structured this reform? After 1967, a strong economic upturn generated sub-
stantial revenue increases for the payers of hospital care. Additionally, after 1970 
sickness funds no longer had to pay sick benefit for the first six weeks of sickness 
leave. In combination with threshold increases, this led to major improvements 
in the financial condition of the funds. In 1969, the CDU-SPD coalition did have 
a large enough majority to amend the constitution. The federal government was 
now given the jurisdiction to supplement state budgets with federal means to fund 
hospital capital. This was an important requirement by the states to support any 
major reforms58.
In 1972, the new left-wing coalition of social democrats and liberals imple-
mented the Hospital Finance Act (HFA). The HFA sought to fundamentally clarify 
the responsibilities of the states and the sickness funds. It opted for the principle 
of dual funding. Sickness funds paid for operational expenditure, while the states, 
with some federal assistance, were responsible for funding the capital costs59. 
With the exception of the hospital sector, which feared additional government 
influence, there was broad support among the major stakeholders involved in this 
reform60. The HFA focused more on enabling (capital) investment than on con-
taining costs61. By law, communities were responsible for supporting the existence 
of an adequate local hospital infrastructure62.
Cost containment was to achieved through efficient planning regulations. States 
had to draw up hospital plans and certificate-of-need procedures in order to 
quantify the number of facilities, medical specialties and hospital beds needed63. 
For equipment and smaller-scale investment, which had to be amortized between 
three and fifteen years, hospitals were given a budget. Once approved, the large-
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scale investment was funded in its entirety, generally in a lump sum, although due 
to the large budgetary impact of such supplements, the actual costs for the loan 
were eventually financed64.
Initially, states had to finance two-thirds of all capital expenditure and the federal 
government financed the remaining one-third. States decided on the definitive per 
diem charges after regional negotiations between hospitals and statutory insurers. 
Generally, hospitals with losses were allowed to charge the remainder in the next 
year and hospitals with a surplus could charge less (retrospective cost coverage)65. 
Table 4.5 illustrates the main distributive consequences of the HFA. The funding 
of the hospital deficits was shifted to the insurers. States and communities focused 
on capital subsidies, and the burden of deficit financing eased.
Each state hospital plan consisted of a statement and an analysis of the hospital 
facilities necessary. Only hospitals that were included in a state hospital plan were 
eligible for public capital subsidies. In 1975, it was stated that sickness funds had 
to commission all hospitals that were included in a hospital plan68. Only under 
certain conditions could the sickness funds commission the services of hospitals, 
which were not included in state hospital plans69.
Public hospitals with over five hundred beds were the main beneficiaries of the 
reform70. Hospitals with less than a hundred beds were only included if they were 
necessary for the long-term infrastructure needs of the region71. This attempt to 
decrease the number of small hospitals did not go entirely without discussion: ‘It 
was against the interests of physicians to decrease the number of smaller hospitals 
in the state plans. The fact that 81.9 percent of all clinics with less than a hundred 
beds were proprietary hospitals with many private patients could have hit phy-
sicians’ revenues. Although they got the support of the CDU/CSU, the effort to 
oppose the new arrangements failed. This was probably the case while it seemed 
clear to most that new technological developments induced larger hospitals’72. In 
response, many smaller hospitals closed73.
From the perspective of (public and nonprofit) hospitals, the main consequence 
of the HFA was its guarantee of ‘free’ capital. For the states, on the other hand, 
it meant that the demand for capital, for which they bore the financial risk, was 
Table 4.5: Total hospital funding, percentages by payers66
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Public67 28.1 18.5 17.3 14.9 12.3
Sickness funds 51.6 63.6 65.0 67.1 68.4
Private insurance 7.7 6.5 6.7 7.3 8.1
Other 12.6 11.4 11.0 10.7 11.2
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‘endless’. As a consequence, a large shortage of capital developed. In 1984, this 
shortage was estimated somewhere between six and fifteen billion DM74. By law, 
the actual availability of capital was dependent on the budgetary means of the 
federal and state governments. The states quickly reached their budgetary limits. 
Although deficit financing decreased from eleven percent (1973) to 4.5 percent 
of total hospital costs in 197675, some communities continued to support their 
hospitals through additional funding76. Nevertheless, the HFA paved the way for 
a massive growth in spending. Hospital expenditure increased by an annual real 
average of thirteen percent during the subsequent decade77.
Consequences of the Hospital Finance Act for for-profit hospitals
The HFA alleviated the financial stress of the public and nonprofit hospital sector, 
but was less favorable for the for-profit hospital sector. The HFA prohibited public 
capital investment in for-profit hospitals78. There was not much discussion of this 
measure, nor was it explained in the parliamentary discussion of the act79. As a 
consequence, new (especially larger) for-profit hospitals were not feasible, while 
existing for-profit clinics became underrepresented in state capital expenditure. 
State hospital plans functioned as an effective barrier to new for-profit hospitals. 
Sickness funds were not required to reimburse clinics that were not included in a 
state hospital plan80. Since excluded hospitals also could not charge for higher per-
diem rates than comparable included hospitals, it was hard to cover for any capital 
costs81. The cost-base of for-profits thus had to be significantly lower than of their 
included peers. This could only be achieved through specialization (efficiencies of 
scope) or through investment that generated savings82. Additional revenues were 
gained by treating private patients.
Their limited access to public capital did not seem to lead to a deterioration 
of the for-profit infrastructure.83. Also, such hospitals were better able to select 
profitable patients. Small for-profit clinics had significantly lower operating costs. 
This was primarily a result of lower salaries for employees, especially nurses, since 
food and administrative expenses were substantially above those in other owner-
ship types84. Nevertheless, with the exception of Rhineland-Palatinate the share of 
for-profit beds fell sharply after the implementation of the HFA. Between 1969 and 
1989, more than two hundred for-profit clinics closed their doors. For-profit mar-
ket penetration only remained above five percent in Schleswig-Holstein, Bavaria, 
and Rhineland-Palatinate (table 4.6)85.
The left-wing government also tried to implement another policy that curbed 
the business model of the for-profit hospital sector. In an effort to create ‘classless’ 
hospitals, payments by private insurers were regulated. Up to that point, private 
rates had been much higher than the payments by the sickness funds. The govern-
ment’s intention was that lower private rates would alter the historic preferences of 
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private patients. It implied a cost shift from private insurers to the sickness funds, 
since the rates for full private insurance were reduced86. Many for-profit hospitals 
treated a disproportionate share of private patients and were harmed.
In 1972, in response to the political climate that had led to these measures, 
eighteen private insurers founded the Association of Private Hospitals. Their goal 
was the creation of a counterweight to the ‘classless hospital’. They founded Sana, 
which in 1976 became a hospital company and gradually started to acquire clinics. 
Like Nuffield hospitals in the UK, Sana formally became a nonprofit company, al-
though it did seek investment returns. Sana was the country’s first private hospital 
chain that relied solely on trading activities.
4.2.5 Cost containment policies and their impact for the for-profit sector
In the spring of 1974, the more moderate Helmut Schmidt succeeded Willy Brandt. 
During the aftermath of the oil shocks, general economic conditions worsened 
and public deficits increased massively between 1972 and 198688. This forced the 
government into adopting more restrictive budgetary policies. In 1975, the federal 
government decreased its share in hospital investment costs89. The states were 
unable to supplement this budgetary hole and an attempt to allow the hospitals to 
charge these costs to the sickness funds also failed.
Animosity between the federal government and the states increased. A new 
Health Insurance Cost Containment Act failed because of resistance from the 
states. However, one important new proposal was the fiscal rule of thumb that 
workers’ contributions to the sickness funds should be kept stable in terms of a 
percentage of their income (Beitragssatzstabilität)90. Eventually, in 1988, this was 
Table 4.6: State percentages of for-profit hospital beds87
1969 1979 1989
Schleswig-Holstein 7.9 6.0 6.4
Hamburg 4.0 3.8 3.0
Lower Saxony 5.6 3.6 3.1
Bremen 5.0 4.5 3.9
North Rhine-Westphalia 1.0 0.6 0.5
Hesse 4.6 3.9 2.6
Rhineland-Palatinate 2.2 2.7 5.4
Baden-Wurttemberg 7.1 2.9 2.0
Bavaria 6.2 4.8 4.9
Saarland 1.2 2.3 0.5
West-Berlin 6.8 7.3 3.8
Germany: the impact of public capital subsidies on for-profit hospitals
135
enshrined in legislation; the government enforced this fiscal rule of thumb by peg-
ging the spending of the sickness funds to their revenues, which in turn, are linked 
to the development of wages and employment91.
In 1981, benefit reductions, co-payments, and lower physician remunerations 
were the most important elements of a new law that sought to contain costs. States 
were given greater control over the negotiation of per diem rates92. To ease pres-
sure on state bureaucracies, smaller maintenance costs were included in the per 
diem rates93. However, these measures only contained health care cost inflation 
temporarily, if at all. Then, the ruling SPD-FDP coalition broke up after almost 
thirteen years in office, with the withdrawal of the liberal FDP ministers on Octo-
ber 1st, 1982. The dismal state of the economy had exacerbated political tensions.
New elections were held and the CDU/CSU became the largest party, with the 
FDP now becoming their junior coalition partner. The FDP, which always had 
been close to doctors’ associations, provided the minister for health. Helmut 
Kohl (CDU) succeeded Schmidt to become the new Chancellor and was to retain 
this position until 1997. The new center-right government did not make radical 
changes in policy, as happened in the UK and the US, but opted for more gradual 
changes. The ‘regulative embeddedness’ of the health system also prevented any 
rapid major changes94. As a consequence, the for-profit hospital sector did not 
gain any new momentum.
Pre-structuring a market paradigm
The center-right government was more tolerant towards private health insurance 
and halted the expansion of the sickness fund scheme. When the economy recov-
ered, membership of private insurance schemes increased rapidly. The number of 
people with supplementary insurance, partly driven by reductions in the statutory 
benefit scheme, also increased quickly. There was thus a larger patient base with 
access to for-profit hospitals95.
On the provider side, gradual market reforms, devolution, and increasing pro-
spective payments became key policies of the new government. This did not mean 
an immediate turnaround in the prospects of for-profit hospitals, but on a concep-
tual level it was definitely important and helped to pave the way for later for-profit 
growth. Reports and policy papers by important think tanks underpinned such 
pro-market viewpoints. The Robert-Bosch Foundation argued for an end to the 
principle of dual financing, the introduction of prospective payments and more 
decentralization of powers to insurers and providers96. The Sachverständigenrat, 
an independent advisory body, also favored market reforms97.
In 1984, the new Hospital Finance Act (nHFA) curtailed federal responsibilities. 
The federal government stopped sharing in hospital capital costs and acquired 
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fewer discretionary powers over state hospital planning policies98. This once again 
increased the pressure on state capital budgets for investment in hospitals; it was 
estimated that by the late 1980s, there was an annual capital deficit of three bil-
lion DM99. Increases in capital subsidies did not keep up with the rising cost of 
investing in new beds100. It is also important to note that the estimated capital 
deficits were not uniform across all states. The richer states in the south were much 
better able to support their hospitals than the poorer city states101. Capitation fees, 
which also differed among the states, funded smaller investments102. In the years 
to come, small adjustments would not ease the general shortage of capital funds. 
For example, with the permission of the sickness funds it became possible to fund 
capital through additional per diem charges but only if such an investment implied 
lower current costs, less capacity, and could be amortized within seven years103; 
sickness funds remained reluctant to facilitate this possibility104.
The nHFA stated explicitly that a plurality of hospital ownership types should 
be considered: ‘The implementation of this law should involve hospital plurality. 
This implies that state regulations should specifically consider the economic base 
of nonprofit and for-profit hospitals. Thus, capital subsidies might not be linked to 
conditions that threaten the independence of hospitals above regular certificate-
of-need-regulations or normal hospital management’105. This statement primarily 
addressed the for-profit hospital sector since nonprofit hospitals were generally 
included in state hospital plans.
The nHFA’s main goal was a gradual policy adjustment, rather than encouraging 
the outright privatization of hospitals106. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the 
formal prohibition of the inclusion of for-profit hospitals was ended. A number of 
states gradually altered their hospital regulations to make it easier for for-profits to 
be included in their state hospital plan107. The nHFA also took a first step towards 
prospective payments, which were strongly favored by the for-profit hospital sec-
tor. Prospective per diem rates were calculated to cover the operating costs of a 
‘reasonably efficient’ hospital. The new payment system included a correction for 
the level of utilization: hospitals received only twenty-five percent of the standard 
rates if they delivered more services than planned, and they were cut by twenty-
five percent if the hospitals did not reach their target108. It also became possible 
to negotiate prospective payments for specific procedures but this was not made 
mandatory and not used much. In 1988, ninety-six percent of hospital turnover 
was still funded by per diem rates109.
Early conversions to for-profit hospital ownership
The immediate impact of these reforms to the for-profit hospital sector was 
small, but the seeds for subsequent growth had been planted. The long-term 
decline of the for-profit sector seemed to have been halted by the late 1980s. 
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What did the for-profit hospital sector look like? In the mid 1980s, larger for-
profit hospitals were rare. In 1985, there were twenty-nine for-profit hospitals 
with over a hundred beds. A significant part of these facilities were operating as 
open-staff hospitals for local ambulatory physicians. Most for-profit hospitals 
were small, specialty hospitals. For-profits accounted for around half of all spe-
cialty clinics and a quarter of all specialty beds. More than half of all for-profit 
beds were located in one of the three southern states. According to an initial 
but less sophisticated study, for-profit hospitals had lower costs than public and 
nonprofit hospitals110.
Public hospitals, which had gained the most from the HFA, now felt the squeeze 
from the cost containment policies. Public hospitals were the most dependent on 
public capital and they also treated the most difficult case-mix. Furthermore, they 
are embedded in political structures that reduce their flexibility. Quite a number 
of public hospitals operated with deficits111. The public authorities funded these 
losses, but many public authorities were now indebted and increasingly short of 
funds.
Following a discussion that had begun as early as 1975 with a Treasury paper, 
hospital privatization was seen as a feasible alternative to balance these public 
deficits112. Privatization, though still controversial, became a possible alternative 
of easing the budgetary pressure on the municipalities113. Hürth was the first city 
that opted to privatize its hospital (box 4.1)114.
However, the favorable economic conditions of the 1980s soon eased budgetary 
pressures and the number of privatizations remained limited115. But less radical 
solutions, which gave hospitals greater autonomy remained a trend. Many cities 
Box 4.1: The privatization of the city hospital in Hürth
The hospital in the city of Hürth had major financial problems and was privatized in 1984 
to Sana hospitals. At that time there were projected losses of 3.25 million DM for the 
period 1984–1988. The hospital also required an estimated five to seven million DM in 
capital investments. Sana, which is owned by most of the private insurance companies, 
sought a return on its capital but is formally a not-for-profit company. Sana got the site 
and buildings for free provided that it did not terminate its operations, in which case the 
city would get its property back. The city paid Sana 1.5 million DM to compensate for 
expected losses in 1984 and 1985. The city also paid an additional 4.25 million DM for 
capital investment. The city was did not retain any formal decision-making powers. In 
other words, Hürth paid Sana to take on the expected future losses, which it did not trust 
itself to handle. By 1993, the utilization rate had risen by sixteen percent while the average 
length-of-stay had decreased by thirty-three percent, the assets on the balance sheet 
had increased by almost 400 percent, the number of hospital employees had increased 
significantly and the hospital had new intensive care and emergency units.
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and communities gradually converted their hospitals into public corporate bodies. 
Formal conversions to private company status, over which the public community 
held all ownership rights, also became a popular alternative, especially in Bavaria, 
Baden-Wuerttemberg, and Schleswig-Holstein116. The outsourcing of hospital 
management was another trend. Sana being the principal hospital company in this 
sector117. Placing the hospital at arms length from the public owner was often a 
prelude to material privatizations to for-profit providers118.
4.2.6 Erosion of the dual funding of capital
Under social conservative Horst Seehofer (CSU), minister of health 1992–1998, 
and left-wing ministers (Green Party and SPD) thereafter, reform policies contin-
ued to be incremental in nature. However, the period started with one significant 
reform. In 1992, the Health Care Structure Act (HCSA) was an effort to tear down 
some of the long-standing divisions in the structure of the hospital system119. 1) 
The split between inpatient and outpatient care was partially lifted. The hospital 
sector was given the freedom to provide some ambulatory surgery and provide 
some outpatient care before and after certain inpatient treatments. The idea was 
that this would bring about greater efficiency. 2) Global budgets were introduced, 
in combination with an extension of the potential for prospective payments. 3) 
Although the principle of dual funding remained intact, it became possible to 
increase the amount of capital reimbursement in the (per diem) charges120. Pro-
spective rates now reimbursed adequately for smaller building expenses121; under 
certain conditions, interest costs could also be included in the per diem rates122; 
capital costs related to ambulatory treatments were included in general charges. 
As a result of the HCSA, hospitals could broaden the scope of their activities. The 
number of ambulatory treatments performed in hospitals grew considerably123. As 
a result of the increase in prospective funding, all hospitals became more exposed 
to financial risk.
In 1997, the Hospital Restructuring Act (HRA) caused a further erosion of the 
principle of dual hospital funding. Dual funding only remained relevant for new 
hospital construction. All maintenance costs as well as investment costs for larger 
equipment were now included in the regular rates. Hospitals with a certificate-
of-need license were permitted to increase their charges by 1.25 percent to fund 
these expenses124. In Bavaria, hospitals received between €1,750 and €3,000 per 
bed, depending on the scale of the hospital125. The states became responsible for 
the settlement of the prospective rates. Because of lower wages, these rates were 
lower in the Eastern part of the country. However, the rates for capital and material 
expenses were not lower in the new states126. It will shortly be illustrated why this 
is of importance.
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Hospitals and sickness funds could adjust prospective rates by up to thirty 
percent. This implied additional potential for hospitals to cover their capital costs: 
‘Special circumstances might lead to higher fixed costs. In such cases, prospec-
tive rates should include their share of such costs. This is possible by adding a 
surcharge to the prospective rate. Special circumstances include for variations in 
assets, the security of medical quality, or the capital costs of hospitals that are not 
included or only partially included in a state hospital plan’127. The latter was still 
the case for many for-profit hospitals.
In 1998, the social democrats formed a new government with the junior green 
party. However, the in-coming left-wing coalition did not fundamentally alter the 
pro-market policies of the former coalition. The new government continued the 
movement towards more prospective payment reimbursement; they also refrained 
from enacting any new legislation that would curb the for-profit hospital sector, 
with the exception of lowering the reimbursements of the for-profit dominated 
open-staff hospitals.
The agenda of the left-wing coalition concentrated on the insurance side 
of health care as well as on the quality of care legislation; the latter implied the 
introduction of an ‘Institute for quality and efficiency in health care’ that would 
increase the transparency of hospital quality128. In an effort to make it more dif-
ficult for individuals to switch from sickness funds to private health insurance, the 
government raised the threshold for the statutory insurance scheme129. In 1999, 
the sickness funds of the former West German states also had to pay 1.2 billion 
DM to strengthen the balance sheets of the sickness funds in the new former East 
German states.
Changing comparative advantages in access to hospital capital
Since the 1990s, the access of public and nonprofit hospitals to capital substantially 
declined in relation to their for-profit counterparts. Historically, public and non-
profit ownership types had held the edge due to their much better access to ‘free’ 
public capital. However, for-profit access to such funds gradually increased. More 
importantly, the relevance of such public capital subsidies to general competitive-
ness decreased.
Figure 4.1 shows that the amount of funding that the states had available for 
investment in hospitals declined, at least in the former West German states. 
Within western Germany, the southern states invested more capital than the other 
states due to their better economic and fiscal positions. Bavarian capital expenses 
were seen as the national benchmark130. The capital backlog appears highest in 
North Rhine-Westphalia, Lower Saxony, and Rhineland-Palatinate131. The total 
capital backlog is estimated at some €30 billion132. Figure 4.1 also shows that there 
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is one major exception to these severe fiscal pressures. The federal government 
financed a large multi-year investment program to rebuild the outdated hospital 
infrastructure of the new eastern states. In the 1990s, the average hospital in the 
eastern states was able to spend an additional €70,000 per bed over and above the 
amount supplied to hospitals in the old states133.
In 1972, as much as twenty-seven percent of total hospital turnover was used for 
capital investment; by 2001 this figure had decreased to around seven percent135. 
The actual availability of public capital was highly dependent on the state of the 
general economy as well as on the fiscal position of the state in question. From 
1991 onwards, German GDP growth lagged significantly behind the OECD aver-
age. In real terms, annual capital subsidies to hospitals decreased by five percent 
between 1996 and 2003136.
The effect was that a monistic funding of hospital capital was in fact gradually 
being implemented: ‘In practice, there is monistic funding of capital in many states. 
Now, the public subsidies for capital are marginal. From a hospital’s perspective, 
the fact that sickness funds are forced to contract hospitals included in a state 
plan is of much more importance than the actual entitlements to public capital 
subsidies’137. Between 1988 and 1992, hospital capital expenses still more or less 
equaled the public capital budgets. However, between 1993 and 1997, almost forty 
percent of capital expenses were funded by other means138. This also illustrates the 
growing involvement of for-profit hospital groups as a source of capital. In 2004, 
average capital expenses for for-profit hospitals were estimated at ten percent, 
Figure 4.1: Hospital Finance Act: state and federal subsidies (1972–2007)134
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much higher than for other ownership types139. For-profit hospital groups often 
tapped the financial markets for capital140.
Because of the erosion of the dual funding principle, the competitive advantages for 
for-profit hospitals increased. 1) The importance of for-profit access to the capital 
markets was encouraged through the large capital shortage of other ownership 
types. In fact, yearly capital costs are expected to increase by about €1.5 billion be-
tween 2004 and 2010, which will further increase their comparative advantage141. 
2) For-profit hospitals had more opportunities to increase their access to public 
capital. The gradual inclusion of capital payments in regular charges worked to 
their advantage. This is becoming even more apparent now that the federal gov-
ernment, although against the will of the states that see their discretionary powers 
diminish142, seems to want to abolish what remains of the dual funding principle 
and encourage capital to become fully included in regular hospital charges143. 3) 
The program to rebuild the hospital sector in the new states was open to for-profit 
hospital groups. It was also not uncommon for a for-profit hospital company that 
was acquiring a public hospital to received a once-only capital grant. In return, 
the for-profit hospital generally promised not to seek any additional public capital 
subsidies for a certain period144.
There are significant differences between the capital structure of for-profit hospi-
tals and other ownership types. For-profit hospitals are more dependent on equity 
as well as on commercial loans. They are able to fund such capital through their 
comparatively higher margins145. However, this also implies that their balance 
sheets are more loaded with debt146. Other ownership types use state subsidies, 
retained earnings (especially nonprofits), and low interest debt, often from their 
owners (table 4.7). The credit enhancement techniques of public and nonprofit 
hospitals are still poorly developed147.
For-profit hospitals that make no appeal for public capital subsidies, which is 
less common than generally assumed148, adopt three strategies to fund for their 
capital investments. They may gain a higher level of efficiency, choose more profit-
Table 4.7: Average balance sheet of German hospitals (2003)150
For-profit hospitals Other hospitals
Total €7.3 billion €62.9 billion
% Equity 25 15
% Public means (HFA) 25 46
% Provisions  5 11
% Other debt 10 17
% Loans with interests 35 11
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able patients, and pursue specific revenue generating strategies: ‘Such possibilities 
appear most in smaller hospitals that are sometimes badly managed. This gives 
opportunities for a quick and easy turnaround. It is disputable whether for-profit 
companies can also gain such advantages for large hospitals with large investment 
needs over a longer period’149.
4.2.7 Rapid for-profit hospital growth
The for-profit hospital sector had been in decline for many years and had become 
a marginal phenomenon by the time of the German reunification. A few small 
hospital groups existed, of which one (Rhön-Klinikum) has been listed on the 
German stock exchange since 1989. Most of these companies had existed for many 
years; they often started as rehabilitation clinics (see appendix 4.1). Now, changes 
in planning and reimbursement regulations (see sections 4.2.5 and 4.2.6), together 
with the political consequences of German reunification brought about rapid 
growth among these for-profit health care companies.
Between 1991 and 1996, for-profit hospitals increased their monetary market 
share by fifty percent. The for-profit hospital sector also sharply increased its share 
of beds, the number of cases it treated, and the number of physicians it employed. 
The fastest growth was among for-profit hospitals that operated over two hundred 
beds. Table 4.8 illustrates that the number of for-profit hospital beds in the sector’s 
traditional strongholds – open-staff clinics and facilities that did not form part 
Table 4.8: Trends in hospital ownership types from the 1990s onwards151
1992 1997 2002 2007
Public hospital beds 355,312 304,500 272,293 229,971
Nonprofit hospital beds 211,137 204,811 190,426 167,739
For-profit hospital beds 25,381 31,603 41,965 70,459
of which in open-staff clinics 14,130 9,991 9,667 5,551
Beds not included in hospital plans
Public 4,624 3,736 3,485 3,515
Nonprofit 5,103 2,763 2,278 2,044
For-profit 8,393 7,960 6,736 7,959
# Day care patients 99,128 192,665 575,294 1,638,911
% in public hospitals 78.75 79.5 55.75 47.5
% in nonprofit hospitals 11.75 13.75 30.75 36.25
% in for-profit hospitals 9.5 6.75 13.25 16.25
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of state hospital plans – was actually declining. On the other hand, the growth of 
for-profit hospitals that were included in a state hospital plan was rising rapidly. 
In the West German states, the number of for-profit hospitals increased most 
where the sector was historically rooted: Schleswig-Holstein, Bavaria, and Baden-
Wuerttemberg. However, in Lower Saxony too, where the man who would later 
become Chancellor Gerhardt Schröder led a leftwing coalition, for-profit hospital 
ownership increased significantly (table 4.9).
Most for-profit hospital growth was driven by acquisitions. For-profit hospital 
companies were allowed to operate many of the former public hospitals in the 
eastern states and more and more also gradually made acquisitions in western 
Germany.
New markets in the East
In the post-communist era, support for neo-liberal policies was strong and most 
of the new eastern states were firmly in favor of for-profit hospitals. The German 
Hospital Association argued strongly for a pluralist landscape of ownership types 
in the new states152. The hospital stock in the new states included many outdated 
public facilities and there was an urgent need for new and upgraded hospitals. It 
was estimated that one-third of the hospitals needed replacing, one-third needed 
drastic upgrading, and only about one-third of buildings were adequate. The Ger-
Table 4.9: Share of for-profit hospital cost (%) and total capital subsidies per bed165
1992 
(costs)
1997 
(costs)
2001 
(costs)
2007 
(costs)
1972–2007 (HFA 
subsidies per bed)
Baden-Wuerttemberg 3.7  5.2  6.7  9.1 196,400
Bavaria 6.7  7.8  8.4 11.7 267,700
Berlin 5.8  3.4 11.6 14.4 396,700
Brandenburg n/a 14.8 10.8 27.8 184,600
Hamburg 2.2  1.5  1.5 n/a 219,000
Hesse 5.6  7.4  8.0 21.2 208,700
Mecklenburg n/a n/a 15.5 45.6 233,600
Lower Saxony 2.9  6.1  7.0 14.1 165,500
North Rhine-Westphalia 0.6  0.7  1.2  4.5 155,500
Rhineland-Palatinate 2.5  2.5  3.9  4.0 192,500
Saxony 1.9  7.8 20.2 23.4 182,000
Saxony-Anhalt n/a n/a  3.0 14.3 210,800
Schleswig-Holstein 8.9 13.3 18.8 24.1 175,700
Thuringia 6.3 17.3 22.2 35.7 225,800
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man Hospital Association estimated that thirty-five billion DM was needed for the 
necessary investment153.
The federal responsibility for investing in hospital construction became part of 
the reunification treaty154. The operating costs of the eastern hospitals were also al-
lowed to increase very rapidly155. Figure 4.1 shows that the new states were able to 
invest approximately €1.5 billion in their hospitals annually, of which three-quar-
ters came from special reunification funds156. Eventually, this massive injection of 
funding paid off. In 2000, the chairman of the Saxony Hospital Association stated 
that the differences between hospitals in Western and Eastern Germany had more 
or less vanished157. As validated by a recent study, these capital investments also 
paid off in another way: ‘operational efficiency (…) was significantly greater than 
that of their western counterparts. This can be explained by the large investments 
made to modernize hospital infrastructure’158.
Ninety percent of hospitals in the eastern states were under public ownership but 
it was initially anticipated that the small nonprofit sector in the new states would 
expand159. However, this did not happen since most voluntary movements in 
the new states lacked the necessary expertise and means. The existing nonprofit 
hospital groups in the Western states had a local or regional focus. In fact, it was 
only the for-profit hospital groups that were willing and able to become involved 
in the consolidation of the hospital sector in the new states – when the conditions 
were favorable, that is.
The German Hospital Association argued for the accommodation of private 
investment through more flexible (accounting) regulations160. The federal govern-
ment favored the privatization of hospitals in the new states161. The pro-market 
ideologies of most of the new states were enshrined in their hospital regulations. 
For example, Saxony stated that new public hospitals were only allowed if no 
private alternative was available. Only in Saxony-Anhalt was it more difficult to 
change the corporate status of public hospitals. Under Saxony-Anhalt law, a public 
hospital should remain public if it can meet its goals in a reasonable way162.
For-profit hospital groups easily passed the planning requirements in most new 
states, which gave them access to the public capital subsidies. This was important, 
because the federal government was at that time supporting the reconstruction 
of hospitals in the new states with significant funding. For example, in 1993 
Rhön-Klinikum acquired the public hospital in Meiningen. The city financed the 
liquidation of the old public hospital. Rhön funded the new hospital but the state 
of Thuringia provided almost thirty percent of the necessary capital. In return, 
Rhön gave up most of its future claims to public capital payments163.
Table 4.9 indicates that within a decade, for-profit hospital groups had grown 
from having no presence at all to a considerable market share in most new states. 
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Most acquisitions were made by one of the five large for-profit hospital groups164. 
An additional advantage for these groups was that, again on ideological grounds 
but with the exception of Brandenburg, the old East German system of ambulatory 
(specialist) group practices was dismantled. There was thus a lack of (outpatient) 
specialist care in many regions. For-profit hospitals filled this gap and built hospi-
tals under less restrictive conditions.
Privatization of public hospitals in the Western states
The trend of hospital privatizations gradually spread to the old states of the west, 
too. Both the federal government (global budgets) and the states (decreasing 
capital subsidies) implemented ever-increasing expenditure controls. Many public 
hospitals, which saw their access to capital decrease, had increasing problems 
with annual deficits as well as outdated facilities166. Between 1996 and 2006, the 
number of hospital staff decreased by more than ten percent and the hospital 
sector now shows signs of underfunding167. According to the Economic Institute 
of North Rhine-Westphalia (RWI), currently many German hospitals bear insol-
vency risks168. The annual average probability of default is currently calculated at 
approximately 1.3 percent, much higher among public than among for for-profit 
facilities169.
The RWI estimates the annual underfunding of the sector to be between one and 
two billion euro170. Since quite some public hospitals have low utilization levels, 
they have often not been able to cover fixed costs and the resulting deficits have 
sometimes been considerable. Facing additional fiscal pressures, the privatization 
of the public hospitals has become an ever more feasible option to ease these bur-
dens. Privatization was usually perceived as a means of increasing efficiency, since 
public hospitals were thought to be highly inefficient. Indeed, privatization of an 
inefficient public hospital may reduce inefficiency compared with the counter-
factual situation in which the particular hospital had not been privatized171.
Much state-level hospital legislation – which traditionally prevented the priva-
tization of public hospitals – had been changed during the late 1980s and early 
1990s172. In the 1994 coalition agreement between the CDU/CSU and FDP, priva-
tizations and a stricter use of the subsidiarity principle were high on the agenda. It 
is also important to note that tax-policies regarding different hospital ownership 
types were broadly although not entirely similar173. Hospitals with roughly forty 
percent sickness fund patients are seen as social companies and thus benefit from 
tax-breaks174. If they are also included in a state hospital plan, there is no discus-
sion whatsoever of whether their work is in the public interest. A public hospital 
that converted to for-profit status was more or less automatically incorporated into 
the state hospital plan.
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Initially, hospital privatizations became the subject of fierce public debate, in which 
labor rights were a significant issue175. Collective agreements between unions and 
employers in the public sector are less flexible and more expensive than those 
made in the private sector176. The Union of public workers opposed privatizations, 
not only for ideological reasons, but also because it would imply a reduction in 
union membership177. By the end of the 1990s, most unions had adopted a more 
pragmatic view, although the public union remained strongly in favor of securing 
employee benefits and its labor co-partnership rights178. The council of employ-
ees had to approve the material consequences of privatization such as lay-offs, 
changes in social security and education policies, and labor co-partnership rights. 
Employee representatives cannot block a privatization but they can influence the 
process significantly and delay it179.
Management and the physicians are often attracted by the additional capital 
investment offered by the new owner. Currently investments as percentage of 
turnover are about thirty percent higher in for-profit clinics versus public hospi-
tals180. Physician salaries are more flexible and also tend to be higher in the new 
for-profit settings, but physician autonomy might be more restricted due to the 
rationalization measures of the acquiring for-profit company. This affects coordi-
nating senior doctors the most since they may lose part of their powers. Physicians 
might also benefit from equity participation and additional stock plans181. The 
Federal Chamber of Physicians supports the pluralist hospital landscape but is 
critical of for-profit involvement in education and research (university clinics); it 
also supports greater transparency on quality issues182. Nevertheless, most doctors 
seem to favor moves towards privatization.
A municipality that faces a decision on hospital privatization must consider a 
difficult mix of arguments. These include the impact of the privatization on the 
local economy; any possible efficiency gains and the effect on the public budget; 
the impact of privatization on employees and voters; the attitudes of the various 
interest groups involved; the possible impact on the patients; and many other 
kinds of personal and political goals183. In the Western states, political support 
for privatization often remained shaky until well into the 1990s184. However, fiscal 
support for struggling public hospitals becomes an increasing difficult option. The 
for-profit hospital sector sees this as incompatible with EU legislation. In 2003, 
Asklepios with the support of the federal for-profit hospital association filed a 
lawsuit at the European Court in an effort to prohibit deficit financing by German 
municipalities185.
States seem still very reluctant to support the privatization of university clin-
ics186. In 2006, there was an extensive public debate on the privatization of the 
university clinic in Marburg/Gießen187. However, over the years many local com-
munities became less reluctant to privatize their hospitals. During the late 1990s 
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and the first years of the new century, the supply of public hospitals even began to 
exceed the demand from for-profit chains to buy them. Purchasing prices halved 
to fifty cents for each euro of revenue; many communities were disappointed by 
the price and the terms associated with these agreements188.
4.2.8 The transformation of the scale and scope of for-profit hospitals
During the 1990s, the for-profit hospital sector not only rapidly increased its share 
of the market but it also changed the scale and scope of its activities. By now the 
sector consisted of more large-scale hospitals, which was a significant change from 
the small and specialized clinics that had previously formed its core. Now the 
large majority of for-profit hospitals were also included in state hospital plans, had 
contracts with the statutory insurance funds, and were eligible for public capital 
subsidies. By 2002, the average for-profit hospital had a hundred beds, up from 
seventy-five a decade earlier189. Specific policies contributed to this process: small 
open-staff clinics were hurt by higher deductions from their all-in rates, which was 
motivated by the fact that open-staff hospitals do not pay any physician’s salaries.
During the 1990s, the for-profit hospital sector consolidated. Four large groups 
(Rhön, Helios, Asklepios, and Sana) came to dominate the market. By 2003, their 
estimated turnover was equal to almost sixty percent of the total for-profit hospital 
sector190. Some for-profit companies brand their hospitals under their own name 
(Asklepios, Helios), while others do not (Rhön). The large hospital groups focus 
heavily on acute care, while some smaller companies favor a model of integrative 
care and also operate rehabilitation and long-term care clinics (Mediclin, Damp). 
German hospital groups – with the exception of Asklepios, which owns a multi-
hospital system in the Los Angeles area – are not active in foreign markets. Neither 
are foreign hospital operators very active in the German market, although some 
Swiss, Swedish, and US operators own a few clinics. According to some, the con-
solidation of the for-profit hospital chains has led to greater efficiency. This may 
imply that future capital requirements can be funded monistically. It could reduce 
the public capital subsidies required, which would make it possible to include 
capital in the DRG financing system. This would be a decisive step towards greater 
responsibility for resources and giving hospitals greater financial freedom191.
Converging patient mixes and cost bases
The strong growth in larger for-profit hospitals implies that the case-mix among 
all ownership types becomes more comparable. Currently, for-profit hospitals 
report even higher patient case-mix than other ownership types192. The traditional 
overrepresentation of private patients in for-profit hospitals has also decreased, 
the workload of nurses seem to be converging. Nurses in for-profit hospitals still 
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provide the most yearly nursing days, but these numbers are converging across 
ownership types193. Average length-of-stay is also tending to converge across 
different ownership types, although it remains somewhat longer in for-profit 
hospitals194. For-profit hospitals are also increasingly involved in educating nurses. 
Nevertheless, in 2002, the for-profit share in training nurses was still no more than 
three percent195. However, relative for-profit expenses for training and education 
kept increasing and now are not that far behind the expenses of other ownership 
types196.
The rapidly growing number of intensive care units in for-profit hospitals as well 
demonstrates the fact that for-profits are treating sicker patients. Between 1992 
and 2002, the number of intensive care beds in for-profit hospitals quadrupled; 
by the end of that period, the sector had 7.25 percent of all intensive care beds197. 
Table 4.10 shows that actual patient charges also converged during the 1990s. The 
practice of average lower charges among for-profit hospitals, due to their lower 
caseloads, has gradually ended. In 1999, the average per diem rate for an intensive 
care unit was 1,580 DM in for-profit hospitals, compared with 1,525 DM in public 
hospitals and 1,390 DM in nonprofit hospitals198. For-profit hospitals still pay 
somewhat lower wages to nurses, partly due to lower pension premiums199. For-
profit hospitals pay physicians higher wages than public hospitals, although this 
difference has lessened (table 4.10).
Table 4.10: Cost-base 1992–2007204
1992 (EUR) 1997 (EUR) 2001 (EUR) 2007 (EUR)
Public hospitals
Costs FTE 32,404 36,622 41,374 52,620
Costs FTE physician 57,386 61,460 66,594 90,288
Per diem charges 225 306 356 n/a
Nonprofit hospitals
Costs FTE 35,865 40,933 48,044 52,179
Costs FTE physician 70,143 73,569 82,231 91,542
Per diem charges 193 260 307 n/a
For-profit hospitals
Costs FTE 31,735 37,596 41,610 50,867
Costs FTE physician 63,755 71,410 72,674 92,093
Per diem charges 171 255 309 n/a
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New competitors?
German for-profit hospitals are comparatively well protected from competition 
from ambulatory surgery centers. After reunification outpatient care in the Eastern 
states was modeled after West Germany’s ambulatory system with solo practitio-
ners and few group practices200. Nevertheless, the separation between inpatient 
and outpatient care has gradually been eroded. The 2004 reform introduced the 
possibility to establish medical care centers, and the right for sickness funds and 
providers to enter into integrated care contracts201.
Currently, a thousand medical centers exist, of which thirty-seven percent are 
owned by hospitals and the remainder by physician partnerships202. For-profit 
hospitals are also involved in this business203. Many patients are enrolled in outpa-
tient disease management programs and in GP-centered care. Outpatient clinical 
centers are a clear threat to single ambulatory physicians. However, if their treat-
ments begin to overlap more with the activities of hospitals, due to technological 
developments or further regulatory changes, they could also threaten the business 
model of (for-profit) hospitals. They may then attract more profitable patients. 
Physicians could become engaged with such centers and refer hospital patients to 
such centers.
4.3 Analysis
This section analyzes the development of for-profit hospital care in Germany. Sec-
tion 4.3.1 explains which historic factors shaped Germany’s proprietary hospital 
sector, and this period ends with World War II. In 1945, Germany was ravaged, 
divided into East and West, and a federal constitution was established in West 
Germany. Section 4.3.2 analyzes how the for-profit hospital sector was able to 
survive the following years of scarce resources, years when the reimbursement 
of hospitals was dissipated and dependent on supplements by hospital owners. I 
then analyze the consequences of the Hospital Finance Act. Section 4.3.3 discusses 
the impact of these new planning regulations on the for-profit hospital sector. 
Strong growth of the for-profit hospital sector started in the early 1990s. What 
pre-structured this sudden and radical change? Section 4.3.4 analyzes the causes 
of this rapid growth in for-profit hospitals. The chapter ends with my concluding 
statements in section 4.3.5.
4.3.1 Constraints on the scale and scope of a declining proprietary sector
Proprietary hospitals have existed in Germany since the mid-nineteenth century 
and supplemented the services of other ownership types. They treated private 
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patients in search of specialized services and luxury care. These patients were able 
to pay the comparatively high charges. In some rural areas, there were insufficient 
public and voluntary funds available to fund a hospital. In such regions, local 
physicians helped to found open-staff proprietary hospitals that served a broader 
range of patients.
Germany stands out as having the first system of sickness funds, which also 
generally covered hospital treatment in public and nonprofit hospitals. This im-
proved the access of these hospitals to (adequate) funding. It also worsened the 
competitive position of proprietary hospitals. Nonprofits also had access to cheap 
philanthropic capital and charity work from religious orders. Both were amply 
available in the industrial areas along the river Rhine in the Western part of the 
country. Indeed, the market penetration of nonprofit hospitals was the highest in 
North Rhine-Westphalia and Rhineland-Palatinate.
The relatively well-funded hospital sector was probably one reason why many 
physicians in public and nonprofit hospitals were on salaried positions as early 
as the 1920s. Lack of hospital access was less critical in determining physician 
remuneration and, in comparison to other countries, founding a proprietary 
hospital was a less feasible alternative. Nevertheless, there was the dormant threat 
that hospital physicians may threaten the income of ambulatory physicians by 
becoming active in those markets.
In 1932, remuneration disputes between doctors were resolved by the establish-
ment of a legal monopoly of self-employed ambulatory physicians active in 
outpatient care. How did this split between inpatient and outpatient care affect 
the scale and scope of the proprietary hospital sector? The split created structural 
inefficiencies because of the duplication of activities by outpatient and inpatient 
providers. Ambulatory physicians did not need the same amount of hospital access 
that physicians in other countries needed to secure their remuneration. Due to 
their legal monopoly, ambulatory physicians, where the medical situation allows 
this, were also able to keep the more profitable patients and refer less financially 
attractive patients to hospital. They could perform additional tests that were also 
likely to be done once the patient is admitted to the hospital. Those proprietary 
hospitals, which depended on the more profitable patients, experienced strong 
competition from ambulatory physicians.
The separation between outpatient and inpatient care impacted on the devel-
opment of the proprietary hospitals. Between 1920 and 1945, the sector became 
a slowly declining fringe. They geared their interests to those of the ambulatory 
physicians. The proprietary hospital sector was shaped according to three models 
that broadly depended on bypassing the inpatient/outpatient split. 1) Proprietary 
clinics served ambulatory physicians, which needed inpatient capacity. In rural 
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areas, the necessary capital and patient base were not always available to fund a 
hospital and its medical staff. In such areas, small open-staff proprietary hospitals 
could survive, although they were hardly profitable. Ambulatory physicians often 
held a stake in such facilities. 2) In urban areas, prestigious (ambulatory) physi-
cians could become involved in specialized clinics. For example, an ambulatory 
ophthalmologist could refer his patients to a specialized clinic where he had an 
investment interest. Such clinics were able to make a profit as a result of price dis-
crimination (sliding fee scales) and many private patients paid considerably above 
costs. These clinics formed the backbone of the for-profit hospital sector. 3) Small 
proprietary inpatient facilities focused on amenities and luxury care. Rehabilita-
tion and preventive care were an important part of the treatment. Initially, this was 
only available for private and well-off patients. However, from the mid 1950s such 
programs were included in many statutory schemes and the number of for-profit 
clinics grew rapidly. Although they focused less on surgery and medical treatment, 
these clinics provided a means by which proprietary hospitals could survive and a 
basis for the future growth in for-profit acute care.
4.3.2 Prolonged stagnation of the proprietary hospital sector
In the decades immediately after World War II, German hospital care faced severe 
shortages and a strong increase in demand. A massive scarcity of capital made 
itself felt daily and the destruction of the capital of proprietary hospitals would 
have been very ‘wasteful’. Moreover, the situation implied the mobilization of as 
many additional resources as possible.
The scarcity of capital was supplemented by a new political system that priori-
tized the subsidiarity principle, self-regulation, and a federal constitution. Federal 
policies on the issue of hospital care could often be modified if they did not fit 
the needs of the states, the local authorities, the sickness-funds, or the hospital 
providers. From an institutional perspective, this implied a natural stimulus for 
pluralism and a diversity of types of hospital ownership. Due to the subsidiarity 
principle and the associated practice of self-regulation, for-profit hospital owner-
ship was never fundamentally disputed at the national level. At a lower level, there 
often existed some discretionary room to re-direct federal policies. The states 
were given constitutional responsibility for the hospital sector. In a general sense, 
the states and local authorities aligned themselves with the hospital sector. They 
owned many public hospitals and shared their interests and also had a natural 
responsibility for adequate treatment opportunities in their jurisdictions.
The above did not imply any fundamental threat to the for-profit hospital sector. 
However, its funding was far from secure. The complete destruction of the hospital 
sector and the many refugees in need of treatment were a burden on resources 
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for many years to come. As a result, funding was highly fragmented. Although 
the large majority of the population was insured by the sickness funds, these 
simply could not meet all the necessary hospital expenses and were not allowed 
to increase their contributions due to general economic policies. As a result, the 
sickness funds reimbursed well below fifty percent of hospitals’ actual total costs.
The natural way out of this dilemma was to make others share this burden. There 
were only a few options for doing this. 1) The states had a constitutional responsibil-
ity and funded many special needs such as investment and maintenance projects. 
Although most of this money went to public and nonprofit providers, states were 
not always unwilling to help proprietary providers, especially if they were deemed 
necessary from a public health perspective. This habit developed into a funding 
mindset that laid the grounds for the principle of dual funding. 2) It was thought 
that the owners of hospitals should help to fulfill hospital needs. Nonprofits had 
to rely on endowments and voluntary contributions to cover capital expenses and 
high operating losses. Municipalities owned their own hospitals and were thus 
legally responsible for the losses of such facilities. As a consequence, nonprofit 
owners and municipalities were given the role as payers of last resort. In 1954, the 
federal government maintained this situation for the years ahead. Through general 
legislation, sickness funds ‘detracted’ such contributions from the per diem rates 
they were allowed to reimburse205. Thus, the role of the owners in the funding 
of the hospital sector became more formalized. 3) Private insurers and private 
patients paid higher rates. These were used to subsidize losses and underfunding 
from the statutory insurance scheme. These high fees were also the only possibil-
ity to make an investment profit. Proprietary hospitals, which sought to make a 
profit (and many did not), specialized almost exclusively on (medical) services and 
amenities for private patients. In addition, from the mid 1950s onwards, profit-
oriented providers could step into the growing market for rehabilitation services 
and preventive treatments to diversify their business.
4.3.3 Further decline of the proprietary hospital sector
In 1972, the HFA legally established the dual financing system. The states, 
supplemented with federal resources, were made responsible for funding the 
capital investment of most hospitals. This responsibility was tied to state plan-
ning procedures for the necessary hospital services. As a funder of one-third of 
this capital, the federal government issued certain compliance requirements for 
these state hospital plans. Sickness funds were responsible for the funding of the 
entirety of the hospitals’ operating costs, largely freeing local authorities from their 
financial obligations to the hospital system. In the wake of this legislation, private 
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insurers were ‘forced’ to pay lower reimbursement rates to the hospitals. The HFA 
supported the entire hospital sector with many additional resources. The number 
of hospital beds increased rapidly due to major investment in public and nonprofit 
facilities. For a short period, there was ample public capital at little or no cost to 
recipients. The larger public hospitals were the main beneficiaries of these reforms.
The HFA brought about a further decline among for-profit hospitals. Normally, 
for-profit hospitals were not included in state hospital plans since this was prohib-
ited by the HFA. This contrasted to earlier periods when states made such decisions 
for themselves. In the years immediately after its enactment, public and nonprofit 
hospitals were supported through large amounts of free capital. In addition, public 
hospitals could rely on local communities as a lender of last resort. Nonprofits still 
had access to voluntary means, although this was declining rapidly.
In 1975, all providers that were included in state hospital plans were protected 
from competition through mandatory contracts with the sickness funds. Pay-
ments by private insurers were trimmed because of regulations that sought to 
create ‘classless’ hospitals. These measures further increased the competitive 
disadvantage of for-profit hospitals. Their traditional business models were being 
tested and – at the same time – their access to growing amounts of ‘public’ funding 
was decreasing. As a result, the share of for-profit hospitals continued to decline 
until the late 1980s.
At first glance, it now seemed that there were few prospects left for the for-profit 
hospital sector. However, there were some green shoots that eventually helped 
to pre-structure a turnaround. 1) Although most of the focus was on the public 
funding of capital, the HFA also implied a large shift in hospital costs towards the 
sickness funds (see table 4.5). The sickness fund rates were raised considerably 
because many state and local authorities stopped supplementing the operating 
costs of hospitals. As a result, sickness fund patients also had more potential for 
for-profit hospitals. 2) Public capital funds turned out to be vulnerable to bud-
getary cuts in favor of other more urgent political priorities. As fiscal pressures 
increased, hospital investments became an obvious target object for budgetary 
cuts. This caused an erosion of the funding base and many came to favor other 
solutions. In retrospect, shortly after the introduction of the HFA, the competitive 
advantage of public and nonprofit hospitals was at its height. It was not long before 
the mechanisms behind dual funding were undermined.
In 1984, the new Hospital Finance Act (nHFA) removed federal supplements for 
capital investment. Without any additional monetary compensation, the states 
now had to bear their hospitals’ capital costs in full. A clear shortage of public 
capital was developing. Being the only formal providers of capital, the states were 
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given greater discretion in this area. The nHFA ended the prohibition on the inclu-
sion of for-profit providers in state hospital plans.
Gradually, more and more states altered their hospital regulations to the benefit 
of the for-profit hospital sector. This trend gathered pace particularly after German 
reunification, when the new federal states were very open to for-profit ownership. 
The nHFA also made it possible to shift part of the costs of capital to the insurers. 
It introduced prospective per diem rates and a system of prospectively financed 
special procedures, which expanded gradually. New legislation also supported 
the growth of prospective payment schemes, which included certain categories 
of capital costs. At best, such measures consolidated the access of public and non-
profit hospitals to capital, while they made it easier for for-profit hospitals to be 
reimbursed for their capital costs. More and more public hospitals that now lacked 
the access to capital to upgrade their facilities and their deficits were mounting 
again. Once again, hospital deficits became a burden on local budgets, which 
increased the pressure for privatization. Such underlying trends pre-structured a 
new and robust business model for the for-profit hospital sector.
4.3.4 Rapid growth and consolidation of for-profit hospitals
The availability of public capital went into decline a few years after the introduc-
tion of the HFA and access to alternative sources of capital became increasingly 
important. The broad availability of public capital was soon followed by structural 
capital shortages. This first drove the decline and then the expansion of the for-
profit hospital sector.
Hospital investment was increasingly tied to the fiscal health of the public au-
thorities that were funding it. Since cutting capital budgets was a popular strategy 
for balancing state budgets, nonprofit and particularly public hospitals encountered 
shortages of capital funds. The local authorities were also no longer in a position to 
automatically cover the structural deficits of public hospitals or provide the neces-
sary funding for investment. In the aftermath of the German reunification, many 
public authorities were short of funds due to prolonged economic slow-down and 
the need to make solidarity funds available for reconstruction projects in the new 
eastern states. In western states, the sell-off of struggling public hospitals to for-
profit companies seemed to be an increasingly feasible strategy to lower the fiscal 
burden of local governments.
However, this movement began in the eastern states where the political climate 
was influenced by free-market ideologies. State hospital plans were favorably 
disposed to for-profit hospitals. At that point, public authorities owned over 
ninety percent of the outdated communist hospitals, the remainder being run by 
semi-autonomous foundations; a well-developed nonprofit sector did not exist. 
Germany: the impact of public capital subsidies on for-profit hospitals
155
The purchasing prices for public hospitals were relatively low compared to any 
standard market valuations. German reunification gave the for-profit hospital sec-
tor the ideological and institutional momentum to become major consolidators. If 
one opted for privatization as a way of modernizing existing hospital infrastruc-
ture, a solution which met with little opposition, for-profit hospital companies 
were the only ones with the necessary expertise to do this job206.
However, to take advantage of the worsening prospects of the public hospital 
sector, the for-profit hospital sector had to improve its investment autonomy. 
Certain specific developments made this possible. 1) The gradual introduction of 
prospective capital payments (monistic funding) as well as the reduction of sepa-
rate capital subsidies. 2) The small for-profit hospital companies increased their 
access to capital through alliances with private equity investors or through stock 
listings. 3) In sharp contrast to the western states, in the east many public capital 
funds were made available for investment in outdated hospital infrastructure.
To a certain extent, this created the same situation as shortly after the HFA came 
into effect in 1972: lavish access to free public capital. However, this time it was 
for-profit hospital companies who were given access to these resources, often be-
ing the preferred party for upgrading outdated hospital infrastructure. Within a 
few years, their investment autonomy was settled. Access to equity capital had 
become a crucial competitive advantage for for-profit hospitals. Together, these 
factors made a significant return on investment much more likely and facilitated 
strong growth in the for-profit hospital sector. Nonprofits and public hospitals had 
much less incentive to grow and they also lacked access to the necessary invest-
ment autonomy.
The rapid growth of the for-profit hospital sector would not have been possible 
without the many opportunities for-profits found for consolidation; there was 
less need for new additional hospital capacity. A significant part of the dissipated 
hospital stock consists of smaller facilities that did bore less investment risk to the 
for-profit consolidators. Many physicians in public hospitals did not resist hospital 
privatization. They could often earn substantially more and enjoy access to better 
technology and equipment.
For-profit companies gradually increased the scale of the hospital facilities 
acquired. The for-profit hospital sector thus began to resemble its public and 
nonprofit counterparts. Case-mixes converged and the for-profit hospitals signifi-
cantly increased their treatment of sickness fund patients. Due to consolidations 
and mergers, the patient base of the for-profit hospital sector is now very similar 
to the patient base of public and nonprofit hospitals.
What is more, the old niche strategy of the for-profit sector also flourished. 
During the 1980s and the 1990s, private insurers and supplementary insurers 
had increased their market penetration. The restrictive regulations on private 
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reimbursements were ended; premium increases were often higher in the private 
segment of the market. This contributed to a continuing demand for the tradi-
tional business model of the for-profit hospital sector, in which private patients 
are overrepresented and amenities are important. These clinics are mainly located 
in western Germany and many are still not included in a state hospital plan. Such 
hospitals focus on carrying out profitable elective treatment. These two business 
models have had different paths of growth and decline. However, the spectacular 
growth of a mature for-profit hospital sector that forms a substitute, and not a 
supplement, to other ownership types is becoming much more evident.
4.3.5 Conclusions
In Germany, the existence of for-profit hospital ownership was strengthened by 
the country’s federalism and the principles of subsidiarity and self-regulation. 
Together, these factors have guaranteed room for a variety of co-existing hospital 
ownership types. In Germany, ideological disputes over for-profit hospital owner-
ship are resolved at the state and local levels, and less at the federal level. The 
federal government structures this arena to a certain extent, but is not a decisive 
actor on the issue of hospital ownership.
The initial business model for the for-profit hospital sector was shaped by the 
needs of private patients as well as the split between inpatient and outpatient care. 
These features guaranteed a place for for-profit hospitals, but they also meant that 
for-profit hospitals remained a niche in the acute care sector as a whole.
An analysis that goes further than the explanation of this niche needs to take 
account of the way in which capital funding is arranged. Capital funding, so 
important for the development of the for-profit sector, is rooted in the country’s 
federal structure207. The changes in the growth path of the for-profit hospital sec-
tor demonstrate the importance of the way capital institutions function. For many 
years, the for-profit sector lacked access to sources of public capital and without 
this, it was not possible to operate a hospital above a certain scale of operations. 
The prospects for for-profit hospitals improved when these public capital subsidies 
became restricted as a result of increasing fiscal pressures, and when these funds 
also became available to for-profit hospitals.
These two trends have gradually evolved during the past three decades. Other 
types of ownership, most notably public hospitals, could not handle the challenges 
of increasing restrictions on public resources. The privatization of public hospital 
assets became one way of supporting these clinics with the necessary capital, and 
also freed local authorities of the strain they were putting on their budgets. The 
for-profit hospital sector flourished because public hospitals were underfunded 
and for-profits were able to capitalize on their greater investment autonomy. Nev-
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ertheless, at the local level, privatization was often the subject of intense debate. 
The interests of the unions often conflicted with those of local government. Gener-
ally speaking, it was only in cases where local governments were short of money 
that for-profit hospitals became a feasible option.
Historical events played an especially important role in the German case. Two 
world wars decimated the assets of hospitals, most notably those of proprietary 
hospitals. German reunification certainly stimulated rapid growth among for-
profit hospitals. In the Eastern states, new right-wing governments were strongly 
in favor of for-profit hospital ownership. They were supported by the federal 
government, which had the task of creating a market economy from scratch. Both 
could fall back on large amounts of capital to build up the new states and cre-
ate a new hospital infrastructure. Currently, only a handful of for-profit hospital 
companies account for over one-third of the hospital sector in the Eastern states.
The momentum towards the privatization of public hospitals continues. How-
ever, the future prospects of the for-profit hospital sector may be less favorable for 
three reasons. 1) Easing the split between inpatient and outpatient care may con-
front them with competition from physician-entrepreneurs. 2) Most ‘low-hanging 
fruit’ – cases with an easy turnaround – may have been largely acquired already. 
For-profit hospital groups are now also increasingly being ‘forced’ to acquire large 
maximum-care clinics, which increases their risk. 3) Prospective capital payments 
may not only create a level playing field of access to public capital subsidies, but 
also increase the investment autonomy of the other types of ownership, which may 
be even more important.
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Appendix 4.1: For-profit rehabilitation and preventive care
The for-profit hospital sector has long been linked with for-profit rehabilitation, 
preventive care, and spa-treatment clinics. Statutory health insurance covers 
medical rehabilitation, while pension schemes fund for most preventive care. 
During the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, the declining market share of for-profit acute 
healthcare was partly offset by growth in the number of for-profit rehabilitation 
and preventive clinics. This created new business opportunities.
Table 4.11 illustrates that the total for-profit hospital sector diversified. After 
the mid 1950s, acute hospital care has become less important within the for-profit 
sector as a whole. The number of spa and rehabilitation beds increased. Spa clinics 
were mostly situated in the south of Germany. Some of these rehabilitation and 
preventive clinics eventually expanded to acute care when prospects gradually 
improved during the 1980s and 1990s.
Wittgensteiner Kliniken (Fresenius-Vamed) was founded in 1952 as a clinic for 
preventive treatments (spa). In 1981, it expanded into medical rehabilitation and 
later still into acute hospital care too. Damp, SRH, Rhön-Klinikum, and Asklepios 
all started as rehabilitation companies. They only entered the hospital market 
when opportunities in that area of health care increased. Most for-profit hospital 
groups still combine acute care with (medical) rehabilitation. However, after 1989, 
acute care formed the bulk of their services.
In 2006, for-profit providers had more than two-thirds of the seven billion euro 
rehabilitation and preventive care markets (table 4.12)209. For-profit clinics domi-
Table 4.11: Acute care as part of total private health care208
# For-profit acute 
care clinics
Acute care beds in 
for-profit sector (%)
Spa beds in for-
profit sector (%)
For-profit beds in 
total acute care (%)
1959 423 70.9 20.7 7.8
1969 493 32.6 48.9 4.2
1979 372 21.2 55.6 3.9
1989 273 16.4 44.1 3.8
Table 4.12: Ownership types of rehabilitation and preventive care211
1992 1997 2002 2006
Total preventive and rehabilitation 
beds
149,909 188,869 184,635 173,000
 % Public 21.4 15.3 16.8 17.2
 % Nonprofit 15.0 16.0 16.4 16.0
 % For-profit 63.5 68.7 66.7 66.8
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nate the rehabilitation market (72% of all beds) but play a less significant role in 
preventive care (46% of all beds).
In the mid 1990s, the government started to introduce policies to reduce the 
utilization and spending of rehabilitation and preventive care. The average 
length-of-stay for rehabilitation benefits was reduced from four to three weeks, 
co-payments doubled, and in 1996, the minimum time lag between two preventive 
treatments was increased from three to four years. The rehabilitation budget of the 
public pension fund was decreased by two billion euro. These measures hit the sec-
tor hard. Besides this, new outpatient disease-management programs threatened 
certain aspects of medical rehabilitation, such as cardiology and internal medicine. 
Only mental health and neurology programs are still expanding.
Acute hospital care and medical rehabilitation are becoming increasing inter-
twined through falling demand for stand-alone rehabilitation and an increasing 
demand for rehabilitation linked to acute treatment. The latter increased from six-
teen percent (1993) to thirty-five percent (2000) and was supported by legislation 
encouraging disease management210. Some for-profit hospital groups (Mediclin, 
Humaine, Damp) saw the combination of acute care and rehabilitation as their 
preferred business model.
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5  The Netherlands: the non-emergence 
of for-profits
5.1 Introduction
For-profit hospitals do not operate in the Netherlands. However, in late 2006 a 
group of investors ‘rescued’ a troubled hospital, and two years later another private 
company also bought a struggling hospital. The authorities only allowed these 
transactions provided that any profits would not be distributed to shareholders, 
and that no assets would be sold without official approval. The central purpose 
of this chapter is to explain why there is no for-profit hospital sector in the Neth-
erlands. This chapter contains a historical section (section 5.2) and an analytical 
section (section 5.3).
I will turn first to the situation before World War II when, in contrast to most 
other countries, a proprietary hospital sector did not emerge (section 5.2.1). 
Section 5.2.2 describes government policies between the 1950s and early 1980s 
– policies which reinforced the exclusion of for-profit providers. Section 5.2.3 
describes how the Netherlands handled rapidly rising health care costs. During 
the 1980s and 1990s, the smooth introduction of for-profit ambulatory surgery 
centers was blocked (appendix 5.1). Section 5.2.4 describes how recent market 
reforms, from 2006 and onwards, have affected hospital ownership.
In the analytical section, I will first explore why a proprietary hospital sector 
did not develop (section 5.3.1), and then analyze how institutions and regulations 
also prevented the development of any for-profit hospital sector after World War II 
(section 5.3.2). In section 5.3.3, the role of this institutional framework in exclud-
ing for-profits comes to the fore. Section 5.3.4 analyzes the pre-structuring that 
is currently underway for the possible lift on the exclusion of for-profit hospitals. 
This chapter ends with my conclusions (section 5.3.5).
5.2 Historical description
5.2.1 The exclusion of a proprietary hospital sector
In contrast to many other countries, a proprietary hospital sector did not develop 
in the Netherlands. In 1951, Andries Querido, an influential public health expert 
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and social democratic member of parliament, expressed a widely held sentiment 
when he stated that: ‘there is one essential objection to proprietary nursing homes: 
they seek a profit. This stands in the way of an adequate relation between a patient 
and the way he is nursed. If the current shortage of public and nonprofit nursing 
beds changes these providers will either decline or disappear’1. In other words, if 
the necessary capital funds were available, other forms of ownership would easily 
dominate proprietary providers, as had been the case in the hospital sector for a 
long time.
In 1840, there were some fifty hospitals in the Netherlands and many more were 
built during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The hospital sec-
tor consisted of three categories of providers: 1) some small cottage hospitals; 2) 
public hospitals, with a closed medical staff; 3) nonprofit hospitals, generally with 
religious affiliations and an open medical staff. The strongest growth was among 
religious providers, most notably Catholic institutions. This trend ran parallel to 
the empowerment of the Catholic denomination after the formal admittance of a 
Roman hierarchy (1853).
Table 5.1 illustrates that religious hospitals were the main ownership type by the 
early decades of the twentieth century. In 1918, smaller facilities were discouraged 
after the association of physicians concluded that, for reasons of medical quality, 
a hospital was not viable with less than a hundred beds2. This seems to be one of 
the root causes of the comparatively large scale of the Dutch hospital sector3. The 
remaining cottage hospitals diminished and specialty facilities remained rather 
uncommon4.
Table 5.1: Number of hospitals by province (1924)5
Public hospitals Nonprofit (religious) hospitals
Groningen 1 4
Friesland 2 8
Drenthe 1 3
Overijssel 2 16
Gelderland 2 35
Utrecht 4 10
North Holland 10 31
South Holland 12 35
Zeeland 4 7
North Brabant 1 58
Limburg 1 14
Total 40 221
The Netherlands: the non-emergence of for-profits
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How was the hospital sector funded?
Hospitals were funded in a number of ways. Richer people were charged above full 
costs; the (lower) middle classes paid through sickness funds6, hospital savings as-
sociations and commercial insurance; the municipalities paid for the poor and the 
lower classes7. Income thresholds excluded richer people from becoming sickness 
fund subscribers. Due to the strong grip of the physicians on the sickness funds, 
this income threshold was enforceable.
The system was nevertheless dependent on a delicate financial balance. If many 
lucrative patients chose to be treated by certain providers, this had a knock-on ef-
fect elsewhere with less scope for below-cost treatment8. Below-cost treatment was 
built into the system because many people were uninsured and both the sickness 
funds and commercial insurers paid below costs, especially for hospital treat-
ments9. Hospitals were dependent on a complicated reimbursement structure with 
many third-party payers, extensive cross-subsidization, and voluntary donations10.
The more prosperous patients were clearly overrepresented in the nonprofit 
hospitals. Generally, the richer patients that visited such hospitals had separate 
rooms and paid comparatively high charges. Nonprofit hospitals operated separate 
wards on the basis of class. Nevertheless – with a few exceptions in the capital city, 
Amsterdam11 – both rich and poor alike were treated within the same hospital 
facility12.
Religious hospitals were the first to upgrade to ‘modern’ hospitals13, which was 
indicative of their better access to capital. The necessary capital was raised through 
voluntary donations (nonprofit facilities) or through taxes (public hospitals). It is 
important to note that until the late 1950s the Netherlands was one of the most 
unequal societies in the Western world14, which probably increased the supply 
of philanthropy and endowments. Capital costs were not calculated in per diem 
charges and hospitals also lacked an administration that included depreciation 
expenditures15.
Most hospitals were not able to make a positive return. The deficit of the public 
hospital sector grew from five million guilders in 1916 to twelve million guilders in 
1920; nonprofit hospitals fared better, their collective deficit was only two million 
guilders16. Due to free voluntary capital and cheap labor from religious orders, 
nonprofits could operate with a lower cost base. Municipalities had to finance 
the growing deficits of both nonprofit and, especially, public hospitals and any 
subsidies were strictly cost-based17.
During the recession of the 1930s, many municipalities sought to shift costs 
towards the nonprofit hospitals18. At the same time, many patients and subscrib-
ers could not pay their hospital bills or insurance contributions. The central 
government sought a solution in the reduction of hospital expenses. The Frederiks 
Committee proposed that all those wanting to build hospitals needed legislative 
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permission from central government. Nonprofit hospitals responded by comply-
ing with these proposals – when their representative bodies could decide on how 
to implement this policy19. However, in the end none of the Committee’s proposals 
were implemented. In 1939, the government chose to regulate consumer prices 
directly and hospital services were included.
Hospital-physician relations
Public hospitals often operated with a closed medical staff. In most nonprofit hos-
pitals, ambulatory physicians were initially allowed to treat their patients. Since 
administrators favored a more closed-staff model for reasons of efficiency and 
smooth management, the limitations on ambulatory physicians grew somewhat 
stronger over time. Nevertheless, physicians were not forced to set up their own 
proprietary facilities in order to access prosperous patients. The need for small fa-
cilities in the countryside was also relatively low in a small and densely populated 
country such as the Netherlands.
For physicians, the case for proprietary ownership was undermined in yet an-
other way. As early as 1912, access to specialist care was regulated by a gatekeeper 
system. This was an effort to protect the income of primary care doctors, who 
dominated the physicians’ association20. They were successful in enforcing these 
policies, because the physicians’ association controlled a significant part of the 
insurance market through their own sickness funds. Such doctors’ funds had no 
interest in a proprietary hospital sector since this could have hit the income of 
physicians.
5.2.2 The government accommodates the nonprofit hospital sector
In 1941, new compulsory health insurance for sixty percent of the population was 
evidence of growing government influence. The German occupier propagated 
some strong statist elements within the existing corporatist system. The sickness 
funds had comparatively little room for maneuver. This mix of corporate and stat-
ist elements continues to dominate Dutch health care to this day. After World War 
II, the government continued to regulate per diem hospital rates on the basis of 
the Price Enforcement and Stockpiling Act (1939) since the economic situation 
required a restrictive policy on hospital expenditure.
However, there were large differences in the costs of individual hospitals. In 
response to this situation, per diem rates became tailored to some extent and 
increased on a case-by-case approach. Uniform increases were thought to reward 
low-cost facilities with a surplus while, at the same time, high-cost facilities needed 
even higher rates to continue operating21. This legacy of tailored funding was to 
remain an element of future policy-making. As Louis Groot, founder of Dutch 
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hospital economics, stated: ‘not every possible solution to the problem of hospital 
reimbursement fits into current practice. This necessarily reduces the range of 
possible policies, which is a good thing since it is of the utmost importance to 
maintain effective practices’22.
However, central government was unable to handle all the red tape that accom-
panied the detailed planning of the finances of individual hospitals. Government 
was also caught between the diverging interests of hospitals and insurers. Hospitals 
faced rising costs due to new technological developments and rapidly declining 
charity income. As a consequence, actual per diem rates were too low. Future 
increases were often backdated, which led to much irritation among the sickness 
funds23.
In 1954, the government first asked the representative bodies of providers and 
sickness funds to consult each other, before the government settled the final rates. 
The fact that these bodies represented nonprofit organizations increased the level 
of mutual trust24. It was generally believed that nonprofit providers were able to 
deliver their services at low costs25. It was also held that it made no sense to negoti-
ate at a local level since there were no profit margins to disturb26. Nevertheless, at 
the national level, the negotiating process between the representative bodies of 
hospitals and sickness funds resulted in a yearly increase that could differ between 
individual hospitals.
In 1965, the Act on Hospital Tariffs enhanced the power of the nonprofit sec-
tor. The Agency of Hospital Remuneration (AHR), a corporatist body including 
nonprofit providers, sickness funds, and indemnity insurers, with only little gov-
ernment influence, was created. Its task was to calculate how much hospitals were 
allowed to charge for their services. The agency started out under bright economic 
circumstances. The mechanisms they developed to calculate hospital rates sup-
ported nonprofit provision. Hospital rates were calculated on an individual basis. 
Hospitals received tailored funding that – importantly – included all of their ac-
tual capital expenditure. Only hospitals with a certificate-of-need could charge for 
their capital costs, and only those that could charge for capital costs were entitled 
to calculate the per diem rates to cover the remaining costs. The AHR calculated 
special rates for all kinds of hospital services. All such calculations tended to add 
up to the actual expenses of individual hospitals27.
However, returns on capital were not reimbursed. Increasing surpluses or mak-
ing profits was not considered expedient: ‘increasing production would mean 
more surpluses, which violates either the nonprofit principle, or could be used to 
incur expenses that are not in line with national directives’28. Hospital buildings 
were amortized on a historical basis over fifty years29. The depreciation calculated 
was far too small to cover replacements. Increasingly, hospitals took out long-term 
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debt to fund their construction plans, while traditional up-front payments ended. 
Interest on any equity supplied was not reimbursed30. Because investment could 
be entirely financed by reimbursable debt, this was not a significant problem for 
the nonprofit hospitals31. These ownership types were now permitted to hold low 
levels of equity – about five percent of their balance sheet, which was needed to 
compensate a possible current deficit32. A high level of solvency was not necessary 
to gain access to capital33. Such directives were not adequate for commercial inves-
tors; indeed, many stakeholders thought that a more market-based funding model, 
such as prospective capital reimbursement, would make hospital administrators 
too dependent on investors and capital markets34.
Hospital planning
Initially, hospital construction depended on charitable donations or subsidies from 
municipalities. After the war, the rapid disappearance of voluntary funding meant 
that public financing gained in importance35. In 1946, a national building plan 
allocated only scarce means for hospital construction36. The government opted 
for an individualized approach and approved projects on a case-by-case basis. 
Prospective funding for hospital construction was not only much too expensive, 
it was also thought to violate the nonprofit principle – the debt-equity ratio would 
change in favor of the latter, implying a ‘profit’ on equity37.
In comparison with other countries, the access to and funding of capital was 
clarified early. Essentially, total debt financing took place on the private markets 
under the shield of public credit enhancement programs and guaranteed amor-
tization through regulated and tailored rates. As a result, hospital rates – even 
within a single city – differed substantially38. In 1949, the central government 
decided that it would subsidize all interest and depreciation expenditure, insofar 
as these costs were above the increase in the general cost of living39. If hospitals 
wanted to claim these funds, they first had to obtain government approval for 
their construction plans; only the actual deficits in such plans were subsidized. 
Credit enhancement (guaranteed loans) through the government was introduced 
in 195840. From a hospitals’ perspective, capital was free. Strong economic growth 
and the liberal attitude of the municipalities (who no longer had to contribute 
financially to hospital construction) when issuing building permits stimulated a 
construction boom. The sums spent on hospital construction increased from 150 
million guilders in 1965 to around 400 million guilders only two years later41.
The government responded to this growth with more centralized planning regu-
lations. In 1971, the Hospital Facilities Act brought in a national plan – and later 
regional, plans – for hospital capacity. It soon turned out that this opened a window 
of opportunity for cost containment through restrictive planning requirements. In 
1975, budgetary caps were put in place, which implied the temporization of most 
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construction activity. Planning requirements turned out to be the most effective 
way of curbing upgrades in smaller hospitals. The Agency for Hospital Planning 
proposed the closure of hospitals with fewer than 250 beds, or 450 beds in the 
large cities, to achieve efficiencies of scale. A large number of smaller hospitals 
closed or merged with other facilities. During the 1970s, many public hospitals 
converted to nonprofit status and eventually secular nonprofit foundations came 
to monopolize hospital ownership.
The Hospital Provision Act contained an important innovation regarding for-
profit hospitals. The business model of for-profit hospitals was already unfeasible 
in the Netherlands, but, with no for-profit sector to protest, this absence was 
now formalized in law: article 10 of the Hospital Provision Act stated that only 
public and nonprofit providers could be granted licenses to build hospitals. This 
provision was added in response to the parliamentary debate on a preliminary 
draft of the act42. Thus, a legal barrier to for-profit hospital ownership was created. 
Only conversions to for-profit ownership as well as to exploit a for-profit hospital 
without any public or social insurance funding remained possible. However, this 
seemed to be a purely theoretical exception at the time.
Health insurers and physicians have no interest in the existence of for-profit 
hospitals
Around seventy percent of the population was covered by social insurance. In 
1941, German reforms implied the centralization of decision-making powers43 
and sickness funds became corporations under public law44. Over the years, the 
regulations on obligatory insurance, hospital funding, and hospital planning came 
to form a tightly knit legal triangle, linking the interests of the sickness funds to 
the public and nonprofit hospitals. Sickness funds were reluctant to contract any 
outsiders, as appendix 5.1 illustrates for the ambulatory surgery centers.
Private indemnity insurers, consisting partly of mutual companies and partly 
of for-profits, enrolled the wealthiest thirty percent of the market. Although these 
companies held much more discretionary powers than the sickness funds, they did 
not, as for example in the UK and to a lesser extent in Germany, help to build up a 
for-profit sector. Nonprofit hospitals already had a tradition of delivering amenities 
geared to the more affluent clientele. During the 1950s, indemnity claims were as 
much as fifty percent above sickness fund rates45: these private rates were critical to 
the funding of the hospitals and the self-employed physicians inside those facilities. 
As a result, private patients were well taken care of within the existing system and 
a for-profit sector was not needed. Increasingly, indemnity insurers participated 
in the existing structure of corporatist governance. Moreover, the sickness funds 
formed private subsidiaries for any of their clients who were over the income-
threshold – purely private indemnity insurers entered into long-term decline.
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Neither did physicians need for-profit facilities. The nonprofit hospital as a 
physician’s cooperative, Pauly and Redisch’s hypothesis, seemed well established. 
During the 1960s, physicians formed specialty-specific partnerships. These part-
nerships operated as virtual monopolies; they were the most powerful force in any 
hospital. Most specialists affiliated with only one hospital. Generally, specialists 
do not pay a fee for the use of hospital services, which they were supposed to do 
prior to 1960 when they worked at arm’s length from hospitals46. Self-employed 
hospital doctors obtain high fee-for-service payments; they effectively influence 
the allocation of most of the hospital’s surpluses and budgets. Physicians thus had 
little to gain from a hospital converting to for-profit ownership. On the contrary, 
for-profit ownership implies additional competition for hospital surpluses from 
investors and could have led to a loss of autonomy for physicians.
5.2.3 Cost-containment and pre-structuring managed competition
During the 1960s and 1970s, health care costs increased rapidly. The government 
focused on cost-containment measures as their central policy goal and global bud-
gets were introduced as the core of these policies. However, these policies did not 
create room for for-profit ownership. The existing institutions were very effective 
in preventing any efforts in that direction, as became clear when physician-entre-
preneurs started to develop for-profit ambulatory surgery centers (appendix 5.1). 
It was not possible to mediate for-profit hospital ownership. This could only have 
happened through a fundamental redevelopment. Managed competition became 
the shared ‘mental’ model for the future of health care governance.
Developments in hospital funding and planning
In 1983, hospitals were paid a global budget based mainly on their adjusted historical 
levels of expenditure. Physicians continued to be reimbursed on a fee-for-service 
basis. To ensure the necessary liquidity, the existing methods and procedures to 
gain remuneration stayed intact. Three underlying features remained important 
regarding the prohibition of for-profit hospital care. 1) Capital costs continued 
to be calculated separately for each individual hospital and were added to the per 
diem rates. There were no calculated returns on capital. 2) The rates calculated for 
outpatient treatment were very low and covered only the marginal costs. 3) Sick-
ness funds were not allowed to do business with any potential for-profit providers, 
and in any case had no interest in doing so. Additional for-profit reimbursements 
would only add to the obligatory funding of existing hospitals, rather than replac-
ing for these costs.
Cost-containment also dominated planning regulations. Certificate-of-need 
procedures were used to stimulate mergers and cut the number of hospital beds. 
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This ‘forced’ reduction in the number of hospital beds was a policy that lasted 
well into the 1990s. Once plans to build or to redevelop a facility had been ap-
proved, the hospital had to wait until the necessary funding was available, which 
sometimes meant a considerable wait.
Physicians: initiators of the first for-profit experiments
Medical specialists were firmly embedded in the nonprofit hospitals, which acted 
as physicians cooperatives. During the 1980s, new technology made it possible for 
physicians to establish ambulatory surgery centers. With limited capital invest-
ments, many elective treatments could be positioned outside the hospital. In the 
mid 1980s, the emergence of for-profit ASCs sparked the first broader discussion 
of for-profit ownership in health care. The government was of the opinion that 
hospital planning regulations prohibited such centers. Most hospitals saw ASCs as 
potential competitors and accused them of cherry-picking.
However, in 1990, the high Court decided that ASCs did not count as hospitals 
and were therefore not subject to planning regulations. As a consequence, the 
government decided to allow their existence in a legal ‘twilight zone’. However, this 
did not pave the way for broader for-profit ownership among health care provid-
ers. The fact that ASCs could only charge for outpatient rates, which were too low 
to cover their costs, put their business model under severe pressure. It was not 
until 1998 that a court ruled that the existing reimbursement differences between 
ASCs and the hospitals were unfair and illegal. The potential for ASCs to help in 
solving the problem of growing waiting lists also meant that they were seen in a 
more favorable light. Gradual institutional adjustments meant that they became 
more widespread, although the formal prohibition on for-profit ownership was 
not lifted. In 2006, ASCs still accounted for less than one percent of acute care 
turnover. Appendix 5.1 discusses the history of for-profit ASCs.
The development of a new ‘policy stream’: managed competition
In 1987, the Dekker Committee proposed universal insurance and managed 
competition as the cornerstones of a new way of organizing health care in the Neth-
erlands. Its recommendations were based mainly on the ideas of Alan Enthoven. 
The Committee proposed mandatory health insurance with open enrolment to 
cover for around eighty-five percent of total health care benefits. This would end 
the split between sickness funds and private indemnity insurers47. The Dekker 
Committee proposed a model of regulated competition to encourage efficiency. 
This model was based mainly on risk-adjusted capitation and community rating 
for the insurers; the funding of hospital services was to be based on output, as well 
as selective contracting by the insurers of health care providers; price setting and 
planning regulations could be liberalized.
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However, efforts to implement the Dekker proposals and realize a national in-
surance scheme failed due to opposition from employers, private health insurers, 
and rightwing politicians. At the time, the ‘technical requirements’ of the regulated 
competition model were not available either. In 1993, the Christian Democrats 
blocked the reforms and closed the window of opportunity that the proposals had 
created, although the work on the necessary ‘technical requirements’ continued.
The Dekker Committee had given rise to an alternative ‘policy stream’ that 
exerted increasing influence on policy adjustments throughout the 1990s. Think-
ing about the health care sector in terms of (regulated) markets, products, and 
consumers became more common48. Together with the negative and visible effects 
of cost-containment policies in the form of waiting lists, this effectively pre-struc-
tured the more successful reforms of 200649. Although the Dekker proposals were 
far-reaching, for-profit hospital ownership was not included explicitly50. Despite 
a new and more positive attitude towards markets, for-profit hospitals remained 
controversial.
5.2.4 Prelude towards for-profit hospital ownership?
During the mid 1990s, cost-containment policies reached their peak. Most cost-
containment incentives discouraged treatments and the waiting lists that they 
gave rise to became a significant political issue. With quite some of the technical 
prerequisites now available, managed competition became a feasible way of ad-
dressing waiting lists and stimulating efficiency. A new right-wing government 
made mandatory health insurance a top priority. As from January 1st 2006, for-
profit or nonprofit health insurers were able to compete to enroll policyholders 
in a community rated system. Planning and pricing regulations were reformed 
to accommodate greater liberalization and competition. Hospital prices could be 
freely negotiated for ten (2005), twenty (2008), and thirty-four (2009) percent of 
turnover.
Such adjustments seem to be paving the way for a more fundamental shift 
towards for-profit care. Increasingly, profit incentives were viewed as a useful way 
of encouraging efficiency. The ideas about the role of profits in health care clearly 
changed. However, any for-profit hospital had to be integrated into a carefully 
constructed and sophisticated institutional framework, which formally continues 
to reject for-profit ownership. From the late 1990s onwards, nonprofit hospitals 
started to experiment with for-profit subsidiaries. More importantly still, in 2006 
and again in 2008 two for-profit companies entered the hospital sector. However, 
possibly in anticipation of a later acceptance of their profit motivation, they com-
mitted themselves to not distributing any of their profits to shareholders for the 
time being.
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Nonprofit hospitals try to bypass budget constrains
Waiting lists and a general scarcity of resources led to propose for a system of prior-
ity care. Patients would pay additional charges for treatment during out-of-office 
hours in order to bypass waiting lists. Employers that funded such experiments 
might see sick employees return to work sooner51. Since only spare capacity was 
used, it was said that the interests of regular patients would not be hurt. Proponents 
stated that such initiatives served as ‘Robin Hoods’, raising additional revenue to 
deliver hospital services to those in need52.
However, the idea of priority care met with fierce resistance in parliament. In 
1998, a large political majority viewed them as unfair and forced the minister to 
abandon such experiments53. Nevertheless, nonprofit hospitals with ambitions for 
for-profit subsidiaries soon had another chance. In 2003, many of the remaining 
bans on ASCs were lifted. In 2006, ASCs were permitted to provide overnight 
stays for ten percent of hospital procedures. Many hospitals decided to establish 
ASCs as subsidiaries54. They did so for various reasons: 1) to bypass any existing 
budget constraints; 2) to hinder possible new competitors; 3) to satisfy physicians, 
who wanted to see patients in such a clinic for additional revenues. However, ASC 
turnover is still estimated at less than one percent of the total hospital market55.
Anticipating an end to the exclusion of for-profit hospitals
Gradually, for-profit hospital ownership became more fashionable56. Many 
newspapers and magazines ran reports on what they claimed was the success of 
German for-profit hospital chains, most notably Rhön-Klinikum. Scholars were 
heartened by the positive effects of for-profit ownership that had been reported in 
international literature57. The health department now took action on the issue; it 
prepared new planning regulations to support the market reforms.
Both the Council for Public Health and Health Care and the High Court viewed 
the formal prohibition of all for-profit hospital ownership as obsolete58. The High 
Court did not see how the prohibition could fit in with the new market reforms 
that the government was seeking. It also saw incompatibilities with EU legislation 
since it blocked the access of foreign (hospital) companies to the Dutch market59. 
The Council for Public Health and Health Care stated that the universal prohibi-
tion on for-profit hospitals was not always in the best interest of the public.
At the time, this might have seemed to settle the dispute60. The new planning 
legislation pre-structured a possible lift on the prohibition of for-profit hospitals. 
For-profit providers would get access to the market if their facility belonged to 
a category of providers, which were permitted to operate on a for-profit basis. 
Although the government did not actually name any such category, this was a 
significant policy shift61.
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In 2005, the government stated in a white paper that it was prepared to lift the ban 
on for-profit hospitals by 2012 at the latest. It saw this as the logical consequence 
of a new prospective payment system to fund hospital capital62. In anticipation of 
a formal lift of the ban on for-profit ownership, the minister of health stated that a 
hospital would be permitted to become a private company, provided it did not pay 
any dividend to investors63. In 2007, the government searched for any market bar-
riers to foreign for-profit hospital chains64. In June 2008, the Healthcare Authority 
was supportive of an experiment with hospitals that were allowed to pay dividends 
to investors. They were of the opinion that this would encourage efficiency with 
limited risk to the public interest65.
It seemed that there was only one more hurdle to jump. The government states 
that the value of hospital assets, supposedly with the exception of goodwill, may 
not ‘leak’ into the hands of private investors66. However, in early 2009 the govern-
ment lost a case brought to court by the providers on this issue. In June 2009, 
the government stated that strict conditions would be attached to any for-profit 
ownership. Property rights would be limited to the supply of equity and a risk-
related reimbursement for this capital, in a proposal that clearly distanced itself 
from the 2005 white paper.
The signals made entrepreneurs eager to anticipate the possible end to the prohibi-
tion on for-profit hospitals. In 2004, a first step was taken by Mr. Sturkenboom, he 
founded a consortium with the aim of starting a small hospital chain. However, 
they received a lukewarm response from the hospitals they targeted and their ef-
forts came to nothing.
In late 2006, the financially distressed Slotervaart hospital in Amsterdam was 
the first to be bought by investors. Meromi Holding, a real estate company, bought 
the hospital after a nonprofit consortium of two housing trusts and a long-term 
care provider retracted its offer after it had already been accepted. The deal was ap-
proved in December 2006, under the condition that Meromi would not distribute 
any profits or sell any assets without prior approval. In its first year as owner of 
the hospital, Meromi transformed a €4.7 million deficit in a surplus of €6.5 mil-
lion; however, in 2008 the hospital stated in its annual report that the surplus had 
decreased to €1.8 million.
In March 2008, the MC Group, a chain of diagnostic clinics, expressed an inter-
est in a local hospital in Weert. In late 2008, in a highly publicized deal, the MC 
Group bought two distressed hospitals in Lelystad and Emmeloord. To avoid a 
bankruptcy, the central government supported this bailout with additional means 
of up to €20 million while the MC group invested some €5 million67. Currently, 
other investors also seem interested in acquiring a stake in the hospital market68.
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5.3 Analysis
This section analyzes why no for-profit hospital sector was able to develop in the 
Netherlands. Section 5.3.1 will look at the early prospects for proprietary hospitals 
and how good access to voluntary and public resources meant that there was no 
need for investor capital. Section 5.3.2 analyzes how this situation was prolonged 
after World War II with government help. The government created an institutional 
framework that supported nonprofit hospitals effectively and kept any for-profit 
hospitals out of the mainstream health system. By the mid 1980s, this had resulted 
in institutional barriers to any for-profit providers that were almost insurmount-
able, as demonstrated by the high barriers to ASCs. Severe cost-containment 
policies did not alter the groundwork of this model (section 5.3.3). Section 5.3.4 
analyzes why the reforms of 2006 seemed to alter the prospects for for-profit hos-
pitals. The chapter then ends with my conclusions.
5.3.1 Insurmountable barriers to proprietary hospitals
Before World War II, nonprofit hospitals were much more competitive than public 
hospitals. Public hospitals could tap fiscal resources but posed a minimal threat to 
the proprietary business model because of their focus on poorer patients. Strong 
voluntary movements gave nonprofit hospitals a significant advantage, partly a 
result of ‘competition’ between the different denominations. Nonprofits had access 
to cheap capital and relied on cheap but comparatively good labor from religious 
orders69. Nonprofit hospitals also treated most of the prosperous patients. Well-
to-do patients could receive good quality treatment and amenities in nonprofit 
hospitals of their own denomination. They did not seek treatment in separate, 
class-based proprietary hospitals. In short, the expected returns on equity invest-
ment were negative and nonprofits had so many competitive advantages that the 
entry of for-profit hospitals into the market was not feasible.
Additionally, physicians felt no need to start up their own proprietary hospitals 
for the following reasons. 1) They already had a great deal of autonomy and could 
control the hospital without bearing any investment risk. 2) Nonprofit hospitals 
offered broad access due to non-exclusivity (open medical staffs). Physicians were 
well-paid and treated with great respect. 3) The lack of hospital access did not 
threaten the income of the large number of family doctors so much. The profes-
sion created a gatekeeper system to ease income-related disputes between family 
practitioners and medical specialists. They could enforce such a system via the 
dominant position of physician-affiliated sickness funds.
Actually, none of the major stakeholders needed a substantial proprietary hospi-
tal sector. The nonprofit hospitals were the preferred workshop of the physicians. 
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Local authorities did not encourage proprietary facilities because these could have 
been competition for their own facilities. Prosperous patients did not need pro-
prietary hospitals because of the well-developed amenities of nonprofit facilities. 
Finally, investors were not interested in establishing proprietary clinics because 
there was no way of obtaining a stable return on their investment.
5.3.2 Institutional barriers replace the barriers of the market
Proprietary hospitals did not exist when the central government entered the 
health care arena. For-profit interests were therefore not represented in the mix 
of corporatist and public institutions that were created for hospital governance. 
In the Netherlands, the dominant structural interests supported nonprofit provi-
sion and were not challenged70. Although the central government acted as a fiscal 
guardian, the hospital sector had the autonomy to influence budgetary policies 
and remuneration procedures to a considerable extent. New public institutions 
reinforced the dominance of the nonprofit providers.
From the perspective of these nonprofit providers, this was necessary because 
the availability of voluntary resources diminished after World War II. However, 
this did not pave the way for for-profit providers for the following reasons. 1) 
Voluntary capital was replaced by ‘public’ capital at no cost, exclusively guaranteed 
for nonprofit and public (municipal) hospitals. Investor capital was unneces-
sary and since there were no for-profit hospitals, there was no need for the new 
regulations to accommodate such providers. 2) Social and private health insurers 
met capital costs through a specific add-on to the regulated per diem rates (no 
dual financing as in Germany). This protected capital expenditure against other 
expenditure categories. Capital expenditures were masked and accommodated by 
regular adjustments in the per diem rates and not exposed to other political needs. 
3) In 1971, the Hospital Facilities Act (WZV) excluded for-profit hospitals from 
being granted any certificate of need and from obtaining any reimbursement from 
social health insurance (sickness funds). The appropriation of the building costs 
was to be mediated through corporatist mechanisms on a case-by-case basis that 
accommodated historical peculiarities.
In fact, what happened was that the government took over any increasing mon-
etary risks from nonprofit hospitals. Reimbursement was structured according to 
the principle that there was no room for profit or any return on invested capital. 
This seemed to pre-structure the formal prohibition of for-profit hospital owner-
ship. Physician interests were still helped by such a nonprofit system, since these 
hospitals acted as physicians’ cooperatives. Both providers and payers helped to 
build an institutional framework that would prove to be very difficult to dismantle 
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to any for-profit entrants. The planning of hospital capacity was linked to the 
reimbursement of hospital services and access to social insurance funding.
In this system, there was no room for for-profit hospitals: they could not received 
a certificate-of-need, nor access any publicly guaranteed ‘free’ capital, nor could 
they levy any per diem charges because these included capital reimbursements, 
and nor could for-profits enter into contracts with the sickness funds. Theoreti-
cally, private indemnity insurers could contract for-profit hospitals, which was in 
any case against their interest as they too increasingly were reliant on the existing 
mode of governance. Additionally, there were no waiting list to bypass and the 
quality of nonprofit hospitals was supposedly adequate. From the 1950s to the 
1970s, legal and institutional barriers gradually replaced the constraints of the 
market place. In practice, they seemed to constitute a virtually insurmountable 
barrier to the establishment of for-profit hospitals.
5.3.3 Cost-containment policies consolidate the dominance of nonprofits
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the robust institutions that were blocking for-
profit hospitals remained intact. There was a political and institutional gridlock on 
the issue of for-profit hospital care. Initially, cost-containment measures further 
weakened the business case for for-profit hospitals. The introduction of global 
hospital budgeting reduced any underlying prospects for an attractive return on 
investment. This created an incentive for the hospital to do less and for the doctor 
to do more; additional services were not reimbursed and the monetary interests of 
hospitals were contrary to those of physicians; both counteract a profitable busi-
ness model.
Nevertheless, the discussion on for-profit hospital ownership gradually grew 
in prominence. Entrepreneurial physicians wanted to set up ambulatory surgery 
centers. During the same period, managed competition emerged as the new policy 
paradigm, though – remarkably – without any formal recommendation of for-
profit hospital care71. However, the growing physical excess capacity of hospitals 
that was the result of reductions in the average length of stay, tended to cancel out 
incentives to reduce the legal entrance barriers to for-profit hospitals. As a result, 
the reduction of the absolute legal barriers to for-profit hospitals remained limited.
5.3.4 Managed competition paving the way for for-profit hospitals?
During the mid 1980s, managed competition emerged as the new paradigm for 
the future of health care governance. A strong vision of this future developed 
rapidly and this arguably shaped many of the coming institutional adjustments. 
Remarkably, the reform proposals went without any explicit statement on for-profit 
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hospital ownership. In hindsight, it seems that the entry of for-profit hospitals may 
have been, though unnoticed at the time, the final consequence of this paradigm. 
The proposals triggered a gradual change in the existing institutional framework 
with the overarching goal of stimulating competition.
Managed competition finally achieved momentum during the first few years of 
the new century. Many fundamental regulatory changes were made: 1) due to the 
introduction of prospective payment and price competition, hospitals were put 
increasingly at risk, also for capital costs; 2) new entry regulations now seem to 
anticipate access of for-profit hospitals. Since 2008, a building license is no longer 
required for hospitals. The increasing financial risk and low solvency position of 
many hospitals have increased the need for investor capital. For-profit ownership 
may therefore be the logical final piece of this reformist agenda of managed com-
petition. Two companies have entered the market in anticipation of the lifting of 
the for-profit ban. The government did not seek to block these developments, but 
rather supported them. However, political opposition to for-profit hospitals seems 
to have gained a new lease of life recently, creating more risks for any for-profit 
entrants.
5.3.5 Conclusions
The Netherlands represents the exception to the rule in terms of this study be-
cause, even today, there are no for-profit hospitals that disperse dividends. There 
are consequently no for-profit hospital sector trends to follow and explain. The 
main reason for the absence of for-profit hospitals seems to date from the initial 
phase of hospital development, which explains why no proprietary capital was 
needed in the Netherlands. Physicians were not interested in for-profit medicine 
until much later, in the 1980s. All institutions and practices were based on the 
systematic exclusion of for-profit hospitals.
The introduction of managed competition has been based on a more neutral 
stance on ownership issues. However, the gradual introduction of prospective 
capital payments is increasing the level of risk in the nonprofit hospital sector. 
If these nonprofit hospitals cannot manage their new investment autonomy, for-
profit hospitals may become more attractive in the eyes of decision makers, but 
also in the eyes of the investors or shareholders, provided there is a reasonable 
prospect of a decent return on their investment.
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Appendix 5.1: for-profit ambulatory acute care
In the 1980s, technological developments made it possible to expand day surgery 
in the outpatient setting. Entrepreneurial physicians sought to apply such tech-
nology in freestanding clinics and ambulatory surgery centers. Generally, these 
new providers were run for profit. Although they were not hospitals facilities, it is 
relevant to describe their entry into the health care market. They entered the field 
at about the same time as the Dekker report was changing thinking on health care 
governance. However, ASCs were not welcomed as an opportunity to test out the 
proposed market reforms.
The government tries to prevent any freestanding for-profit clinics
In 1985, Boerema, a urologist, tried to start a small group of for-profit diagnostic 
clinics. He had the support of a large chain of department stores. Others followed, 
mostly in the fields of plastic surgery, eye diseases, dermatology, fertility disorders, 
and diagnostics. In addition to the profit-making potential, physician autonomy, 
patient convenience, and patient access to additional services were also reasons 
to start such projects. In 1990, The National Council for Health Care counted at 
least thirty-nine clinics72. Most were small scale – as late as 2001 an average clinic 
employed only twelve employees73.
In 1985, Dick Dees, the right-wing deputy secretary of health, tried to prohibit 
all for-profit clinics that delivered acute care. It was stated that these clinics should 
legally be considered hospitals since they were in fact outpatient departments. 
Thus, according to the Hospital Facilities Act, these clinics needed a license, which, 
according to the same law, they were not able to obtain74.
The government sued two clinics, those of Boerema and Valkenhorst, but both 
lawsuits were won by the for-profit clinics. Appeals followed. In 1990, the highest 
court decided that since these clinics had no formal or material ties to a hospital, 
and neither did their patients stay overnight, the government’s claim that they 
needed to comply to the Hospital Facilities Act was not valid. It turned out that 
the regulations contained a loophole for freestanding for-profit clinics that did not 
deliver inpatient care75.
However, there were more problems with the business model of the ASCs. Most 
freestanding clinics did not receive adequate remuneration to cover their costs, 
had little access to capital, and received few referrals from other professionals. 
Many new clinics, like the ambitious Boerema project, therefore went out of busi-
ness over time. Very few clinics were profitable76. However, the lawsuits had put 
the issue on the political agenda; the government had to determine what to do 
about the loopholes in legislation on for-profit health care.
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Freestanding for-profit clinics in the twilight zone
A new centre-left government (1989–1994) adopted a more liberal approach. 
Health care policies were based on the ideas of the Dekker Committee: regulated 
competition and universal health insurance. Hans Simons, the social democratic 
deputy secretary of health care, decided not to close the legal loophole regarding 
for-profit care. Freestanding clinics were able to compete with hospitals, and, even-
tually, were considered compatible with the system of regulated competition. For 
the time being, the clinics were tolerated although regulations on remuneration 
were used to cap payment rates at only a small amount above the physician’s fee77. 
As a result, these clinics were attractive to indemnity insurers,78 although sickness 
funds remained hesitant to contract with and reimburse freestanding clinics79.
The clinics struggled with the low reimbursements; many received negative pub-
licity as a result of illegally high charges for their services80. In 1994, Els Borst, the 
new social-liberal health minister, curbed the range of services the clinics could 
provide81. She wanted them to integrate into the nonprofit hospitals and attacked 
irregularities in remuneration. On the other hand, after several court proceedings, 
the clinics were able to improve their remuneration. In 1997, they were allowed to 
charge seventy, later rising to one hundred, percent of the formal inpatient rates 
for the same procedure. However, they still could not charge the important per 
diem rates that included capital expenditures82.
In 1998, the Rule on Freestanding Clinics clarified the ambiguous position of 
the clinics further. The goal was to legalize current practices, but also to hold 
down the total number of clinics. To obtain regulatory approval, clinics needed 
to form alliances with hospitals. More definite arrangements were to be made by 
the anticipated reform of hospital planning regulations83. These clinics would now 
be allowed to serve patients on social insurance, although the sickness funds were 
not required to allow them any contracts. Formally, the clinics could not obtain 
profits from obligatory entitlements and many clinics therefore operated with 
both nonprofit and for-profit subsidiaries. In 2000, thirty-four clinics with sixty-
five medical specialists84, less than half of the applicants, were officially granted 
lawful status. A separate trade association represented these clinics, most of which 
operate in the densely populated West of the country.
Table 5.2 shows that this ‘legalization’ process left many problems unresolved. 
In contrast to other (for-profit) sectors, the acute care clinics had considerable 
problems. Providers in acute care were less content with remuneration, the func-
tioning of the Agency of Health Care Remuneration as well as with the policies 
of the health insurers. Nevertheless, the clinics were able to increase the number 
of patients they treated considerably and reduce their debt85. In 2001, only ten 
percent of the freestanding clinics distributed a ‘dividend’ to shareholders and 
eighty percent still did not meet adequate solvency standards86.
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Table 5.2: Experienced constraints by (outpatient) for-profit providers87
Acute care Home care Mental health
I have many difficulties with the 
health department
44% 40% 17%
I have many difficulties with the 
agency for remuneration
56% 14%  8%
Remuneration regulations are 
adequate
32% 81% 70%
I have many difficulties with the 
health insurers
68% 29% 25%
For-profit initiatives in the other sectors were doing better. Between 1994 and 1998, 
the development of for-profit mental health got a boost from privatization mea-
sures in social security. Employers were becoming exposed to increasing financial 
risks for sick employees and those unable to work. This created an incentive to 
deter avoidable absenteeism. Since for-profit ownership in occupational health 
was a less sensitive proposition88, new mental health clinics were able to spring 
up. It was estimated that the five largest for-profit providers had a market share of 
almost fifteen percent89. Many traditional providers responded with (for-profit) 
subsidiaries. In 2005, some for-profit inpatient mental health became possible. 
Dutch patients could obtain treatment for addiction and eating disorders in the 
clinics of the Priory Group in the UK90, which had been bought by the Dutch bank 
ABN-AMRO a couple of months earlier.
Home care was the primary battlefield over market experiments. In 1994, 
for-profit home care providers entered the market as a result of another legal loop-
hole91. Existing nonprofit providers also hired these new for-profit providers to 
deliver additional services. Sometimes, such arrangements were attacked because 
irregular activities were suspected. The growth of for-profit home care was also 
stimulated by new funding experiments. In 1995, patients could opt to receive a 
personal budget with which to purchase home care services themselves. Due to 
regulatory flexibility, inpatient long-term care sometimes can be delivered on an 
outpatient basis, which allowed for-profit homes to serve the rich elderly92.
The government reluctantly supports freestanding clinics
In 2003, regulations became slightly more accommodating to freestanding clinics. 
1) Sickness funds no longer had a say in determining whether for-profit clinics 
would be granted a certificate-of-need. 2) The existence of waiting lists was no 
longer a requirement. 3) Clinics no longer needed a cooperative venture with a 
hospital. On the other hand, for what proved to be a very short time, hospitals 
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and sickness funds could not participate in freestanding clinics as separate 
subsidiaries93.
The implementation of a new system for hospital remuneration appeared highly 
promising for the clinics. Per diem rates would be abolished and substituted by 
prospective payment rates that were related directly to costs. Diagnosis treat-
ment combinations (DTCs) became the new method of setting payment rates. 
Freestanding clinics profited as: 1) in 2003, a reimbursement for capital costs was 
included in their rates94; 2) in 2005, ten percent of hospital fees could be freely 
negotiated with the insurers. Freestanding clinics provided a comparatively much 
larger proportion of such elective services.
However, some clouds remained on the now much brighter horizon. In June 
2003, the Health Inspectorate decided to check the quality of care in the freestand-
ing clinics and concluded that there were severe failures95. The report led to some 
political turmoil, and the clinics were made subject to quality regulations. Quality 
audits intensified, and in 2004 the Inspector General concluded there had been 
improvements96. The number of clinics had already started to grow – thirty began 
operating during 2003 and early 200497. Some entrepreneurs set up small chains 
of three or four clinics. Medinova, the largest chain with five clinics, demonstrated 
that the business was still risky. In 2003, Medinova went almost bankrupt and 
was rescued through turnaround management and an additional infusion of funds 
from its major investors.
In 2006, the special regulation of the freestanding clinics was abolished and they 
became subject to mainstream regulations. The new insurance legislation created 
a level playing field by lifting obligatory contracting between insurers and hospi-
tals98. However, during the summer of 2006 it turned out that the new outpatient 
rates had not been correctly calculated and need to be cut. This hit the freestanding 
clinics because of their less complex workload and lack of budgetary guarantees.
The Dutch Healthcare Authority concluded that the total patient volume of 
freestanding clinics, although they were growing rapidly, was still less than one 
percent of total covered hospital care. Even this figure was inflated since many 
clinics were subsidiaries of nonprofit hospitals. The Dutch Healthcare Authority 
estimated that fifteen of the approximately one hundred clinics had strong ties to 
a hospital. They also concluded that their charges were substantially lower than 
those of hospitals99. The agency thus took the opinion that creating more clinics 
would be in the public interest. They proposed a greater number of freely negoti-
ated rates as the best way to obtain this goal. The Health Inspectorate was also 
content with the development of the quality of care in the freestanding clinics. In 
late 2009, they published an optimistic report on the increasing quality of care in 
these clinics, especially regarding eye care, orthopedics, and plastic and cosmetic 
surgery100.
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6  A comparative and longitudinal analysis 
of for-profit hospital development
6.1 Introduction
This chapter seeks to provide an integrated explanation of the comparative and 
longitudinal differences and similarities in the development of the for-profit hos-
pital sector. This explanation is based on the analysis of the development of the 
for-profit hospital sector in the four countries that were studied in the preceding 
chapters. The chapter starts by describing the quantitative patterns in the growth 
in the number of for-profit hospital beds. I then summarize the differences and 
similarities in these patterns for the countries studied. What, on a country-by-
country basis, were main reasons for these trends? Three different stages can be 
recognized that present a preliminary answer to how for-profit hospital ownership 
has evolved within the four health care systems (section 6.2). However, how can 
we understand and explain for-profit hospital development over a longer period of 
time? Why does the development of the for-profit hospitals differ between coun-
tries? I structure my analysis to answer these research questions by examining 
specific questions on the most notable differences and similarities.
Section 6.3 concerns proprietary hospital care. Why did proprietary hospitals 
win a greater market share in some countries than in others (section 6.3.1)? 
Why did proprietary hospital care enter a period of long-term decline (section 
6.3.2)? Section 6.4 investigates the process of stagnation between the decline of 
the proprietary sector and the growth of the for-profit hospital sector. What were 
the factors that halted the decline of the proprietary sector (section 6.4.1)? Did 
proprietary hospital care pre-structure a for-profit hospital sector, and if so, how 
(section 6.4.2)? Section 6.5 focuses on the subsequent growth of the for-profit 
hospital sector. How was strong growth able to re-emerge after such a long period 
of decline (section 6.5.1)? Why did for-profit hospital growth emerge sooner in 
some countries than in others (section 6.5.2)? Why did for-profit business models 
differ in some respects (section 6.5.3)? In section 6.6, I present the most important 
key determinant of the development of the for-profit hospital sector and present 
the most powerful constraints on the development of the for-profit hospital sector.
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6.2 Patterns in for-profit hospital development
Figure 6.1 summarizes the patterns in for-profit hospital development on the 
basis of the four case studies. It can be seen that the graphs showing for-profit 
hospital development are characterized by u-shaped curves in the US, the UK, 
and Germany. In the Netherlands, for-profit companies have only recently entered 
hospital care and are not permitted to distribute any profits. The three u-shaped 
curves show that for-profit sectors have declined and grown at different rates, and 
also began to grow again at different points in time. In fact, the later the gradient 
begins to rise, the steeper the curve.
The rising curve is clearly the steepest in the case of Germany, followed by the 
UK, and the US. On the left-hand side of figure 6.1, these three countries all faced 
a steady decline in proprietary hospital care. This decline was the steepest in the 
US, followed by the UK, and was the least steep in Germany. The bottom stage of 
the u-curve lasts the longest in Germany, followed by both the UK and the US. It 
can also be seen that in recent years, for-profit hospital growth has stagnated in 
the UK; in the US there were short interruptions during the late 1980s and again 
during the late 1990s.
These patterns can be divided into the following three consecutive stages, which 
are more or less pronounced in each of the three countries.
Table 6.1: Major factors/determinants of the emergence of proprietary hospital care
Impact on 
proprietary 
ownership
Nether-
lands
UK Germany US
Physician access to hospitals
Early distinction between GPs 
and specialists
Yes = negative Yes Yes No No
Early dominance of ‘open’ staff 
models
Yes = negative Yes Limited No No
Large share of nonprofit hospitals Yes = negative Yes Limited Limited Yes
Financial constraints
Access to capital No = negative No Limited Limited Limited
Existence of self-pay market No = negative Limited Fair Fair Good
Possibility to isolate from 
competition
No = negative No Fair Fair Fair
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Stage 1: declining proprietary hospital care
The origin of modern for-profit hospital care begins with the establishment of pro-
prietary hospital facilities1. Proprietary hospitals developed in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. During this period, hospitals that had formerly 
been almshouses gradually evolved to become the mainstream providers of acute-
care. Although still limited, the number of paying patients grew; the interest of 
physicians in securing access to and control of these hospital facilities increased. 
Physician-owned proprietary hospitals provided the most straightforward own-
ership type for this access and control. This seemed more important than the 
opportunity to gain a return on investment.
Proprietary hospitals operated on a small scale and often focused on treating 
better-off patients. The proprietary sector consisted predominantly of stand-alone 
facilities, which were geographically disparate. In comparison to other types of 
ownership, they had a much smaller scope of activities. However, our case studies 
show that proprietary facilities soon turned out to be less successful than their 
public and, especially, nonprofit counterparts.
The proprietary hospital sector was the most developed in the US2. Figure 6.1 
illustrates that although the share of proprietary beds was already declining, it 
accounted for at least eighteen percent of all hospital beds in 1928. Proprietary 
hospital care was also significant in the UK, where the share of beds in pay hospitals 
Figure 6.1: Patterns in the percentage of proprietary and for-profit hospital beds 
(plotted with trend line)
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and nursing homes exceeded ten percent. The German proprietary hospital sector 
was somewhat smaller; in 1931, it accounted for seven percent of all hospital beds. 
A proprietary hospital sector never developed in the Netherlands. More specific 
data in our case studies show that the turnover of proprietary hospital care was 
well below their share in the number of beds. Proprietary hospitals delivered less 
complex care. On the other hand, the observation that a long-term marginalization 
of proprietary hospital care took place, has to be qualified somewhat. The decline 
in the proprietary hospital sector was predominantly relative rather than being a 
decline in the absolute numbers of proprietary beds. Other types of ownership 
were able to grow faster than the proprietary hospital sector.
Stage 2: Stagnation of proprietary hospital care
Figure 6.1 then shows a period in which the decline of the proprietary sector eases 
and the share of the sector stabilizes for some time. In the US, this period last from 
the mid 1950s until the late 1960s; in the UK, it lasts from the 1950s until the late 
1970s; in Germany, this period spans the entire period between the early 1960s 
and German reunification in 1990. Although on the surface it would appear that 
not much was happening during this stage, in fact the proprietary sectors were 
gradually being replaced by the modern for-profit hospital sector.
Supported by broader public investment in the construction of a welfare state, 
proprietary hospitals were able to develop into more profitable niche players. In 
the US, this depended primarily on seizing some of the opportunities offered by 
employer-based health care funding; in the UK, it depended on the provision of 
‘supplementary’ services that the NHS did not provide; in Germany, niches were 
created by certain forms of specialization as well as treating private patients.
During this second stage, the decline of proprietary hospital sector care came to a 
halt before for-profit hospitals began their growth. For physicians, the importance 
of acquiring hospital access and control was substantially reduced, meaning that 
profit-making had become the main reason for the existence of the proprietary 
hospital sector. On the other hand, free or voluntary sources of capital could not 
keep pace with the increasing demand for hospital services. The way the different 
health systems ‘solved’ the problem of rapidly declining voluntary sources, most 
notably capital, determined the structure of their for-profit sector. The existence of 
a reasonable number of (stand-alone) proprietary hospitals fed the initial growth 
of the new for-profit hospital chains.
Stage 3: strong for-profit hospital growth
Figure 6.1 illustrates strong for-profit hospital growth in each of the countries, 
except the Netherlands. The US saw significant for-profit hospital growth from 
the early 1970s onwards. In the UK, the for-profit hospital sector grew very 
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strongly during the 1980s and, to a somewhat lesser extent, during the 1990s. In 
Germany, for-profit growth began after the reunification and continues to this day. 
In the Netherlands, two for-profit companies recently entered the hospital market. 
Growth was preceded by a long period of relative decline or stabilization in the 
for-profit hospital sector. A different model was emerging, unlike the sector’s 
previous model of proprietary hospital care.
Large hospital chains were established and soon formed the core of the for-profit 
sector. The average scale of the for-profit hospital increased and they began to 
deliver a broader range of services. On such indicators, for-profit hospitals be-
came more comparable with public and nonprofit facilities, but the governance 
of for-profits focused more strongly on investment returns. In contrast to the old, 
physician-dominated proprietary hospitals, stock-listed firms and private equity 
companies dominated the ownership of these new for-profit hospitals. How did 
this turnaround in the characteristics of the for-profit hospital sector occur? What 
are the similarities and differences between the countries in this study?
This turnaround is even more remarkable since proprietary hospitals had been 
losing market share for many decades or, as in the Netherlands, were unable to 
develop at all. Indeed, only a few years before or even after these reversals, scholars 
had concentrated mainly on the reasons for nonprofit growth as well as proprietary 
decline3. The combined share of public and nonprofit hospitals continues to out-
weigh for-profit hospital ownership in these four countries, which remains firmly 
below twenty percent; however, the share of for-profit ownership has increased 
substantially. In these four cases, the start of the revival in for-profit ownership 
occurred at a different time, which would suggest that country-specific develop-
ments and institutions have played a role. This is also supported by the fact that 
these revivals occurred fairly suddenly. There is little evidence for a tipping point 
explanation, by which slow growth suddenly accelerates due to a certain threshold 
being reached4.
6.3 The expansion and decline of proprietary hospital care
This section analyzes the expansion and decline of proprietary hospital care. Pro-
prietary hospitals, which were mainly owned and controlled by physicians, were 
the first forms of ownership that were formally able to distribute profits to their 
shareholders. This section focuses on the reasons for the establishment of propri-
etary hospitals, the differences in their market share between countries, as well as 
the their long-term decline soon after their emergence. Two questions structure the 
analysis: 1) Why did proprietary hospitals emerge and why did market shares differ 
between countries? 2) Why did proprietary hospitals enter into long-term decline?
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6.3.1  Why did proprietary hospitals emerge and why did market shares 
differ between countries?
During the early decades of the twentieth century, technological progress was 
transforming hospitals into the core institutions of acute health care5. Hospitals 
now had a broader patient base that was no longer limited to the poor and needy. 
Both the growing middle classes and the better-off were seeking increasing 
amounts of hospital treatment. These patients were able to pay for their treatment, 
often at higher amounts than the actual costs. This created opportunities for a 
proprietary hospital sector: 1) since treatment shifted to the hospital environment, 
hospital access became much more important to physicians and private ownership 
was the most direct way for a physician to obtain such access; and 2) due to the 
growing number of paying patients, financial constraints eased, which helped to 
mitigate the risks involved in owning a proprietary hospital.
Our case studies show that these trends and the way they were handled took 
different forms in different countries. Physicians’ need for hospital access could 
be eased due to the separation of general treatment by family practitioners and 
specialized treatment by specialists in hospitals. Family practitioners’ need for 
hospital access thus vanished. Such arrangements could often be proposed and 
enforced by the profession itself (self-regulation). Providers could help to ease the 
tensions between physicians over hospital access by choosing an open medical 
staff. In such cases, doctors could easily follow their patients into the hospital. 
In practice, the availability of open staff hospitals depended on the availability of 
voluntary sources to fund such hospitals. The financial constraints on proprietary 
hospitals could be eased by the existence of a large self-pay market or other kinds 
of financial advantages, for example access to capital or the absence of competi-
tion. Table 6.1 summarizes the ordinal scores of the countries studied on how 
physician access to hospitals was structured as well as the importance of financial 
constraints to a proprietary hospital sector.
Physician access to hospitals
Constraints on hospital access were very important to physicians. In fact, the 
physicians’ need for access to a broad patient base is crucial to understanding 
the origins of the proprietary hospital sector. Other constraints were, necessarily, 
of secondary importance, since few proprietary facilities generated significant 
profits on their hospital services. Individual physicians or physician partnerships 
dominated proprietary ownership6. In those days, physicians needed enough 
well-off patients to gain a reasonable income. In contrast to current health care 
systems, physician incomes were much less protected and secure. There existed a 
relatively large pool of doctors due to the unregulated expansion of the number of 
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medical schools. The medical profession was less stratified into different segments 
or specializations and doctors were competing for as many (paying) patients and 
treatments as possible. Hospital access was thus increasingly the key to a doctor’s 
professional success.
A physician-owned proprietary hospital provided the most radical opportunity 
to gain access to paying patients and control over the inpatient surroundings. 
However, such a decision implied a trade-off between different opportunity costs, 
since physicians might also have been able to treat their patients in public or in 
nonprofit hospitals. In such cases, other factors would determine physician access: 
the main models involved a ‘closed’ or an ‘open’ medical staff. The precise mean-
ing of such terms was articulated by specific regulations that were subject to local 
variations7.
Public hospitals mainly operated on the basis of a salaried or ‘closed’ staff; they 
treated few richer patients. However, this hindered physician-access to patients: 
such facilities often offered them lower financial rewards due to their focus on 
the poor and needy. Nonprofit hospitals often had good access to capital, a high 
number of paying patients, and allowed physicians considerable control over day-
to-day operations.
Physicians in search of access to patients were best off with ‘open’ staff nonprofit 
hospitals. If their patients needed hospital treatment, they could follow them and 
use the available equipment and facilities. This implies that in the presence of 
well-established nonprofit hospitals with ‘open’ staff models, it was difficult for 
proprietary facilities to become established. If there were many public hospitals 
and nonprofit hospitals that retained a strictly ‘closed’ staff model existed, this may 
have stimulated the co-existence of proprietary hospitals.
Financial constraints
Financial constraints were important in deciding whether to set up and operate 
a proprietary hospital. Proprietary hospitals were exposed to high financial risks. 
Three aspects were important to achieve a sound financial position and a sustained 
flow of revenue: 1) access to capital; 2) stable funding to cover for all costs; 3) a 
pseudo-monopolistic position, if other types of ownership could afford to charge 
at lower fees.
It is often assumed that for-profit hospitals have a better access to capital than 
their public and non-profit counterparts because they can tap into the financial 
markets. Ninety years ago, however, this was not automatically the case. Due to 
the limited prospect of profits, such access was often limited. Financial markets 
were less developed than they are now, and transaction costs were higher for both 
equity capital and commercial loans. As a consequence, most entrepreneurs had 
to fall back on their own funds or form a partnership with congenial initiators, but 
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building a hospital was expensive and this was not easily done. In late-nineteenth-
century Germany, for example, the cost of funding a hospital was estimated to equal 
the costs of a complete regiment of the Prussian army8. In 1928, a US physician 
needed some $70,000, a small fortune in those days, to set up a small proprietary 
clinic. Nonprofits could invest substantially higher capital sums per bed.
Another important constraint was the lack of stable sources of funding. Third-
party payments were poorly developed and often did not cover costs in full. This 
implied that proprietary hospitals depended on paying patients – an unstable 
source of funding that fluctuated according to the general economic climate. Many 
proprietary clinics tried to overcome these difficulties by pursuing niche strategies 
to attract a better-off clientele. However, the severity of these financial constraints 
was such that the survival of proprietary facilities was often determined by the ab-
sence of competition from other types of ownership, especially nonprofits. Indeed, 
quite a number of proprietary hospitals emerged in remote rural surroundings 
that were unable to provide the funds for a nonprofit hospital.
The remainder of this section analyzes the specific constraints presented by 
physician access and financial resources to the emergence of proprietary hospital 
care in our four cases.
The Netherlands
We can deduce some important reasons for the absence of proprietary hospital care 
in the Netherlands from table 6.1. Financial constraints on building proprietary 
hospitals were considerable, at least in comparison with the other countries studied 
here: 1) small, specialized hospitals were discouraged by the medical profession 
for reasons of quality, which increased the relative cost of hospital construction; 
2) religious hospitals were comparatively well-funded and available, and these 
attracted many well-to-do patients; however, the total number of paying patients 
was comparatively small due to a less developed economy and comparatively large 
income disparities; 3) proprietary hospitals would face considerable competition 
since, in a geographically small country, the next hospital was never far away.
From a physicians’ perspective, the opportunity costs involved in owning a pro-
prietary hospital to secure patient access were also high: 1) nonprofits developed 
from the late nineteenth century onwards and accounted for a large proportion 
of hospitals in the Netherlands; 2) most of these nonprofit hospitals had an open 
medical staff; 3) due to the early development of a gatekeeper system, hospital 
access was less crucial for most family physicians. The remaining physicians had 
good access to nonprofit hospitals; they had no need for proprietary hospitals. If 
physicians had, in spite of this, chosen to participate in proprietary ownership, 
they were faced with high financial constraints.
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The UK
In comparison with nonprofits in the other countries in this study, UK nonprofit 
hospitals were the worst funded. The affluent did not visit nonprofit facilities; they 
preferred treatment in their own homes or in small proprietary clinics. Class-con-
sciousness was important in such decisions. However, since voluntary hospitals 
were expected to deliver ‘free’ treatment, they often could also not provide the 
services the rich preferred9. Nonprofit hospitals did not provide many additional 
amenities or luxury facilities. This meant that the demands of paying patients were 
not well-served, creating an opportunity for proprietary clinics.
Indeed, UK proprietary hospitals, more so than their counterparts in other 
countries, focused exclusively on well-off patients. Such a separation of hospital 
treatment along class lines limited competition between the different types of 
ownership. In the UK, financial constraints did not prohibit the existence of a 
proprietary hospital sector. On the other hand, physicians’ need for hospital access 
was not as pronounced as in some other countries due to the early development 
of a gatekeeper system. GPs stopped treating patients in hospitals comparatively 
early, which limited their need for hospital access. Both public and nonprofit hos-
pitals operated on the basis of a ‘closed’ medical staff, which limited the access of 
physicians to their patients. However, since there were few paying patients outside 
the proprietary hospital sector, this did not present a problem to most physicians.
Germany
The limited access of physicians to hospitals is important to understanding propri-
etary hospital care. However, most German physicians were salaried in both public 
and nonprofit hospitals. There were large numbers of ambulatory physicians, 
many of which specialized in certain diseases and treatments. German physicians 
practiced in a rather competitive market and their numbers increased quickly. It 
was not until 1933, when, unlike in other countries, medical services were strictly 
separated along the lines of inpatient and outpatient treatment, that physician 
segmentation became clear. By then, limited access to hospitals had generated a 
proprietary hospital sector.
A distinguishing characteristic of the German case is the early development of 
social insurance and a system of sliding scales of hospital reimbursement (high 
incomes paid substantially more, but also had more amenities). Generally, sick-
ness funds were permitted to contract with proprietary providers. The system of 
sliding scales permitted cross-subsidization to less profitable services as well as the 
possibility of attracting richer patients with amenities and physicians with a good 
reputation. Physicians who also held senior university positions initiated many 
proprietary clinics. These clinics were located in the cities and were able to attract 
a richer clientele. In rural surroundings with less voluntary funds, in the north and 
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south of the country for example, proprietary hospitals could sometimes develop 
into natural monopolies. Voluntary funds were unevenly spread throughout the 
country and concentrated in the industrial west where they helped to support the 
dominance of the nonprofit hospital sector. A variety of factors thus influenced the 
viability of proprietary hospitals.
The US
Table 6.1 shows that the proprietary hospital sector was the most widespread in 
the US. Financial constraints were relatively limited and the constraints on physi-
cians’ hospital access were severe. This combination promotes proprietary hospital 
ownership as a natural ‘solution’. The lack of physician access to hospitals was a 
clear explanation for the establishment of proprietary facilities. US physicians 
developed no gatekeeper system, and nor was there a split between inpatient and 
outpatient care. Initially most nonprofit hospitals operated on the basis of a ‘closed’ 
medical staff. These providers only gradually opened their doors to larger numbers 
of practitioners. By then, competition for hospital access was considerable and 
this had led to the founding of quite a number of physician-owned proprietary 
hospitals.
In the US, proprietary hospitals also had the fewest financial constraints. More 
proprietary facilities were established in comparison with other countries, which 
indicated rather better access to capital. Immigration continued and the demand 
for medical services rose rapidly. The most important factor seems to have been 
that due to a large middle class and comparatively high-income levels, the num-
ber of paying patients was much larger than in the three other countries10. This 
made it possible for a significant proprietary hospital sector to develop. However, 
proprietary ownership was unevenly spread across the country. In the southern 
and western regions, nonprofits represented a much lesser threat to proprietary 
hospitals. In those places, voluntary sources were less available; many who could 
afford it preferred proprietary treatment above a stay in a public hospital; in rural 
areas proprietary hospitals faced little competition.
Conclusion
This analysis shows that hospital-physician relations are the most dominant factor 
in explaining the development of a proprietary hospital sector. The presence of 
hospitals with closed medical staffs among public and nonprofit providers cor-
relates with proprietary ownership. Hospital access was a very acute concern to 
physicians, who lacked such privileges. However, the prospect of making a decent 
return on capital over time, a crucial condition to for-profit ownership, generally 
did not exist. The flow of patient reimbursements was insecure as a result of bad 
debts, limited insurance coverage, and price-sensitive buyers; costs for labor and 
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capital were higher for proprietary hospitals than for other types of ownership; 
the number of patients who could pay for charges above costs was limited. On 
the other hand, the ‘contractibility’ of proprietary care was still rather high due to 
the focus on amenities and the lack of sophisticated technology. Because of good 
‘contractibility’ and their focus on the better off, proprietary hospitals were not 
considered as a public service and initially there were few cultural and regulatory 
constraints (see figures 1.1 and 1.2).
Nevertheless, the risks associated with owning a hospital were considerable and, 
from a physician’s perspective, proprietary clinics seemed a ‘second best’ solution. 
Most physicians thus preferred nonprofit ‘open staff ’ hospitals. However, during 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century these simply were not always widely 
available. Public hospitals dominated the scene, creating a niche for proprietary 
hospitals that treated paying patients who were looking for facilities with ameni-
ties. The preference of doctors for nonprofit ‘open staff ’ hospitals was underlined 
by the initial strategies of the new physician interest groups that were founded 
during the same time-period: 1) limiting inter-doctor competition through self-
enforced referral models eased the pressures to set up proprietary hospitals; 2) 
favoring the opening of (nonprofit) ‘closed’ staff hospitals to more physicians; 3) 
opposing the establishment of corporate hospitals or investor-owned proprietary 
facilities.
6.3.2 Why did proprietary hospital care go into long-term decline?
Table 6.2 shows that the proprietary hospital sector went into serious decline 
almost immediately after its emergence. The proprietary hospital sector did not 
prove to be a successful business model. This can be explained as a result of im-
proving physician access to their preferred nonprofit hospital ownership types. The 
proprietary hospital sector was also unable to compete with the growing number 
of nonprofit hospitals. From a proprietary hospital’s perspective, the set of condi-
tions on which they depended for their success, as set out in table 6.1, worsened 
over time. Physicians obtained effective control over nonprofit hospitals; the op-
portunity costs for proprietary ownership increased. The effect of the deteriorating 
prospects for proprietary hospitals can be most clearly seen in the US11.
Table 6.2: Estimated percentage of proprietary hospital beds12
1921 1928 1931 1935 1937 1938 1940 1946
Germany 7.0 5.9
UK 9.6 7.2
US 17.3 12.8 9.5 8.2
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Physician access to hospitals
The medical profession continued to specialize and stratify. They were increas-
ingly successful in enforcing referral models: general practitioners in the UK 
and the Netherlands, an outpatient-inpatient split in Germany. This limited the 
competition among physicians for hospital privileges. In the US, physician inter-
ests supported the emergence of ‘open staff ’ voluntary hospitals as the dominant 
form of ownership. In all countries, physicians increasingly dominated hospital 
decisions concerning staff privileges, hospital strategies, as well as day-to-day 
operations13. They became the single most powerful force within public and non-
profit hospitals14. Physicians, rather than the formal owners, held effective control 
of the hospital.
Fewer and fewer physicians had any interest in formal control over hospitals 
through proprietary ownership; formal control increased their exposure to fi-
nancial risk, with only limited opportunities for additional control and revenues. 
This argument appears to verify Pauly and Redisch’s hypothesis that the nonprofit 
hospital is a physicians’ cooperative (see section 1.3). Physicians who harbored 
ethical doubts about profit making now also had an economic rationale to reject 
proprietary hospitals. Hospital profits were seen as an unjustified claim on a 
doctor’s income. In the US, physicians argued that the full return on their labor 
belonged to them, which included all possible returns on investment. The neces-
sary capital had to be donated by the public authorities or the communities for 
‘free’. Proprietary hospitals could only be reconciled with such reasoning if they 
were owned by physicians or physician partnerships, not if they were incorporated 
and owned by investors.
Financial constraints
Prior to World War II, financial constraints remained strong. Table 6.2 sug-
gests that a sound business model for proprietary care became increasingly 
unfeasible. The need for capital continued to increase, partly due to technological 
developments. Proprietary hospitals were unable to attract such capital from the 
markets15; public facilities could fall back on tax appropriations and nonprofits 
benefited significantly from philanthropically motivated sources of capital. Non-
profit hospitals had also access to substantial amounts of cheap and comparatively 
competent religious labor. Additionally, the emergence of third-party payers was 
not necessarily in the interest of proprietary clinics. Proprietary hospitals charged 
above costs, while most third-party payers, if they reimbursed proprietary clinics, 
did so below actual costs. Capital costs were normally not included in third-party 
reimbursements. This was less of a problem for public and nonprofit owners that 
got their capital ‘free’ or at very low cost and thus had much lower fixed costs. A 
final factor that affected the proprietary hospital sector negatively was the political 
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and economic turmoil of the first half of the twentieth century. Small proprietary 
hospitals were the most vulnerable to economic fluctuations due to their reliance 
on self-pay patients. The German economy suffered severely during the 1920s, 
while the global recession of the 1930s hit the US the hardest.
Reasons for the decline of the proprietary hospitals are validated by the case of 
the US
Table 6.2 illustrates that until World War II, the decline of the proprietary hospital 
sector was the most persistent and enduring in the US. If the above constraints do 
indeed explain the decline of proprietary hospital care, they should also have been 
the most prominent in the US. Although other countries were catching up, the US 
had by far the largest share of self-pay patients, which implied a good basis for the 
development of a proprietary hospital sector (but also made the US proprietary 
hospitals the most vulnerable to the economic depression of the 1930s).
However, as is indicated above, the interests of physicians may have been more 
important than the actual financial constraints. Indeed, physician pressure for 
hospital access decreased strongly over time. As early as 1933, five out of six 
physicians, both family doctors and specialists, were affiliated with at least one 
acute-care hospital16. Hospital privileges were virtually non-existent for most phy-
sicians in the late nineteenth century; they remained uncommon during the early 
years of the twentieth century. Since the voluntary, ‘open’ staff hospital emerged 
as the preferred option for most physicians, the legitimacy of proprietary facilities 
had largely vanished.
Other barriers to proprietary hospitals in the US also increased. 1) Supported by 
the medical associations, several US state courts ruled that corporate, for-profit 
medicine violated ‘sound public policy’. Many states prohibited incorporated 
hospitals; proprietary hospitals were not exempted from taxes. There were no 
such legal battles curbing proprietary hospital sector in the other three coun-
tries. 2) Nonprofit hospitals dominated Blue Cross plans, which dominated the 
health insurance industry. Blue Cross sometimes did not reimburse treatment in 
proprietary hospitals and almost always negotiated lower rates for these types of 
ownership. The mixing of interests between third-party payers and (nonprofit) 
providers was less in most other countries; for example German sickness funds 
were less hesitant to reimburse proprietary hospitals. 3) Another barrier was the 
general economic situation. In the US, the recession of the 1930s was the most 
severe. Hospital receipts from self-pay patients fell heavily over a very short span 
of time. 4) In the US, it was easier for proprietary hospitals to convert to nonprofit 
or to public ownership. In the UK, for example, conversion was a more complex 
process. The exclusive focus of proprietary hospitals on the well-off did not fit 
194
For-profit Hospitals
with the practices of the other types of ownership. In Germany, proprietary con-
versions to public or nonprofit status often implied a complicated change in the 
self-employed status of physicians to a salaried position.
Together with the (exceptionally) strong growth in physician access to (non-
profit) hospitals, such constraints explain why the decline of the for-profit hospital 
sector proceeded faster in the US than in Germany or the UK. These constraints 
thus validate the central importance of the hospital access of physicians to hospi-
tals (and of certain financial constraints) to the rise and decline of a proprietary 
hospital sector. However, the US case also illustrates the growing importance of 
governmental influence in the hospital sector: proprietary ownership was dis-
couraged by both legal and self-regulations, while conversion to other types of 
ownership was encouraged.
Conclusion
This section has analyzed the decline of the proprietary hospital sector until World 
War II. This decline resulted from a relative increase in certain important constraints 
to proprietary hospital ownership. Both public and nonprofit hospitals were better 
positioned to receive funds from emerging third-party payers. The considerable 
growth of nonprofit hospitals indicated the strengthening of voluntary resources, 
while proprietary hospitals were more vulnerable to economic downturns. More 
importantly, most physicians preferred access to nonprofit hospitals over access to 
proprietary facilities and this option became much more real, especially in the US 
and the Netherlands.
Physicians canalized their activities through professional referral systems as well 
as professional segmentation. This limited the competition for hospital access to 
smaller numbers of doctors. Ownership regulations that curbed the proprietary 
sector were increasingly sought after, especially in the US. The developments in 
the US validate the important role played by these constraints in the decline of 
the proprietary hospital sector. The US was not only the country in where the 
conversion to nonprofit or public ownership was relatively easy, but also where the 
decline of the proprietary hospital sector was relatively sharp.
6.4 Stagnation and pre-structuring a for-profit hospital sector
Figure 6.1 illustrates that the proprietary sectors of the US, the UK, and Germany 
all show periods of stagnation. The length of these periods of stagnation differs and 
was rather shorter in the US (from the mid 1950s until the late 1960s) than in the 
UK (from the 1950s until the late 1970s) and in Germany (from the 1960s until the 
early 1990s). This section analyzes these periods of stagnation. This is important 
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because we can see that the rate of decline among proprietary ownership eased off; 
sometimes there was even some slow growth (UK).
The stagnation of proprietary hospital care predates the rapid growth of the 
various for-profit sectors. The immediate determinants for such rapid growth are 
analyzed in section 6.5. Three questions structure the analysis of this period of 
stagnation and the pre-structuring of a for-profit hospital sector: 1) Why did the 
rate of decline of the proprietary hospital sector level off? 2) How did the shaping 
of new institutional frameworks pre-structure a for-profit hospital sector? 3) Did 
the existence of proprietary hospitals pre-structure a for-profit sector?
6.4.1 Why stagnated the decline of the proprietary hospital sector?
Historically, proprietary hospitals have depended on self-pay patients for most of 
their funding. The gradual transformation of self-pay markets into private insur-
ance is thus important. If private insurers depend on proprietary hospitals to serve 
their subscribers, this implies that the position of these types of ownership might 
improve. This is because the financial basis and stability provided by private insur-
ers is probably more able to support the proprietary sector than individual self-pay 
patients. Table 6.3 depicts the relative role of private health insurance in the three 
countries with a proprietary hospital sector.
Table 6.3: Dependence of private insurance and self-pay patients on proprietary 
 hospitals
Germany
(1960s to early 1990s)
UK
(1950s to late 1970s)
US
(Mid 1950s to late 1960s)
Self-pay market High High Modest
Private insurance Fairly high Very high Modest
Germany
The rate of decline of the German proprietary sector leveled off between the early 
1960s and the late 1980s. The new federal constitution of the Republic was one 
factor in ending the decline of this sector. States had constitutional discretion 
regarding the hospital sector. This increased ownership pluralism, and in addition, 
all available capacity was needed to provide the necessary services as a result of the 
damage the war had done to the hospital infrastructure. However, the benefits of 
federalism to the for-profit hospital sector disappeared after the implementation 
of the HFA (1972). Private insurance increasingly replaced the self-pay markets 
for amenities and higher-end services. Proprietary facilities were the natural 
institutions for these kinds of high-end services; co-operation between private 
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insurers and private hospitals flourished. This brought a halt to the decline of the 
proprietary hospital sector.
UK
In the UK, stagnation went hand in hand with some growth in the independent 
hospital sector. The decline of UK proprietary care ended more or less with the 
introduction of the NHS. The creation of the NHS represented a watershed that, 
overnight, seemed to destroy the prospects of the proprietary hospital sector; 
indeed most of these hospitals went out of business. However, the NHS did not 
deliver the amenities and standard treatment by consultants that many of the 
upper-middle classes demanded. This market of self-pay patients was gradually 
replaced by private medical insurance. The viability of these insurance companies 
was tied to the existence of an independent hospital sector. They needed private 
hospital capacity and a complete reliance on NHS-pay beds may have been too 
great a political risk. Private insurers were even willing to (help) found new com-
mercially aware hospital groups (section 3.2.5). Thus, not only did the decline 
of independent hospital care end, it was actually replaced by a period of limited 
growth.
US
In the US, the stagnation in the decline of the proprietary hospital sector was 
clearly the least visible and least enduring (see table 2.4). The main reason for the 
leveling off in the decline of the proprietary sector was the establishment of em-
ployer-based health insurance coverage for workers. As employer-based insurance 
matured, Blue Cross plans were passed over by commercial indemnity insurers as 
the preferred option for health insurance. These insurers were more accommodat-
ing to proprietary hospitals; Blue Cross plans tended to prefer nonprofit hospital 
provision. In contrast to Germany, state responsibilities towards hospital planning 
did not favor the proprietary sector. State agencies which overviewed Hill-Burton 
funds sometimes, as in New York, enacted new regulations that forced proprietary 
facilities to terminate their operations (section 2.2.3). The main reason for any 
leveling off in proprietary decline was much broader insurance cover, especially 
by commercial private indemnity insurers.
Conclusion
The transformation of self-pay markets into private insurance markets improved 
the prospects for proprietary hospitals. The increased strength of private insur-
ance helped to slow down the rate of decline among proprietary hospitals for a 
lengthy period before they resumed rapid growth. In fact, the stronger private 
insurers had an interest in the existence of proprietary care. Table 6.3 shows that 
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this interest was strongest in the UK, followed by Germany, but less obvious in 
the US. Indeed, in the UK, there was even a gradual increase in the size of the 
independent hospital sector; in Germany, the rise of private insurance implied a 
deceleration in the rate of decline followed by longer period of stability in the size 
of the sector; in the US, the prospects of the proprietary hospital sector were the 
most volatile among the three countries. However, in the US, new institutions that 
improved proprietary prospects arrived the earliest (see section 6.5.1).
6.4.2  Did changing institutional frameworks and physician interests 
pre-structure for-profit sectors?
The opportunity costs of for-profit hospital ownership had remained higher than 
those of their public and nonprofit counterparts for a long period. However, after 
World War II, the capital required by the latter could no longer be met as easily 
through up-front public payments or by philanthropic donations. Cheap labor by 
religious orders, another important voluntary source, declined rapidly; in Ger-
many, religious nurses cost up to seventy-five percent less than secular nurses. 
During the same period, the demand for hospital services increased.
How did countries deal with declining community sources and pressure on 
public budgets? These highly institutionalized responses differed. Countries with 
a high nonprofit hospital stake and a comparatively rapid decline in voluntary 
resources, such as the Netherlands and the UK, felt the pressure to act most keenly. 
Philanthropic sources in Germany and, especially, in the US declined more slowly. 
The decline of voluntary sources was also the first driver behind a gradual com-
mercial transformation of the nonprofit hospital sector (see section 1.2).
Changes in hospital funding, capital, and planning
Governments had to intervene to resolve the issue of rising hospital demand and 
declining voluntary resources. Since new welfare regimes were built to increase 
hospital access and coverage, these ‘solutions’ involved increasing (public) fund-
ing. New institutional configurations broadened the coverage of hospital services; 
increasingly, hospitals were publicly guaranteed access to capital sources; the 
increase of public funding for capital induced government involvement, most 
notably regarding hospital planning. What was the impact of these changes on the 
viability of the for-profit hospital sector? Table 6.4 shows that the chosen policies 
and institutional constraints differed between the four countries. Nevertheless in 
all countries, capital funds were used almost exclusively to support public and 
nonprofit hospitals.
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The Netherlands
The most important difference between the Netherlands and the other three 
countries was the country’s solution to the problem of reimbursing capital. In the 
Netherlands, this was tackled comparatively early; by the late 1950s the means of 
funding capital was fairly clear. Capital payments were based on actual annual 
costs without any reimbursements for equity and were included in the per diem 
rates on a case-by-case base. This represented an important entry barrier, since 
for-profit clinics had no access to regular funding. Private indemnity insurance 
and self-pay patients became an integral part of this system. Importantly, capital 
subsidies to hospitals were kept off the public balance sheets, and thus the risk of 
this investment being crowding out by other expenditure categories was limited. 
As a result, the need for investor capital was absent.
The US
US public and nonprofit hospitals could rely on Hill-Burton funds for their con-
struction activities. For-profit hospitals were not eligible for these capital funds, 
but were not excluded from other sources of reimbursement. Proprietary clinics 
were eligible for reimbursement from the growing commercial insurers, which 
often paid above costs. At both a federal and a local level, the Hill-Burton funds 
Table 6.4: Funding, planning, and capital (early 1960s)
Netherlands US Germany UK
Third-party 
funding
Main third-
party payers
Social/private 
insurance
Employer- 
based private 
insurance
Social/Private 
insurance
State
Scope of 
coverage
Broad Less broad Broad Universal
Hospital 
planning
Formal 
responsibilities
Central regula-
tions
Federal 
program
State regula-
tions
Central 
govern-
ment
Executive 
responsibilities
Decentralized State level State level Central
Access to 
(public) 
capital
Reimbursement By insurers 
once ‘passed 
through’
Upfront 
subsidies 
(federal/state)
Upfront 
subsidies by 
states
Upfront 
subsidies 
by govern-
ment
Eligibility Public/non-
profits
Public/non-
profits
Mainly 
focused on 
public and 
nonprofits
Public
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were constrained by other public budget categories. The way access to capital was 
secured, turned out to be less stable over time than was the case in the Netherlands.
Germany
German policies had to be pragmatic. The funding of the war-ravaged hospital 
sector posed a major challenge that put pressure on hospitals regardless of their 
type of ownership. Public and nonprofit owners were ‘forced’ to bear part of this 
burden. The states had major discretionary powers over the hospital sector due to 
the new federalist constitution. Federalism seems to have allowed for a pluralist 
hospital landscape. Additionally, the severity of the capacity shortages implied 
that for-profit hospitals may be tolerated in state funding programs. Although, 
like most other types of ownership, most for-profit hospitals were underfunded, 
they were able to capitalize to a certain extent on the much higher reimbursements 
from private indemnity insurers, which favored their amenities.
The UK
The most radical reform program took place in the UK. The NHS created a di-
chotomy between public hospitals and all other types of ownership. Apart from 
some rather sporadic commissioning, independent sector hospitals had no access 
to public funding. NHS hospitals operated with (semi) budgetary constraints. The 
stricter these constraints, the higher the demand tended to be from certain catego-
ries of richer patients for duplicate or supplementary for-profit hospital services 
and amenities. The viability of the independent sector depended on whether the 
NHS succeeded in delivering hospital services that met the standards of the better 
off.
Changing physician interests towards hospital types of ownership
Hospital access was important for physician incomes; as we have seen, this 
constitutes one explanation for the founding of proprietary hospitals. Section 6.3 
analyzes how the four countries dealt with physician access to hospitals, which in 
general reduced the need for proprietary hospitals. However, the resulting ‘solu-
tions’ did not end the interest of physicians in hospital employment conditions. 
The importance of the problem of absence of hospital access eased, but now direct 
physician incomes became more important in decisions on the provision of their 
services.
Salaried physicians are confronted with greater limitations on their incomes 
than self-employed doctors. Section 6.3.2 stipulates that most physicians preferred 
self-employed status in ‘open’ nonprofit hospitals, not the least because of the ef-
fect on their income. It is important to note that self-employed physicians are also 
better able to capitalize on their productivity gains than salaried physicians. Table 
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6.5 shows that high physician remuneration in nonprofit hospitals continued into 
the early 1960s. Since keeping their physicians ‘happy’ is often part of the for-profit 
business model, proprietary hospitals are more able to attract doctors than public 
hospitals who pay lower physician remuneration. The trade off between working 
in public hospitals versus working in for-profit hospitals may have led doctors to 
seek additional income in the private sector. The existing data in this research do 
indeed validate this notion.
In the UK, salaried consultants were allowed to treat private patients in NHS 
pay-beds or in independent sector hospitals. The interests of consultants were 
thus aligned with the independent sector, not because of better hospital access, but 
because of a generous supplementary source of income. In both Germany and the 
US, too, public and for-profit hospitals operated in the same geographical areas. 
Regions with a large share of nonprofit hospitals have fewer proprietary facilities. 
The fact that physicians could earn significantly higher reimbursements in for-
profit hospitals compared to public facilities may explain the growing willingness 
of physicians to work in such institutions.
Table 6.5 illustrates that, over time, for-profit hospitals also pay the high level 
of physician reimbursements of the nonprofit providers17. Such trends exist in all 
three countries with a for-profit sector. However, improvements in physician re-
muneration still had to be traded off against the risk of proprietary ownership. The 
outcome of this trade-off may still have been negative to most physicians. There 
seems to be one clear exception to this. If an incorporated company took over 
the risk of insolvency and business volatility, many more physicians may favor 
(working in) for-profit hospitals.
Table 6.5: Physician employment status, hospital access, and income levels (early 1960s)
UK Germany Netherlands US
Dominant 
employment status
Salaried Salaried Self-employed Self-employed
Regular hospital 
access
Closed staff Closed staff Closed staff Open staff
Highest physician 
payments (early 
1960s)
Independent 
sector hospitals
Nonprofit 
hospitals
Nonprofit 
hospitals
Nonprofit 
hospitals
Highest physi-
cian payments 
(current)
Independent 
sector hospitals
For-profit 
hospitals
Nonprofit 
hospitals
For-profit 
hospitals
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Conclusion
Why was strong for-profit hospital growth able to emerge after such a long-term 
decline in proprietary hospitals? The underlying factors that had stimulated non-
profit and public ownership – better access to capital and voluntary sources and 
the value of physician privileges to their facilities – had already weakened even 
before rapid for-profit growth began to resume. This implied a relative decrease 
in the production costs of proprietary and for-profit hospitals. The reimburse-
ment levels of third-party payers increased to the level of the actual costs, which 
enhanced profit margins.
However, whether these underlying forces would really come to the fore 
depended to a large extent on new regulations and institutions. Governments 
stepped in to ensure the increasing demand for capital and funding of the public 
and nonprofit sectors was met. The conditions attached to the access to new public 
sources of capital that often excluded for-profits were particularly important. The 
robustness and endurance of such institutions had a strong impact on the pros-
pects of further for-profit growth. The solutions of the Netherlands turned out to 
be the most robust in prohibiting for-profit entrance; US and German institutions 
were less stable, which eventually turned out to be very important in encouraging 
rapid for-profit growth.
Regarding physician incentives, the focus on hospital access (indirect source of 
income) had been replaced by a focus on more direct sources of remuneration. 
UK independent sector payments soon came to form a significant share of the 
remuneration of NHS consultants. In the other countries, salaried physicians in 
public hospitals were also attracted to higher remuneration from for-profit provid-
ers; in the Netherlands, many public hospitals converted to nonprofit ownership. 
In the US and Germany, the underlying erosion of nonprofit competitiveness also 
gradually put pressure on their ability to pay their physicians the best remuneration 
packages. Note that this also undermined a continuing growth of the nonprofit 
hospital as a physician’s cooperative (see section 1.3.2).
6.4.3 Did proprietary hospitals pre-structure a for-profit sector?
The new for-profit hospital chains were able to grow by building new facilities or 
acquiring other hospitals. Existing proprietary hospitals were logical first targets 
for acquisition. There were often fewer political, legal, and other barriers to for-
profit chains acquiring a (stand-alone) proprietary hospital, while the patrons of 
public and nonprofit hospitals could fiercely resist a for-profit acquisition. The 
larger scale and greater asset-specificity of public and nonprofit hospitals, as well 
as their radically different governance structures, created additional investment 
risks. At the same time, as I have argued, proprietary hospitals experienced seri-
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ous constraints from their inception. However, proprietary hospitals often lacked 
good exit options18 and the emergence of for-profit chains therefore provided an 
opportunity for struggling proprietary hospitals to exit under reasonable terms. 
Nevertheless, table 6.6 shows that when for-profit chains entered the scene, the 
available targets for acquisitions differed in importance among the three countries 
included in this study.
Table 6.6: Conditions to for-profit growth (during initial growth of for-profit sector)
UK
(Late 1970s)
US
(Early 1970s)
Germany
(Early 1990s)
Conditions for new construction Available Available Tied to acquisition
Conditions for proprietary acquisitions Few available Available Available
Conditions for public acquisitions None Few available Available
Conditions for nonprofit acquisitions Available Few available Few available
The initial growth of the US for-profit chains depended on the acquisition of 
(financially troubled) proprietary hospitals, as well as the construction of new 
hospitals. When for-profit hospital chains were formed, the US had the largest 
proprietary sector; due to exceptionally good reimbursement of capital invest-
ments, new hospital construction was also possible. Other types of ownership 
were far less involved in mergers and acquisitions until the 1980s. In the US, the 
existence of a proprietary hospital sector clearly pre-structured the growth of for-
profit hospital chains.
UK for-profit hospital chains were dependent on the construction of new 
hospitals, as well as acquisitions from the independent hospital sector. However, 
at the time when for-profit hospital groups were formed, the independent sector 
consisted mainly of nonprofit hospitals. Nevertheless, we must note that most of 
these nonprofit hospitals had a much more commercial orientation due to the 
dichotomy between the NHS and the independent sector. Initially, this meant that 
for-profit groups acquired nonprofit hospitals or built new for-profit facilities. The 
significance of proprietary hospitals in the pre-structuring of a for-profit sector 
was limited. Independent nonprofit hospitals in the UK depended largely on trad-
ing activities and thus, in effect, resembled a proprietary sector.
In Germany, proprietary hospitals were available for acquisition, although this 
sector was smaller than was the case in the US. German proprietary hospitals 
were less in need of exit options, due to their specific business model; however, for 
the same reason, they were also less attractive to the emerging for-profit hospital 
groups. Most proprietary hospitals operated according to niche models and were 
not included in planning regulations19. The prospects for further growth in these 
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niche models were limited. Although such hospitals were available for acquisition 
by for-profit groups, this was less lucrative than the acquisition of public hospitals 
that were included in the state hospital plans and whose assets could be acquired 
on much more favorable terms. Once such public hospitals were acquired, there 
were also good opportunities for large construction projects to upgrade the 
acquired facility. The practical significance of German proprietary hospitals in 
pre-structuring a for-profit sector was limited.
Conclusion
In countries with a still significant proprietary hospital sector, these hospitals were 
able to pre-structure the growth of for-profit hospitals. Generally, the transaction 
costs of acquiring proprietary hospitals can be considered less than those of their 
public and nonprofit counterparts. This section shows that, of the three countries, 
this was only the case in the US. To a certain extent, this proposition might also be 
validated in the UK – if, that is, one takes into account the fact that UK nonprofit 
hospitals were more commercially oriented and thus bore a greater resemblance 
to proprietary ownership. The German case gives no support to this proposition.
6.5 Strong for-profit hospital growth
Figure 6.1 shows the strong increase in the market share of the for-profit hospital 
sectors during recent decades. The share of US for-profit hospital beds has more 
than doubled since the 1970s. In the UK, the independent sector grew strongly 
from the 1980s until the mid 1990s; UK for-profit groups increased their market 
share within the total independent sector from the mid 1970s onwards. Germany 
saw the steepest increase in for-profit hospital beds and has recently passed the US 
in terms of the share of for-profit beds. In Germany, the market share of for-profit 
hospitals increased to four times that of the late 1980s, for-profit intensive care 
units have increased even faster.
The goal of this section is to analyze the specific reasons behind such rapid 
growth and put them in a comparative perspective: 1) Why did such a turnaround 
occur and at such different points in time in these countries? 2) Why, and to what 
extent, could the for-profit hospital sector converge to the scale and scope of other 
types of ownership? 3.) What has led to interruption of rapid for-profit growth?
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6.5.1  Why did the turnaround in the for-profit sectors occur at different 
points in time?
The timing of strong for-profit hospital growth differs between the four countries. 
Rapid growth started in the 1970s (US), the 1980s (UK), and the 1990s (Germany). 
Changes in country-specific institutions were important in the timing of these for-
profit hospital take-offs. The different case studies explain that ‘sudden’ changes 
in for-profit constraints were largely driven by policy changes. What drove these 
policy changes? Section 6.4.2 illustrates that governments had to solve the growing 
need for funding and capital among public and nonprofit hospitals.
Funding, capital reimbursement, and hospital planning had to be developed 
anew (see table 6.4), and this was the basis for new institutional configurations. 
It turned out that adjustments in the configurations would be crucial in the rapid 
growth of the for-profit hospital sector in the three countries. Table 6.7 illustrates 
the impact of the institutional arrangements on the start of for-profit hospital 
growth. In this section, the specific relevance of these changes is analyzed for each 
of the studied countries. I then look at the question of whether there is any com-
mon ground in these different institutional changes.
Table 6.7: Institutional changes and their effect on strong for-profit hospital growth
Funding Capital reimbursement Planning regulations
US Positive Positive Neutral
UK Positive Neutral Positive
Germany Neutral Positive Positive
Netherlands Negative Negative Negative
The US
US for-profit hospital care was the first to experience rapid growth among these 
countries. This can be explained by the comparatively late arrival of public pro-
grams to fund hospital care. In contrast to the other countries, such programs 
were built upon the reimbursement mechanisms of the existing private indem-
nity insurers, which also administered these programs. Medicare and Medicaid 
increased hospital funding enormously through large infusions of new money. 
The execution of these programs was based on practices in the private insurance 
system that was already established20; type of ownership made no difference for 
reimbursement that took place on a fee-for-service basis. At the time, this was 
the only way of implementing Medicare and Medicaid and honoring Lyndon 
Johnson’s 1964 election promises before the next general elections.
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The terms of Medicare were very generous to for-profit hospitals. For-profit 
hospitals were allowed to calculate their Medicare reimbursements on a fee-for-
service basis, which included a profit margin on their invested capital without 
any risk. Neither nonprofit hospitals, nor public hospitals were entitled to such 
a guaranteed return on their investment. As a logical consequence of Medicare 
reimbursement for capital, the Hill-Burton program was gradually phased out. 
Together with the lasting decline of philanthropic donations, this implied a radical 
change in capital constraints among the different types of ownership. The competi-
tive advantage of nonprofit and public hospitals came to and end. The for-profit 
hospital sector not only gained access to public capital, they also got the most 
generous conditions. This brought about a very profitable business model for the 
for-profit sector.
The UK
The UK independent hospital sector functioned both as a supplement to and a 
substitute for the NHS. During the mid and late 1970s, the constraints placed 
on the independent sector by planning regulations paved the way for a for-profit 
hospital sector. Such an intervention was incompatible with the system’s two-tier 
logic, which depended on certain implicit links between both sectors: the impact 
on remuneration for NHS consultants and the demand for (independent) hospital 
capacity from private insurers. The government’s policies united NHS consultants, 
private insurers, and the independent hospital sector.
New for-profit providers were able to fill the gap left by the declining level of 
private treatment in the NHS. Due to their access to equity capital, these new 
for-profit hospital groups were more responsive to the opportunities for growth 
than independent nonprofit hospitals. This became apparent in the first half of 
the 1980s. The UK was a frontrunner in the movement towards the retrenchment 
of the welfare state. It is no coincidence that the rapid growth of the independent 
hospital sector began at about the same time. Cuts in NHS services fit very well 
Table 6.8: Differences in acquisitions and scope of for-profit activities22
Acquisitions For-profits: aver-
age bed capacity 
versus other types.
Scope: ratio of total for-
profit costs versus total 
for-profit bed capacity
For-
profit
Non-
profit Public
UK ++ ++ n/a 0.09 1.2
US ++ ++ + 0.76 0.7
Germany + + ++ 0.43 0.7–1.123
The Netherlands n/a ++ n/a n/a n/a
206
For-profit Hospitals
with the business model of the for-profits, which sought to meet the demand for 
hospital services among those able to pay for them.
The other side of the retrenchment agenda was a stimulation of the private 
market forces. Subscribing to private medical insurance became more attractive 
through new tax-benefits. NHS consultants were enticed into supplementing their 
limited salaries with additional private work21. There was no direct institutional 
framework to steer the independent sector, but changes in NHS constraints as 
well as the growth in private medical insurance led to improved prospects of the 
for-profit hospital sector and it was able to grow rapidly.
Germany
The biggest for-profit hospital boom began in Germany during the early 1990s. 
Since 1972, the Hospital Finance Act had curbed for-profit growth fairly effectively. 
For-profit hospitals were kept more or less out of the mainstream service delivery 
system. However, these capital institutions proved unable to endure over the long 
term. There were no incentives to limit the demand for capital. The practical ability 
to invest in hospital construction depended on fiscal constraints imposed by the 
state and local governments, who faced a high demand for capital. These fiscal 
constraints gradually increased over time, bringing about a need for investor capi-
tal. The shortage of capital was the most urgent among public providers, which 
were completely dependent on public subsidies and had hardly any access to other 
sources of funding (retained earnings). Ultimately, this made them vulnerable to 
acquisition by the for-profit sector.
In the early 1990s, German reunification proved to be the watershed of rapid 
growth among for-profit hospitals. In Germany’s new eastern states, dominated by 
right-wing governments and supported by the federal authorities, the privatiza-
tion of public hospitals assets was a priority. It was only for-profit hospital groups, 
which were able to respond to this new policy environment, and which were able 
to access the required equity and acquire a share of the privatized hospital sector 
in the Eastern states. In these new states, for-profits were included in the state 
hospital plans. They gained access to public hospital assets as well as public capital 
subsidies on very generous terms.
In contrast to the old states, large amounts of public capital were generated to 
rebuild and strengthen the outdated infrastructure of the new states. Because of this 
additional public funding, the Eastern states passed Westerns states in their total level 
of investment per hospital bed (see table 4.9). Rapid for-profit growth also spread 
to the Western states, although for different reasons. Increasing fiscal constraints on 
state and local authorities, partly as a consequence of the solidarity payments to the 
new states, as well as the amendments to the (state) hospital law(s) to support a more 
pluralist hospital landscape stimulated the process of privatization.
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The Netherlands
Table 6.7 shows that constraints on for-profit hospital development were at their 
strongest in the Netherlands. The mix of hospital funding, capital reimbursement 
structures, and hospital planning regulations together effectively scuppered the 
prospects of for-profit hospital ownership. By implication, the institutional frame-
work as a whole would have to be altered if the entry of for-profit hospitals had 
been permitted. After the 2006 reforms, two for-profit companies were allowed 
to buy two hospitals in financial difficulty, but only provided that they would not 
distribute any profits. Planning regulations have become more flexible, but still 
prohibit for-profit hospitals; reimbursements structures are gradually being altered 
to prospective payment models, which are better suited to for-profit ownership 
than global budgets.
Conclusion
The reimbursement of and access to capital are crucial in explaining the rapid 
for-profit hospital growth in Germany and the US. The relationship is less straight-
forward in the UK; there, the impact of the dichotomy between the NHS and the 
independent hospital sector dominates for-profit viability. Funding and planning 
regulations, especially when linked to capital reimbursements, are also important. 
In the different countries, time lags between rapid for-profit hospital growth exist 
because of the political nature of reforming these institutions and because of the 
fact that the viability of for-profit hospitals was not central to these reforms.
The institutional changes mentioned above were primarily rooted in and 
shaped by larger political issues: 1) in the US, the politics of coverage benefits 
meant that Medicare had to be modeled on private insurance plans; 2) in the UK, 
an ideological retrenchment of the welfare state corresponded with the specific 
business model of the for-profit hospital sector; 3) in Germany, fiscal restraints 
and the ‘sudden’ change in the political direction in the new states created new 
opportunities for for-profit hospitals, based on the privatization of public facilities; 
4) the Dutch model of implementing managed competition gradually increased 
risk, putting pressure on less well-managed hospitals; in other words, the rationale 
behind for-profit ownership increased.
These institutional changes took place in different phases of welfare state 
development: US for-profit hospitals capitalized on the implementation of large-
scale welfare state programs; UK for-profit hospitals capitalized on welfare state 
retrenchment policies; German for-profit hospitals capitalized on their inclusion 
in the hospital system as a ‘solution’ to inefficient public provision and a lack of 
access to capital by these providers; and in the Netherlands, a potentially larger 
role for the for-profit sector seems consistent with reforms that seek to improve 
efficiency. This shows that when institutional constraints are favorable, for-profit 
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hospital sectors have been able to expand in a variety of political environments 
and during different stages of welfare state development.
6.5.2  Did for-profit hospitals have similar business models in the countries 
studied?
In many respects, the transformation processes of the for-profit hospital sectors 
in these countries have seemed to resemble one another. For-profit chains have 
replaced stand-alone proprietary hospitals as the dominant type of ownership in 
the for-profit sector. The major characteristics of such hospital chains are fairly 
similar. 1) They have a clear focus on investment returns. 2) Although the average 
number of beds in for-profit facilities remained below their public and nonprofit 
counterparts, they substantially increased the scale of their operations. 3) In con-
trast to other types of ownership, for-profit hospital chains created networks that 
operated on a national scale. 4) The business model of the for-profit chains often 
proved unviable outside their national borders. The management of country-spe-
cific political, regulatory, and professional risks necessitated a business model that 
was tailored on a country-by-country basis and was associated with substantial 
transaction costs. 5) Consolidation within the for-profit hospital sector has been 
significant and a few companies came to dominate the for-profit hospital sector 
over a short span of time. 6) Generally speaking, for-profit hospital chains grew 
through acquisitions instead of new construction activities.
Why is this picture so similar across the three countries in this study? Rapid 
for-profit growth was triggered by the opportunity to obtain healthy investment 
returns for the first time. It was possible to place capital returns at the front of 
the business model. The primary reason underlying the existence of proprietary 
hospital care – physician access to and formal control of hospitals – took a back 
seat.
Strategies to obtain capital returns are determined by the nature of hospital 
operations. High fixed-costs imply inherent entrance and exit barriers. Hospitals 
that operate on a larger scale are more attractive to physicians, who demand a 
broad range of sophisticated technological facilities. Scale also provided important 
advantages to individual hospital companies. It enhanced the bargaining power 
versus third-party payers and subcontractors. It often implied better access to 
capital on more favorable terms. Better access to specific and valuable knowledge 
about how to handle the complex billing routines in a way that favors the hospi-
tal company was essential. This not only reduced administration costs but also 
facilitated profitable up-coding strategies. Finally, hospital chains can often save 
on overhead costs such as controlling, auditing, human resources and the like, by 
centralizing them.
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Increases in for-profit scale are also the result of acquiring larger public and 
nonprofit hospitals. For-profit hospitals chains prefer acquisitions to the construc-
tion of entirely new plant. Goodwill is of essential importance in hospital care, 
especially among larger facilities where asset-specificity most increases investment 
risks. However, hospital chains often encounter less risk if they acquire the neces-
sary goodwill through public and nonprofit bailouts.
Differences between the for-profit hospital sectors of the countries studied
Table 6.8 shows that there are also certain important differences between the for-
profit hospital sectors in the countries in this study. The main acquisition targets 
of the for-profit chains are not exactly the same. In all countries, for-profit chains 
routinely acquire or merge with other for-profit hospitals. However, UK and US 
for-profits have mainly acquired nonprofit facilities, while German for-profit 
hospital groups have primarily acquired public hospitals.
How can the different for-profit acquisition strategies across countries be ex-
plained? In the UK, the dichotomy between the NHS and the independent hospital 
sector prohibits for-profits from acquiring public hospitals. Public hospitals are 
also the least acquired among US for-profit chains. As a result of their location in 
city centers and their tradition of serving the poor, many public hospitals have high 
levels of uncompensated care. In Germany, public hospitals are more vulnerable 
to acquisition than nonprofits. They lack access to necessary capital, experience 
the most fiscal pressure, and, in contrast to both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals, 
employ their physicians on lower salaries. For-profits can add value through their 
better access to capital and the fact that they can offer physicians a substantially 
higher level of income.
Table 6.8 illustrates that the relative scale and scope of for-profit operations differs 
between the countries. In all countries, average for-profit bed capacity is (much) 
lower than of their nonprofit and public counterparts. This difference is by far the 
most pronounced in the UK, which indicates the supplementary function the for-
profits have in relation to the NHS for the rather small section of the population 
with access to private medical insurance. The average number of for-profit hospital 
beds is the most similar to the other types of ownership in the US. This is the 
result of a long-term trend of converging scales (see also figure 2.1). However, high 
chances of bad debt, competition from ASCs, below-cost reimbursement, and stiff 
negotiations by managed care organizations do not permit their entry into every 
segment of the market; for-profit hospital chains focus on medium-scale com-
munity hospitals. The increase in scale is much larger among German for-profit 
hospitals. Here, as explained briefly, for-profit maximum care hospitals are more 
common alongside many smaller for-profit hospitals.
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With the exception of the UK and certain German states, the share of for-profit 
hospital costs is lower than their share of hospital beds. A ratio of less than 1.0 is 
no surprise since the case studies have shown that for-profit hospitals generally 
focus on a less complex patient base. Higher ratios point towards a more complex 
patient-mix, as is the case in certain Eastern German states, or towards more inef-
ficiency, as in the UK for example. The UK independent sector focuses exclusively 
on elective care, amenities, and high physician remuneration, and it operates in a 
low-volume environment with high logistic costs; the relatively high cost ratio of 
for-profit versus NHS beds thus reveals inefficiencies and a focus on niche markets 
for those willing to pay. In Germany, the scope of the for-profit hospital sector 
differs across the country. In Western Germany, the for-profit sector has histori-
cally operated on a small scale and focused on specialized elective treatments and 
less-complex general acute care. In the new states, for-profit hospitals operate on 
a similar scale and scope to the other types. They have access to all sources of 
reimbursement, often on better terms than other types of ownership. It is the only 
region in this study where the scope of the hospital activities has converged among 
the various types of ownership.
Conclusion
Why are the different for-profit hospital sectors similar on certain aspects, while 
there are also significant differences? The trend towards for-profit hospital chains 
that has followed a broadly similar course in the different countries is best ex-
plained by the disciplining forces of seeking (and needing) a return on investment 
as well as the specific characteristics of the hospital market. Due to the fact that 
hospitals have high fixed-costs, consolidation is the obvious strategy to bring 
about additional efficiencies of scale. Nevertheless, there have been country-
specific differences in this consolidation process. These are the preferred targets 
for acquisition (in terms of their ownership type), and the scale and scope of the 
different for-profit hospital sectors. These differences can be explained by the spe-
cific institutional characteristics in the various countries, as well as the operational 
fit between for-profit hospitals and the other types of ownership.
6.5.3 What has caused the interruption in rapid for-profit growth?
In the UK, the share of the independent hospital sector peaked during the late 
1990s and a new impulse has not yet returned (figure 6.1). The continuation of US 
for-profit growth was interrupted for short periods in the late 1980s and again in 
the late 1990s. This section, which is based mainly on evidence from the UK and 
US, addresses the reasons behind these interruptions of rapid for-profit growth. 
Which specific constraints have caused slow-downs in the growth of for-profit 
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hospitals? What strategies have for-profits used to bypass such constraints? Have 
these been successful?
The UK
The relative growth of the independent hospital sector stagnated in the late 1990s. 
New Labour’s agenda focused on improving the NHS quality, reducing waiting 
lists, and increasing responsiveness to patients’ concerns. NHS funds were mas-
sively increased to accomplish these goals. Waiting lists were reduced and patients 
got more choice about where they underwent treatment. Physicians received 
significant salary increases; they could earn additional income by joining medical 
compliance programs. This reduced the attractiveness to physicians of working in 
the independent sector. Investment programs upgraded the appearance of NHS 
facilities.
Chapter 3 concluded that improving NHS performance represents a fundamen-
tal threat to the independent hospital sector that depends on the willingness of 
people to bypass the NHS and pay for such services themselves. However, the 
independent sector was allowed to gain a share of NHS business if they fit certain 
conditions. Among other requirements, charges needed to be brought more into 
line with NHS reimbursements, implying a drastically lower cost basis. Figure 6.1 
suggests that the for-profit hospitals are struggling with these challenges.
The US
US for-profit hospital growth experienced interruptions in the late 1980s and again 
in the late 1990s. In the mid 1980s, Medicare introduced prospective payment as 
well as significant reductions in the generous for-profit capital reimbursements. In 
the 1990s, prospective capital payments created a level playing field: now nonprofit 
and public hospitals received the same capital reimbursements as for-profits24. 
Since 1987, patients in need of emergency care and complex medical treatment 
could no longer be denied treatment. This increased for-profit exposure to the risk 
of bad debt. These factors caused a temporary dip in further for-profit hospital 
growth (section 2.2.7).
During the 1990s growing managed care penetration put the entire hospital sector 
under pressure. For-profits relied more on fee-for-service reimbursement to fund 
for comparatively high volumes of elective treatments and all kinds of additional 
services. They were somewhat more vulnerable to managed care strategies. More 
importantly still, in 1997, Medicare payment cuts under the Balanced Budget Act 
brought the sector to a more or less complete budgetary standstill for three years. 
New physician-owned specialty hospitals and ambulatory surgery centers focused 
on the more profitable patients. Such facilities could greatly enhance physician 
income. Physicians could fund them internally; they also had good access to other 
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sources of capital since these enterprises were inherently very profitable. Many 
such companies located in the same states as the for-profit hospitals, putting a 
strong constraint on the growth of for-profit hospitals.
Bypassing constraints: diversification and lobbying
The for-profit hospital sectors responded to increasing constraints with a range of 
strategies: diversification into other market segments, mergers and acquisitions, 
terminating unprofitable services, and lobbying to influence political decisions. 
These efforts had mixed success. US for-profit hospitals that diversified into insur-
ance or outpatient treatment were not very successful. Such services competed 
with hospital care in a zero-sum game for the profit margins. Both US and UK 
for-profits had some success in diversifying into specialty care sectors, most nota-
bly acute mental health. However, government cost containment policies, such as 
the implementation of prospective payment schemes, eventually spread to these 
segments also. In the UK, the independent hospital sector tried to share in the 
growing resources of the NHS. However, the terms were not generous.
In hospital care, political lobbying can be a successful strategy in overcoming 
important constraints. With the support of others, the US for-profit hospital sector 
scored some points: 1) the ‘whole hospital’ exemption from self-referral prohibi-
tions in the Stark laws; 2) a moratorium on specialty hospitals; 3) the reversal of 
many of the cost-containment measures in the Balanced Budget Act; 4) ensuring 
that the appropriateness of nonprofit tax-benefits was on the political agenda; 5) 
successful efforts to orchestrate a backlash among managed care subscription and 
raise hospital reimbursement rates25.
Conclusion
Government policies in the UK and the US led for-profit hospitals to adjust their 
business model. This was especially detrimental to for-profit growth if such adjust-
ments pressured for-profits to lower their cost base. UK for-profits are increasingly 
exposed to the expansion of NHS-funded care. They have had to adjust their busi-
ness model, which had focused on delivering supplementary medical services, 
towards one of being a subcontractor of NHS services, a major adjustment. In the 
US, increasing for-profit exposure to stiffer government reimbursements, more 
managed care organizations, and physician-owned providers forced them to lower 
costs or lose profits. Over time, the pressure of government policies and managed 
care organizations eased, but not that from physician-owned providers. The for-
profit hospital sector organized an effective lobby to ease regulatory constraints. 
Nevertheless, this required the support of other stakeholders (physicians, insurers, 
other types of ownership) to adjust the relevant institutions in their favor.
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6.6 Key determinants in the development of for-profit hospitals
6.6.1 A hierarchy of determinants
This section seeks to develop an analytical hierarchy among the most important 
determinants of the development of a for-profit hospital sector (see table 6.9). The 
study has shown that a prosperous for-profit hospital sector does have a couple 
of important determinants. There is the straightforward premise that, to prosper, 
these facilities should be able to generate a profitable return on the capital invested. 
This return on capital should be able to grow, or at least remain steady, over longer 
time periods. Growing returns on capital attracts the entry of profit-oriented 
hospitals. To guarantee a for-profit hospitals’ continuity, its capital returns at least 
need to account for amortization and appreciation of its assets. This study has 
shown that this is not always possible.
As a matter of fact, the existence of proprietary hospital sectors can be better 
explained by their direct utility for physicians who needed access to hospitals to 
earn an income. This implies that physician interests are often a major determinant 
of hospital ownership types. Indeed, physicians are a strong force in the hospital 
sector, with effective control of many day-to-day activities. If for-profit hospitals 
cannot align their interests with the doctors that work in their facilities, investment 
risks might be excessively high. The potential to steer or direct physicians limits 
the actual governance modes of for-profit hospitals. It explains why physicians 
often have a stake in hospital equity or why hospitals try to keep their physicians 
happy as a way of gathering patient referrals.
Which factors lead to positive returns on investment and thus are important 
in for-profit hospital care? This study shows that over time, many factors have 
stimulated or limited such returns: the level of private insurance, willingness to 
pay among the well-off, the availability of cheap labor from religious orders, tax 
policies, reimbursement possibilities, the opportunities for cherry-picking and the 
impact of technological innovations. However, conditions that determine access 
to and the price of capital have been shown to be important in all the case studies.
Table 6.9: The importance of various determinants of for-profit hospital development
Access to capital Physician income Ownership 
regulations
Exposure to 
 competition
UK + +++ −− ++
Netherlands −−− − −−− −−−
US +++ ++ − +
Germany +++ ++ + +
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Access to capital
From the point of view of public and nonprofit hospitals, capital was both free 
and available during much of the first half of the twentieth century. It was paid 
upfront on the basis of need by public authorities or philanthropic sources. Since 
proprietary hospitals had no access to these means, they had a lasting structural 
competitive disadvantage. Although they were subject to few formal constraints, 
most proprietary hospitals could not obtain a decent return on investment. After 
World War II, the relative price of and access to capital sources gradually became 
less favorable for nonprofit and public hospitals. The up-front provision of free 
capital from governments and philanthropic organizations came under pressure 
and could not cover the growing demand for hospital services.
New institutions structured the price and access to hospital capital. The majority 
of such institutions still reserved capital sources for public and nonprofit ownership 
types. However, with the exception of in the Netherlands, these new institutions 
did not endure, gradually creating more discretionary room for for-profit hospi-
tals. For-profit hospital chains could, during specific periods, count on even more 
favorable capital reimbursement than other types of ownership (US, Germany). 
The capital advantage of for-profit hospitals increased over time because of struc-
tural pressures on public budgets that reduced the capital access of public hospitals 
(Germany). This study shows that access to and the reimbursement of capital are 
crucial in understanding the rapid growth of for-profit hospitals in Germany and 
the US or its late appearance in the Netherlands.
Physician income
I now turn to the relationship between hospital ownership and physician interests, 
most notably their income. Proprietary hospitals were a second-best alternative for 
physicians who lacked access to hospitals with other types of ownership. Invest-
ment returns were of secondary importance. Nonprofit hospitals gave physicians 
the best access to the highest earning potential, effective control over important 
decisions, and involved no investment risk. In other words, physicians preferred 
nonprofit hospitals over proprietary facilities. With the spread of physician access 
to nonprofit hospitals, the proprietary sector went into decline.
However, if nonprofit hospitals acted as physician cooperatives, how was the 
for-profit hospital sector able to gain in importance again? This study shows that 
the emerging for-profit hospital chains were able to pay their physicians the high-
est remuneration (other workers were often worse off). Higher physician income 
seems to be an important factor in the growth of the for-profit hospital sector. UK 
for-profit hospitals generated substantial additional income for NHS consultants. 
German for-profits paid higher wages an offered better financial incentives than 
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public hospitals, their main acquisition targets. US for-profit hospitals offered gen-
erous reimbursements and financial incentives to their self-employed physicians.
Ownership regulations
For-profit hospitals have often been exposed to restrictive ownership regulations. 
These regulatory restrictions have eased in recent decades. One reason for this 
is that they were often tied to the reimbursement of capital. Since capital is in-
creasingly reimbursed through prospective payments, the rationale for hospital 
planning agencies and certificate-of-need regulations is declining.
The two federalist countries in this study have allowed for the greatest variety 
among types of hospital ownership. Since jurisdiction over hospital planning 
regulations resides at state level, specific local peculiarities helped proprietary 
hospitals to continue operating in spite of severe constraints. Federalism permits 
a breeding ground for (political) experiments where formal for-profit constraints 
can be eased. For example, right-wing states in the US were the first to abandon 
or stop enforcing certificate-of-need policies. In Germany, the new governments 
of the Eastern states were eager to abandon the communist legacy of state owner-
ship. In unitary states, ownership decisions are much more centralized. In both 
the UK and the Netherlands, there is much less variety among types of ownership. 
Although, during the 1970s, UK efforts to curb for-profit ownership were coun-
terproductive, ownership regulation has been very effective in the Netherlands.
Exposure to competition
The changing competitive positions of the different types of hospital ownership 
have already been discussed thoroughly. In the UK, increases in NHS funding 
altered the for-profit business model. However, the hospital sector is also exposed 
to competition from other provider types. Technological progress has facilitated 
outpatient treatments or treatments in alternative, less capital-intensive surround-
ings. This could gradually alter hospitals’ monopoly on acute health care provision.
Physicians may become less dependent on hospital access. They may, once again, 
find it viable to found their own facilities, like ambulatory surgery centers and 
specialty hospitals. From a physician perspective, the financial rewards of such 
investments may be substantial. This could develop into a serious threat to the 
for-profit hospital sector, which builds part of their business on physicians seek-
ing high remunerations. In the US, exposure to such new forms of competition is 
more manifest than in the other countries. Especially in Germany, the traditional 
dichotomy between inpatient and outpatient care persists to a large extent.
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6.6.2 Summarizing the answers to the research questions
Three questions have guided this work. Four case studies have shown how for-
profit ownership has actually developed within the context of different Western 
health care systems (question 1). Access to and reimbursement of capital, together 
with physician interests matter most if one is seeking to understand the develop-
ment of for-profit hospital ownership over the long term. These factors are more 
important to for-profit development than ownership-related performance differ-
ences regarding efficiency, medical outcomes, or community benefits (question 
2). The different development paths of the for-profit hospital sector in Western 
countries are predominantly the result of how and when the institutions regarding 
capital and physician interests were shaped (question 3).
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1 It is notoriously difficult to cut health-care services due to political and public opposition; 
most efforts thus concentrate on increasing efficiency, for example by bringing the market 
in.
2 For a short overview: Tiemann and Schreyögg, 2009, p. 116–118.
3 Newhouse (1970), Feldstein (1971), Pauly and Redisch (1973) were among the first health 
economists to analyze the (severe) economic problems of nonprofit hospitals. During 
the 1980s and 1990s, many studies by Frank Sloan indicated that for-profit hospitals 
performed at least as well, or better than other types of providers. Kessler and McClellan 
(2002) studied the spill-over effects of for-profit ownership to other ownership types and 
suggested that for-profit ownership was superior if such spill-over effects were included.
4 The exchange between Arnold Relman and Uwe Reinhardt (1986, p. 209–223), published 
in the landmark study of the Institute of Medicine on for-profit health care, forms an 
instructive example of such reasoning.
5 Schlesinger and Gray, 2006, p. w289-w290.
6 Wörz compares and analyzes the results of eleven systematic meta-reviews on the level of 
their included studies. He studied 186 articles on the cost-efficiency of for-profits versus 
nonprofits (Wörz, 2007, p. 66–92).
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themes – such as the privatization or corporatization of health care – have received more 
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stands out in particular.
9 The work of Weisbrod (for example 1998) on nonprofit theory and development is well 
known. Simon (2000) describes the post-war history of German hospital politics. UK 
scholars such as Klein (1983) and Hunter (2008) concentrate on the NHS. Rosenberg 
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10 Feldstein, 1979, p. 186–188.
11 Anheier and Ben-ner (2003) edited an overview of theories and approaches on nonprofit 
ownership. Many scholars see nonprofits as more responsive towards public goals. This 
can be explained by specific nonprofit objectives such as a maximization of quantity and 
quality over profits (Newhouse, 1970) or external mechanisms like the non-distribution 
constraint (Hansmann, 1980). Pauly and Redisch (1973) suggest that physician cartels 
capture nonprofit hospitals in an effort to meet personal interests. Weisbrod (1975) stated 
that nonprofits are understandable as an alternative mechanism for providing public-type 
services. The more homogenous a society is, the more similar its citizens’ preferences, and 
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the smaller the need for nonprofit organizations. A preference of the nonprofit workforce 
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peted the three alternative models of corporate governance: the managerial model (the 
Netherlands), the labor-oriented model (Germany), and the state-oriented model (Japan).
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increased from 179 hospitals representing 19,912 beds in 1978 to 282 hospitals and 35,000 
beds in 1983 (Custer and Musacchio, 1986, p. 229).
175 Gray, 1986b, p. 26.
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Corporation
 Hospitals 493 51.0 255 25.6 −48.3
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 Beds 36,976 48.1 89,171 80.1 141.2
 Source: Mullner and Hadley, 1984, p. 145.
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180 Gray, 1986b, p. 28; Mullner and Hadley, 1984, p. 145.
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181 Table: Mean Realized Rates of Return by Industry
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197 Table: Decomposition of the Change in Nonprofit-to-For-Profit Average Size Ratio
Category 70–74 74–78 78–82 82–86 86–90 90–94 94–98
Stayers −0.8 −1.0 −3.3 −4.5 0.6 −0.3 −0.7
Exitors −7.2 −6.7 −4.0 −4.7 −5.7 −1.3 −1.4
Entrants −5.9 −2.3 0.5 0.8 −0.9 −1.2 −1.0
Switch into for-profit −1.0 −0.3 2.9 2.5 1.8 −1.6 −3.6
Switch from for-profit 0.1 −1.3 −0.8 −1.2 −3.1 −2.3 −1.0
Total −14.9 −11.6 −4.7 −7.1 −7.3 −6.7 −7.7
 Source: David, 2005:11
198 Figure: Average number of nonprofit versus for-profit beds in a single facility
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vor of for-profit ownership (Herzlinger, 1997; Lutz, 1993). These authors made it very clear 
were they stood. Weiss dedicated his book to: ‘those who have suffered or died as victims 
of a health system dedicated to maximum profit rather than universal access’ (Weiss, 1997, 
p. v).
207 Relman and Rheinhardt, 1986, 221, 223.
208 McNerney, 1986, p. ix.
209 Gray, 1986b, p. 4–11.
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This is not possible. 2.) The Committee thought that there were more pressing policy 
concerns than whether the advantages and disadvantages of for-profit and nonprofit own-
ership balanced each other. 3.) The Committee saw no particular reason why the goal of 
policy should be the equivalence in treatment by the government rather than a substantive 
goal such as to assure access to care and quality care (Gray, 1986b, p. 63).
211 In 1985 the Utah State Supreme Court – in a highly relevant case on the Intermountain 
Health System – denied property tax exemption to two nonprofit hospitals because of lack 
of evidence of community services (Sanders, 1995, p. 451).
212 Gray, 1986b, p. 65.
213 There was discussion about the nonprofit status of the Blues for a long time. Half the states 
refused to grant the plans tax-exempt status, while the IRS ruled early in their history that 
donations to the plans were not tax-deductible (Schlesinger, 1987, p. 431).
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215 Watt et. al., 1986b, p. 89.
216 Gaumer, 1986, p. 367.
217 Pattison, 1986, p. 290.
218 Coelen, 1986, p. 329.
219 The GAO concluded that: ‘proprietary (4.3%) and not-for-profit (4.7%) hospitals provide 
about the same level of uncompensated care, measured as a percent of total expenses, but 
that the public hospitals’ level (9.9%) is about twice that of other hospitals’ (GAO, 1986, p. 
46).
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222 Brock and Buchanan, 1986, p. 225.
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227 Table: For-profit hospitals, Beds, and Admissions
Hospitals Beds Admissions (in thousands)
1980 730  87,000 3,165
1985 805 104,000 3,242
1990 749 101,000 3,066
1995 752 106,000 3,428
2000 749 110,000 4,141
2002 766 108,000 4,365
 Source, Hospital Statistics, 2004
228 Hospital Statistics, 2004.
229 At hindsight some called this the end of the golden age era of hospital reimbursement 
(Gray, 1991, p. 37).
230 Gray, 1991, p. 40.
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231 Gray, 1991, p. 33.
232 A correct allocation of debt depends on an accurate determination of the value of the 
assets acquired. Section 203 of Medicare’s Provider Reimbursement Manual sets forth a 
method for determining the amount of debt that can be allocated for Medicare’s purposes 
to acquired assets when the purchase price exceeds the book value of the assets. Section 
203 requires that the allowable costs of the asset related to patient care can be subtracted 
from the purchasing price. The resulting amount (goodwill and asset value not related to 
patient care) is not recognizable for Medicare purposes (GAO, 1983, p. 19–20).
233 Specifically, different useful lives were used in appraising and depreciating the acquired 
assets; in computing depreciation, acquired assets were assumed to have no salvage value; 
and values were assigned to leased assets, which resulted in higher interest and deprecia-
tion expenses being claimed. In addition, the independence and accuracy of the appraisals 
were questionable because they were changed at HCA’s request (GAO, 1983, p. 26–27).
234 General Accounting Office, 1986b, p. 5.
235 Gray, 1991, p. 23–24.
236 Table: health spending by business as a percentage of pre-tax corporate profits and of total 
labor compensation,
Health costs as share of pretax 
profits
Health costs as share of total 
 compensation
1965  8.7 2.1
1970 20.2 3.2
1975 22.8 4.1
1980 28.7 5.2
1985 51.0 6.0
1987 48.7 6.2
 Source: Levit, Freeland and Waldo, 1989
237 Salmon, 1995, p. 24.
238 Frank and Salkever, 2000, p. 209.
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240 General Accounting Office, 1993b, p. 8.
241 Another important exception to the Stark provisions was the in-office ancillary exception, 
which allowed physicians to provide lab tests, imaging, and other services to their own 
patients as long as the laboratory or x-ray machine was directly supervised by the physi-
cian and physically located near the physicians office suite.
242 Gray, 1991, p. 24.
243 The Provider Reimbursement Review Boards was established in 1972 to give due process 
to providers who had objections to determinations of allowable costs for reimbursement 
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However, mostly nonprofit interest does dominate the AHA’s viewpoints.
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245 Table: PAC contributions to political candidates reported to the Federal Election Commis-
sion, by hospital sector ($)
1981–1982 1985–1986
For-profit
Universal Health Services 2,654
NME 29,460 81,150
Humana 3,800 8,300
Charter 9,570 10,450
AMI 3,000 53,500
HCA 8,150 35,034
National Ass. Private Psychiatric Hospitals 19,300 25,800
Federation American Health Systems 201,625 135,517
Nonprofit
Voluntary Hospitals of America 17,500
Mixed
American Hospital Association 182,925 279,896
 Source: Gray, 1991, p. 162
246 Gray, 1991, p. 42.
247 Table: decline in size of major investor-owned companies
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HCA 202 (1982) 82 78
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 Source: Gray, 1991, p. 43
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p. 126–127).
253 Hacker, 2004, p. 252.
254 CMS, 2003a; Bloche, 2006.
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declined as a result of a 1990 ruling by the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) 
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nies balance sheets (Blumenthal, 2006, p. 84).
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plus the full difference between the premiums of the low and high cost plans if they choose 
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would standardize the benefits to which all Americans would be entitled. (...) Employers 
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the average health plan premium, and to pay a payroll tax to cover their part-time and 
temporary employees’ (Robinson, 1999, p. 45).
260 Bloche, 2003, p. xiii.
261 Beaulieu, 2003, p. 42.
262 Cutler et. al., 2000.
263 Rosko, 2001, p. 449.
264 Dranove, 2000, p. 89–90.
265 Table: Health Plan Enrolment for Covered Workers by Plan Type
HMO POS PPO Indemnity
1988 16% 11% 73%
1993 21%  7% 26% 46%
1996 31% 14% 28% 27%
1998 27% 24% 35% 14%
2000 29% 22% 41%  8%
2002 26% 18% 52%  5%
 Source: CMS, 2003a, p. 10
266 Massachusetts leads this movement and tries to have universal coverage for the 550,000 
uninsured by 2007. The plan sees for strong incentives for smaller employers to offer health 
plans. Other states with universal health care laws or mandatory provider-posted pricing 
were California, Nevada, Maine, Vermont, Ohio, Illinois, Missouri, Minnesota, Kansas, 
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York and Rhode Island (PWC, 2006, p. 6).
267 Kaiser, Employer Health Benefits 2006 summary of findings.
268 Gray, 1986b, p. 64.
269 Watt et. al., 1986, p. 283.
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270 Table: Hospital Characteristics Associated With Lower and Higher Ratios of Capital to 
Operating Costs (excludes return on equity)
Government ownership 5.65%
Teaching Hospitals 5.68%
New England location 5.97%
National Average 6.89%
For-profit ownership 9.75%
 Source: GAO, August 1986, p. 37
271 In 1984 the overall occupancy rate of for-profit hospitals was 57.4%, against 71.4% for 
nonprofit hospitals, 64.6% for local government, and 71.9% for state hospital facilities 
(GAO, 1986, p. 31).
272 The average age of for-profit hospitals was 5.5 years in 1982 against 8.9 years for govern-
mental facilities, and 8.0 years for nonprofit facilities (GAO, 1986, p. 32).
273 Gentry and Frank, 2000, p. 321.
274 HHS was in favor of a rather short term (four years) to implement prospective capital 
reimbursement; the AHA wanted a much longer transition-period of fifteen years (GAO, 
1986, p. 14,15).
275 General Accounting Office, 1986, p. 23–24.
276 Hospital debt financing decreased from 48.1% in 1990 to 42% in 1997 (Cleverly, 1999, p. 
8).
277 Figure: Hospital Construction and Bed Capacity, 1960–2003 YTD
 CMS, 2003b, p. 23
278 The Lewin Group, 2004.
279 HMFA, 2006, p. 9.
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280 Table: Percentage of External Capital from various Sources
1997 2002
For-profit debt / equity 14% 13%
Tax-exempt bond issues 39% 54%
Bank loans 36%  7%
Philanthropy  5% 10%
Leasing  7% 16%
 Source: HMFA, 2003a, p.4
281 Bank loans dropped from $ 24.9 billion in 1997, to $ 3.8 billion in 2000 (CMS, 2002a, 
p. 23).
282 CMS, 2002a, p. 21, 23.
283 HMFA, 2004a, p. 9.
284 ‘Those who said that they would increase capital spending were overwhelmingly at non-
profit hospitals CFOs from for-profit hospitals were the only group in which the majority 
did not expect to increase capital spending by 15 percent or more. (…) This finding is 
substantiated by the nation’s largest for-profit chain, HCA. In 2003, HCA spent $ 2 bil-
lion on capital investments on existing hospitals, up from $ 1.7 billion the previous year. 
However, HCA is predicting decreases in capital investment in 2004 and 2005 (HMFA, 
2004b, p. 12).
285 In a leveraged buyout: ‘Large volumes of debt capital are deployed to buy out a firm’s pub-
licly traded stock, typically at a premium above the shares’ market price, and convert the 
firm to private for-profit ownership. Some of the debt is paid down through asset sales, but 
the acquired firm remains heavily leveraged and therefore is constrained to pay out free 
cash flows to bondholders rather than squandering them on conglomerate diversification 
or other forms of agency failure. The firm is controlled by a self-perpetuating board of 
directors, not subject to election or recall by shareholders but monitored by bond rating 
agencies and bond investors. The for-profit firm subject to a leveraged buyout comes to 
adopt a financial and governance structure similar to that of the nonprofit organization, in 
which nonelected, self-perpetuating directors wield authority under the watchful eyes of 
their tax-exempt bondholders’ (Robinson, 2000, p. 66).
286 HMFA, 2003a, p. 7; HMFA, 2004a, p. 5.
287 Oberlander, 2003, p. 14.
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288 Table: Historical Inpatient PPS Payment Updates
Fiscal Year Large Urban Other Urban Rural Market Basker 
Update
1988 1.50% 1.00% 3.00% 4.7%
1989 3.40% 2.90% 3.90% 5.4%
1990 5.62% 4.97% 9.72% 5.5%
1991 3.20% 3.20% 4.50% 5.2%
1992 2.80% 2.80% 3.80% 4.4%
1993 2.55% 2.55% 3.55% 4.1%
1994 1.80% 1.80% 3.30% 4.3%
1995 1.10% 1.10% 8.40% 3.6%
1996 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 3.5%
1997 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.5%
1998 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.7%
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2001 3.40% 3.40% 3.40% 3.4%
2002 2.75% 2.75% 2.75% 3.3%
2003 2.95% 2.95% 2.95% 3.5%
2004 (proposed) 3.50% 3.50% 3.50% 3.5%
 Source: CMS, 2002a, p. 6; CMS, 2003b, p. 10
289 Oberlander, 2003, p. 164.
290 However, in 2002 Medicare + Choice appeared to be a clear policy failure. Enrollments 
were declining with rapid speed (Oberlander, 2003, p. 194).
291 Silvers, 2001, p. 1026.
292 Rodengen, 2003, p. vi.
293 CMS, 2002a, p. 7.
294 Figure: Distribution of Inpatient versus Outpatient Revenues (1980–2002).
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295 The idea is that such referrals would produce little personal economic gain, because hospi-
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298 Goldsmith, 1998, p. 28.
299 Kuttner, 1996, p. 362.
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301 The General Accounting Office (2003) defines a specialty hospital as a facility in which the 
diagnoses of two thirds of its Medicare patients fell into no more than two major classifica-
tions according to the diagnosis-related group system, or those in which at least two thirds 
of its Medicare patients were classified into surgical DRGs.
302 HMFA, 2004b, p. 9.
303 Iglehart, 2005, p. 83.
304 Lynk and Longley, 2002; Bian and Morrisey, 2007.
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307 Iglehart, 2005, p. 78.
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310 Iglehart, 2005, p. 79.
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312 Stevens, 1999, p. 352.
313 Hansmann (1989) stipulates the withdrawal of the doctrine of charitable immunity from 
torts (1940); the passage of the unrelated business income tax (1950), which withdrew 
corporate income tax exemption from for-profit commercial activities by nonprofits; the 
elimination of state unemployment tax exemption (1970); the deletion by the National 
Labor Board of worthy cause exemptions that shielded nonprofits from federal labor law 
(1970–1976); the requirement that nonprofits should pay social security taxes (1983); the 
more aggressive application of antitrust laws (1980 onwards); and, after the Intermountain 
case (1985), specific fiscal community benefit requirements.
314 Kuttner, 1996, p. 365.
315 Nonprofit hospitals are exempted from federal and (mostly) state and local taxes if they 
meet certain tests, set by the IRS. Between 1956 and 1969, the test for tax-exempt status in-
cluded specific reference to providing (to the extent the hospital’s finances allowed) charity 
services to those not able to pay. Since 1969, the IRS has not required such care so long as 
the hospital provides benefits to the community in other ways. In 1983 it was decided that 
also hospitals that did not operate an emergency room could get a tax-exemption status 
(GAO), 1990, p. 2, 47).
316 Scholars raised issues of methodology; about the data (unaudited and self-reported by 
hospitals); and about ignorance of state-level differences (Gray, 1997b, p. 39). Most stud-
ies found evidence of a lack of community benefits by nonprofit hospitals if the value of 
exempt taxes was balanced against the total of paid taxes, distributed dividends and stock 
appreciations by for-profits (Young and Desai, 1999, p. 146–147). However, conversions 
from nonprofit, and especially public, hospitals towards for-profit status did lead to less 
uncompensated care: Thorpe found that uncompensated care as a percent of total hospital 
expenses were .6 percent lower in nonprofit hospitals that converted towards for-profit 
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ownership versus all nonprofit hospitals; uncompensated care was 2.7 percent lower in 
public hospitals that converted towards for-profit status (Thorpe et. al., 2000, p. 191).
317 $ 4.6 billion exemptions from income taxes; $ 1.7 billion property exemptions; $ 1.1 billion 
tax-benefits for donors; and, $ 0.4 benefits related to tax-exempt bonds. Bloche states that 
the ability to pay tax-free interest on borrowed funds is of more importance than the shield-
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318 Gentry and Penrod, 2000, p. 286–287.
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of the uninsured seeking improved availability of services, and for-profits seeking 
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the notion that the resource allocation decisions of nonprofit organizations are properly 
set by government is antithetical to the idea that the third sector’s role is to contribute 
something that is distinct from that of government’ (Gray, 1998, p. 311). More specifi-
cally, Gray thought that the social benefits of nonprofits lay not only in the provision of 
community benefits, but also in regulatory benefits and trustworthiness (Gray, 1997b, p. 
36–38). Still others were concerned about the possible damage to pre-existing professional 
linkages between physicians and institutions (Gurewich et. al., 2003, p. 554).
320 For-profit community benefits focus on uncompensated care, a biased figure since it con-
stitutes up to eighty percent ‘ordinary’ bad debt (Josephson, 1997, p. 65) and, without the 
large negotiated discount by MCOs, is valued at distorted high charges. Many for-profit 
(but also nonprofit) hospitals reported charity care in terms of charges instead of at real 
costs (PWC, 2006, p. 15); since 1980, the ratio of charges to costs has grown from 1,1 to 2,6 
(Tompkins et. al., 2006).
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324 Josephson, 1997, p. 68.
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2004 (PwC, 2006, p. 4).
326 ‘In 1995 around half of private hospitals were solo, compared with 42 percent in 2000. (...) 
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(Evans Cuellar and Gertler, 2003, p. 79–80).
327 Hollins, 1997, p. 132.
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8 hospitals), Galen (1993, 71 hospitals), HCA (1994, 97 hospitals), Medical Care America 
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57–59).
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334 Mark, 1999, p. 83.
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preventing violence, and addressing the root causes of poor health. A smaller number 
fund – or in some cases provide – health services for uninsured and indigent patients 
or underwrite the costs of sending physicians or medical residents to underserved areas. 
Where health is not the main or exclusive priority, conversion foundations tend to fund a 
broad array of community activities (Isaacs et. al., 1997, p. 229).
337 General Accounting Office, 1997, p. 15.
338 The value of a hospital is determined by a multiplied factor of the hospital’s earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA). The actual multiple varies from 
hospital to hospital depending on the existing debt, the market share of the hospital, and 
the age of the hospital’s capital plant. In the nineties a multiple of six times EBITDA has 
been applied to most sales of nonprofit hospitals (Anderson, 1997, p. 144).
339 Anderson, 1997, p. 145; Gray, 1997b, p. 32. Others found that the purchase prices paid by 
for profits were correct, or perhaps even too high (Sloan et. al., 2000).
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343 Shactman and Altman, 1996, p. 52; Cutler and Horwitz, 2000, p. 49.
344 Kleinke, 1998b, p. 12.
345 In Dickinson, Tennessee, where Goodlark Hospital was sold in 1995 to Columbia/HCA, 
the local state representative, served both as a trustee of Goodlark and as its lawyer before 
its sale and as head of the new foundation afterward (Kuttner, 1996, p. 447).
346 General Accounting Office, 1993a.
347 Rodengen, 2003, p. 103.
348 Bloche, 2003b, p. 186.
349 Baser et. al., 2009, p. 1154.
350 Cutler and Sheiner, 1999, p. 5; Cleverly, 1999, p. 14.
351 Hansmann (1996, p. 239) states that such a result should perhaps be no surprising: ‘Man-
agers of nonprofit firms are not much differntly situated than managers of large publicly 
traded investor-owned firms in which shareholders exercise no meaninful voting control. 
(...) firms of the latter type are, in an important sense, effectively producer nonprofits: 
they are managed on behalf of their shareholders, but not by their shareholders. Indeed, 
if investor-owned firms are in fact managed more efficienctly than are nonprofit firms, 
and in particular are better at cost minimzation. In large part this may not be because the 
managers of the investor-owned firms are more effectively monitored, but because their 
organization’s stated goal is clearer’.
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353 In the late nineties commercial health insurers increased premiums much faster than the 
actual growth of workers earnings.
Chapter 3
1 British Medical Journal, 29th May, 1886, p. 1030; cited by Abel-Smith, 1964, p. 113.
2 However, the scheme expanded slowly; in 1939, half of the population was still not insured 
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65 § 17 (2), (Federal Hospital Reimbursement Ordinance, 1973).
66 Simon, 2000.
67 Table: Unadjusted public expenditures
Public capital expenditure (billion DM) Public current expenditure (billion DM)
1970 1.975 1.259
1975 3.551 1.399
1980 4.824 1.744
1985 5.401 2.186
1990 6.469 1.651
 Source: Simon, 2000.
68 Bruckenberger, 2003.
69 Klinger, 2005, p. 55.
70 Volk, 1989.
71 § 8 Abs 1, HFA
72 Original text: ‘Die Einschränkung der Förderung wurde von den ärtzlichen Standes-
vertretungen und der Kassenärtzlichen Vereinigung abgelehnt. Da 81,9 Prozent aller 
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Krankenhäuser unter 100 Betten Privatkliniken waren, kämpften die Standesorganisatio-
nen somit um den Erhalt einer ergiebigen Einnahmequelle. Obwohl sie bei der Forderung 
der Streichung der ‘100-Betten-Klausel’ die Unterstützung der CDU/CSU erhielten, konn-
ten sie sich letzendlich nicht durchsetzen, vermutlich auch deshalb, weil offensichtlich 
wurde, daß der medizinisch-technische Fortschritt zur Bildung größerer Krankenhäuser 
drängte’ (Löber, 1974).
73 Between 1975 and 1984, 375 hospitals were closed (Prößdorf, 1988, p. 299).
74 Karl, 1999.
75 Federal Statistics Office, 1979.
76 Karl, 1999.
77 Reichsthaler, 2001.
78 § 4 (3.2), HFA.
79 Original text: ‘Krankenhäuser, deren Betrieb auf Gewinnerzielung gerichtet ist, sollen in 
die Förderung nicht einbezogen werden. Deshalb sind Krankenhäuser, die nicht gemein-
nützig sind, von der Förderung ausgeschlossen’ (Federal Assembly sixth election period, 
1971).
80 Gerdelmann, 1994.
81 § 17 (5), HFA.
82 Robbers, 1998, p. 246.
83 For-profit clinics in Schleswig-Holstein were often in new buildings In 1975, fifty-four 
percent of for-profit facilities were built in the last five years; only twenty percent of for-
profit hospitals were older than twenty-five years, against fifty-one percent of the public 
and nonprofit hospitals (Brandecker, 1978).
84 Karl, 1999.
85 The outlook for preventive care and rehabilitation remained bright. These facilities domi-
nated for-profit health care by the late 1960s and increased their position until the 1990s. 
Some for-profits mixed acute and rehabilitative services (see Appendix 4.1).
86 Löser-Priester, 2003.
87 Federal Statistics Office, different years.
88 156,1 billion DM (1972); 802 billion DM (1986), (Prößdorf, 1988, p. 298).
89 Table: Public capital supplements 1972–1988 (million DM).
1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988
States 998 3.513 3.540 3.611 3.970 4.361 4.457 4.666 4.630
Federal 350   370   404   290   226   255
 Source: Bölke, 1990, p. 304.
90 Bruckenberger, 2008, p. 3.
91 Giaimo and Manow, 1999, p. 981; Bruckenberger, 2008.
92 Karl,1999.
93 Löser-Priester, 2003.
94 Giaimo and Manow, 1999, p. 983.
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95 Table: Number of private insured people (million)
Private health insurance Supplementary insurance
1980 4.8 3.6
1985 5.2 4.2
1990 6.6 5.2
1995 6.9 6.0
2000 7.5 7.5
2002 7.9 7.7
 Source: Private health Insures, 2002
96 Robert-Bosch foundation, 1983.
97 Advisory Council for the Concerted Action in Health Care, 1983.
98 Bölke, 1990, p. 304.
99 Advisory Council for the Concerted Action in Health Care, 1989, p.89.
100 In 1972, 29,000 beds could be constructed with HFA means, but in 1993 no more than 
11,000 beds could be built (Robbers, 1998, p. 246).
101 Bölke, 1990, p. 306.
102 Small hospitals in Hamburg got 2,452 DM (1991) for each bed, while large clinics in Hesse 
got 5,090 DM (1991) (Bölke, 1990, p. 307).
103 Reichsthaler, 2001.
104 Karl, 1999.
105 Original text: ‘Bei der Durchführung des Gesetzes ist die Vielfalt der Krankenhausträger 
zu beachten. Dabei ist nach Maßgabe des Landesrechts insbesondere die wirtschaftli-
che Sicherung freigemeinnütziger und private Krankenhäuser zu gewährleisten. Die 
Gewährung von Fördernmittel nach diesem Gesetz darf nicht mit Auflagen verbunden 
werden, durch die die Selbständigkeit und Unabhängigkeit von Krankenhäusern über die 
Erfordernisse der Krankenhausplanung und der wirtschaflichen Betriebsführung hinaus 
beeinträchtigt werden’ (§1, (2), nHFA).
106 Karl, 1999.
107 However, the nHFA also required that a hospital should serve at least forty percent patients 
on social insurance; it should not seek higher reimbursements than normal per-diem rates, 
to be included in a state hospital plan (Saed-Hedayatiy, 1995; Knorr and Wernick, 1991).
108 Karl, 1999.
109 Karl, 1999.
110 However, this result can be disputed since for-profit hospitals treat a less complex patient 
base and not all for-profit costs are fully included like capital costs and physician fees in 
the open staff facilities. Nevertheless, not adjusted for such differences the public hospitals 
still have some one-third higher costs than for-profit hospitals (my own interpretation and 
calculation of the data of Breyer F., D. Paffrath, W. Preuß, and R. Schmidt, 1987).
111 Schick, 1986.
112 Saed-Hedayatiy, 1995.
113 This also meant a discussion if privatization was allowed by the constitution. On the one 
hand there was the subsidiary principle and the social market system, but on the other 
hand opponents thought that privatizations might hurt the public health for which the 
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government is responsible. However, most scholars support the legal and economic case 
for privatization (Däubler, 1980; Saed-Hedayitiy, 1995).
114 Rogge, 1984; Imdahl, 1993; Bosch, 1995.
115 Here it is important to note that in German health care politics, stabilization of the 
statutory premiums as a part of the GDP is a main goal. However, often this was a direct 
consequence of the strong economic growth, especially in the 1980s. Thus budgetary re-
forms were not immediately necessary and delayed. On the other hand the income related 
premiums of the statutory funds did increase sharply due to a decreasing share of wages 
in the GDP. This implied that there was a feeling of exploding costs under the German 
population (Breyer et. al., 2001; Simon, 2001; Löser-Priester, 2003; Schölkopf and Stapf-
Finë, 2003).
116 Bosch, 1995.
117 In 1991, Sana did a management turnaround in the city hospital of Wuppertal and the 
nonprofit St. Catharine hospital in Stuttgart. Typically in such contracts, Sana gets a lump 
sum as well as part of the efficiency gains (Losse, B, 1994).
118 Löser-Priester, 2003.
119 European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, 2004, p. 192.
120 Ocker, 1995, p. 73.
121 Hospitals payments would be prospective general fees or, for certain procedures, specific 
rates. The federal government decides on the construction of the rates. Small investments 
and building expenditures are included on a replacement base (Karl, 1999).
122 Löser-Priester, 2003.
123 Between 1993 and 1995, the number of hospitals that offered outpatient care before treat-
ment increased from 6¼ percent to 38¾ percent. Outpatient care after treatment increased 
from 5½ percent to 37½ percent. Ambulatory surgery penetration increased form 11 
percent to 32¾ percent of the hospitals (Karl, 1999).
124 Karl, 1999.
125 Neubauer, 2003.
126. Table: Rate adjustments by state (1998)
Point-rates labor costs Point-rates material costs
Baden-Wuerttemberg 1,089 1,093
Bavaria 1,090 1,090
Berlin 1,080 1,080
Brandenburg 0,901 1,075
Bremen 1,060 1,060
Hamburg 1,082 1,084
Hesse 1,083 1,085
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 0,907 1,075
Lower Saxony 1,060 1,060
Northrhine-Westphalia 1,082 1,071
Rhineland-Palatinate 1,060 1,060
Saarland 1,065 1,065
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Saxony 0,900 1,075
Saxony-Anhalt 0,903 1,073
Schleswig-Holstein 1,059 1,063
Thuringia 0,907 1,080
 Source: Reichthaler, 2001.
127 Original text: ‘Außergewöhnliche Tatbestände eines Krankenhauses können dazu führen, 
dass erhöhte Fixkosten vorliegen. Aufgrund der Kostenkalkulation muss das pauschalierte 
Entgelt auch diese Kosten anteilsmäßig verrechnen, was durch Kalkulation eines ent-
sprechenden Zuschlags möglich ist. Als solche außergewöhnlichen Tatbestände können 
bauliche Gegebenheiten, Kosten zur Qualitätssicherung oder Finanzierung der Investi-
tionskosten bei der nicht oder nur teilweise geförderten Häusern gelten’ (Reichsthaler, 
2001).
128 Wendt, Rothgang, and Helmert, 2005, p. 4. Hospitals are required to publish a quality 
reports and their scores on 26 quantitative quality indicators.
129 Busse and Wörz, 2004.
130 Federal Physicians’ Chamber, 2007, p. 16.
131 Augurzky et. al., 2007, p. 19.
132 Bruckenberger, 2002; Schmidt 2001; Augurzky et. al., 2004.
133 Table: Average state capital supplements pro included bed in the hospital plan (total 
1991–2000 in €)
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 148.931
Saxony-Anhalt 144.014
Berlin 138.788
Thuringia 130.167
Brandenburg 129.470
Saxony 121.206
Bavaria  90.024
Hamburg  80.831
Saarland  66.054
Baden-Wuerttemberg  65.854
Hesse  64.942
Bremen  64.633
Rhineland-Palatinate  63.261
Schleswig-Holstein  60.544
Lower Saxony  54.322
North Rhine-Westphalia  47.273
 Source: Bruckenberger, 2003
134 Bruckenberger, 2008, p. 10.
135 Bruckenberger, 2002.
136 Augurzky, et. al., 2007, p. 17.
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137 Original text: ‘Faktisch ist in vielen Bundesländer heute schon eine quasi monistische 
Finanzierung Realität. Die Fördermittel einzelner Bundesländer sind mittlerweile zu eine 
Marginalität verkommen (...) Mittlerweile ist aus Sicht der Krankenhäuser die Kontrahier-
ungspflicht weitaus wertvoller als die spärlichen Fördermittel.’ (Neubauer, 2003).
138 Hahn and Polei, 2000, p. 191.
139 Augurzky et. al., 2004
140 Between 1989 and 2001, Rhön-Klinikum went three times to the stock exchange for ad-
ditional capital. In 2005, Fresenius went to the stock market to finance its acquisition of 
Helios.
141 Augurzky, et. al., 2004.
142 Federal For-profit Hospital association, 2009, p. 17.
143 Handelsblatt, July 10th, 2008.
144 Karl, 1999.
145 In 2006 their EBITDA margin was 10.5 percent, versus 2.2 percent for nonprofits, and 0.9 
percent for public hospitals (Augurzky et al., 2009, p. 16).
146 For-profits (2006) have 16.3 percent liabilities on their balance sheet; nonprofits have 8.1 
percent and public hospitals 9.7 percent (Everling and Kampe, 2008, p. 88).
147 For example, local authorities often do not guarantee for hospital loans (Bruckenberger, 
2008, p. 8).
148 Table: Average capital investment quote of average hospital turnover (%) 2002
Public hospitals Nonprofit hospitals For-profit hospitals
Public capital subsidies 7.7 6.8 9.7
Other capital funds 4.2 3.3 8.0
 Source: Federal Physicians’ Chamber, 2007, p. 18.
149 Original text: ‘Diese Möglichkeiten waren insbesondere bei kleineren Krankenhäusern 
gegeben. Die zum Teil sehr rückständig gemanaged wurden. Hier waren oft mit einfa-
chen Mitteln der Geschäftsführung sehr schnell entsprechende Erfolge zu Erzielen. Im 
DRG-System werden diese Möglichkeiten auf der Ertragsseite beseitigt (…) für große 
Krankenhäuser mit einem überproportionalen Investitionsbedarf ist fraglich, ob allein 
auf dieser Grundlage privat betriebene Krankenhäuser über 20 Jahre und mehr derartige 
absolute und relative Kostenvorteile herausarbeiten können’ (Strehl, 2003).
150 Augurzky, et. al., 2004.
151 Federal Statistic Office, different years.
152 Original text: ‘Angesichts der historisch bedingten einseitigen Trägerstrukturen in der 
ehemaligen DDR (89 prozent der Krankenhausbetten sind in öffentlicher Trägerschaft) 
plädiert die DKG an alle Verantwortlichen, die Voraussetzungen dafür zu schaffen, daß 
auch in den neuen Ländern sich ein ausgewogenes System der pluralen Trägerschaft von 
freigemeinnützigen, öffentlichen und privaten Krankenhausträgern entwickeln kann’ 
(German Hospital association, 1990, p. 571).
153 German Hospital Association, 1990, p. 569.
154 § 21 (5) Reunification Treaty.
262
For-profit Hospitals
155 Table: Change (%) in health care costs old and new states
Old states including Berlin New States
1992 8.4 25.6
1993 3.9 11.6
1994 3.6 11.0
1995 5.4 8.2
1996 0.6 4.2
 Federal Statistics Office
156 Robbers, 1995, p. 247.
157 Das Krankenhaus (the Hospital) no. 12, 2000, p. 970.
158 Tiemann and Schreyögg, 2009, p. 127.
159 German Hospital Association, 1990b, p. 249.
160 Original text: ‘Daneben ist zu empfehlen,daß in geeigneten Fällen und im Rahmen 
der Krankenhausplanung zur Entlastung der öffentlichen Hand auch der Einsatz von 
Kapital des Krankenhausträgers ermöglicht wird. In diesen Fällen ist vorher mit den 
Sozialleistungsträgern eine Vereinbarung über die Berücksichtigung entsprechender 
Abschreibungen, Zinsen und Anpassungsrückstellungen in den Pflegesätzen zu treffen 
bzw. Sicherzustellen, daß die für die Investitionsförderung zuständigen Behörden entspre-
chende Annuitätshilfen übernehmen’. (German Hospital Association, 1990b, p. 250).
161 Federal Ministry of Health, 1995.
162 In Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania a private third party has to become part of the new 
for-profit hospital for a conversion to be approved (Thier, 2001).
163 Karl,1999.
164 Table: Market share five largest for-profit hospital groups (% of total hospitals) in 2001.
For-profit market share Five largest groups
Baden-Wuertemberg 30 5
Bavaria 29 5
Berlin 30 1
Brandenburg 14 6
Bremen 14 0
Hamburg 15 6
Hesse 21 8
Mecklenburg-Western 
Pomerania
21 18
Lower Saxony 25 7
Northrhine-Westphalia 7 1
Rhineland-Palatinate 17 3
Saxony 26 17
Saxony-Anhalt 9 6
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Schleswig-Holstein 41 7
Thuringia 22 18
Total 22 6
 Source: Schlüchtermann and Albrecht, 2003 (rounded figures).
165 Statistisches Bundesamt Wiesbaden, different years; Bruckenberger, 2008, p. 10.
166 Westphal, 1991; Rathje, 2001.
167 From 880,000 fte (1996) to 792,000 fte (2006) (German Hospital Association, 2008, p. 23).
168 Das Krankenhaus (the Hospital), no. 4, 2008, p. 301.
169 In 2009 changes for default were 1.8 percent for public hospitals, 0.8 percent for non-
profit hospitals, and 1.2 percent for for-profit hospitals. However, the possibility of default 
among for-profits is concentrated at small chains and stand-alone hospitals, not at the 
large for-profit hospital chains (Augurzky et. al., 2009, p. 112, 115).
170 Augurzky et. al., 2008, p. 210.
171 Herr, 2008, p. 1068.
172 Knorr and Wernicke, 1991.
173 For-profit hospitals pay 151 million euro’s corporate tax or 1.7 percent of turnover (2006), 
nonprofits pay 4 million and public clinics another 15 million (Augurzky et al., 2009, p. 17, 
27). Public and nonprofit hospitals pay a reduced value-added tax rate of 7% (Herr, 2008, 
p. 1058).
174 Klinger, 2005, p. 148.
175 It is hardly possible to discharge employees during a conversion. It is also not possible 
to resign civil servants or change their conditions of employment. The legal protection 
of other employees is slightly less. Employees which are older than forty or work longer 
than fifteen years in the hospital also cannot be dismissed. It is also not possible to change 
the wages, including all pension benefits, after a conversion (Saed-Hedayatiy, 1995; Karl, 
1999).
176 In general wages are ‘too high’ for lower employees and ‘too low’ for higher educated em-
ployees (Strehl, 2003). Public hospitals in Berlin, North Rhine-Westphalia, Lower Saxony 
and Schleswig-Holstein suffer under additional costs from the ‘Zusatzversorgung’ of the 
federal government and the states (Rocke, 2002).
177 Saed-Hedayatiy, 1995.
178 Löser-Priester, 2003.
179 Karl, 1999; Strohe et. al, 2003a, p. 882.
180 In 2006, for-profit investments as percentage of the balance sheet were 11.5 percent, versus 
9.9 percent (nonprofits) and 8.6 percent for public hospitals (Augurzky et al. 2009, p. 12).
181 Strohe et. al, 2003a, p. 886–887.
182 Federal Physicians’ Chamber, 2007, p. 82–90.
183 Strohe et. al., 2003b.
184 Original text: ‘Für den Deutschen Städtetag (…) kommt eine völlige oder weitgehende Über-
tragung der Krankenhausversorgung auf private Träger nicht in Betracht (…). Der Grund 
liegt darin, daß sich die kommunalen Krankenhäuser aus der Verplichtung der Gemeinden 
für die allgemeine Daseinsvorsorge entwickelt haben (…). Der Deutsche Städtetag räumt 
allerdings ein, daß im Einzellfall die Privatisierung kommunaler Krankenhäuser durchaus 
wünschenswert sein kann, was jedoch im einzelnen einer Abwägung der Aufgabenstellung 
und der örtlichen Gegebenheiten und Verhältnisse bedarf ’ (Saed-Hedayatiy, 1995).
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185 Federal For-profit Hospital Association (BDPK), 2009, p. 20, 48.
186 For example Rhön-Klinikum, which was interested in the medical faculty of the university 
of Leipzig could not get the approval of the state of Saxonia (Saed-Hedayatiy, 1995). Ham-
burg is another good example.
187 Recent research states that university hospitals are clearly associated with lower levels of 
efficiency (Tiemann and Schreyögg, 2009, p. 125.
188 Klinger, 2005, p. 91; Strohe et. al., 2003a, p. 882–883.
189 Schnack, 2004.
190 Table: Estimated turnover (million.) and market share of for-profit hospital chains.
Rhön-Klinikum € 950 18 %
Helios-Kliniken € 900 17 %
Asklepios-Kliniken € 690 13 %
Sana-Kliniken € 430 8 %
SRH-Kliniken € 310 6 %
Paracelsus-kliniken € 240 5 %
Humaine-kliniken € 160 3 %
Mediclin € 150 3 %
Damp Holding € 150 3 %
Fresenius Pro Serve € 110 2 %
Other € 1,200 23 %
 Source: www.helios-kliniken.de
191 Augurzky et. al., 2007, p. 13.
192 Augurzky et al., 2009, p. 18. Note that this partly may be a result of stronger incentives to 
upcoding by for-profit hospitals.
193 Gerste, 2003.
194 Rosenow and Steinberg, 2003.
195 Table: Nurse education places in hospitals
Total For-profit share
1992 70,149 0.4%
1997 69,885 0.8%
2002 67,649 3.0%
 Federal Statistics Office, different years
196 Augurzky et al., 2009, p. 32.
197 Table: Intensive care beds in hospitals
Total For-profits share
1992 19,662 2.2%
1997 21,675 4.6%
2002 22,948 7.3%
 Federal Statistics Office, different years
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198 Reichsthaler, 2001.
199 In 2006, for-profit hospitals pay a yearly average of about € 1,100 per full-time staff mem-
ber for their pensions, against € 2,700 at public hospitals (Augurzky et. al., 2007, p. 57).
200 Licas, Reimers, Henke, and Schlette, 2010, p. 47.
201 Licas, Reimers, Henke, and Schlette, 2010, p. 47.
202 Augurzky et. al., 2009, p. 70.
203 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, August 4th, 2008.
204 Federal Statistical Office, different years.
205 This was their first major success in their continuing efforts to increase federal power over 
hospital policies (Bruckenberger, 2008, p. 2).
206 Most for-profit hospital groups were also founded in the comparatively large rehabilita-
tion and preventive care sectors. Thus they could draw upon a reservoir of management 
capabilities, expertise and capital.
207 I argue that France’s recent finding that German federalism has little to do with health care 
financing have at least one exception: its impact on the growth of the for-profit hospital 
sector (France, 2008, p. 696).
208 Federal Statistics Office, different years: own calculations.
209 Messemer and Margreiter, 2003.
210 Erler, 2002; Busse, 2004.
211 Rosenow and Steinberg, 2003; Augurzky, et. al 2009.,
Chapter 5
1 Querido, 1951, p. 34–35.
2 Juch, 1997, p. 242.
3 Another one is the fact that the Netherlands is a small but densely populated country.
4 There were some nonprofit hospitals for children and a limited number of other diseases. 
There also were women’s clinics and sanatoria for more prosperous patients, but these 
kinds of facilities were rare and eventually disappeared (Juch, 1997, p. 129).
5 Juch, 1997, p. 124.
6 Sickness funds did develop since the late nineteenth century. They started with a religious 
or socialist background. Since 1910, physicians started their own sickness funds. These 
funds dominated the market by the late 1930s (Companje, 2001).
7 The law for the poor (1854) allotted municipalities to deliver or pay hospital services for 
the poor (Groot, 1960, p. 13).
8 Van der Velden, 1993, p. 49.
9 Initially, hospital care was not reimbursed by many sickness funds. In 1907 only fifty-eight 
funds covered some hospital costs (Widdershoven, 2005, p. 127)
10 Municipalities financed hospital services for those unable to pay; hundreds of local sick-
ness funds existed that financed, mostly on a per capita base, some expenses of physicians 
and medicine; since the nineteen-twenties special funds for hospital costs were founded; 
commercial insurers operated for the middle-classes that sought some kind of financial 
coverage; out-of-pocket payments made up a substantial amount of total hospital turn-
over. Cities and charity foundations paid for the capital costs.
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11 In Amsterdam, the large public hospitals had a bad name and three smaller private clinics 
developed: the Prinsengracht hospital for the rich; the Civilian hospital for the prosperous 
middle classes; and, the Central-Israelitic hospital for richer Jews (Van der Velden, 1992, 
p. 174).
12 Querido, 1960, p. 70–71.
13 ‘Modern’ hospitals started in the late nineteenth century. They operated an equipped 
surgery room and held X-rays and other (diagnostic) equipment. Schooled nurses assisted 
the physicians (Juch, 1997, p. 59).
14 In the Netherlands, the gini index was, with the exception of West Germany, the lowest 
among ten nations (1950). The top five percent earned a larger share (24%) of national in-
come than in the U.S. (20%), the UK (20 %), or Sweden (17 %). (Lijphart, 1968, p. 28–35).
15 Querido, 1960, p. 72; Valk, 1951.
16 Van der Velden, 1993, p. 75.
17 In industrial Schiedam, public per diem payments for services delivered by the new catho-
lic hospital were strictly cost-based. The city council did not want this hospital to generate 
a profit Van der Velden, 1993, p. 121.
18 Juch describes the typical situation in a provincial town of sixty thousand inhabitants. In 
Arnhem there existed a catholic, a protestant and a public hospital. In 1921, the protestant 
hospital only treated six out-of two thousand patients against a reduced rate. In 1931, the 
City Council decided that poor patients could seek treatment in religious hospitals, and 
many did so. As a consequence, the public hospital soon operated with large deficits (Juch, 
1997, p. 60–62, 257).
19 Van der Velden, 1993, p. 210–211.
20 Juch, 1997, p. 209–211.
21 Groot, 1960, p. 25–26.
22 Groot, 1960, p. 109.
23 Festen, 1984 p. 22.
24 In 1956, the hospital sector consisted of 43 public hospitals, 102 Roman-Catholic, 43 
Protestant, 1 Jewish, and thirty independent nonprofit facilities (Groot, 1960, p. 109).
25 Mr. C. van Lienden, the respected chairman of a body of sickness funds, marked in 1951: 
‘both hospitals and sickness funds need each other and do not obtain for any profit. Hos-
pitals have to be reimbursed for their costs and sickness funds have to pay their fair share, 
which partly depends on their means’ (Festen, 1984, p. 17). Mr. J. Maenen, chairman of 
the Catholic Hospital Association and member of parliament, stated in 1959: ‘we think 
that their is no reason whatsoever that nonprofit providers would charge rates that are, 
from a public perspective, more unreasonable than normal for-profit companies. Thus the 
government should not determine these rates’ (Festen, 1984, p. 24).
26 Groot, 1960, p. 131.
27 Groot, 1984, p. 86.
28 Wagner, 1978, p. 217.
29 Such practice factually started in the late forties (Groot, 1964, p. 298).
30 Van Straaten, 1984, p. 113.
31 Van Straaten, 1984, p. 116.
32 Deficits were possible because some expenses were not calculated in the per diem rates 
(start-up losses on new equipment because of low utilities, fraud, and the consequences of 
bad management).
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33 Van Straaten, 1984, p. 118.
34 Groot, 1985, p. 13.
35 Groot, 1960, p. 39.
36 Fifty-five percent was allocated for industrial projects; twenty-five percent for residential 
property; and twenty percent for all other construction (Sijmons, 2006, p. 116).
37 Van der Meyden, 1961, p. 209–220.
38 Groot (1960, p. 156) stated that even ‘all-out’ per diem rates lay between ƒ 6,45 and ƒ18,10.
39 The government paid 3/7 of the construction costs. The hospital should pay the remainder 
from regular rate increases that were on par with the rising costs of living (Groot, 1960, p. 
52).
40 Groot, 1960, p. 52–53.
41 Sijmons, 2006, p. 125.
42 Sijmons, 2006, p. 133.
43 The number of sickness funds was severely reduced along geographical lines and they did 
not compete for new enrollees. Decisions on covered services as well as reimbursements 
were centralized and contributions became dependent on income.
44 Companje, 2001, p. 172.
45 Telder Foundation, 1963, p. 206.
46 Zwaan, 2008, p. 25–26.
47 The system struggled with the consequences of the lack of community rating in private in-
surance and the higher costs of the sickness funds due to its overrepresentation of elderly. For 
the moment, these problems were solved (1986) in anticipation of a more definite solution.
48 Lieverdink, 2001, p. 1191–1192.
49 Helderman, 2007, p. 208–217.
50 Committee Structure and Remuneration Health Care, 1987.
51 After a regulatory change (1994), employers stood at risk for the continuation of payments 
to employees unable to work.
52 Van Montfort, 1998, p. 355; Brouwer and Hermans, 1999.
53 They got some support from academics that thought priority care unfair. Van Dartel states 
that health care is placed in an economic context, and that thus the interest of the chroni-
cally ill, who already got few chances in society, is neglected (van Dartel, 1997, p. 229).
54 The total number of certificate-of-need for freestanding clinics increased from 35 (2002) 
to 158 (2006) (Dutch Healthcare Authority, 2007, p. 20).
55 Dutch Healthcare Authority, 2007, p. 7, 9.
56 Elsinga and Keuzenkamp, 2001; Council for Public Health and Health Care, 2002.
57 Central Planning Bureau, 2003; Hers and Wijnker, 2004; Dijkgraaf et. al., 2006.
58 Hermans, 2004, p. 425.
59 Sijmons, 2006, p. 218, 318–319.
60 Sijmons, 2006, p. 221.
61 An earlier draft stated that only nonprofit providers get a license to be active on the health 
care market (Sijmons, 2006, p. 217).
62 Ministry of Health, 2005.
63 Sijmons, 2006, p. 222.
64 PwC, 2007a and 2007b.
65 Dutch HealthCare Authority, 2008, p. 7–8.
66 Sijmons, 2006, p. 257, 308.
268
For-profit Hospitals
67 Medisch Contact, 2009, p. 234.
68 See De Volkskrant (Peoples Daily), December 31th, 2008).
69 Van der Heyden, 1994, p. 74.
70 See Robert Alford (1975) for a thorough analysis of the importance of structural interests 
in the development of health care policy.
71 Any fundamental causalities between the external incentives of managed competition and 
the internal stimuli of for-profit property-rights were not given much thought.
72 National Council for Health Care, 1991, p. 5.
73 Jeurissen, 2002, p. 15.
74 The Agency for Hospital Planning stated that it always had been the intention of the Hos-
pital Provider Law to include all acute care facilities, save physician offices and residential 
property (National Council for Health Care, 1991, p. 8).
75 Knoors, Vrijland, and van Zenderen, 2000.
76 Jeurissen, 2002.
77 Knoors, Vrijland, and van Zenderen, 2000, p. 482.
78 The sickness funds, in contrast to indemnity insurers, were forced to contract all hospitals 
and thus paid for their fixed costs. It was in their interest that hospital utility stayed high.
79 Turnover (2001) of freestanding clinics depends for twenty-five percent on indemnity 
insurers; turnover from sickness funds was twenty-three percent; remaining revenues 
were largely out-of-pocket payments (Jeurissen, 2002, p. 37).
80 Van Delft, 2001.
81 This was to prevent these clinics to deliver in-vitro-fertilization techniques, which was 
possible on an outpatient base.
82 Knoors,Vrijland, and van Zenderen, 2000.
83 Knoors, Vrijland, and van Zenderen, 2000, p. 483.
84 Internal spreadsheet data of the Agency for Hospital Planning.
85 Jeurissen, 2002, p. 43–44.
86 Jeurissen, 2002, p. 49–50.
87 Jeurissen, 2002, p. 34–35.
88 Occupational health is a well-developed separate sector. The consequence is that there 
exist specialized services that do not form part of the health care sector.
89 Research voor Beleid, 1999, p. iii.
90 This indicates the changing climate regarding for-profit care. Most experiments start in 
long-term care and mental health.
91 It was possible that more than one provider delivered care in a certain region; insurers 
were obliged to contract those new providers (Breedveld, 2003, p. 192–200).
92 CBZ, 1999, p. 1.
93 Hermans, 2004, p. 418–420.
94 A surcharge of 12,5 percent could be calculated to include capital expenditure.
95 IGZ, 2003.
96 IGZ, 2004.
97 IGZ, 2004, p. 5.
98 Formerly, sickness funds had to contract all hospitals, which was not in the interest of the 
freestanding clinics.
99 About twenty-two percent (Dutch Health Authority, 2006, p. 21, 24, 46).
100 Inspectorate Health Care (IGZ), 2009, p. 6.
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1 This is clearly the case in the US, the UK, and Germany. The Netherlands did not develop 
a proprietary sector.
2 It must be noted that these older statistics probably do not use the same definitions and 
therefore are not completely comparable.
3 The theoretical arguments of Arrow (1963), market failures due to information asymme-
try; Pauly and Redisch (1973), nonprofit hospitals as physician cooperatives; and Weisbrod 
(1975), heterogeneous demand of public type services, all seem to predict the increasing 
dominance of nonprofit ownership and a further decline of proprietary ownership types.
4 In sociology, a tipping point refers to the fact that a rare phenomenon becomes rapidly 
more common. Slow growth suddenly accelerates. It stems from the study by Grodzins 
in the 1950s. He used it to explain ‘white’ flight from neighborhoods when the number of 
minorities reaches a certain level.
5 Rosenberg, 1987.
6 Other proprietary owners were (industrial) companies that did not seek actual profits. 
Only in the Western part of the US did a few corporate hospital companies develop.
7 Salaried physicians were always on the hospitals’ ‘closed’ list. However, they could be 
supplemented with self-employed physicians that held such preferences. In many ‘open 
staff ’ hospitals there were also soft constraints on the medical staff. For example Catholic 
hospitals may only be ‘open’ to Catholic physicians. In both ‘closed’ and ‘open’ staff models, 
it was common that physicians provided some services in return for their hospital affilia-
tion.
8 Winkelman, 1971.
9 In fact, until 1936, it was ‘illegal’ for nonprofits to charge private fees and keep their charity 
status (Lee, 1978).
10 See also Stevens, 1999.
11 The available data are most comprehensive for the US, which increases scientific reliability 
for any statements on this case. Table 6.2 also shows that the slope of the curve in the years 
predating World War II is most steep for the US.
12 This table is composed of different statistics from the individual countries. Thus they may 
not be completely comparable.
13 Rosenberg (1987) describes this process of decreasing power by hospital boards and 
administrators.
14 They already occupied such a position in the proprietary hospitals, which they owned.
15 Proprietary hospitals often had limited access to capital because the prospects of a reason-
able return on investments were limited.
16 Starr, 1982, p. 167.
17 The emergence of stock-listed for-profit hospital companies opened important additional 
reimbursement possibilities. Physicians that affiliated to for-profit hospital chains could 
participate in highly lucrative equity compensation schemes.
18 In the US, conversions to nonprofit ownership were a possibility. However, in general 
capital traps and high exit-barriers typify the hospital sector. (Hansmann, Kessler, and 
McClellan, 2002).
19 The proprietary hospital sector consisted of: 1) specialized facilities that hold no certif-
icate-of-need, and 2) small general acute open-staff facilities, which, due to increasing 
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ambulatory alternatives and easier access to more developed hospitals, were less needed in 
the rural surroundings where they had their base. Diversification into rehabilitation and 
spa treatments was necessary for those that sought to grow.
20 Oberlander, 2003, p. 37.
21 In a less efficient way, the independent sector eased pressure on public budgets. They ‘paid’ 
for part of the consultant salary and delivered services that otherwise would place an ad-
ditional burden on NHS budgets.
22 These ratios are my own calculations, based on the data gathered for this study.
23 This range is calculated on a state-by-state basis.
24 Two characteristics prohibited a completely level playing field. Nonprofit and public 
hospital still had access to cheap tax-exempt bonds. For-profits still had access to the com-
mercial equity markets. If these considered hospitals a very good long-term investment, 
for-profits might get temporary access to capital on favorable conditions.
25 A recent book by Alan Miller – CEO of for-profit Universal Health Services – illustrates 
some health care reforms the sector still wishes: 1) tort reform to limit jury awards for 
noneconomic damages; 2) allow insurance companies to sell policies across state lines; 3) 
tax credits to those that buy insurance on the individual market (Miller, 2009).
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Don Cox, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Planning and Evaluation (ASPE)
David Cutler, Harvard University
Randy Fenninger, American Surgical Hospital Association
Matt Gallivan, Nashville Health Care Council
Bradford Gray, Urban Institute
Steven Speil, Federation of American Hospitals
Jana Joustra Davis, HCA
John Butler, Nashville Chamber of Commerce
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Mr. Charles Auld, CEO (non-executive), General Healthcare Group
Mrs. Joan Higgins, Professor health policy, University of Manchester
Mr. William Laing, Director, Laing&Buisson
Mr. David Lewsey, Group Financial Controller, Aspen Healthcare
Mr. Michael Neeb, CFO and Vice President International Operations, HCA International
Mr. Stephen Withers, Director European Affairs, BUPA
Germany
Mr. Boris Augurzky, RWI, Essen.
Mr. Markus Wörz, Technische Universität Berlin
Mr. Dietmar Pawlik, CFO Rhön-Klinikum
Mr. Kai Klinger, Universität Mannheim
Mr. Michael Burkhart, PricewaterhouseCoopers
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Samenvatting
Opzet van dit onderzoek
Dit onderzoek is een vergelijkende en historische analyse van de ontwikkeling van 
winstbeogende ziekenhuizen in de Verenigde Staten, het Verenigd Koninkrijk, de 
Duitse Bondsrepubliek en Nederland. Drie vragen worden beantwoord. 1) Hoe 
heeft de for-profit ziekenhuissector zich ontwikkeld binnen deze vier landen? 2) Hoe 
kunnen we de ontwikkeling van de for-profit ziekenhuissector verklaren? 3) Waarom 
verschilt de ontwikkeling van de for-profit ziekenhuissector tussen deze landen?
In het onderzoek komen vier mogelijke theoretische verklaringen voor de ei-
gendomsverhoudingen in de ziekenhuissector aan de orde. Een eerste verklaring 
heeft betrekking op de kosten van kapitaal en het rendement op investeringen. Het 
feit dat in alle onderzochte landen de marktpenetratie van nonprofit en publieke 
ziekenhuizen hoger is dan die van for-profit ziekenhuizen zou (mede) een gevolg 
kunnen zijn van de hogere (kapitaals)kosten bij deze laatste eigendomsvorm. Vol-
doende rendement op eigen vermogen vormt een natuurlijke voorwaarde voor het 
bestaansrecht van een for-profit ziekenhuissector. Of er voldoende rendement kan 
worden behaald, hangt af van de prijzen die in rekening kunnen worden gebracht, 
de toegang tot productiefactoren (kapitaal, arbeid en technologie) en de grip op de 
kosten. Hoe minder marktimperfecties er zijn, hoe meer men mag verwachten dat 
de for-profit instellingen een hogere toegevoegde waarde zullen bieden dan andere 
eigendomsvormen.
Een tweede verklaring heeft betrekking op de mogelijkheid om goede contrac-
tuele afspraken te kunnen maken over de te leveren prestaties. Wanneer dat niet 
goed mogelijk is, bijvoorbeeld omdat kwaliteit niet goed observeerbaar is, bestaat 
het risico dat for-profit instellingen geneigd zijn om te beknibbelen op kwaliteit 
als dat meer winst oplevert (opportunistisch gedrag). In dit geval is er sprake 
van contractfalen en zijn nonprofit instellingen voor zorggebruikers aantrekkelijk 
omdat het ontbreken van uitkeerbare winst of het bestaan van altruïstische doel-
stellingen aangeeft dat de instelling minder of geen belang heeft bij een dergelijk 
opportunistisch gedrag.
Een derde verklaring voor de specifieke eigendomsstructuur van de zieken-
huissector heeft betrekking op het belang dat artsen hebben bij een bepaalde 
eigendomsvorm. Zo kunnen artsen belang hebben bij de vaak zwakkere gover-
nance structuur van nonprofit instellingen of juist een belang hebben bij for-profit 
instellingen wegens een betere beloning of andere arbeidscondities.
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Tenslotte kan het bestaan van publieke- en nonprofit instellingen mogelijk ook 
een gevolg zijn van de hoge mate van complementariteit tussen overheid en non-
profit sector.
De drie onderzoeksvragen worden beantwoord met behulp van een inductieve 
strategie, waarbij door middel van een analyse van literatuur en historisch bron-
nenmateriaal en op grond van interviews met deskundigen en betrokkenen in de 
betreffende landen geprobeerd is om de ontwikkeling van de eigendomsverhou-
dingen in de ziekenhuissector te beschrijven en te verklaren. De keuze van de vier 
casussen is gebaseerd op: 1) verschillen in de institutionele omgeving; 2) verschil-
len in de kenmerken van de ziekenhuissector; en 3) verschillen in de omvang van 
de for-profit sector. Het empirische onderzoek beschrijft een ruime periode, vanaf 
de opkomst van het ‘moderne’ ziekenhuis (begin twintigste eeuw) tot de huidige 
tijd. De nadruk ligt echter op de moderne verzorgingsstaat en op de periode na de 
Tweede Wereldoorlog. De analyses van het chronologisch gerangschikte empiri-
sche materiaal vinden in eerste instantie plaats op het niveau van elke individuele 
casus. Vervolgens vindt een vergelijkende analyse tussen de verschillende casussen 
plaats.
Verenigde Staten: de ontwikkelingen in de grootste for-profit sector
De geschiedenis van de Amerikaanse for-profit sector is ruwweg in te verdelen in 
een drietal perioden. Vanaf het begin van de twintigste eeuw to het midden van de 
jaren zestig werd deze sector met een dalende relatieve omvang geconfronteerd. 
Tot het midden van de jaren tachtig was er aansluitend een snelle groei van het 
aantal for-profit ziekenhuizen. Tot slot volgt een periode die wordt gekenmerkt 
door gematigde groei, soms zelfs stagnatie, van de for-profit sector. Uit het onder-
zoek blijkt dat drie factoren deze ontwikkeling kunnen verklaren.
Ten eerste de relatieve toegang tot (of kosten van) kapitaal. Deze was tot medio 
jaren zestig namelijk (veel) gunstiger voor de publieke- en voor de nonprofit zie-
kenhuizen. Na de komst van Medicare (1965) sloeg deze situatie radicaal om en 
hadden de for-profit ziekenhuizen de beste toegang, dankzij een ‘gegarandeerd’ en 
hoog rendement op het eigen vermogen. In de recente periode zijn deze voordelen 
grotendeels afgebouwd; er is een min of meer gelijk speelveld tussen de verschil-
lende eigendomsvormen gecreëerd.
De tweede belangrijke verklarende factor is gelegen in de belangen van artsen bij 
bepaalde eigendomsvormen. Aanvankelijk startten veel artsen en maatschappen 
proprietary hospitals (privéklinieken) omdat ze geen toegang hadden tot publieke 
en nonprofit instellingen. Toen dit probleem was opgelost, waren de artsenorgani-
saties het meest gecharmeerd van nonprofit ziekenhuizen – die functioneerden als 
physician co-operatives – en tegen het bestaan van proprietary instellingen. Sinds 
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de jaren zeventig is de opstelling van de medische beroepsgroep minder uitgespro-
ken. Dit wordt veroorzaakt doordat veel for-profit ziekenhuizen inmiddels betere 
arbeidsvoorwaarden bieden dan ziekenhuizen met andere eigendomsvormen.
Een laatste factor – van groot belang in de Verenigde Staten – vormt de aanwe-
zigheid van grote groepen on(der)verzekerde patiënten. Dit vormt een probleem 
omdat het weigeren van deze patiënten in de regel geen optie vormt, zeker niet 
als het gaat om spoedeisende behandelingen. De oninbare vorderingen die 
hiervan het gevolg zijn zetten de winsten onder druk. Dit werd voor het eerst 
duidelijk tijdens de crisis in de jaren dertig toen bleek dat de grote afhankelijkheid 
van de (proprietary) ziekenhuizen van eigen betalingen hun kwetsbaar maakte 
tijdens een economische neergang. Voor nonprofit instellingen is het probleem 
van niet betalende patiënten minder groot omdat zij als compensatie hiervoor 
belastingvrijstelling kregen en omdat zij genoegen namen met lagere winstmarges. 
Medicare (1965) en Medicaid (1966) hebben dit probleem verminderd. Sinds het 
midden van de jaren tachtig is het aantal onverzekerde patiënten weer geleidelijk 
toegenomen. Bovendien betalen Medicare, sommige zorgverzekeraars, en Medi-
caid de ziekenhuizen steeds minder vaak een kostendekkende vergoeding.
Het Verenigd Koninkrijk: for-profit instellingen buiten het publieke systeem
De Engelse proprietary sector heeft zich vanaf haar oorsprong sterk gericht op de 
bovenste laag van de bevolking. Mede doordat nonprofit instellingen zich minder 
op deze groep richtte, was haar marktaandeel bij deze patiëntengroep zeer groot. 
Deze proprietary instellingen waren vaak eigendom van verpleegsters, met artsen 
in een consultatieve rol.
De in 1948 opgerichte National Health Service (NHS) nationaliseerde bijna de 
gehele ziekenhuissector of ‘dwong’ instellingen om te stoppen met hun activiteiten. 
De resterende instellingen werden verenigd in een ‘onafhankelijke’ sector. Deze 
sector was vooral interessant voor de beter gesitueerden die behandeling door 
senior specialisten uit de NHS wilden en gesteld waren op extra luxe. Overigens 
domineerde de NHS deze markt met eigen private voorzieningen (pay-beds).
De ‘onafhankelijke’ instellingen begonnen na invoering van de NHS aan een 
groei die min of meer ononderbroken voortduurt. Wel is het tempo van de groei 
sterk afhankelijk van de investeringen in de NHS en de beloning van artsen. Ten 
eerste neemt de vraag naar ‘onafhankelijke’ zorg toe als de NHS slechter presteert, 
bijvoorbeeld door groeiende wachtlijsten. Ten tweede zijn de senior specialisten 
in de NHS voor een aanzienlijk deel van hun inkomen afhankelijk van extra werk 
in de ‘onafhankelijke’ sector. Daarnaast is de groei van de onafhankelijke sector 
ook gestimuleerd door een groeiende rol van particuliere zorgverzekeraars, die 
hun bestaansrecht grotendeels ontleenden aan de ‘onafhankelijke’ ziekenhuizen. 
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Deze verzekeraars wilden niet afhankelijk zijn van een politiek bestuurde publieke 
zorginfrastructuur. Met eigen middelen werd de ontwikkeling van een separate 
private ziekenhuissector herhaaldelijk ondersteund.
Hoewel de ‘onafhankelijke’ sector lange tijd groeide, bleef ze toch betrekkelijk 
marginaal; de NHS domineerde lange tijd de markt voor luxe zorg. Dit alles 
veranderde radicaal in de jaren zeventig. Een poging van de nieuwe Labour rege-
ring specialisten te ontmoedigen om dit type zorg te verlenen mislukte faliekant. 
Patiëntenstromen werden verlegd van de NHS naar de ‘onafhankelijke’ sector en 
daarbinnen weer naar de for-profit instellingen. Toen bovendien het ideologische 
tij enkele jaren later omsloeg, kon de sector snel groeien. Deze groei werd op-
gevuld door (nieuwe) ketens van for-profit ziekenhuizen die de toegang tot het 
benodigde kapitaal hadden en ook veel individuele nonprofit en for-profit instel-
lingen opkochten.
De komst van een interne markt (1991) impliceerde dat de for-profit instellingen 
betere toegang tot NHS contracten konden krijgen. Dit kwam echter nauwelijks 
van de grond door lage NHS tarieven voor dit soort werk alsmede andere insti-
tutionele belemmeringen. Vanaf 1997 investeerde de Labour regering massief in 
verbetering van de NHS. Hoewel de for-profit sector nu met meer succes aanspraak 
maakte op een deel van deze middelen, was het gevolg daarvan dat zij langzaam 
meer geïncorporeerd werd in het NHS-systeem, wat leidde tot een afkalving van 
het traditionele bedrijfsmodel dat dreef op de ‘noodzaak’ van een alternatief voor 
de NHS (zowel voor patiënten als voor de senior specialisten).
Duitsland: impact van publieke investeringssubsidies op for-profit 
instellingen
Medische hoogleraren hadden een niet onbelangrijk aandeel in het ontstaan van 
de eerste Duitse privéklinieken. Deze kenmerkten zich door een relatief hoog kwa-
liteitsniveau en door de concentratie op één of enkele specialismen. De primaire 
doelgroep bestond uit patiënten uit de bovenlaag van de bevolking.
De wettelijke scheiding tussen de ambulante en de intramurale zorg (1932) 
was een nadeel voor de ontwikkeling van de proprietary sector. Verliesgevende 
patiënten konden worden doorverwezen; winstgevende patiënten konden (zo 
lang mogelijk) bij de ambulante artsen blijven. Naast gespecialiseerde privéklinie-
ken in de stedelijke gebieden en een aantal instellingen met luxe zorg, bestond er 
enkel ruimte voor een aantal plattelandsziekenhuizen die functioneerden als een 
platform voor de lokale ambulante dokter.
Na de Tweede Wereldoorlog zorgde de combinatie van een federale constitutie, 
subsidiariteit en zelfregulering dat een beperkt aantal for-profit instellingen bleef 
bestaan. Alle ziekenhuizen hadden het moeilijk door het ontbreken van een kapi-
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taalkrachtige vraagzijde. Voor publieke en nonprofit ziekenhuizen veranderde dit 
met de komst van een planningswet in 1972. Aanvankelijk hadden de for-profit 
ziekenhuizen geen toegang tot het ‘gratis’ kapitaal op basis van deze wet. Vanaf 
de invoering van de planningswet speelt de toegang tot en de prijs van kapitaal 
een cruciale rol bij de verdere ontwikkeling van de for-profit sector. Door steeds 
grotere bezuinigingen op de fondsen voor publieke investeringen, sloeg het aan-
vankelijke voordeel van publieke en nonprofit ziekenhuizen langzamerhand om 
in een nadeel. Toegang tot de private kapitaalmarkten werd een steeds belang-
rijker concurrentievoordeel. Bovendien kregen de for-profit ziekenhuizen door 
veranderingen in de wet- en regelgeving steeds betere toegang tot deze publieke 
investeringsmiddelen.
De Duitse eenwording zorgde voor een plotselinge en definitieve doorbraak 
van de for-profit sector. In het oosten moest de publieke ziekenhuissector worden 
gesaneerd. Het waren de for-profit ziekenhuizen die de noodzakelijke politiek-
ideologische en financiële steun kregen om deze taak ter hand te nemen. Deze 
wisten een marktaandeel van rond de dertig procent op te bouwen en behandelen 
min of meer dezelfde patiëntenpopulatie als de andere aanbieders. In de deelstaten 
in het westen werden steeds meer publieke ziekenhuizen geprivatiseerd omdat 
veel steden niet langer konden opdraaien voor structurele exploitatietekorten 
en omdat noodzakelijke middelen voor nieuwe investeringen niet voorhanden 
waren. De toegang van commerciële ziekenhuisketens tot de financiële markten 
werd een steeds groter voordeel. Deze dynamiek is tot op dit moment intact.
Nederland: het wegblijven van een for-profit sector
Tot op de dag van vandaag bestaat er in Nederland geen for-profit ziekenhuissec-
tor. De belangrijkste oorzaken hiervoor liggen in het begin van de twintigste eeuw. 
Artsen hadden geen behoefte aan privéklinieken; ze hadden voor de behandeling 
van hun kapitaalkrachtige clientèle in de regel al toegang tot één of meerdere 
nonprofit ziekenhuizen. De beroepsgroep kon voor haar belangenbehartiging en 
financiering terugvallen op een groot aantal eigen ziekenfondsen die de markt 
domineerden.
Na de Tweede Wereldoorlog werd de opkomst van een for-profit ziekenhuis-
sector verhinderd door een steeds fijnmaziger en onderling vervlochten systeem 
van instituties. Toegang tot kapitaal werd gegarandeerd uit collectieve middelen 
en exclusief voorbehouden aan instellingen zonder winstoogmerk.
Snelle invoering van for-profit ziekenhuizen was nog steeds niet mogelijk toen 
gereguleerde marktwerking vanaf het midden van de jaren tachtig het heersende 
bestuurlijke oriëntatiepunt werd. Niettemin wordt het verbod op winstuitkering 
sinds 2005 langzaam maar zeker ondermijnd door de geleidelijke liberalisering 
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van de prijsvorming en de geleidelijke afschaffing van de collectieve bekostiging 
van kapitaalslasten. Dit wordt onderstreept door recente investeringen van 
commerciële partijen in twee ziekenhuizen. Als nonprofit ziekenhuizen hun 
toegenomen investeringsautonomie niet kunnen waarmaken dan komt overname 
door commerciële partijen in beeld. Zolang winstuitkering wettelijk nog niet is 
toegestaan, is de komst van een for-profit ziekenhuissector echter nog steeds geen 
volledig uitgemaakte zaak.
Vergelijkende en longitudinale analyse
Een vergelijking tussen de vier landen maakt duidelijk dat: 1) de toegang tot en de 
vergoeding van kapitaal, samen met 2) de (inkomens)belangen van de medisch 
specialisten de belangrijkste factoren zijn die de verschillen in de ontwikkeling 
van de for-profit ziekenhuissector verklaren. De gevonden kwantitatieve patronen 
hangen sterk samen met de instituties die de toegang en prijs van kapitaal alsmede 
de belangen van de artsen bepalen.
In de eerste helft van de twintigste eeuw kregen publieke en nonprofit ziekenhui-
zen het benodigde kapitaal in de regel om niet. Proprietary ziekenhuizen hadden 
daardoor een behoorlijk nadeel. Meer in het algemeen was het behalen van een 
positief rendement op het geïnvesteerde vermogen een lastige opgave. Dit voor-
deel van publieke en nonprofit ziekenhuizen werd na de Tweede Wereldoorlog 
geleidelijk minder. De vraag naar ziekenhuisinvesteringen nam sterk toe en het 
benodigde kapitaal kon veelal niet meer rechtstreeks worden opgebracht. Dankzij 
de toenemende rol van ziektekostenverzekeringen nam de potentiële klantenkring 
toe en werd de for-profit sector minder gevoelig voor conjunctuurschommelingen. 
Nieuwe instituties werden ontwikkeld om de toegang tot en de prijs van kapitaal 
te reguleren. Meestal waren deze instituties nog steeds veel gunstiger voor de 
publieke- en de nonprofit ziekenhuizen dan voor de for-profit instellingen. Echter, 
met uitzondering van Nederland, waren deze instituties niet stabiel over een lange 
reeks van jaren. Institutionele aanpassingen boden meer en meer ruimte voor 
for-profit instellingen. Gedurende bepaalde perioden hadden for-profit instel-
lingen in sommige landen zelfs betere investeringsvoorwaarden dan de andere 
eigendomsvormen. De regulering van de toegang tot en prijs van kapitaal is es-
sentieel om de snelle groei van for-profit instellingen in Duitsland en de Verenigde 
Staten te begrijpen, maar ook de lange periode van complete afwezigheid van dit 
type instellingen in Nederland. In het Verenigd Koninkrijk is de kwaliteit van de 
dienstverlening van de NHS een belangrijke determinant van de ontwikkeling van 
de for-profit ziekenhuissector.
Nonprofit ziekenhuizen boden artsen lange tijd de beste arbeidsvoorwaarden. 
Dit betrof zowel het inkomen, de controle over belangrijke aspecten van de be-
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drijfsvoering, maar ook het ontbreken van enig investeringsrisico. Artsen hadden 
een voorkeur voor nonprofit ziekenhuizen boven proprietary instellingen, maar 
omdat zij aanvankelijk niet overal toegang kregen tot nonprofit ziekenhuizen wa-
ren de proprietary instellingen soms wel een belangrijk alternatief. De toenemende 
toegang van artsen tot nonprofit instellingen droeg dan ook bij aan de neergang 
van de proprietary sector. Vele jaren later waren de opkomende for-profit ketens in 
staat om de artsen een beter arbeidsvoorwaardenpakket te bieden, inclusief toe-
gang tot technologische vernieuwingen. In het VK konden de senior specialisten 
uit de NHS riante vergoedingen krijgen als ze een deel van hun tijd in for-profit 
klinieken doorbrachten. Duitse for-profit ketens betalen meestal meer salaris (en 
vooral extra bonussen) dan de publieke instellingen, hun primaire acquisitiedoel. 
Amerikaanse commerciële ketens creëren aantrekkelijke arbeidsvoorwaarden 
voor de vrijgevestigde specialisten die van deze faciliteiten gebruik maken. Wel 
ondergraaft de komst van kapitaalextensieve behandelcentra het natuurlijke 
monopolie van de ziekenhuissector op curatieve zorg. Dit is bedreigend voor for-
profit ziekenhuizen die hun bedrijfsmodel mede baseren op het bieden van een 
behandelplatform aan die artsen die georiënteerd zijn op maximalisatie van hun 
inkomens en nu met deze centra een alternatief hebben voor behandelingen in een 
ziekenhuis. Tot op heden is deze competitie meer manifest in de Verenigde Staten 
dan in de andere landen; zo is de traditionele dichotomie tussen ambulante en 
intramurale zorg in Duitsland nog steeds grotendeels aanwezig.
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Dankwoord
Vlak na de officiële goedkeuring van dit proefschrift, begon voor mij en ons gezin 
een periode van grote onzekerheid. Op woensdag 30 december 2009, een paar 
dagen na Kerstmis, werd namelijk een hersentumor bij onze zoon Lucas geconsta-
teerd. Op dinsdag 6 april 2010, twee dagen na Pasen, twee operaties en heel veel 
onzekerheid verder, kregen wij het bericht dat de verwijderde tumor goedaardig 
bleek te zijn, iets waar het op basis van de gemaakte scans lange tijd niet naar 
uitzag.
Het schrijven van een proefschrift en alles wat daarbij komt kijken valt volstrekt 
in het niet bij het belang van de genezing van je eigen kind van zo’n levensbedrei-
gende ziekte. Ik neem daarom de vrijheid om op de eerste plaats de betrokken 
neurochirurg, mw. M.L. van Veelen, te bedanken. Hiernaast is er ook veel dank 
en respect voor de kennis en betrokkenheid van haar ondersteunende staf, alle 
medewerkers van de verpleegafdelingen 1-Noord en IC 1 van het Sophia kinder-
ziekenhuis.
In de vaste overtuiging dat het doorstaan van dit soort gebeurtenissen om meer 
vraagt dan professionele bekwaamheid, wil ik ook alle mensen bedanken – te 
veel om op te noemen – die ons in deze moeilijke periode hebben gesteund met 
hun gebeden en blijken van medeleven. Het is goed om je omringd te weten door 
medemensen. Zoals gezegd, het zijn er veel te veel om op te noemen, maar een 
uitzondering moet gemaakt voor Mgr. H. Steinkamp, die nog tijdens de beide 
operaties van Lucas de heilige mis voor hem heeft opgedragen.
Dan nu waar dit dankwoord feitelijk voor bedoeld is, het bedanken van de mensen 
die op een of andere wijze hebben bijgedragen aan de totstandkoming van dit 
proefschrift. Op de eerste plaats zijn dat natuurlijk mijn beide promotoren: Tom 
van der Grinten en Erik Schut. Ik ben blij dat ze mij mijn eigen ‘verhaal’ hebben 
laten maken, een integraal ‘verhaal’ van de ziekenhuizen met winstoogmerk. Zon-
der hun kritische maar altijd opbouwende houding was er een ander proefschrift 
uitgekomen: op de eerste plaats veel langer, op de tweede plaats minder goed. Ik 
ben ook Pieter Vos, algemeen secretaris van de RVZ, veel dank verschuldigd. Zon-
der zijn jarenlange steun was het onmogelijk geweest om dit project uit te voeren; 
ik heb bovendien veel van hem geleerd.
Dan zijn er de mensen die conceptteksten hebben doorgelezen en van commen-
taar voorzien. George Greenberg (Department of Health and Human Services) 
heeft alles gelezen. Hem dank ik voor de vele verbeteringen van mijn Engels en 
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voor de consequenties van zijn vragen voor mijn analyses. Hiernaast heb ik veel 
gehad aan het commentaar van Stephen Withers (BUPA), Bradford Gray (Urban 
Institute), Boris Augurzki (RWI-Essen), Claus Wendt (Universität Mannheim) en 
Markus Wörz (Technische Universität Berlin) op individuele landenhoofdstukken.
Hans Maarse (UvM), Jan-Kees Helderman (RU), Kim Putters (EUR) en Wendy 
van der Kraan (RVZ) hebben ook nuttig commentaar geleverd op eerdere con-
ceptteksten. Alfred Driessen, Gerben Brummelman, René Groot-Koerkamp en 
Simone Jeurissen hebben bijgedragen aan het verwezenlijken van enkele niet 
onbelangrijke details. Zonder de steun en ‘goedheid’ van mijn vrouw Janine was 
dit alles ook zeer zeker niet mogelijk geweest.
Het einde is ook het begin. ‘Maar er moet feest en vrolijkheid zijn, omdat die zoon 
van je dood was en levend is geworden, verloren was en is teruggevonden (naar 
Lc 15, 32)’.
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